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§ 1 International Arbitration and its Limitations
International arbitration is truly a sphere of its own. Unlike in state court lit­
igation, in arbitration the parties have almost unlimited discretion to tailor 
the proceedings to their needs—for example, to appoint the arbitrators, 
choose a neutral seat of arbitration, agree on procedural rules and determine 
the applicable substantive law.1 Not only do the arbitral proceedings remain 
strictly confidential, but most often, the arbitral award can be challenged 
only on very limited grounds.2 Besides, in order to facilitate the arbitral pro­
ceedings, the parties can choose from among numerous arbitration institu­
tions seated all over the world. It is therefore unsurprising that, especially in 
the field of cross­border disputes, international arbitration remains the pre­
ferred dispute settlement mechanism.3 
In light of these advantages, one could easily conclude that there is no 
reason not to choose arbitration as the alternative to state court litigation. 
However, since arbitration is mostly a purely private matter between the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal’s power does not extend beyond this private 
realm. This issue becomes especially evident with regard to the taking of 
evidence. While the arbitral tribunal may request the parties to produce evi­
dence, this does not apply to third parties outside the respective arbitration.4 
In such a scenario, assistance from state courts is essential. However, numer­
ous procedural questions arise from this course of action, as illustrated by 
the following example.5 
A French company commences an ICC arbitration seated in Geneva 
against its trading partner company located in the US. Most likely, the crucial 
evidence will be located not at the seat of the arbitral tribunal in Geneva, but 
rather in France, the US or elsewhere in the world. If the evidence in question 
1  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.03 n. 26; Lew, 490 et seqq.
2  Sutton et al., n. 1–023 et seqq.
3  Queen Mary Survey (2018), 5; BLackaBy et al., n. 1.01; waincymer, Evidence, 3.
4  DonDe, 269; Dupeyron, 464; Schaefer, 529 et seq.
5  See also the example given by DonDe, 270.
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is in the possession of third parties, the arbitral tribunal cannot force them 
to produce such evidence and court assistance becomes necessary. But 
which state court will render such assistance: the Swiss court in Geneva or 
the court where the evidence is located? Who is authorised to make a request 
for assistance and according to which law will the assistance be rendered? In 
what ways can the arbitral tribunal and the parties to the arbitration influ­
ence this procedure and how can third parties defend themselves? 
§ 2 Importance of Court Assistance in  
Taking Evidence
These questions are indeed justified. After all, the purpose of arbitration is to 
submit a dispute to a non­governmental decision maker; thus, the court as­
sistance that is the topic of this book could be variously described as either 
helpful aid or unwelcome intervention.6 Ultimately, the issue at hand is posi­
tioned at the intersection between state courts and international arbitral 
tribunals; or, to put it in the words of anDrewS7:
“The marriage between courts and arbitration is at times tempestuous …, 
at other times harmonious. But the relationship is always interesting. The 
marriage has not broken down: too many depend on its success.” 
This book will provide the reader with helpful insights concerning court as­
sistance in the taking of evidence and its effect on efficient arbitral proceed­
ings. However, court assistance in general, and in taking evidence in particu­
lar, has received little attention in the past. Although the possibility to seek 
state court assistance in the taking of evidence is foreseen in many arbitra­
tion rules, the UNCITRAL ML and various leges arbitri, the process has gen­
erally been considered too time consuming, burdensome and costly.8 How­
ever, two important exceptions suggest that this is about to change.
First, since the US Supreme Court’s Intel decision in 2004, a broad dis­
course has emerged around the availability of US discovery in aid of arbitral 
proceedings. To this day, US case law and legal doctrine remain inconsistent 
regarding this question, and as the latest decisions show, the discussion 
6  See p. 91 et seqq. infra.
7  anDrewS, n. 1.14.
8  Dupeyron, 459; DaSSer, Schiedsgerichte, 120; Schaefer, 522; Born, Law and Practice, 
ch. 9.02 n. 24; kneiSeL/Lecking, 153; see also Arts. 3 (9) and 4 (9) IBA Rules; Art. 27 
UNCITRAL ML; Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; § 1050 CCP FR; S. 43 and 44 EAA 1996.
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appears to be ongoing.9 As a result, the topic of this book remains highly 
relevant—but not only as regards the situation in the US.
Second, in a recent study of more than 900 arbitration practitioners 
conducted at Queen Mary University of London, the lack of power in relation 
to third parties was rated as one of the three worst characteristics of interna­
tional arbitration.10 Indeed, at a time when international disputes have be­
come more complex, in terms of multiple contracts, parties, jurisdictions 
and third parties, the mechanisms for obtaining assistance from state courts 
in the taking of evidence are more crucial than ever.11 This also holds true in 
the light of big data and related requests for vast categories of electronic doc­
uments stored in the form of emails, chat histories and e­databases.12 
All in all, the present contribution aims to provide a thorough analysis of 
the relationship between state courts and arbitral tribunals, concentrating on 
the taking of evidence. At the heart of this debate lies the question of whether, 
when and under what conditions a state court can assist in the taking of evi­
dence in international arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, it remains to be 
seen whether this process can be subject to a subsequent appellate proceed­
ing, either directly against the decision of the respective state court or by 
challenging the arbitral award itself, immediately or during the recognition 
and enforcement stage. Such an in­depth examination will not only contrib­
ute to a better common understanding of this problem, but will also provide 
arbitration practitioners with helpful advice for their next tactical moves.
§ 3 Method and Distinctions 
Since the present question can hardly be answered in general, the focus will 
mainly be on the situation in Switzerland. Quite recently, the Swiss lex arbitri 
has undergone several amendments in order to facilitate arbitral proceed­
ings, including in relation to court assistance in the taking of evidence.13 Ac­
cordingly, it is intended that Swiss courts will now provide assistance in the 
taking of evidence to foreign arbitral tribunals with their seat outside Swit­
zerland.14 Such assistance may be provided in many ways, offering foreign 
9  See p. 198 and p. 202 et seq. infra.
10  Queen Mary Survey (2018), 8.
11  Ibid.
12  See e.g. Art. 3 (3) (a) (ii) IBA Rules; marghitoLa, 35; DaSSer, Schiedsgerichte, 120.
13  See p. 223 et seqq. infra.
14  Art. 185a (2) Draft­PILA CH.
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arbitral tribunals a more efficient means of obtaining evidence than the cum­
bersome route of international court assistance through, for instance, the 
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters.15
By means of a comparative approach, this book presents an overview of 
how court assistance in the taking of evidence is provided in other important 
arbitration­friendly jurisdictions, such as England, France, the US and Ger­
many. This comparison paves the way to assess the Swiss status quo and an­
alyse it in depth. It will be shown that in Swiss case law as well as legal doc­
trine, the matter in question has not yet been sufficiently explored. This holds 
especially true as, in comparison to statutory law in Swiss domestic arbitra­
tion (CCP CH), its international counterpart (PILA CH) says very little about 
court assistance in the taking of evidence and thus leaves ample room for 
interpretation. As a consequence, the CCP CH will often provide helpful guid­
ance and space for analogous application. 
As the title of this book indicates, the focus primarily lies on the process 
of taking evidence itself, rather than the means through which evidence is 
taken (e.g., witnesses, document production, inspections). Other court assis­
tance—for instance, as regards the constitution of the arbitral tribunal at the 
beginning of the arbitration or assistance during the enforcement stage—is 
only rarely discussed.16 This also applies to interim measures, which are not 
examined extensively, even though admittedly they are closely related to the 
taking of evidence. Finally, although the emerging field of international in­
vestment arbitration affords considerable scope to examine interesting issues 
related to the present one, this would go beyond the main focus of this book. 
§ 4 Structure of the Book
This book is divided into nine chapters. The next chapter provides a brief 
outline of how the different approaches to the taking of evidence in interna­
tional arbitral proceedings with parties from common and civil law countries 
work in general. In the third chapter, the legal framework for the taking of 
evidence in international arbitration is set out. To this end, various leges ar-
bitri as well as the arbitration agreement itself and (ad hoc and institutional) 
arbitration rules are compared, with a focus on the two examples of docu­
ment production and witnesses. Since parties might not always comply with 
15  See p. 118 et seqq. infra. 
16  Lew, 496 et seqq.; Dupeyron, 458.
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evidentiary orders, the arbitral tribunal can impose various sanctions on 
non­compliant parties; this is the subject of the fourth chapter. To under­
stand why sanctions might not always prove helpful and why there is thus an 
urgent practical need for court assistance, the fifth chapter outlines the lim­
itations of the arbitral tribunal’s powers in relation to the taking of evidence. 
The sixth chapter goes on to analyse the different measures that nation­
al courts can offer in this regard and considers whether court assistance in 
the taking of evidence may be regarded as true assistance or rather an unwel­
come intervention. One might further ask whether national courts might 
even be obliged to assist in international arbitral proceedings, based on Swiss 
constitutional and international public law; if this is in fact the case, the na­
tional courts’ discretion as regards whether to assist will be very limited. 
Having answered this crucial question, the seventh chapter compares the 
German, French, English and US leges arbitri, in order to arrive at a clearer 
picture of how different jurisdictions deal with the issue at hand. 
Based on this comparison, the eighth chapter sets out an exhaustive 
analysis of the Swiss approach to court assistance in the taking of evidence, 
examining it at every stage of the arbitral proceedings. Finally, the ninth 
chapter draws conclusions on all relevant outcomes and provides a short 
summary of possible future developments in this area. 
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Chapter 2: 
Different Approaches to the 
Taking of Evidence 
§ 1 Introduction
In state jurisdictions as well as in arbitration, it is widely acknowledged that 
success in a case largely hinges on the evidence that the winning party can 
gather to support its claims.17 In fact, it is assumed that about 60% to 70% of 
all cases in international arbitration are decided based on the facts, rather 
than on the application of the relevant principles of law.18 Hence, it is crucial 
to understand how the evidentiary rules work in this regard. Needless to say, 
the fact that every legal system has its own methodology of fact finding does 
not make this objective any easier. 
Compared to domestic litigation, in arbitration the parties and the arbi­
tral tribunal have broad discretion when it comes to the taking of evidence, 
and the parties can tailor the proceedings in accordance with their needs.19 
In most cases, therefore, subject to any party agreement or mandatory law, 
domestic rules of evidence are not applicable.20 If the parties choose arbitra­
tion over litigation, they must decide whether they wish to proceed either in 
ad hoc arbitration or under an arbitration institution.21 If the parties desire 
their own tailor­made arbitration rules, they are more likely to choose ad hoc 
17  waincymer, Evidence, 743.
18  BLackaBy et al., n. 6.75.
19  See the numerus clausus in many civil procedural rules such as Arts. 168 et seqq. CCP CH.
20  pouDret/BeSSon, n. 644. See e.g. Section 2 (1) of the Singapore Evidence Act which 
expressly excludes—with the exception of evidence in banking matters—arbitral pro­
ceedings from its scope of application. Theoretically, because of the parties’ discre­
tion in evidentiary matters, they could agree upon the application of national rules 
of evidence. This can be seen in domestic arbitration quite often, but it is not recom­
mended in international arbitration where the parties come from different legal back­
grounds and are thus not willing to agree upon ‘foreign’ rules of evidence; see also 
S. 34 (2) (f) EAA 1996, which provides an opt­in clause to apply any law of evidence.
21  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.06 n. 35. Within the field of institutional arbitration, 
several institutions are now specialised in various matters such as sports, investment 
or IP/IT arbitration.
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arbitration. However, one of the main disadvantages of this type of arbitra­
tion is the lack of a supporting institution; the effectiveness of the proceed­
ings thus depends fully on the cooperation of the parties.22 That is why in 
most cases, the applicable procedure rules are chosen by referring to the 
rules of an experienced arbitration institution.23 
However, even where such a set of rules is referenced, it often says very 
little about the process of taking evidence.24 In such cases, the normal reac­
tion would be to seek inspiration from the national civil procedure rules of 
the country where one has been educated. Indeed, since there is no manda­
tory ‘international arbitration law’, a practitioner has many good reasons to 
look for help to the domestic legal system in which he or she was trained and 
educated. 
As long as the parties come from the same country and are used to the 
same procedural rules, the chances of reaching agreement on the applicable 
evidentiary rules are quite high. However, if the parties are from countries 
with different legal backgrounds (e.g., common law versus civil law), the sit­
uation becomes more complex.25 Quite often, parties from these back­
grounds have almost opposing views as to how evidentiary matters should 
be handled—for instance, regarding whether document production is per­
missible or how witnesses are examined. Hence, from the arbitration practi­
tioner’s perspective, it is in many ways beneficial—if not crucial—to under­
stand the most significant differences between common and civil law sys­
tems concerning the taking of evidence. Only with this insight can arbitrators 
govern the proceedings accurately and judiciously, and render a verdict that 
is truly international and not merely a replication of domestic procedural 
rules applied to international arbitration.26 If the arbitral tribunal can bal­
ance the two legal cultures and their diversities, the parties will be more 
willing to commit to arbitration and more likely to accept the arbitral award.
 
22  BLackaBy et. al., n. 1.145.
23  BöckStiegeL, Beweiserhebung, 4; see e.g. Art. 25 ICC Rules; Art. 24 Swiss Rules; 
Art. 34 AAA Rules.
24  E.g. Arts. 27–29 UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 22 HKIAC Rules; Art. 22.1 (vi) LCIA Rules.
25  hay, n. 16; SLapper/keLLy, 4 et seq. Very broadly speaking, common law can be de­
scribed as the law based on decisions, while civil law is based on statutes. In practice, 
however, both common law and civil law system are mostly mixed systems whit a 
greater or smaller part of case or statutory law.
26  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9.01 n. 16.
8 Chapter 2: Different Approaches to the Taking of Evidence
§ 2 Distinctions
The interplay in international arbitration between arbitrators and the parties 
and their counsel, all of whom may sometimes be from different legal back­
grounds, is unique. This is especially true when it comes to the taking of evi­
dence and the clash of views in cross­cultural arbitration is a much­debated 
topic.27 As this book examines court assistance in the taking of evidence in 
common and civil law countries, the following remarks focus primarily on 
these two legal systems.28 In this regard, two preliminary remarks must be 
made.
First, anyone who tries to combine the two systems in an attempt to ar­
rive at ‘the best of both worlds’ must bear in mind that the goal is to find an 
optimal, tailor­made compromise, and never a perfect solution or a feeling of 
being ‘at home’ in a procedural sense, which would contradict the very na­
ture of international arbitration.29 
Second, the term ‘common and civil law’ is very broad and should not be 
overestimated or generalised.30 As an example, a closer look at the rules of 
discovery/disclosure of two (mostly) common law countries, such as the US 
and England, reveals significant differences and variations.31 The same ap­
plies, of course, to civil law countries: again, there are significant differences 
between the Roman and German families of civil law.32 Nonetheless, and 
despite these divergences, there seems to be enough uniformity in eviden­
tiary matters to justify the classification of common and civil law countries.33 
27  waincymer, Evidence, 746 et seqq.; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9 n. 16; BLackaBy et 
al., n. 6.77 et seq.
28  For an in­depth analysis in comparative law of other legal families see Zweigert/
kötZ, 62 et seqq.
29  reymonD, 367; waincymer, Evidence, 41.
30  BLackaBy et al., n. 6.77 et seqq.; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9 n. 16; Born, Int. 
Comm. Arb., 2206; marghitoLa, 12. reymonD even argues that there is no ‘Civil 
Law Procedure’ in civil and commercial litigation because of the lacking common 
origin. He reasons therefore that there are as many civil procedures as countries in 
Europe (358).
31  For example, in obtaining evidence, US­style discovery is much broader than the 
disclosure procedure in England; Bettinger, 30 et seqq. and 125 et seqq.
32  Zweigert/kötZ, 73 et seqq., 130 et seqq.
33  BLackaBy et al., n. 6.77, n. 6.80.
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§ 3 Common Law Approach 
The common law has its origins primarily in England and its former colonies, 
including the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and many more.34 Despite 
the technical differences concerning evidentiary rules in many common law 
countries, some common principles can be identified in order to distinguish 
the common law approach to the taking of evidence from its civil law coun­
terpart.35 
First, the common law system is in many ways adversarial, with the rival­
ry of the parties at its centre.36 This is true even, for instance, of English law, 
where the adversarial approach has been maintained despite the revision of 
civil procedure and its partial adaption to civil law countries.37 For the sake of 
simplicity, the following remarks will therefore focus on the US approach ac­
cording to the FRCP USA, where the adversarial method is best illustrated.38 
The common law civil procedure for the taking of evidence can be divid­
ed into five stages: (1) filing the complaint, followed by (2) the pre­trial stage, 
during which the parties gather the relevant evidence for (3) the trial stage, 
when it is presented to the court, after which (4) the judge (as the case may 
be, together with a jury) renders his or her verdict;39 (5) an appeal may follow 
if one of the parties wants to challenge the decision.
Compared to civil law proceedings, the complaint in common law pro­
ceedings is not as detailed and only defines the scope and nature of the ac­
tion40—or, in the words of the US Supreme Court, ‘enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face’.41 Next, as opposed to civil law proceed­
ings, where evidence is gathered through the exchange of written submis­
sions and in the court proceedings, the pre­trial stage serves to obtain a wide 
range of evidence from the adverse party prior to any court proceeding.42 In 
34  SLapper/keLLy, 4; hay, n. 1 et seqq.; kiDane, 181; Bettinger, 30 et seq.
35  hay, n. 15; DenniS, n. 1.015; marghitoLa, 12.
36  craig, 12.
37  Bettinger, 49 and 135 et seq.; see also the remarks about the trend to alternative 
dispute resolution under the CPR 1998 (Ibid., 119 et seq.).
38  For the approach under English law, see e.g. Bettinger, 125 et seqq.
39  wirth, 10; DFT 4A_315/2017 of 17 Jan. 2018, cons. 5.3.1; DFT 132 III 291, cons. 2.1; hay, 
n. 150 et seqq.
40  Rule 8 (a) (2) FRCP USA: ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief …’; hanotiau, 361; Bettinger, 41 et seq.; DFT 132 III 291, 
cons. 2.1.
41  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009); Bettinger, 43.
42  See p. 206 et seqq. infra.
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this critical stage, the parties try to collect evidence in the form of depositions, 
interrogatories, production of documents and even inspections.43 If the evi­
dence in question is protected by privilege, the court can impose a protective 
order.44 
In contrast, if a party fails to produce evidence without a valid reason, it 
can be forced to pay any expenses resulting from its failure to produce evi­
dence, or the misconduct may be treated as contempt of court.45 Aside from 
this, however, the role of the court is rather passive.46 To summarise, during 
the pre­trial stage, the parties weigh up their chances of success and are en­
couraged to reach a settlement before the trial begins.47
In the trial stage, the judge takes a mostly passive role and does not par­
ticipate in the gathering of evidence, but rather acts as referee by determin­
ing whether the evidence offered by the parties (gathered in the pre­trial 
discovery) is admissible and choosing between the two options presented by 
the parties.48 The idea here is that the best way to reveal the truth is to leave 
it solely to the parties to prepare and present their cases, in order to convince 
the court.49 This should ensure a fair and just trial, since the judge remains 
receptive to the arguments of both parties until he or she finally renders a 
verdict.50 
Although a strict application of the adversarial method makes sense 
from a theoretical point of view, in most common law systems, no such strict 
model exists.51 In the interests of clarification, the judge is free to ask ques­
tions directly to witnesses, or to interrupt their examination if there is no 
need for further evidence on either a certain point or the entire case. Never­
theless, the judge must be very cautious on this point, to avoid a possible vio­
lation of the right to be heard.52 
43  See e.g. Rules 26 (a) (1) (A) (ii) and (3) (A) (ii) FRCP USA; Bettinger, 44.
44  Rules 26 (c) (1) (g) and 45 (d) (3) (iii) FRCP USA.
45  Rule 37 (b) (2) (B) FRCP USA; Bettinger, 45.
46  As an exception, see the possibility of a pre­trial conference, for instance, to facilitate 
an early settlement or discourage ‘wasteful pre­trial activities’ (Rule 16 (a) FRCP USA).
47  DFT 132 III 291, cons. 2.1; hay, n. 184 et seqq.
48  DenniS, n. 1.015; Blackaby et al., n. 6.77; SutcLiffe/wirth, 34; kiDane, 182.
49  Zweigert/kötZ, 268; SutcLiffe/wirth, 34; raeSchke­keSSLer, Discovery, 45; 
Bettinger, 46.
50  Staughton, 353.
51  Ibid., 353 et seqq.
52  Ibid., 355. In addition, a constant excessive intervention by the judge is considered 
‘entirely at odds with the adversarial system’ (Lord Borough of Southwark v. Kofi-Adu 
[2006] EWCA, Civ. 281, n. 148).
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Second, a great deal of common law evidentiary rules become comprehensi­
ble when considered in light of the jury trial.53 Its underlying principle is that 
a person can be judged fairly only by a group of ordinary people (the jury).54 
The task of the jury is to determine the facts; the judge has exclusive author­
ity over the application of law.55 Traditionally, in civil and criminal cases, the 
arguments are presented to the court orally by the parties and their counsel 
in such a way that the jurors—who mostly have no legal education—can un­
derstand the relevant facts and arguments in order to render a verdict.56 
The principle of orality has its historical foundation in the idea that the 
most direct way to reveal the truth is by examining and cross­examining 
witnesses.57 In this way, parties can confront their accusers and even dis­
prove certain facts or the claim as a whole.58 Because of the mandatory at­
tendance of the jury, trials can last for hours, if not days; thus, court proceed­
ings reach their climax in a single trial.59 Consequently, lawyers must obtain 
relevant evidence before trial in order to present it to the judge.60 While the 
role of the jury has weakened in recent times, its tradition and the important 
role of lawyers in convincing the jury have persisted.61 The fact that there are 
also lay judges in the judiciary, and that juries consist of individuals without 
any legal education, has necessitated complex laws of evidence relating to 
how evidence is obtained, adduced and evaluated at trial.62 Otherwise, mis­
leading evidence could impress a jury and unduly influence their verdict.63 
While these laws of evidence are not binding on arbitrators, they may serve 
as inspiration in conducting the arbitral proceedings.64
With these two differences in mind, it makes sense that a discovery pro­
cedure exists in common law countries, whereby all relevant—and even un­
favourable—documents must be disclosed to the other party.65 If the court 
53  craig, 11; Zweigert/kötZ, 266.
54  craig, 11.
55  Ibid., 12.
56  Ibid., 11.
57  DenniS, n. 1.015.
58  Ibid.
59  Zweigert/kötZ, S. 266 et seqq.
60  craig, 14.
61  Ibid., 11.
62  DenniS, n. 1.001, 1.015; Zweigert/kötZ, 270.
63  craig, 12.
64  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 8.08 n. 51; see e.g. S. 34 (2) (f) EAA 1996; Civil Evidence Act 
1995.
65  kühn, 3.
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has not had all available relevant information, it cannot render a just verdict.66 
Notably, US discovery under the FRCP USA is very wide ranging,67 while so­
called ‘disclosure’ under the CPR 1998 is much more restrictive.68 As will be 
discussed in detail, ‘discovery’ in international arbitration is less extensive 
than in domestic litigation, but nonetheless plays a vital role.69 
To sum up, one must bear in mind that the aim in common law systems 
is to reveal the ‘whole truth’.70 This is possible only if the means of gathering 
evidence are very wide ranging. 
§ 4 Civil Law Approach 
Compared to the common law approach, with its search for truth through the 
adversarial method and the climax in a single trial, the civil law method is 
different in many ways. It has its origins in many European countries. In fact, 
depending on how one classifies civil law, there are at least three legal fami­
lies: Roman, German and Nordic.71 Therefore, their origins extend from 
France through Spain and Italy, across Germany, Austria and Switzerland 
and north to Scandinavia. Here again, while there are various procedural 
differences within the civil law system, some commonalities in the approach 
to evidence can be identified that distinguish it from its common law coun­
terpart. 
While common law proceedings are mainly adversarial (party­led), civ­
il law proceedings are in many ways inquisitorial (judge­led).72 They are in­
formed more by the Roman law principle of ‘Quod non est in actis non est in 
mundo’ (‘What is not kept in the records does not exist’) than by the search 
for the whole truth.73 Accordingly, the gathering of evidence is largely con­
trolled by the judge and the parties have no wide­ranging discovery rights.74 
In light of this, a common law lawyer would claim that it is quite unfair for the 
adverse party to withhold documents which the other side does not know 
66  Davies v. Eli Lilly & Co., [1987] 1 WLR 428, 431.
67  See Rule 26 et seqq. FRCP USA. 
68  See Pt. 31 et seqq. CPR 1998.
69  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9 n. 36; see p. 194 et seqq. infra.
70  trittmann, 20; Wagner, 463.
71  Zweigert/kötZ, 73; kiDane, 195.
72  waincymer, Evidence, 746; Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2344 et. seqq.; riSSe/haLLer, n. 8.
73  DaSSer, Schiedsgerichte, 120; see also p. 12 et seq. supra.
74  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2345.
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about. In contrast, the civil law lawyer would respond that broad discovery 
rights are a severe invasion of privacy, admissible only in criminal cases;75 
and further that it would be quite odd to file a complaint first and only then 
search for evidence to support the complaint.76 
The inquisitorial approach is mirrored in the different stages of civil law 
proceedings, which can, broadly speaking, be divided into five stages: (1) fil­
ing of the complaint, (2) exchange of written submissions, (3) the court pro­
ceeding, (4) the decision stage and (5) a possible appellate procedure.77 In the 
first stage, the parties file a detailed complaint in which they set out the 
claimed facts and the law on which the complaint is based.78 Furthermore, 
all relevant documents to the complaint and/or an exact explanation of 
which further evidence should be obtained must be attached.79 Unlike in 
common law, where the initial complaint is more a summary of the facts and 
the legal bases of the claim, the complaint in civil law is much more detailed 
and conclusive.80 
The second stage is a sort of ‘interim stage’, in which the adverse party 
has time to respond to the complaint and the judge can intervene by holding 
an instruction hearing in preparation for the main hearing.81 At the instruc­
tion hearing, the matter in dispute can be discussed informally and the facts 
can be completed—for instance, by means of a precautionary taking of evi­
dence.82 Finally, the instruction hearing gives the parties a first chance to 
reach agreement before the main hearing begins. All in all, in the interest of 
procedural economy, the second stage tries to balance out the level of infor­
mation of the parties and ensure that in the subsequent main hearing, only 
matters which have not been subject to the second stage will be discussed.83
The third stage involves the pleadings of the parties and the taking of evi­
dence under the control of the judge.84 During this stage, the role of the judge 
is very active—not only in the conduct of the proceedings, but also in the gath­
ering of evidence (e.g., by examining witnesses and allowing or denying evi­
75  reymonD, 360; haZarD, 1022.
76  tercier/BerSheDa, 80.
77  wiLLiSegger, 321; Bettinger, 69 et seqq.
78  eLSing/townSenD, 60.
79  wirth, 10.
80  eLSing/townSenD, 59 et seqq.; hanotiau, 361.
81  Art. 226 CCP CH.
82  Art. 158 CCP CH.
83  Bettinger, 70 et seq.
84  See e.g. Arts. 228 et seqq. CCP CH.
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dence requests).85 The judge is obliged to identify the legal issues and deal 
with them accordingly in the fourth stage.86 When the judge comes to render 
a verdict, he or she is usually bound by what the parties have demanded and 
will not go beyond what they have requested (non ultra petita).87 In doing so, 
the judge may freely choose the applicable rule of law and assess the facts 
presented.88 
Because there is no jury, civil law proceedings take place in a succession 
of hearings, which ends with pronouncement of the verdict.89 Compared to 
common law proceedings, the principle of orality does not play such a vital 
role and consequently the weight lies mainly on documentary evidence.90 
Therefore, witnesses are rarely cross­examined.91 Likewise, in many civil 
law jurisdictions, contact between lawyers and witnesses in order to inter­
view or prepare them for trial is prohibited.92 Although there are some rules 
of evidence in various civil law rules of procedure,93 they are not as detailed 
as their common law counterparts.94 
To sum up, it may be said that the aim in civil law systems is to find the 
‘relative truth’. ‘Relative’ in this sense means that the truth is revealed based 
on what the parties present to the court, rather than what they are obliged to 
disclose through discovery. 
§ 5 Conclusion
From this short outline of the different approaches to gathering evidence in 
common and civil law, it is evident that each system has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. While the common law procedure is more adversarial 
and party­led, the civil law system is largely inquisitorial and judge­led. The 
85  waincymer, Evidence, 746; Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2345; BLackaBy et al., n. 6.77; 
kiDane, 201.
86  haZarD, 1021.
87  See e.g. Art. 58 (1) CCP CH.
88  reymonD, 366. This principle goes back to the Latin maxim of iura novit curia (the 
court knows the law); kiDane, 199.
89  reymonD, 359.
90  hanotiau, 360.
91  Van houtte, 458.
92  For Switzerland see e.g. DFT 2C_8/2010 of 4 Oct. 2010, cons. 3.2.2; for France see Paris 
Court of Cassation, 10 Sept. 2014, 13­22400, cons. 1; Van houtte, 461.
93  E.g. Arts. 150 et seqq. CCP CH; Arts. 132 et seqq. CCP FR.
94  E.g. the FRCP USA.
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latter method is clearly apparent once the judge takes control of the whole 
case,95 which occurs at a much earlier point in the civil law system. On the 
other hand, there is almost no court interference in the pre­trial procedure 
in the common law system, and it is almost fully incumbent on the parties to 
gather evidence and prepare it for trial. 
These systemic differences may influence the dynamic in international 
arbitration—which suggests that the task of finding a compromise in the ap­
proach to taking evidence could be quite challenging. It is, to say the least. 
However, despite this clash of cultures, the parties have the main advantage 
of being able to choose the procedure à la carte.96 Thus, for all participating 
parties, an understanding of the legal backgrounds at play is crucial in figur­
ing out how evidentiary matters should be addressed. However, understand­
ing the differences is just the first step. The next step is to decide where and 
when to agree to evidentiary rules, which leads to the legal framework for the 
taking of evidence in international arbitration. 
95  reymonD, 367.
96  hanotiau, 362.
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Chapter 3: 
Legal Framework for the  
Taking of Evidence
§ 1 Introduction
At the time the parties to a contractual relationship agree on an arbitration 
clause, evidentiary issues seem to be of little importance. The parties rather 
hope that no dispute will arise in the first place, but nevertheless agree that 
should this come to pass, the dispute will be resolved by an arbitral tribunal.97 
However, evidentiary rules must be addressed once a dispute arises, so it is 
crucial to understand where, when, how and by whom this is done. This gives 
rise to many questions about which procedural framework is applicable to the 
arbitral proceedings. Because of the parties’ broad discretion in determining 
the procedural framework in arbitration, the range of legal sources can be (and 
often is) quite vast. Thus, it is paramount for the parties and arbitrators to know 
and define which laws and procedural rules will shape the taking of evidence. 
In this respect, national arbitration laws (henceforth ‘leges arbitri’) act as 
a kind of minimal standard,98 and set the scene for the arbitral proceedings to 
take place within the boundaries of the parties’ agreement and (in the vast 
majority of cases) institutional arbitration rules. One may think of the legal 
framework in international arbitration as a temple built on these three pillars. 
In this chapter, the three pillars will be examined, with a focus on how the 
taking of evidence may be conducted by the parties and the arbitral tribunal. 
§ 2 Leges Arbitri 
A. Introduction
As the first pillar, the leges arbitri play a key role by determining not only 
‘external’ procedural issues (i.e. the relationship between the arbitral tribunal 
and the national courts—for example, in relation to the possible annulment 
97  BLackaBy et al., n. 1.41.
98  gökSu, n. 181.
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of the arbitral award), but also ‘internal’ matters (e.g. the appointment, re­
moval and replacement of arbitrators and the taking of evidence).99 Before 
comparing various leges arbitri and their approach to the taking of evidence, 
a few remarks are necessary to distinguish this term from other concepts. 
First, the leges arbitri should not be confused with the substantive law 
governing matters in dispute such as the interpretation and validity of the 
contract or the rights and obligations of the parties.100 This law, also called 
the ‘applicable law’ or the ‘governing law’, is usually stated in a choice of law 
clause within the arbitration agreement.101 Even though the substantive law 
usually does not address evidentiary procedural issues, it is contentious if, 
for example, the burden of proof—which is clearly an evidentiary issue—falls 
under the regime of either substantive or procedural law.102 That is why the 
arbitral tribunal, when determining the applicable procedure for the taking 
of evidence, may also have to consider the substantive law.103 
Second, the term ‘procedural rules’ must be distinguished from the leg-
es arbitri. While the leges arbitri serve as some sort of general legal frame­
work, the procedural rules are found in more detailed institutional arbitra­
tion rules.104 As will be discussed shortly (see p. 26 et seqq. infra), even these 
institutional arbitration rules are often insufficiently specific as regards the 
taking of evidence. 
Third, although the national civil procedure laws at the seat of the lex 
arbitri can influence certain aspects of the arbitral proceedings, they do not 
apply in general.105 Instead, it is the respective lex arbitri which establishes 
the general legislative (procedural) framework. The term ‘procedural law of 
arbitration’ is therefore nowadays understood as the lex arbitri of the select­
ed state and not the respective national civil procedure law.106 Luckily, the 
outmoded doctrine of automatically applying domestic civil procedure rules 
to international arbitral proceedings has long been rejected by nearly every 
jurisdiction.107 Notwithstanding that in some cases (especially in domestic 
99  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 6.01 n. 6.
100  BLackaBy et al., n. 3.37. While the substantive law of the arbitration agreement and 
the law of the underlying contract can differ, they are most often the same law.
101  Ibid., n. 3.107. Which substantive law is chosen depends on the parties’ choice of 
which law they consider suitable to govern the contractual relationship (see ibid., 
n. 3.114 et seqq.).
102  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2315; waincymer, Evidence, 746 et seqq.; emanueLe et al., vii.
103  For the situation in Germany, see trittmann, 21.
104  BLackaBy et al., n. 3.51.
105  o’maLLey, n. 1.18; raDicati Di BroZoLo, 52 et seqq.
106  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 1624.
107  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 6.02 n. 14.
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arbitration) it can make sense to apply national civil procedure rules, this is 
not generally recommended in international arbitration, where far more pro­
cedural flexibility is needed.108 
With these distinctions in mind, the question arises of which of the 
many leges arbitri to apply in international arbitral proceedings. Since the 
parties are free to agree on almost any procedural aspect of the proceedings, 
this should also apply to the choice of the lex arbitri. 
B. Seat of Arbitration
According to the well­established ‘seat theory’, the applicable lex arbitri is al­
ways that at the seat of arbitration.109 Not only the UNCITRAL ML, but also the 
NYC and several leges arbitri provide that the lex arbitri at the seat of arbitra­
tion governs the most important issues of the arbitral proceedings.110 Thus, 
the seat of arbitration is not merely a geographical matter, but defines the 
place where the arbitration is held and which lex arbitri will be applied. The 
parties should therefore choose a seat in a jurisdiction which provides a cer­
tain degree of autonomy for arbitral proceedings and at the same time grants 
the necessary support.111 Although the seat of arbitration is essential, this 
does not mean that the hearings must actually be held there (i.e. at a specific 
geographical location). In fact, the flexibility of international arbitral proceed­
ings and practical reasons—such as the domicile of the parties and thus poten­
tially high travel costs—mean that the hearings may need to be held else­
where.112 Although it is theoretically possible to change the seat of arbitration 
during the course of the proceedings, this is not recommended due to various 
procedural difficulties, such as the competence of different jurisdictions.113 
The lex arbitri as the law which governs the basic principles of the arbi­
tral proceedings is not necessarily the lex arbitri at the seat of arbitration. 
Hence, parties which have chosen the seat of arbitration in State A can agree 
on a foreign lex arbitri of State B. The Swiss lex arbitri, for instance, allows the 
108  girSBerger/VoSer, n. 894; see also Art. 176 (2) PILA CH which provides an opt­out 
clause for the domestic arbitration rules as stated in the CCP CH (Arts. 353 et seqq. 
CCP CH).
109  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 6.02 n. 16; raDicati Di BroZoLo, 49 et seqq.
110  Art. 1 (2) UNCITRAL ML; Art. V (1) (a) (d) NYC; Art. 176 PILA CH; S. 2 and 3 EAA 1996.
111  raDicati Di BroZoLo, 57.
112  BLackaBy et al., n. 3.57; waincymer, Evidence, 172 et seqq.; Born, Law and Practice, 
ch. 6 n. 4; Art. 20 (2) UNCITRAL ML.
113  waincymer, Evidence, 172.
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parties to proceed in this way.114 While the parties are free to do so, the arbi­
tral tribunal must be aware that equal treatment of the parties and the right 
to be heard must be guaranteed at all times.115 This scenario gives rise to 
numerous practical questions. For example, in which jurisdiction can a par­
ty challenge the arbitral award—at the seat of arbitration or before the court 
in the country of the foreign lex arbitri? Are there any differences as to how 
the courts approach procedural and substantive matters? In light of these 
procedural complexities, it becomes obvious why in the vast majority of cas­
es the parties choose the same lex arbitri as that at the seat of arbitration.116 
C. Broad Discretion of Leges Arbitri 
The leges arbitri take various approaches in defining the parameters of the 
arbitral proceedings. However, most often, the arbitral tribunal, subject to 
the parties’ agreement, has broad discretion in conducting the arbitral pro­
ceedings, including as regards the taking of evidence. With the aim of harmo­
nising the various leges arbitri of common law and civil law countries, and 
thus harmonising international arbitral proceedings, the UNCITRAL ML of 
1985 states that the parties are free to agree on the rules of procedure:117
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on 
the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conduction the 
proceedings.” 
“(2) Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the pro­
visions of Law, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers 
appropriate. The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the 
power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight 
of any evidence.”
In the absence of such agreement, the arbitral tribunal can conduct the pro­
ceedings in an appropriate manner.118 This also includes the power to deter­
mine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence 
114  Art. 182 (1) PILA CH.
115  Art. 182 (3) PILA CH.
116  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 212. In contrast, the Swiss approach is very liberal and thus 
allows the parties to choose a foreign lex arbitri (Art. 182 (1) PILA CH).
117  See Art. 19 UNCITRAL ML. So far, 80 of a total of 111 jurisdictions have based their lex 
arbitri on the UNCITRAL ML. For a detailed list, see the current status.
118  Art. 19 (2) UNCITRAL ML; Art. 182 (3) PILA CH; § 1042 (1) CCP DE; Art. 1510 CCP FR; 
S. 33 (1) (a) EAA 1996.
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presented to the arbitral tribunal.119 It is important to note that S. 34 (1) (f) of 
the EAA 1996 gives the arbitral tribunal, subject to the parties’ agreement, 
the power to apply strict rules of evidence. It refers to the laws of evidence 
which have already been mentioned (see p. 12 supra). Even though the EAA 
1996 provides such an opt­in clause, arbitrators will not usually impose re­
strictions according to laws of evidence.120 At this point, much could be said 
about the assessment of evidence and the burden of proof in different legal 
traditions, let alone in institutional arbitration rules. Nonetheless, it should 
suffice to state that when it comes to the conduct of the proceedings, the ar­
bitral tribunal and the parties enjoy the widest discretion. 
D. Limits to the Broad Discretion
In addition to the parties’ agreement, the broad discretion of the arbitral 
tribunal is limited by the principle of due process, which includes the right to 
equal treatment and the opportunity to present a case.121 Art. 18 UNCITRAL 
ML reads as follows:
“The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given 
a full opportunity of presenting his case.”
Equality requires, for instance, that both parties be subject to the same time 
limits or be allowed to present the same number of expert witnesses.122 The 
opportunity to present a case entitles each party to give its opinion on the 
relevant facts, to present the legal arguments and the supportive evidence, 
to comment on the arguments of the opponent and its presented evidence, 
and finally to present new evidence in reply.123 S. 33 (1) (a) of the EAA 1996 
recognises the right to present a case as one aspect of the principle of fair and 
impartial treatment, stating: 
“The tribunal shall act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giv­
ing each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing 
with that of his opponent … .” 
119  Art. 19 (2) UNCITRAL ML; see also, for example, Art. 184 (2) PILA, § 1042 (4) CCP DE, 
Art. 1509 CCP FR, S. 34 (1) (f) EAA 1996 and S. 12 (3) IAA SG.
120  ShepparD, S. 34 EAA 1996 n. 8.
121  o’maLLey, n. 1.12; for examples in Leges arbitri, see e.g. Art. 18 UNCITRAL ML; 
Art. 182 (3) PILA CH; § 1042 (1) CCP DE; Art. 1510 CCP FR. Of course, there are other legal 
principles which must also be considered, such as attorney­client privilege or com­
mercial or technical confidentiality. However, the main focus in this chapter remains 
due process.
122  Schütze­patocchi/nieDermaier, n. 339.
123  DFT 117 II 346, cons. 1; Schütze­patocchi/nieDermaier, n. 340.
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While the UNCITRAL ML refers to the ‘full’ opportunity to present a case, the 
EAA 1996 gives each party only a ‘reasonable’ opportunity to present its case. 
This English approach does not seek to limit the parties’ right to present their 
case, but rather aims to set boundaries to prevent the potential misuse of this 
right.124 Accordingly, the parties have no right to present as many witnesses 
as they like or to ignore procedural deadlines on the grounds of due process. 
The arbitral tribunal’s obligation to ensure due process can be quite de­
manding, especially in an international context in which the parties all have 
different ideas of this concept. In this regard, the situation may arise where 
one party from a common law country believes that broad discovery rights 
are a crucial part of due process, while the adverse party from a civil law back­
ground believes quite the contrary. Therefore, the parties must agree on rules 
which address the principle of due process more specifically. In this regard, it 
will be demonstrated that the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Interna­
tional Arbitration (IBA Rules) serve as the authoritative body and best practice 
when it comes to rules of evidence in international arbitration.125
E. Summary
The foregoing has shown that in order to define the term ‘leges arbitri’, a dis­
tinction must be made between the substantive law which governs the arbi­
tration agreement and not only that which governs the underlying contract, 
but also the procedural rules—that is, the (institutional) arbitration rules and 
the national civil procedural rules at the seat of arbitration. According to the 
widely accepted seat theory, the lex arbitri at the seat of arbitration is appli­
cable to the respective arbitral proceedings. Although this is not recom­
mended, the parties can choose a different lex arbitri from that at the seat of 
arbitration. In such case they should be aware that they will still be bound by 
certain mandatory rules of the lex arbitri at the seat of arbitration and will 
also face numerous other procedural difficulties and uncertainties. 
It is apparent from an outline of various leges arbitri that the arbitral 
tribunal has broad discretion—subject to the parties’ agreement—to tailor the 
arbitral proceedings. This discretion is limited by the principle of due pro­
cess, which encompasses the right to be heard and the opportunity to pres­
ent a case. Because there is no uniform consensus about this principle, it 
must be addressed in a more specific set of rules. The earliest possible way to 
agree on such rules is in the arbitration agreement. 
124  harriS et al., S. 33 EAA 1996 n. 33D; waincymer, Evidence, 185.
125  o’maLLey, n. 1.16; see p. 31 et seqq. infra.
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§ 3 Arbitration Agreement
A. Introduction
The importance of the arbitration agreement as the second pillar cannot be 
stressed enough, since it is the basic condition for the arbitral proceedings to 
take place. According to the NYC, if there is no (valid) arbitration agreement, 
the arbitration itself is invalid and, as a consequence, there is no enforceable 
arbitral award.126 When considering the process of taking evidence, the 
question arises as to whether the arbitration agreement mentions eviden­
tiary issues by means of either direct or indirect reference. Furthermore, a 
few remarks about the features of a valid arbitration agreement highlight its 
importance. 
B. Content of the Arbitration Agreement
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the arbitration agreement will have 
been included in a commercial contract between the parties before the dis­
pute arises.127 If that is not the case and the parties nevertheless wish to 
commit to arbitration, they can still draft a separate agreement to this ef­
fect—a so­called ‘submission agreement’ or ‘compromise’.128 This seldom 
happens, however, as the parties may have already developed their litigation 
tactics by this stage and are therefore unlikely to agree to settle the dispute 
through arbitration.129 
As regards content, the parties are largely free in drafting the arbitration 
agreement.130 That is why the extent of arbitration agreements varies so 
widely. For instance, an arbitration clause which says simply that ‘any dis­
pute is to be settled by arbitration in Geneva’ is considered to be valid.131 
Nonetheless, it is highly recommended that the arbitration agreement at least 
includes key elements such as the agreement to arbitrate, the scope of the 
disputes to be submitted to arbitration, the institutional arbitration rules, the 
126  See Arts. II (1) and V NYC.
127  Art. 7 (1) UNCITRAL ML; BLackaBy et al., n. 1.40; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.07 
n. 52; waincymer, Evidence, 130.
128  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.07 n. 52; waincymer, Evidence, 131.
129  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.07 n. 52; waincymer, Evidence, 131.
130  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 204.
131  BLackaBy et al., n. 1.49; Art. 179 (2) Draft­PILA CH.
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arbitral seat, the language of arbitration and a choice of law clause.132 The 
parties can also agree directly to certain evidentiary rules, although this rare­
ly seems to happen.133 This view is also confirmed in light of various standard 
arbitration clauses: no such clause—whether under the AAA134, DIS135, HKI­
AC136, ICC137 or LCIA138 Rules—refers directly to evidentiary issues. In this 
regard, the standard clause of the Swiss Rules139 is an exception by proposing 
wording which allows an arbitral award based only on documentary evi­
dence. Usually, however, parties handle evidentiary issues indirectly by re­
ferring to an institutional arbitration clause, in which these are addressed 
more specifically. In addition to institutional arbitration rules, it is possible 
to refer to international guidelines for the taking of evidence, such as the IBA 
Rules, which are analysed below (see p. 31 et seqq. infra). 
C. Separability 
In discussing the arbitration agreement, the concept of separability must 
inevitably be addressed. The existence of a valid arbitration agreement is 
crucial in order to decide whether the parties are willing to submit the dis­
pute to an arbitral tribunal or a state court. In this respect, the principle of 
separability, which is enshrined in almost all leges arbitri, comes into play.140 
This means that the arbitration agreement, which is usually included within 
a contract, is to be considered separate from that contract.141 If the arbitral 
tribunal concludes that the contract in dispute is invalid, this would logically 
encompass the arbitration agreement too. Accordingly, in order to uphold the 
parties’ commitment to arbitrate, separability ensures that the arbitration 
agreement can exist on its own, separate from the (perhaps invalid) contract. 
132  For a detailed checklist of elements in international arbitration agreements see Born, 
Law and Practice, ch. 1.07 n. 53 et seqq.
133  craig, 21. He points out that Amercian parties occasionally draft arbitration clauses 
which refer to some provisions of the FRCP USA regarding discovery; waincymer, 
Evidence, 754.
134  Standard AAA-ICDR arbitration clause. 
135  Standard DIS arbitration clause.
136  Standard HKIAC arbitration clause.
137  Standard ICC arbitration clause.
138  Standard LCIA arbitration clause.
139  Standard Swiss Rules arbitration clause.
140  See e.g. Art. 16 (1) UNCITRAL ML; Art. 178 (3) PILA CH; Art. 1506 i.c.w. Art. 1447 CCP FR; 
S. 7 EAA 1996.
141  BLackaBy et al., n. 2.101. Of course, the problem is less obvious when there is a submission 
agreement, which is indeed separate from the contract from the outset of the dispute.
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Because of this principle of separability, the aforementioned choice of law 
clause may address not only the applicable law applying to the underlying 
contract (i.e. the substantive law), but also a different law which may apply to 
disputes in relation to the arbitration agreement itself.142 In most cases, how­
ever, the applicable law governing the arbitration agreement is not specifical­
ly addressed, and in case of a dispute it is anything but clear which law must 
be applied.143 
This issue, called the ‘conflict of laws’, is the subject of heated debate in 
legal doctrine, which shall not be explored further at this point.144 Rather, it 
is sufficient to summarise that in such cases, the doctrine considers the ap­
plicable law to be either the law chosen by the parties, the law of the under­
lying contract or the lex arbitri at the seat of arbitration.145 Apart from that, 
there are two less popular positions that are nonetheless noteworthy. First, 
the Swiss approach represents a so­called ‘validation principle’, whereby the 
arbitration agreement is valid under either the law chosen by the parties, the 
law of the contract or Swiss law.146 Second, the French position, tailored by 
numerous decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal, has the parties’ intention at 
its centre and thus is not bound to national laws.147 Accordingly, the arbitra­
tion agreement remains independent and there is no conflict of laws to be 
settled at all.148 
This short outline of the different laws which might possibly be applied 
to an arbitration agreement reveals that the complexity of the conflict of laws 
can be very challenging if the parties have not addressed this issue in ad­
vance. Therefore, it is highly recommended to determine the law applicable 
to the arbitration agreement, as well as that applicable to the matter in dis­
pute, when drafting the arbitration agreement.149 
142  See p. 23 supra; Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 209.
143  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 2.06 n. 32.
144  For an overview of how this problem is treated by various authors and jurisdictions, 
see waincymer, Evidence, 136 et seq.; BLeSSing, Applicable Law, 169 et seqq.
145  waincymer, Evidence, 135; BLackaBy et al., n. 3.11; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 2.06 
n. 30 et seq.
146  See Art. 178 (2) PILA CH.
147  Société d’étude et représentations navales et industrielles (SOERNI) et autres. v. Société 
Air Sea Broker limited (ASB), Paris Court of Appeal, Cass., 1st Civil Chamber, 8 Jul. 2009, 
08–16.025.
148  BLackaBy et al., n. 3.33.
149  Ibid., n. 3.10. For conflict of law clauses regarding the substantive law, see e.g. Art. 187 (1) 
PILA CH and Art. 24.1 DIS Rules.
25 § 3 Arbitration Agreement
D. Summary
The principle of separability ensures that the arbitration agreement survives 
even if the arbitral tribunal concludes that the underlying contract is invalid. 
Precisely because of this separation, the law applicable to the agreement can 
differ from that governing the underlying contract. Because the parties can 
choose from a multitude of laws which could be applicable to the arbitration 
agreement, they would be well advised to agree explicitly on the law which 
governs any dispute in relation to the agreement in order to avoid a conflict 
of laws. 
As the drafting of the arbitration agreement is completely in the hands 
of the parties, evidentiary issues can be addressed as part of this process. The 
parties can thus agree directly on certain matters, such as the extent of dis­
covery or proceedings based solely on documentary evidence. In practice, 
however, this seldom seems to happen, as a short summary of different 
standard arbitration clauses reveals. It seems that these clauses are drafted 
rather briefly and generally, simply stating the intention to settle disputes 
through arbitration and designating the applicable laws and rules to the ar­
bitration. Hence, evidentiary issues are referred to indirectly through the 
choice of applicable institutional arbitration rules. These rules address evi­




Where the lex arbitri does not provide for adequate procedural measures, the 
parties themselves can draft rules which are tailored to their specific needs 
(ad hoc arbitration rules). In practice, however, this seldom tends to happen; 
the parties normally choose institutional arbitration rules to govern the ar­
bitral proceedings. This third pillar is examined next. 
The popularity of these rules is due to the fact that the arbitral proceed­
ings are conducted under a standard set of rules, managed by professional 
staff and held almost anywhere in the world—that is, not only at the seat of the 
institution.150 Furthermore, today more than ever, arbitration institutions 
150  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.06 n. 38.
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provide a fast and efficient way to settle disputes.151 Their rules offer a com­
prehensive procedural framework, addressing the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal, the arbitral proceedings, the award and the costs. In this way, the 
proceedings become more predictable and therefore more likely acceptable 
by the parties than the sometimes very general default provisions of the leges 
arbitri.152
There follows an examination of various approaches to the taking of 
evidence under several of the most popular institutional arbitration rules 
from common law and civil law countries. It begins by looking at the general 
power of the arbitral tribunal to conduct the proceedings in taking evidence. 
Next, in order to understand how the arbitral tribunal and the parties must 
find a compromise in this respect, a few observations are made about the 
initial evidentiary issues to be addressed. The process of taking evidence is 
very broad; this is illustrated by considering two types of evidence as exam­
ples—document production and witnesses. It is beyond the scope of this book 
to analyse all evidence extensively (e.g. documentary evidence, witnesses, 
party and tribunal­appointed experts, inspections); it should rather be suffi­
cient to focus on these two examples, which play prominent roles in interna­
tional arbitral proceedings. 
As will be seen, there are significant differences between the approach­
es of common and civil law institutional arbitration rules—sometimes quite 
contrary to what one might have expected. Thus, the arbitral tribunal must 
do its best to find a compromise in this regard. In this respect, the IBA Rules 
offer a well­established tool to harmonise and simplify the taking of evidence 
in international arbitration by combining common law and civil law ap­
proaches. These rules will be considered in showing how document produc­
tion and witnesses are treated in international arbitration. 
B. General Provisions
Although all institutional arbitration rules provide that the arbitral tribunal 
shall conduct the arbitral proceedings with broad discretion, there are note­
worthy differences in the exact wording in which they do so. In this regard, 
and although UNCITRAL is not an institutional arbitration organisation, its 
rules have played an important role in inspiring the wording of institutional 
151  See the recent developments in relation to expedited arbitration rules, which apply 
either automatically or by means of an opt­in clause; Art. 30 ICC Rules; Art. 42 Swiss 
Rules; Rule 5 SIAC Rules; Art. 1 (4) ICDR Rules.
152  UNCITRAL Notes, n. 7.
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arbitration rules.153 Like their counterpart, the UNCITRAL ML, their goal is 
to harmonise arbitral proceedings and to avoid discrepancies.154 Art. 17 (1) 
UNCITRAL Rules reads as follows:155
“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration 
in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are 
treated with equality and that at an appropriate stage of the proceedings 
each party is given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case. The 
arbitral tribunal, in exercising its discretion, shall conduct the proceed­
ings so as to avoid unnecessary delay and expense and to provide a fair 
and efficient process for resolving the parties’ dispute.”
Similar provisions can be found in the Swiss, ICDR, ICC and LCIA Rules, with 
only small linguistic differences.156 The DIS Rules even emphasise procedur­
al efficiency by stating: ‘The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall conduct 
the proceedings in a time­ and cost­efficient manner, taking into account the 
complexity and economic importance of the dispute.’157 The SIAC Rules put 
it slightly differently, stating that the arbitral tribunal must ensure a ‘fair, 
expeditious, economical and final resolution’.158 The first sentence of Art. 17 
UNCITRAL Rules is a clear reminder of the provisions of the various leges 
arbitri previously mentioned (see p. 20 et seqq. supra). As in the leges arbitri, 
the institutional arbitration rules equip the arbitral tribunal, subject to the 
parties’ agreement, with broad discretion in governing the proceedings. The 
limits are again found in the principle of due process and therefore reference 
can be made to what has already been said in this respect.159 
Compared to the leges arbitri, the UNCITRAL Rules provide for the case 
to be presented at an ‘appropriate stage of the proceedings’, which refers to 
the provisions set out in the procedural timetable, as will be discussed short­
ly.160 The second phrase of Art. 17 (1) UNCITRAL Rules obliges the arbitral 
tribunal to act as a diligent case manager, and therefore to avoid delay and 
153  Schütze­patocchi/nieDermaier, n. 1, 6, 13.
154  UNCITRAL YB (1968–1970), 261, n. 1.
155  See Art. 17 (1) UNCITRAL Rules; While Art. 18 UNCITRAL ML speaks of the ‘full oppor­
tunity’ to present the case, the UNCITRAL Rules, under the same reasoning as the 
EAA 1996, mention only a ‘reasonable opportunity’ (see p. 21 supra).
156  Art. 15  (1) Swiss Rules; Art. 20 (1) ICDR Rules; Art. 22 (4) ICC Rules; Art. 14.4 (i) LCIA Rules.
157  Art. 27.1 DIS Rules; ScharDt, 29.
158  See Rule 19 (1) SIAC Rules and the similar provision in Art. 14 (5) LCIA Rules, but from 
the point of view of the parties.
159  See p. 23 et seqq. supra.
160  Schütze­patocchi/nieDermaier, n. 343; see p. 29 et seqq. infra.
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expenses and ensure a fair and efficient process.161 To avoid delay, therefore, 
the preliminary meeting may take place by telephone conference instead of 
waiting to find a convenient date when all the parties can meet in person.162 
To avoid unnecessary expense, in lieu of granting a party’s request for the 
appearance of eight witnesses, the arbitral tribunal may limit this number to 
two significant witnesses.163 Thus, the question of whether it is appropriate 
to present the case at any stage of the proceedings depends on whether this 
accords with the schedule as set out in the procedural timetable. 
C. Case Management Conference
At the outset of the proceedings, many institutional arbitration rules include 
a preliminary meeting (also called a ‘case management conference’),164 at 
which the arbitral tribunal will consult the parties on procedural issues and 
establish a timetable which sets out the time limits for each step of the pro­
ceedings.165 The content of this conference depends in large part on the in­
stitutional arbitration rules and—as always—on the will of the parties. Thus, 
the arbitral tribunal must find a proper balance between the intentions of the 
parties and the arbitral tribunal’s duty to ensure fair and efficient proceed­
ings, avoiding unnecessary delay and expenses.166 
The case management conference usually includes a timetable for the 
initial pleadings, claims and counterclaims, and the timeframe within which 
the arbitral award must be rendered.167 As regards evidentiary matters, an 
overview of issues that must be dealt with gives an idea of how complex the 
case management conference can be:168
— Document production: timeframe for submission and request of disco­
very/disclosure, consequences of failure to submit documents, presen­
tation of documentary evidence;
161  See also Art. 14.4 (ii) LCIA Rules; Rule 19 (1) SIAC Rules; Schütze­patocchi/nieDer­
maier, n. 345.
162  It has become common practice to hold the preliminary meeting via telephone or video­
conference (BLackaBy et al., n. 6.41); see e.g. Art. 24 (4) ICC Rules; Rule 19 (3) SIAC Rules.
163  Schütze­patocchi/nieDermaier, n. 346.
164  See e.g. Art. 24 ICC Rules; Art. 27.2 DIS Rules.
165  See e.g. Art. 17 (2) UNCITRAL Rules; Rule 19 (3) SIAC Rules; Art. 20 (2) ICDR Rules; 
Art. 27.2 DIS Rules.
166  Art. 17 (1), 2nd sentence in fine UNCITRAL Rules; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 8.07 n. 31.
167  Ibid.; as regards an expedited procedure whereby an arbitral award must be rendered 
within six months of the case management conference, see Art. 30 ICC Rules.
168  This short overview is inspired by Art. 2 IBA Rules and Arts. 13­17 UNCITRAL Notes; see 
also ICC, Effective Management of Arbitration; DIS Rules annex 3; ScharDt, 30 et seqq.
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— Hearings: decision on whether to hold hearings, schedule of hearings, 
admission of cross­examination;
— Witnesses: permitted number of witnesses, their preparation and the 
timing of submission of witness statements;
— Party and tribunal­appointed experts: permitted number of experts and 
timing of submission of expert reports;
— Inspections: measures of safekeeping physical evidence and organisati­
on of inspection of site, property or goods; and 
— Confidentiality: rules applicable to commercial or technical confiden­
tiality. 
The approaches taken to these issues under various institutional arbitration 
rules vary significantly, as will be demonstrated below (see p. 34 et seqq. in-
fra). Moreover, the parties often have divergent opinions—for example, on 
whether cross­examination of witnesses and experts should take place or 
whether the parties can make disclosure requests. The arbitrators, in estab­
lishing the procedural measures, should consider all different points of view 
in order to ensure fair and equal proceedings. To facilitate and harmonise the 
taking of evidence in international arbitration, several organisations have 
provided helpful guidelines. 
D. Harmonisation Initiatives
One could argue that since every international arbitration has its own diffi­
culties and challenges, there is no need to harmonise such proceedings 
through international guidelines. On the one hand, it is true that every case 
should be treated differently by considering its peculiarities. On the other 
hand, however, if the parties come from different legal backgrounds, the 
guidelines offer a well­established compromise between different views of 
how evidence might be taken in international arbitration. Moreover, where 
such guidelines are used, the proceedings become more predictable and 
transparent, while the arbitrators retain the right to adapt them in order to 
meet the special needs of the respective arbitration.169 
169  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.08 n. 65.
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In this respect, there is one main source, among others,170 which serves as a 
guideline for the taking of evidence and can be used in conjunction with in­
stitutional arbitration rules: the IBA Rules. These guidelines are not institu­
tional arbitration rules, but rather a code of best practice.171 The term ‘rules’ 
can therefore be misleading, especially if they are used purely as guidelines. 
The IBA Rules and another (less important) harmonisation initiative are ad­
dressed briefly below, before considering how institutional arbitration rules 
and such guidelines can work together. 
1. IBA Rules 
a. Content
The IBA Rules have become the preferred guidelines and best practice in har­
monising the process of taking evidence in international arbitration.172 First 
published in 1983 as the ‘IBA Supplementary Rules Governing the Presenta­
tion and Reception of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration’, they 
were first revised in 1999, when their name was changed to the IBA Rules on 
the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration. The IBA Rules were last 
revised in 2010. Their success depends significantly on the fact that they offer 
a broadly accepted combination of evidentiary rules from common law and 
civil law countries.173 They include not only provisions on document produc­
tion, witnesses, experts and inspections, but also detailed technical norms 
relating to the evidentiary hearing and the admissibility and assessment of 
evidence. In this way, where neither the leges arbitri nor the institutional ar­
bitration rules provide enough guidance, the IBA Rules can fill this vacuum.174 
b. Application
Although the IBA Rules are not institutional or ad hoc arbitration rules, they 
are intended to work in conjunction with them as supplementary guidance.175 
170  See e.g. the CIArb Guidelines on Party­appointed and Tribunal­appointed Expert Wit­
nesses in International Arbitration; CIArb Guidline on Documents Only Arbitration 
Procedures; ICC Commission Report on Controlling Time and Cots in Arbitration; 
ALI /UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.
171  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 199.
172  waincmyer, 752; riSSe/haLLer, n. 6; emanueLe et al., n. 58; BLackaBy et al., n. 6.95; 
o’maLLey, n. 1.05; Lau, 563 et seqq.; IBA Report (2016), 1, 8 ff. According to this study, 
out of 845 respondents, 48% frequently refer to the IBA Rules. It is noteworthy that in 
certain key jurisdictions, the use of the IBA Rules varies significantly, see ibid., 15; see 
also Queen Mary Survey (2015), 36. This survey involved more than 700 practitioners 
and shows that the IBA Rules are used in more than 60% of arbitrations.
173  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9.01 n. 18; IBA Report (2016), 9.
174  riSSe/haLLer, n. 2.
175  IBA Rules, Preamble, n. 1.
31 § 4 Arbitration Rules
As well as applying them in their entirety, it is possible to apply only parts 
thereof or to adapt them to particular circumstances.176 Their binding appli­
cation can be achieved in two ways: either by agreement of the parties or by 
direct order of the arbitral tribunal.177 As an alternative, the IBA Rules can 
also be used as non­binding guidelines.178 
Implementation by party agreement can take place by inclusion in the 
arbitration agreement, although this seldom seems to happen (see p. 23 su-
pra).179 More often, the parties will agree on their application at the case 
management conference upon the suggestion of the arbitral tribunal.180 If 
the parties are silent as to the application of the IBA Rules, the arbitral tribu­
nal can decide at its discretion whether and how to apply them. Usually, how­
ever, the IBA Rules are used as non­binding guidelines in the form of soft law.181 
This is confirmed by a recent survey, which revealed that of the 60% of re­
spondents who applied the IBA Rules, 53% adopted them as guidelines and 
only 7% as binding rules.182 In this way, the arbitral tribunal has maximum 
flexibility in taking evidence.183 Consequently, the parties must be aware 
that they have no right to enforce the IBA Rules.184 
Another advantage of using the IBA Rules as pure guidelines is that it 
strengthens the finality of the arbitral award. Several leges arbitri state that 
an arbitral award can be set aside if the arbitral tribunal did not consider the 
parties’ agreement in conducting the proceedings.185 Thus, in using the IBA 
Rules as non­binding guidelines, the risk of the arbitral award being set aside 
because of mistakes in the taking of evidence can be avoided or at least signif­
icantly reduced.186 
176  Ibid., n. 2.
177  riSSe/haLLer, n. 22 et seqq.
178  IBA Rules, Preamble, n. 2.
179  riSSe/haLLer, n. 23.
180  IBA Rules, Foreword, 3; riSSe/haLLer, n. 24.
181  Queen Mary Survey (2015), 36; Queen Mary Survey (2012), 11.
182  See also IBA Report (2016), 9, 16 et seqq. Accordingly, approximately 80% of respond­
ents declared the IBA Rules as non­binding.
183  Queen Mary Survey (2012), 11; riSSe/haLLer, n. 27; emanueLe et al., n. 59.
184  riSSe/haLLer, n. 27.
185  Art. V (1) (d) NYC; Art. 34 (2) (a) (iv) UNCITRAL ML; § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE; S. 68 (2) (c) 
EAA 1996; conversely, see the Swiss perspective (see p. 270 infra); ASA Bull. 2004, 779; 
DFT 117 II 346, cons. 1b.
186  emanueLe et al., n. 59.
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c. Scope of Application
Reading the previous remarks, one might easily conclude that there seem to 
be only advantages to using the IBA Rules as guidelines in an international 
arbitration. However, although the IBA Rules are a very effective and tested 
tool to be utilised in the taking of evidence, both parties and arbitrators must 
consider carefully whether to use them in their arbitration. 
In this respect, two remarks are noteworthy. First, the IBA rules are de­
signed to be used in international arbitration.187 Where the arbitration is pure­
ly domestic, even though the rules could be applied, the parties should refrain 
from doing so and should choose familiar evidentiary rules, instead of inter­
national guidelines. Second, although the IBA Rules represent a well­accepted 
compromise between common law and civil law, they remain a compromise 
between ‘different legal traditions’.188 If the parties are both from either the 
common law or civil law tradition, the application of the IBA Rules can present 
unnecessary difficulties. This becomes evident in the context of an interna­
tional arbitration where the parties are both from civil law countries. To im­
plement document production according to the IBA Rules, which contain 
several common law elements, would not meet the parties’ expectations; nor 
would it have any other justification from an objective point of view.189 
d. Result
When the parties must agree on evidentiary matters in international arbitra­
tion, the IBA Rules are the most commonly used tool, as they cleverly combine 
common law and civil law elements. They fill the gap if neither the lex arbitri nor 
the institutional arbitration rules are of help regarding evidentiary issues. 
Therefore, they are meant to be used in conjunction with (institutional or ad 
hoc) arbitration rules. Not only can the parties agree on their application; in the 
absence of such an agreement, the arbitral tribunal can declare them applica­
ble and binding, either in whole or in part. However, they are most commonly 
applied in a non­binding way—that is, as pure guidelines. This strengthens the 
finality of the arbitral award, while at the same time supporting the arbitral 
tribunal in its procedural flexibility. However, application of the IBA Rules 
makes sense only if the arbitral proceedings are international and the parties 
are from different legal traditions. Otherwise, there is no logical reason for 
implementing rules with which the parties and their lawyers are unfamiliar. 
187  IBA Rules, Preamble, n. 1.
188  Ibid., n. 1; riSSe/haLLer, n. 33.
189  Ibid.
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2. UNCITRAL Notes 
In addition to this preferred evidentiary tool, another harmonisation initia­
tive should be mentioned. Although not comparable in importance to the IBA 
Rules, the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings provide 
helpful inspiration in shaping international arbitral proceedings.190 First es­
tablished in 1996 and revised in 2016, they can be used in conjunction with ad 
hoc or institutional arbitration rules. The notes—as compared to the IBA 
Rules—are not intended to serve as a code of best practice; their raison d’être 
is rather to be used as a sort of general checklist.191 Since the UNCITRAL 
Notes are not binding and serve only as guidelines, the parties can use them 
or refer to them at their full discretion.192 Regarding evidentiary issues in 
particular, the UNCITRAL Notes contain recommendations about document 
production, witnesses, experts, inspections and hearings. Hence, it might be 
helpful for arbitrators and the parties to consult the UNCITRAL Notes at the 
beginning of arbitration to check whether the most import (evidentiary) is­
sues have been addressed. 
E. Examples of Evidence in International Arbitration
In the following, two examples of evidence will be examined in order to show 
the differences in their treatment under different sets of institutional arbitra­
tion rules. In particular, it shall be demonstrated to what extent institutional 
arbitration rules mirror the legal domestic regime at their headquarters (e.g. 
the ICC in Paris, France). In doing so, one should remember that how institu­
tional arbitration rules are applied in practice always depends on the parties 
and arbitrators. An ICC arbitration with parties from Austria and Switzerland 
and a German arbitrator will therefore be conducted differently from an ar­
bitration under the same rules but with parties from England and the US and 
an Australian arbitrator. 
In order to bridge the gaps between different legal traditions, and where 
institutional arbitration rules might not provide an answer, the aforemen­
tioned IBA Rules can provide helpful guidance in order to find a compromise 
regarding evidentiary issues. The two examples that will be examined have 
not been chosen randomly. The way that document production and witnesses 
190  Queen Mary Survey (2015), 35, 36. Even though the UNCITRAL Notes 1996 seem to be 
known in international arbitration, they are not yet used frequently.
191  UNCITRAL Notes, n. 1­2.
192  Ibid., n. 3.
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of fact are treated in international arbitration serves as a perfect illustration 
of its flexibility and facility to settle disputes in a fast and efficient manner. 
Furthermore, as has been shown, the oral and written parts of arbitral pro­
ceedings differ significantly between the civil law and common law traditions. 
1. Document Production
a. Introduction
As a rule, of all types of evidence in international arbitration, documentary 
evidence enjoys the greatest credibility.193 This is especially true in commer­
cial disputes, where documentary evidence provides a record of what the 
parties have undertaken and agreed upon (e.g. in the minutes of the board of 
directors or balance sheets).194 In addition, it is often far less time consuming 
and costly to present documentary evidence than to examine witnesses, who 
might have to be prepared to give testimony on an event that happened years 
ago.195 As mentioned above (see p. 12 supra), the weight in common law coun­
tries still lies heavily on oral testimony, while in civil law countries documen­
tary evidence is paramount.196 Anyone who might conclude that internation­
al arbitration is primarily influenced by civil law should bear in mind that 
‘documentary evidence’ is not the same as ‘document production’. While the 
former is a form of evidence, the latter relates to how documentary evidence 
is made available for the parties and the arbitral tribunal. 
A quick look at a selection of international arbitration rules reveals that 
the arbitral tribunal has broad discretion to order document production, 
which has its origins in the common law tradition. Therefore, document pro­
duction as a means of requesting a party to disclose documents which it has 
not voluntarily delivered itself is widely accepted in international arbitra­
tion.197 
Nonetheless, there are some differences between the institutional arbi­
tration rules in this regard. It would be logical to conclude that although ar­
bitration institutions in civil law countries accept document production, 
their provisions are more moderate, given that in the courts in civil law coun­
tries are very reluctant to order broad document production (see p. 13 supra). 
In contrast, common law arbitration institutions would be assumed to have 
more extensive provisions in this regard. Before examining whether this 
193  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 8.07 n. 38; waincymer, Evidence, 826; karrer, 54.
194  waincymer, Evidence, 826.
195  BLackaBy et al., n. 6.90.
196  waincymer, Evidence, 827; o’maLLey, n. 3.02. 
197  o’maLLey, n. 3.03.
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assertion holds true, the IBA Rules on document production will be quickly 
examined in order to outline why they are such a widely accepted compro­
mise between the common law and civil law traditions. 
b. Document Production in the IBA Rules
Art. 3 IBA Rules deals with three groups of documents: (1) documents on 
which the parties base their claim and defence; (2) documents on which one 
party wants to rely but cannot produce it on its own; and (3) and documents 
held by third parties. As document production plays a vital role in interna­
tional arbitration, Art. 3 is one of the provisions most commonly referred to.198 
Although extensive US or English­style discovery/disclosure is not available 
in international arbitration, there is a consensus that document production 
is appropriate to a certain degree.199 Thus, various institutional arbitration 
rules state that the arbitral tribunal must establish the facts ‘by all appropri­
ate means’.200 Hence, the question is not whether, but rather to what extent, 
there should be document production.201
Art. 3 (3) IBA Rules limits document production in various ways:
— lit. a: Each requested document must be identified sufficiently (author, 
date and content);202
— lit. b: The requesting party must provide a statement as to how the docu­
ment is relevant to the case and material to its outcome; and
— lit. c: A further statement is necessary, confirming that the requested 
document is not in the possession of the requesting party, and stating 
why it would be unreasonably burdensome to produce the document on 
its own and why the party assumes that the requested document is in 
possession of the adverse party.
Following the document request, the arbitral tribunal will set a time limit 
within which the party to which the request is addressed must either pro­
duce the document or raise an objection (e.g. attorney­client privilege or 
commercial or technical confidentiality).203 In case of an objection, the ar­
bitral tribunal will consult the parties in order to reach agreement.204 If no 
198  IBA Report (2016), 15 et seq.
199  IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 7.
200  See e.g. Art. 25 (1) ICC Rules; Art. 22.1 (iii) LCIA Rules.
201  ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 3 IBA Rules n. 34.
202  Ibid., n. 109 et seqq.
203  Art. 3 (4), (5) IBA Rules; Art. 9 (2) IBA Rules.
204  Art. 3 (6) IBA Rules.
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agreement is reached, the arbitral tribunal will finally decide whether to 
order document production.205 
This rather narrow extent of document production combines the differ­
ent common law and civil law approaches quite thoughtfully. On the one hand, 
parties from civil law countries consider these provisions helpful, since they 
limit document production to a degree where the requested documents must 
be sufficiently specified and fishing expeditions are thus avoided, or even im­
possible.206 Furthermore, the high costs of document production in state 
court litigation can be bypassed by focusing on those documents that are 
claimed to be relevant to the case. On the other hand, parties from common 
law countries who are used to discovery/disclosure rights in state court litiga­
tion can still seek access to internal documents form the adverse party.207 With 
Art. 3 IBA Rules in mind, the focus will now shift to the provisions of document 
production under common law and civil law institutional arbitration rules. 
c. Civil Law Institutional Arbitration Rules
To begin with, Art. 24 (3) Swiss Rules reads as follows:
“At any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral tribunal may 
require the parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence 
within such a period of time as the tribunal shall determine.”
This provision, as an exact copy of Art. 27 (3) UNCITRAL Rules, affords the 
arbitral tribunal broad discretion to order document production. The term 
‘other evidence’ refers to inspections of sites or even witness examination.208 
Similar provisions are found in Art. 25 (5) ICC Rules and Art. 28 (2) DIS Rules. 
None of these rules seems to limit the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to 
order document production beyond the general limits of due process. Ac­
cordingly, the extent of document production here is even wider than under 
the IBA Rules, Nonetheless, various commentators point out that although 
the abovementioned rules do not explicitly impose any restrictions on doc­
ument production, they are not intended to pave the way for wide­ranging 
discovery/disclosure rights.209 Rather, the arbitral tribunal is bound by the 
principle of due process and must thus conduct the proceedings accordingly 
(i.e. also meeting the expectations of the parties). 
205  Art. 3 (7) IBA Rules.
206  ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 3 IBA Rules n. 108; IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 8.
207  Ibid.
208  Zuberbühler et al.­nater­BaSS/rouVineZ, Art. 24 Swiss Rules n. 30.
209  girSBerger/VoSer, n. 994; Schütze­reiner/aSchauer, n. 552.
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d. Common Law Institutional Arbitration Rules
Unlike institutional arbitration rules from civil law countries, those from 
common law origins are less uniform. This shall be demonstrated by means 
of two examples. 
According to Art. 22.1 (v) LCIA Rules, the arbitral tribunal has the following 
power:
“To order any party to produce to the Arbitral Tribunal and to other par­
ties documents or copies of documents in their possession, custody or 
power which the Arbitral Tribunal decides to be relevant.”
This provision specifies that only documents in the parties’ ‘possession, cus­
tody or power’ can be subject to document production. Moreover, the docu­
ments must be ‘relevant’. These limitations have been drafted bearing in 
mind that the arbitration might be held in a civil law country with very re­
stricted (or even no) discovery or disclosure rights.210 Art. 22.1 (v) LCIA Rules 
is therefore quite similar to Art. 3 (3) IBA Rules, since it limits the scope of 
document production and therefore takes into account that the provisions 
will be potentially used in an international context between parties from 
different legal traditions. 
Another example is Art. 21 (4) ICDR Rules, which reads as follows:
“The tribunal may, upon application, require a party to make available to 
another party documents in that party’s possession not otherwise avail­
able to the party seeking the documents, that are reasonably believed to 
exist and to be relevant and material to the outcome of the case. Re­
quests for documents shall contain a description of specific documents 
or classes of documents, along with an explanation of their relevance 
and materiality to the outcome of the case.”
In general, Art. 20 (4) ICDR Rules provides that the tribunal can order docu­
ment production which it finds necessary or appropriate. Unless the parties 
agree otherwise, this article shall be applicable. At first glance, there seem to 
be no differences at all compared to Art. 3 (3) IBA Rules: The requested docu­
ments have to be specified, relevant and material to the outcome of the case. 
Furthermore, they need to be not otherwise available to the requesting party. 
210  Scherer et al., Art. 22 LCIA Rules n. 28.
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Despite the resemblance to the IBA Rules, two differences should be pointed 
out. The first one concerns categories of documents. While the IBA Rules 
speak of ‘narrow and specific requested category of documents’211, Art. 21 (4) 
ICDR Rules requires only ‘specific documents or classes of documents’. The 
fact that the parties can ask for a whole category of documents has led to 
much discussion.212 Behind the ‘narrow and specific’ standard lies the argu­
ment that there might be a relevant document that cannot be identified suffi­
ciently specifically.213 This is the case, for instance, if a party knows that the 
adverse party has made a decision—for example, about the termination of a 
contract—which should have been recorded in the minutes of the meeting of 
the board of directors.214 The party may be unable to specify the author, date 
and exact content of such a document, but may nonetheless be able to de­
scribe the requested document in a narrow and specific way. 
The ICDR Rules do not seem to have adopted this standard and therefore 
they do not limit document production to narrow categories of documents.215 
Consequently, they provide for even wider document production than under 
the IBA Rules. One would be mistaken in assuming that this broad document 
production under the ICDR Rules is due to the wide­ranging discovery rights 
in US state court litigation. Art. 21 (10) ICDR Rules explicitly states that certain 
measures of US­style discovery are not applicable in arbitration under the 
ICDR Rules. 
The second difference concerns control over the requested documents. 
According to Art. 21 (4) ICDR Rules, the arbitral tribunal can require a party to 
present only documents that are in its possession. By contrast, Art. 3 (3) (c) (ii) 
IBA Rules obliges the requesting party to provide a statement of the reasons 
why it assumes that the documents requested are in the possession, custody 
or control of another party. This difference can be explained by the fact that 
US law grants arbitral tribunals the power, under certain conditions, to order 
211  Art. 3 (3) (a) (ii) IBA Rules.
212  o’maLLey, n. 3.35 et seq.; IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 9; ZuBerBühLer, Art. 3 
Swiss Rules n. 114.
213  IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 9.
214  Ibid.
215  marghitoLa, 29; see also Art. 21 (6) ICDR Rules, which states that requests for docu­
ment production regarding e­documents must be ‘narrowly focused’. Therefore, the 
extent of document production for e­documents is more limited than that for physical 
documents. However, this provision only complements the general rule about phys­
ical document production in Art. 21 (4) ICDR Rules and does not adopt the ‘narrow and 
specific’ standard (guSy/iLLmer, 289).
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documents from third parties which are not part of the arbitration.216 There­
fore, Art. 21 (4) ICDR Rules refers only to documents in the possession of the 
requested party and does not mention third parties.217 
e. Result
The previous remarks on document production in international arbitration 
have revealed different controversies. Although virtually all institutional ar­
bitration rules provide for document production, there are significant differ­
ences. The thesis was proposed that since civil law countries tend not to pro­
vide for broad document production, institutional arbitration rules from 
these countries would mirror this in their provisions by limiting document 
production; and vice versa for institutional arbitration rules from common 
law countries. This thesis has been disproved, at least partially. 
Institutional arbitration rules from civil law countries grant broad dis­
cretion when it comes to document production, subject only to the general 
principle of due process and other legal principles such as attorney­client 
privilege and commercial and technical confidentiality. However, this broad 
discretion does not form the basis for far­reaching discovery/disclosure 
rights. Still, compared to the IBA Rules, the Swiss, ICC and DIS Rules take a 
very liberal, arbitration­friendly approach. The institutional arbitration rules 
from common law countries show a different picture. The LCIA Rules are 
quite similar to the IBA Rules. Anticipating that they may also be used in in­
ternational arbitral proceedings with parties from different legal traditions, 
they narrow document production accordingly. At the other end of the scale 
are the ICDR Rules, which, despite many similarities to the IBA Rules, do not 
adopt the ‘narrow and specific’ standard with regard to requests for catego­
ries of documents. Therefore, the ICDR Rules allow for broader document 
production than the IBA Rules. 
What consequences can be drawn from this brief examination? The fact 
that common law institutional arbitration rules contain detailed provisions 
on document production is because this procedure is also well known in state 
court litigation in those countries. On the other hand, arbitration institutions 
from civil law countries, which are unfamiliar with document production, 
content themselves with affording the arbitral tribunal broad discretion. At 
the end of the day, however, institutional arbitration rules should leave 
enough space for the parties and the arbitral tribunal to reach agreement on 
the degree of document production that is permissible. 
216  marghitoLa, 30; S. 7 FAA USA; see p. 183 infra.
217  marghitoLa, 30.
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2. Witnesses
a. Introduction 
Despite the preference in international arbitration to rely mainly on docu­
mentary evidence, the practical significance of fact witnesses is considera­
ble.218 The main advantage of examining witnesses is that questions can be 
asked directly by all parties. Even though the arbitral tribunal governs the 
hearings, it has become standard practice in international arbitral proceed­
ings that the parties themselves (i.e. their lawyers) can question not only 
their own witnesses, but also those of the adverse party. The drawbacks to 
this are the significant expenses and often time­consuming examinations 
involved.219 Nonetheless, the significance of fact witnesses should not be un­
derestimated. This is especially true given that documentary evidence and 
the examination of fact witnesses are regularly linked. Witnesses are often 
indispensable to explain the background and nature of documentary evi­
dence.220 Many institutional arbitration rules therefore include detailed pro­
visions on the hearing and the examination of witnesses.221 
The differences in the approach to witnesses in common law and civil law 
countries are quite astonishing.222 As previously mentioned (see p. 12 supra), 
compared to civil law countries, orality plays a much more important role in 
state court litigation in common law countries. The two legal traditions differ 
with regard not only to who can be a witness, but also to how witnesses can 
be prepared for examination and how the examination itself works.223 Even 
though the institutional arbitration rules examined below are designed for 
an international setting and the differences between legal traditions seem to 
be diminishing, it would be unsurprising if there were certain provisions that 
can be explained only within the context of their legal background. Whether 
this is in fact true shall now be analysed. To this end, the provisions on wit­
nesses in the IBA Rules shall be quickly addressed before turning to institu­
tional arbitration rules. 
218  o’maLLey, n. 4.01; BLackaBy et. al., n. 6.120: waincymer, Evidence, 885; moLitoriS, n. 1.
219  waincymer, Evidence, 885.
220  BLackaBy et al., n. 6.120.
221  See e.g. Arts. 17 (3), 27 (2), 28 and 31 UNCITRAL Rules; Arts. 15 (2), 25, 29 (2) Swiss Rules; 
Arts. 25 (3), 26 ICC Rules. 
222  ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 3 IBA Rules n. 4.
223  IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 14.
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b. Witnesses in the IBA Rules
With regard to witness examination, the IBA Rules have adopted many com­
mon law elements. This applies in relation not only to the identity of witness­
es, but also to the degree of interaction between parties and witnesses. The 
examination also includes cross­examination, with which civil law lawyers 
will usually be unfamiliar.224 Despite this common law approach, the IBA 
Rules also state that the arbitral tribunal shall have full power over the hear­
ing at all times, which clearly refers to the judge­led civil law approach (see 
p. 13 et seqq. supra). 
Art. 4 IBA Rules addresses numerous issues in regard to witnesses of 
fact. Thus, only those on which the common law and civil law traditions di­
verge most significantly are discussed here, which are as follows: 
— Who can be a witness?
— How can parties interact with witnesses?
— How and by whom are witnesses examined?
I. Identity of Witnesses
The first issue concerns the identity of witnesses. Art. 4 (2) IBA Rules makes it 
quite clear that ‘any person’ may be a witness and present evidence, includ­
ing the parties, their officers, lawyers, employees and other representatives. 
For a civil law practitioner, this may come as a surprise, as civil law systems 
often exclude parties from acting as witnesses; in common law systems, by 
contrast, the term ‘witness’ is interpreted broadly.225 The exclusion of par­
ties as witnesses in civil law countries is mostly due to the fact that as the 
parties have a special interest in the outcome of the proceedings, their state­
ments are considered less valuable.226 In international arbitration, however, 
the view has been established that anyone who is capable of commenting on 
the facts based on his or her own experience can be a witness.227 While the 
parties and related persons can therefore testify as witnesses, their credibil­
ity can be tested according to their identity and relation with the parties.228 
224  ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 8 IBA Rules n. 19.
225  See e.g. for civil law: Art. 169 CCP CH; § 402 CCP DE (see also exceptions for minors 
according to § 455 (2) CCP DE); Art. 204 CCP FR; ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 4 IBA Rules 
n. 8 et seqq; for common law see e.g. Rule 30 (a) (1) FRCP USA; Rule 34.1 (1) (b) CPR 1998.
226  wagner, 485 et seqq.; o’maLLey, n. 4.08; BLackaBy et al., n. 6.125 et seqq.
227  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 8.07 n. 43; Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2276 et seq.; wain­
cymer, Evidence, 896 et seq.; o’maLLey, n. 4.08; UNCITRAL Notes, n. 89.
228  waincymer, Evidence, 897; BLackaBy et al., n. 6.129.
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Consequently, the arbitral tribunal might weigh the statement of a party’s 
officer differently from that of a more independent witness.229
II. Interaction Between Parties and Witnesses
The second question concerns the degree of interaction between the parties 
and witnesses. Art. 4 (3) IBA Rules states:
“It shall not be improper for a Party, its officers, employees, legal advisors 
or other representatives to interview its witnesses or potential witnesses 
and to discuss their prospective testimony with them.”
Again, the approaches in common and civil law systems differ significantly. 
The fact that in civil law countries, it is the judge (and not the parties’ lawyers) 
who examines witnesses explains why contact between lawyers and (poten­
tial) witnesses prior to the hearing is considered unethical in some countries.230 
In contrast, because the proceedings are more party­led in common law coun­
tries, lawyers may discuss and prepare the statements with and of their own 
witnesses.231 Despite these differences, in international arbitration the view 
has been adopted that lawyers are generally permitted to contact their232 wit­
nesses prior to the hearing in order to prepare and discuss their statements.233 
While the degree of preparation may vary from a general discussion of 
the issues of the case to an intensive rehearsal of witness examination, there 
are certain limits.234 It would be unethical and under some laws even criminal 
to encourage a witness to lie in court or to give misleading statements.235 There­
fore, lawyers would be well advised not to ‘over­prepare’ their witnesses, for 
229  Art. 9 (1) IBA Rules; IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 15.
230  IBA Working Party, 27; ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 4 IBA Rules n. 12 et seqq.; o’maLLey, 
n. 4.15; SincLair, 29 et seqq.; see e.g. also the Swiss Federal Act of the Free Movement 
of Lawyers (SR 935.61), Art. 12a; Swiss National Rules of Professional Conduct, Art. 7; 
DFT 2C_8/2010 of 4 Oct. 2010, cons. 3.2.1.
231  IBA Working Part, 27; SincLair, 36 et seq.
232  Art. 4 (3) IBA Rules. The IBA Rules are thus quite clear that to contact a party’s own 
witness is permissible by speaking of ‘its’ witness—that is, the witness a party intends 
to present. As regards contacting adverse witnesses, the ICSID developed certain 
conditions under which this is allowed (Azinian et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID, 
ARB (AF)/92/2), 1 Nov. 1999, n. 56); concerning contacting adverse witnesses in gener­
al see o’maLLey, n. 4.19 et seqq).
233  IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 16; BLackaBy et al., n. 6.123 et seqq; Von SegeSSer, 
Witness Preparation, 224; o’maLLey, n. 4.15; waincymer, Evidence, 898; see also IBA 
Guidelines 24.
234  Von SegeSSer, Witness Preparation, 225.
235  ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 4 IBA Rules n. 15; BLackaBy et al., n. 6.124; Von SegeSSer, 
Witness Preparation, 225; hoffmann/Shetty, 211; see also IBA Guidelines 23.
43 § 4 Arbitration Rules
fear of losing credibility.236 This also applies to witness statements that con­
tain testimony on the facts experienced by a witness.237 These statements not 
only help the parties to prepare for the hearing, but also help the arbitral 
tribunal to conduct the proceedings time and cost efficiently.238 Nonetheless, 
the arbitral tribunal should consider carefully whether such statements are 
in fact necessary. This is especially true if the arbitral tribunal intends to rely 
solely on a witness statement and does not request direct examination of the 
witness. Thus, a well­prepared witness statement can be time consuming and 
costly for the parties.239 
III. Examination of Witnesses
The third and last point concerns how and by whom witnesses are examined 
in the hearing. As already mentioned, one of the significant differences be­
tween common law and civil law proceedings is the fact that in common law 
countries, the proceedings are more party led and therefore witnesses are 
mostly examined by the parties; while in civil law countries, witnesses are 
usually questioned by the judge (see p. 14 supra). Notwithstanding this fact, it 
is common practice in international arbitration that a witness who has deliv­
ered a witness statement must appear in person at the hearing for examina­
tion and cross­examination if his or her attendance is requested by either the 
parties or the arbitral tribunal.240 Cross­examination as a main feature of 
adversarial (common law) proceedings has become widely accepted in inter­
national arbitral proceedings.241 Even civil law lawyers today appreciate it, 
because it allows them not only to elicit facts that were not mentioned in the 
witness statement, but also to reveal contradictions and to undermine the 
reliability and credibility of a witness.242
According to Art. 4 (7) IBA Rules, the arbitral tribunal will usually disre­
gard the witness statement if a witness whose attendance has been requested 
fails to appear without any valid reason. According to Art. 8 IBA Rules, the ar­
bitral tribunal shall have full control over the hearings and shall therefore 
conduct and govern it appropriately—a provision which calls to mind judge­led 
236  ZuBerBühLer et al, Art. 4 IBA Rules n. 16; Von SegeSSer, Witness Preparation, 225; 
SincLair, 31; see also IBA Guidelines 21.
237  Arts. 4 (4)–(6) IBA Rules; ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 4 IBA Rules n. 22 et seqq.; SincLair, 
29 et seqq.
238  IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 16; oetiker, Witnesses, 254; o’maLLey, n. 4.23.
239  ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 4 IBA Rules n. 25; oetiker, Witnesses, 255.
240  Art. 8(1) IBA Rules; IBA Review Subcommittee (2010), 17.
241  SincLair, 41; Van houtte, 459 et seq.
242  SincLair, 41; mekat, 121; newman, 408 et seqq.
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civil law proceedings.243 Furthermore, Art. 8 (3) IBA Rules recommends the 
order in which the examination should be carried out: starting with the claim­
ant’s witnesses, followed by the respondent’s witnesses and experts. After the 
direct examination of each witness, there is the possibility for cross­examina­
tion by the adverse party and in some cases even for re­examination.244 Since 
the IBA Rules aim to provide for flexible proceedings, the arbitral tribunal can 
change the suggested order of examination as it considers appropriate.245 
c. Civil Law Institutional Arbitration Rules
When it comes to witnesses, institutional arbitration rules based in civil law 
countries differ in their level of detail. While the Swiss Rules govern witness 
examination quite specifically, the DIS and ICC Rules content themselves 
with a few general provisions. Art. 25 (1) ICC Rules merely states:
“The arbitral tribunal shall proceed within as short a time as possible to 
establish the facts of the case by all appropriate means.”
Although this wording is a clear reminder of the inquisitorial civil law ap­
proach, the tendency in international arbitration is that responsibility for 
producing and presenting the evidence falls first and foremost on the par­
ties.246 At the same time, the arbitral tribunal has maximum flexibility, 
since it must establish the facts of the case ‘by all appropriate means’. This 
allows the arbitral tribunal to consider the different legal backgrounds of 
the parties and to tailor the proceedings accordingly. Concerning witness­
es, the ICC Rules provide a general procedural framework only, and refrain 
from establishing specific and detailed rules.247 Consequently, this leaves 
plenty of space to handle every case individually and specifically. Apart 
from these general remarks, Art. 26 (3) ICC Rules says that the arbitral tribu­
nal, subject to the parties’ agreement, shall be in full charge of the hearings, 
which underlines the arbitral tribunal’s broad discretion in tailoring the 
arbitral proceedings.248 This means, for instance, that the arbitral tribunal 
may hear witnesses on its own initiative.249 
243  See p. 13 supra; Art. 8(2) IBA Rules; IBA Review Subcommittee (201), 23. The arbitral 
tribunal is therefore entitled not only to question witnesses at any time, but also to 
limit or exclude questions and answers if it considers them unnecessary (Arts. 8(2) 
and 8 (3) (g) IBA Rules). 
244  Art. 8 (3) (a) IBA Rules; IBA Review Subcommitte (2010), 23.
245  Art. 8 (3) (f) IBA Rules; IBA Review Subcommitte (2010), 24.
246  VerBiSt/Schäfer/imhooS, 140.
247  Mistelis­BonD/paraLika/SecomB, Art. 25 ICC Rules n. 1 and 2.
248  Ibid., Art. 26 ICC Rules n. 2; VerBiSt/Schäfer/imhooS, 150.
249  Arts. 25 (2) and (3) ICC Rules.
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A typical civil law approach is pursued by the DIS Rules, Art. 28.2 of which 
states the following: 
“For this purpose, the arbitral tribunal may, inter alia, on its own initia­
tive, appoint experts, examine fact witnesses other than those called by 
the parties, and order any party to produce or make available any doc­
uments or electronically stored data. The arbitral tribunal shall not be 
limited to admit only evidence offered by the parties.”
The arbitral tribunal has full discretion in hearing witnesses on its own initi­
ative and is not bound by the parties’ offer of evidence. Here, the inquisitori­
al civil law approach is mirrored by defining the arbitral tribunal as an active 
case manager.250 This is confirmed by the new Art. 27.2 DIS Rules, as amend­
ed in 2018, which obliges the arbitral tribunal to hold a case management 
conference as soon as possible after its constitution.251 The fact that the DIS 
Rules emphasise the active role of the arbitrator does not mean that he or she 
must act purely inquisitorially, as judges do in some state court litigation 
proceedings.252 Rather, Art. 28.2 is modelled as a ‘may’ provision, leaving the 
arbitral tribunal with broad discretion.253 
According to a practitioner of the DIS Rules, most DIS arbitral tribunals 
seem to avoid being too proactive in conducting the proceedings, but rather 
leave it to the parties to present the relevant evidence or to file requests to 
produce evidence.254 However, this may change following the amendment 
of the DIS Rules in 2018 and the introduction of the mandatory case manage­
ment conference.255 Annex 3 of the DIS Rules sets out a list of measures to 
increase procedural efficiency. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal can discuss 
with the parties, for example, whether to limit the length or number of sub­
missions of any written fact witness statements or expert reports.256 Further 
suggestions are made—for example, to hold only one oral hearing, including 
any taking of evidence, or to limit requests regarding document production.257
250  BeSch/kreuZeDer, 266; Böckstiegel et al.­riSSe, S. 27 DIS Rules n. 2.
251  See also DIS Rules annex 3; BeSch/kreuZeDer, 257 et seq.; ScharDt, 29; Boog/
wimaLaSena, 25 et seq.
252  Böckstiegel et al.­riSSe, S. 27 DIS Rules n. 2. In this regard see, for example, § 139 CCP 
DE, stating that in order to establish the relevant facts of each case, state courts must 
question the parties.
253  BeSch/kreuZeDer, 256.
254  Böckstiegel et al.­riSSe, S. 27 DIS Rules n. 6.
255  Art. 27.2 DIS Rules.
256  DIS Rules Annex 3, A.
257  DIS Rules Annex 3, B and E.
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On the other hand, the Swiss Rules contain detailed provisions on witnesses. 
In many ways inspired by the UNCITRAL Rules, they cover not only who can 
be a witness, but also interaction with and examination of witnesses.258 
Art. 25 (2) Swiss Rules says:
“Any person may be a witness or an expert witness in the arbitration. It is 
not improper for a party, its officers, employees, legal advisors, or counsel 
to interview witnesses, potential witnesses, or expert witnesses.”
Regarding the identity of witnesses, the Swiss Rules are in line with interna­
tional standard practice, as in Art. 4 (2) IBA Rules, by confirming that ‘any 
person may be a witness’. As compared to the UNCITRAL Rules, they take a 
more liberal approach by declaring that interaction with (potential) witness­
es is not improper.259 Since such contact is allowed, it is standard practice for 
the evidence of witnesses to be presented in the form of witness statements.260 
As compared to Art. 4 (3) IBA Rules, the Swiss Rules do not limit contact with 
witnesses that a party has requested to present, although they do distinguish 
between potential witnesses and named witnesses. Since a potential witness 
does not belong to either party, it is theoretically not improper to interview 
witnesses of the opposing party.261 To avoid any uncertainty in this regard, 
the parties should discuss this issue early in the proceedings. They could, of 
course, exclude any contact with witnesses of the opposing party by applying 
Art. 4 (3) IBA Rules. 
As regards the way in which witnesses are examined, Art. 25 (4) Swiss Rules 
provides:
“At the hearing, witnesses and expert witnesses may be heard and exam­
ined in the manner set by the arbitral tribunal.”
No suggestions are made about the manner and order in which witnesses 
should be examined. Thus, the arbitral tribunal, in accordance with the 
258  See Art. 27 (1) UNCITRAL Rules; Zuberbühler et al.­BeSSon/thommeSen, Introduction 
Swiss Rules n. 6 et seqq.; Zuberbühler et al.­nater­BaSS/rouVineZ, Art. 25 Swiss 
Rules n. 3, 4.
259  Zuberbühler et al.­nater­BaSS/rouVineZ, Art. 25 Swiss Rules n. 11. Even though the 
UNCITRAL Rules do not expressly allow contact with witnesses, they seem to accept 
this, given that witness statements are foreseen in Art. 27 (2) UNCITRAL Rules. The 
UNCITRAL Rules, as compared to other institutional arbitration rules, say little 
about the conduct of hearings to avoid over­regulating arbitral proceedings (UNCI­
TRAL, A/CN.9/669 (2009), n. 69).
260  Art. 25 (3) Swiss Rules.
261  Zuberbühler et al.­nater­BaSS/rouVineZ, Art. 25 Swiss Rules, n. 13; BLeSSing, Wit-
nesses, 46; oetiker, Witnesses, 264 et seq.
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parties, must choose the appropriate way to do so. Depending on the arbitra­
tion, arbitrators often choose the common law practice of examining, 
cross­examining and re­examining witnesses.262 Furthermore, the arbitral 
tribunal is free to order ‘witness conferencing’, where various witnesses are 
examined at the same time on specific issues.263
d. Common Law Institutional Arbitration Rules
As is the case with document production, the institutional arbitration rules 
diverge considerably in their provisions about witnesses. The LCIA Rules, 
which are some of the most detailed institutional arbitration rules, provide 
in Art. 19 (2):
“The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the fullest authority under the Arbitra­
tion Agreement to establish the conduct of a hearing, including its date, 
form, content, procedure, time­limits and geographical place.”
As a general statement, this passage makes it crystal clear that the arbitral tri­
bunal enjoys the widest discretion in conducting the hearings. Not surprisingly, 
Art. 20.6 LCIA Rules declares that even a party itself can testify as a witness:
“Subject to any order by the Arbitral Tribunal otherwise, any individual 
intending to testify to the Arbitral Tribunal may be treated as a witness 
notwithstanding that the individual is a party to the arbitration or was, 
remains or has become an officer, employee, owner or shareholder of 
any party or is otherwise identified with any party.”
The word ‘may’ indicates that the drafters of the LCIA Rules were aware that 
the parties cannot be considered as witnesses in all countries, and therefore 
they allow exceptions.264 Also, like the Swiss Rules, Art. 20.5 LCIA Rules al­
lows contact with potential witnesses:
“Subject to the mandatory provisions of any applicable law, rules of law and 
any order of the Arbitral Tribunal otherwise, it shall not be improper for 
any party or its legal representatives to interview any potential witness for 
the purpose of presenting his or her testimony in written form to the Arbi­
tral Tribunal or producing such person as an oral witness at any hearing.”
262  wirth, 14; girSBerger/VoSer, n. 1009; ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 25 IBA Rules n. 19.
263  Zuberbühler et al.­nater­BaSS/rouVineZ, Art. 25 Swiss Rules, n. 30; hanotiau, 376 
et seq.; mciLwrath/SaVage, n. 5­243; peter, 47 et seqq.; raeSchke­keSSLer, Witness 
Conferencing, 415 et seqq.
264  Scherer et al., Art. 20 LCIA Rules n. 37. While the LCIA version of 1998 used to contain 
the word ‘shall’, under the revised version of 2014 it is now possible to treat parties 
differently from witnesses.
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Here again, it is acknowledged that in some jurisdictions, witness contact 
might not be permissible and therefore the arbitral tribunal will be bound by 
such restrictions. The ability of the arbitral tribunal to forbid any pre­hearing 
contact with witnesses serves to level out the imbalance where one party 
might not be allowed to make such contact due to national laws or profession­
al standards.265 Reading this passage in its strict wording, one might recog­
nise that it speaks only of ‘potential witnesses’, and not of all witnesses. Com­
pared to Art. 4 (3) IBA Rules, which allows contact with all witnesses, the LCIA 
Rules are therefore more restrictive. However, since Art. 20.5 LCIA addresses 
only interviewing witnesses, preparing witnesses is considered permissible.266
When the hearing finally takes place, Art. 20.8 LCIA Rules provides for differ­
ent possibilities:
“Any witness who gives oral testimony at a hearing before the Arbitral 
Tribunal may be questioned by each of the parties under the control of 
the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal may put questions at any 
stage of such testimony.”
While the parties are often limited in the time given for their examination 
and cross­examination, the arbitral tribunal may put questions to the wit­
nesses at any given time. Like judge­led examination, this supports a fast and 
efficient hearing, without too much time lost to exhaustive examinations. 
Although Art. 20.8 LCIA Rules is not as detailed as Art. 8 (2) IBA Rules (see p. 44 
supra), it puts the arbitral tribunal in full control of the hearing. However, the 
arbitral tribunal must consult the parties about the manner in which the 
examination should take place—for example, by proposing time limits for 
examination and cross­examination. 
As compared to the LCIA Rules, the ICDR Rules mention witnesses and their 
examination just briefly in Art. 23 (4):
“The tribunal shall determine the manner in which witnesses are exam­
ined and who shall be present during witness examination.”
Like the respective provisions in the UNCITRAL Rules and the Swiss Rules, 
Art. 23 (4) ICDR Rules reminds the arbitral tribunal to choose a method of 
examination which is appropriate to the case.267 Apart from that, there are 
no other provisions on the identity of witnesses, let alone about contact with 
265  Scherer et al., Art. 20 LCIA Rules n. 34.
266  Ibid., Art. 20 LCIA Rules n. 35.
267  Art. 28 (2) UNCITRAL Rules; Art 25 (4) Swiss Rules; guSy/hoSking, Art. 23 ICDR 
n. 23.10.
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witnesses or the examination of witnesses. Art. 23 (4) ICDR Rules gives a hint 
in this regard by saying:
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or directed by the tribunal, evi­
dence of witnesses may be presented in the form of written statements 
signed by them. In accordance with a schedule set by the tribunal, each 
party shall notify the tribunal and the other parties of the names of any 
witnesses who have presented a witness statement whom it requests to 
examine. The tribunal may require any witness to appear at a hearing.” 
As a default, the ICDR Rules follow the IBA Rules by suggesting that unless a 
party asks to examine a witness who has submitted his or her statement, 
there is no need for direct examination.268 It seems to be common practice 
in ICDR proceedings to draft witness statements together with the witnesses 
and, if necessary, to prepare them for the hearing where they will be (cross­)
examined.269 As always, the parties and/or the arbitral tribunal can depart 
from this default procedure. Although in many cases witness statements con­
tribute to efficient and less expensive proceedings, they should not be al­
lowed without careful consideration, given the time and effort needed to 
produce well­prepared witness statements.270 This is especially true if there 
are just a few witnesses and the issues at stake are limited.271 
e. Result
The thesis that various provisions concerning witnesses in institutional arbi­
tration rules make sense only when considered in the context of their legal 
background has only partially been affirmed. One might have expected that 
since the principle of orality is paramount in common law proceedings, in­
stitutional arbitration rules from common law countries would include de­
tailed and extensive provisions on witnesses and the hearing itself. On the 
other hand, because the main emphasis in civil law proceedings is on docu­
mentary evidence, the rules of arbitration institutions based in civil law 
countries might be thought more likely to limit the oral part of the proceed­
ings (i.e. the presentation and examination of witnesses). As the previous 
examples have demonstrated, however, institutional arbitration rules from 
civil and common law countries do not result in a uniform picture, either as 
a whole or within each system.
268  Arts. 4 (4)–(8) IBA Rules.
269  Mistelis­feLLaS/moSquera, Art. 23 ICDR Rules n. 2.
270  oetiker, Witness Statements, 30; oetiker, Witnesses, 255.
271  Ibid.
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Compared to the Swiss and IBA Rules, the ICC Rules say very little about how 
to treat witnesses. That the silence of the ICC Rules on typical witness issues, 
such as their identity, interaction and examination, is due to their civil law 
background seems unlikely. Rather, to grant maximum flexibility, the ICC 
Rules provide the arbitral tribunal with broad discretion when it comes to 
witnesses. The DIS Rules in turn allow for the arbitral tribunal to act in a qua­
si­inquisitorial (civil law) way. While this might be suitable for German do­
mestic arbitration, the practice in international DIS arbitration places the 
responsibility for presenting evidence largely on the parties. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the Swiss Rules include more specific provisions about wit­
nesses. As previously discussed, they adopt the common law approach not 
only by allowing anyone to be a witness, but also by allowing for the parties 
to interact with witnesses quite freely. Therefore, they represent a very liber­
al, up­to­date set of rules that mirror modern practice in international arbi­
tration, quite similar to, but not as detailed as, the IBA Rules.
The provisions on witnesses in the LCIA Rules are almost as detailed as 
those in the IBA Rules. In terms of content, the LCIA Rules not only allow the 
parties to serve as witnesses, but also consider contact with witnesses as 
permissible and cross­examination as standard procedure. Furthermore, as 
the arbitral tribunal is in full control of the hearings, the arbitrators can put 
questions to witnesses at any given time. Thus, the LCIA Rules combine com­
mon and civil law elements regarding the treatment of witnesses. In contrast, 
the ICDR Rules say very little about witnesses. Much less detailed than the 
LCIA Rules, they leave it almost entirely to the arbitral tribunal to decide how 
witnesses should be treated. The provisions on witness statements, which 
are quite similar to the IBA Rules, are therefore exceptional. 
To sum up, it has been shown that, regarding witnesses, institutional 
arbitration rules, regardless of their legal background, are either very de­
tailed or just briefly mention the issue. In only a few cases are the provisions 
explicable solely due to their legal background (e.g. the DIS Rules, see p. 46 et 
seqq. supra). Hence, traces of domestic civil court litigation in institutional 
arbitration rules are increasingly seeming to disappear.272 The overwhelm­
ing majority of rules provide the arbitral tribunal with broad discretion to 
conduct the proceedings in regard to witnesses. This could include applying 
the IBA Rules as a whole or at least partly, especially in cases where institu­
tional arbitration rules say almost nothing about witnesses (see e.g. the ICC 
and DIS Rules, p. 45 et seqq. supra). 
272  SincLair, 47 et seq.
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F. Summary
This part of the chapter has highlighted the effectiveness and flexibility of in­
stitutional arbitration rules. Their general provisions grant the arbitral tribu­
nal broad discretion in conducting the proceedings, which finds its limits 
mainly in the principle of due process. Regarding evidence, it has been demon­
strated that to ensure the proceedings run smoothly, all sorts of evidentiary 
issues should be addressed in the case management conference. Here, parties 
may have very different views—for example, concerning document production 
or the conduct of hearings. The IBA Rules provide solid guidelines to bridge the 
gap between opposing opinions. In most cases, they are used not as binding 
rules, but as guidelines, which strengthens the flexibility of the fact finding and 
the finality of the arbitral award. Despite these advantages, their application 
should not be ordered or agreed upon without due consideration. Since they 
are made to work between parties from different legal traditions, their appli­
cation in domestic arbitration is often against the parties’ intentions. 
In a further step, an examination of the treatment of document produc­
tion and witnesses under institutional arbitration rules and the IBA Rules has 
revealed the following findings. Regarding document production, the differ­
ence between common and civil law countries is evident in either detailed 
provisions (common law approach) or provisions which afford the arbitral tri­
bunal broad discretion to decide to what extent document production is per­
missible (civil law approach). This difference might be due to the fact that in 
civil law state court litigation, document production is almost unknown. Under 
both approaches, however, there is enough space for the arbitral tribunal, in 
accordance with the parties and the guidance of the IBA Rules, to find a suitable 
solution for each case. The situation regarding witnesses is more complex. The 
rules are either general remarks or rather detailed provisions, with no com­
monalities evident among common and/or civil law institutional arbitration 
rules. Compared to document production, the traces of the legal traditions 
within which the specific institutions are based seem to have disappeared over 
time. Here too, the IBA Rules offer useful solutions and a balanced compromise 
between the common law and civil law traditions in handling witnesses. 
Summing up, with regard to the taking evidence, institutional arbitra­
tion rules in themselves provide barely enough guidance. In conjunction 
with the IBA Rules, however, the process of taking evidence becomes more 
tangible and effective for both the parties and the arbitral tribunal. 
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§ 5 Conclusion 
After examining the three pillars of the legal framework of international ar­
bitration—namely the leges arbitri, the arbitration agreement and the institu­
tional arbitration rules—several conclusions can be drawn. 
The leges arbitri contain the general legislative framework by determin­
ing external issues such as the relation between state courts and the arbitral 
tribunal, as well as internal matters such as the taking of evidence. It has been 
shown that the parties should choose as the seat of arbitration an arbitra­
tion­friendly country where state courts will not interfere in the arbitral pro­
ceedings without good reason, and will also grant support (e.g. assistance in 
taking evidence or enforcement of the arbitral award). Unsurprisingly, the 
leges arbitri examined in this chapter are all very arbitration friendly, grant­
ing the arbitral tribunal wide discretion to govern the arbitral proceedings as 
long as due process is respected. Even though the leges arbitri provide a gen­
eral procedural framework, the taking of evidence is in most cases only brief­
ly mentioned. Thus, the question is where the parties should agree more 
specifically on evidentiary matters. 
The arbitration agreement is crucial, since the validity of the arbitration 
itself—let alone that of the arbitral award—hinges on its validity. Because of 
the principle of separability, parties would be well advised to agree on the law 
governing the arbitration agreement and the underlying contract. In the ar­
bitration agreement itself, the parties usually refer to evidentiary matters 
indirectly by agreeing on the application of institutional arbitration rules, in 
which all sorts of evidentiary issues are addressed in more detail. Although 
the parties can directly agree on the application of, for instance, the IBA 
Rules in the arbitration agreement, this seldom happens in practice. 
An examination of the institutional arbitration rules reveals that, as in 
the leges arbitri, the arbitral tribunal has vast discretion to choose the proce­
dural rules à la carte. In consultation with the parties, the arbitral tribunal 
should address matters of evidence at the outset of the proceedings (i.e. at the 
case management conference). By means of two examples, it has been demon­
strated how views on these matters differ among institutional arbitration 
rules from common law and civil law systems. In this regard, the IBA Rules 
combine different elements from common law and civil law, and therefore 
represent an excellent compromise that works well in conjunction with insti­
tutional arbitration rules. 
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From this study of the legal framework, one thing is clear: in arbitration, as 
perhaps nowhere else, party autonomy is paramount.273 This is evident in all 
three pillars of the arbitral procedural framework. Applied to the taking of 
evidence, the parties are at liberty, according to their intentions, to choose 
the seat of arbitration, draft the arbitration agreement and agree therein on 
a suitable set of institutional arbitration rules. In addition, those arbitration 
rules can be tailored to a high degree to the special needs of the respective 
case. Thus, compared to state court litigation, the taking of evidence in inter­
national arbitration seems to be almost limitless. 
Obviously, however, this is true only as long as the parties play by the 
rules. So what happens if the parties do not comply with evidentiary orders? 
How can the arbitral tribunal respond? Can it sanction the disobedient party 
and if so, by what means? The next chapter will focus on the various possibil­
ities the arbitral tribunal has at its disposal in this regard.
273  raDicati Di BroZoLo, 40.
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Chapter 4: 
Sanctions of the Arbitral 
Tribunal
§ 1 Introduction
The previous chapter has shown the arbitral tribunal’s broad discretion to 
order document production and to summon witnesses as it deems appropri­
ate. However, because the tribunal has no coercive power, the effectiveness 
of such orders depends largely on the parties’ compliance. In this regard, 
there are several good reasons for parties to comply with evidentiary orders. 
First, they have an interest in the smooth functioning of the proceedings, in 
order to obtain an arbitral award within a reasonable timeframe. Second, 
since it is the arbitral tribunal that will eventually decide on the merits of the 
case, the parties are usually inclined to follow its procedural orders to keep 
the arbitral tribunal onside.274 Third, despite the arbitral tribunal’s lack of 
coercive power, it has some very effective sanctions at hand, which the par­
ties should try their best to avoid. 
Inevitably, however, in certain situations it may be impossible to present 
evidence, due to force majeure or other unforeseen circumstances.275 In addi­
tion, the parties might have the right to refuse to comply with evidentiary 
orders due to (among other things) attorney­client privilege, technical and/or 
commercial confidentiality, or loss or destruction of a document.276 However, 
the arbitral tribunal has various sanctions at its disposal if a party is unable 
to explain sufficiently why evidence has not been produced or if other ob­
structionist behaviour is revealed. Otherwise, parties might be able to undu­
ly influence the proceedings by destroying or forging documents,277 by pro­
viding false testimony or by improperly influencing witnesses and their state­
ments.278 This chapter outlines several sanctions that the arbitral tribunal 
274  SachS/nieDermaier, n. 4.
275  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 81.
276  Art. 9 (2) IBA Rules.
277  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 110 et seq.
278  Ibid., 112 et seqq.
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can impose and considers whether they are in fact helpful to effectively gath­
er evidence.279 The focus is on the main sanction—so­called ‘adverse infer­
ence’—although cost sanctions, sanctions against party representatives and 
monetary penalties are also addressed. 
§ 2 Adverse Inference
A. Introduction
The previous chapter has demonstrated the paramount significance that ev­
idence plays in arbitral proceedings. As pointed out in the introduction to 
this chapter, the parties’ compliance with evidentiary orders is crucial for the 
arbitral proceedings to function smoothly. In order to facilitate the parties’ 
right to present their case and to render an award based on a broad evalua­
tion of the facts, a certain degree of disclosure is necessary.280 
In contrast, if a party fails to produce a document without sufficient 
reason, the arbitral tribunal can draw an adverse inference under certain 
circumstances—that is, conclude that the document is adverse to the interests 
of the reluctant party. Or, to put it differently, the arbitral tribunal may con­
sider a fact as proven despite the absence of the evidence in question.281 This 
principle is widely accepted in international arbitration.282 Its origin is found 
in English common law rules of evidence, but it has also become popular in 
civil law jurisdictions as a tool to sanction non­compliant parties.283 Its raison 
d’être lies in the tension between parties’ reluctance to present evidence that 
is harmful to their case and the arbitral tribunal’s lack of coercive power to 
order the parties to present such evidence.284 By contrast, any party which 
has evidence that is advantageous to its case in its possession would present 
this to the arbitral tribunal. International arbitration resolves this situation 
by letting the arbitral tribunal draw an adverse inference from any failure to 
279  In the Queen Mary Survey of 2015, 46% of all respondents cited the ‘lack of effective 
sanctions during the arbitral process’ as one of the main disadvantages of interna­
tional arbitration (7).
280  Sharpe, 550.
281  SourgenS et al., n. 8.01.
282  waincymer, Evidence, 775; o’maLLey, n. 7.37; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 181; 
Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2391; for investment arbitration see also SourgenS et al., 
n. 8.03.
283  LuttreLL, 283 et seq., 285; o’maLLey, n. 7.03; DFT 4A_2/2007 of 28 Mar. 2007, cons. 4. 
see also Art. 10 and 11 CCP FR i.c.w. Art. 1464 CCP FR, according to which an arbitrator 
may draw an adverse inference in case of non­compliance with evidentiary orders.
284  Sharpe, 549; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 180; LuttreLL, 281.
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present evidence by concluding that the reluctant party has something to 
hide and such evidence is adverse to its interest.285 Another advantage of this 
sanction is the fact that it need not be enforced separately in state courts.286 
In terms of proportionality, the arbitral tribunal should always consider 
whether the other evidence in the case is already sufficiently strong that 
drawing an adverse inference becomes superfluous.287 Since this sanction 
can have a significant influence on both the arbitral proceedings and the 
award, its application is subject to certain conditions, which are examined 
below. 
B. Sources of Adverse Inference in International Arbitration
1. Leges Arbitri and Institutional Arbitration Rules
Today, the power of the arbitral tribunal to draw an adverse inference is 
broadly accepted in international arbitration.288 That said, there are very few 
provisions regarding this issue in leges arbitri and institutional arbitration 
rules. Although several ‘default clauses’289 are included in some leges arbitri 
and institutional arbitration rules, they should not be confused with the right 
to draw an adverse inference. These clauses provide only that the arbitral 
tribunal may continue the proceedings if a party fails to participate and pro­
duce evidence. Consequently, the arbitral tribunal can render an award 
based on the evidence at hand. Still, it must take care not to violate the right 
of the parties to present their case.290 This is why it is common practice to 
keep a passive party updated about every step of the proceedings and why 
there is no automatic award in favour of the other (more active) party.291
Most leges arbitri, however, contain no provisions concerning adverse 
inference. S. 41 (7) (b) EAA 1996 is therefore exceptional by allowing the arbi­
tral tribunal to draw an adverse inference ‘from the act of non­compliance as 
the circumstances justify’ within the scope of a peremptory order. Under 
English law, peremptory orders go one step further than normal procedural 
orders by setting a timeframe for compliance for the production of docu­
285  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 147 et seq.
286  hoSang, Adverse Inferences, 803.
287  greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 204.
288  waincymer, Evidence, 775; Sharpe, 549 et seq.; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 181; 
SachS/nieDermaier, n. 3.
289  See e.g. Art. 25 (c) UNCITRAL ML; Art. 30 (3) UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 28 (3) Swiss Rules; 
Art. 30 DIS Rules; Art. 26 (3) ICDR Rules.
290  Mistelis­BrekouLakiS et al., Art. 25 UNCITRAL ML, 887.
291  ButcherS/kimBrough, 236.
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ments, for example.292 If a party fails to produce the document, the arbitral 
tribunal can draw an adverse inference, among other measures.293 The EAA 
1996 thus sees adverse inference not as an automatic sanction, but merely as 
one possibility among others.294 According to other leges arbitri—for in­
stance, those of Germany and Switzerland—even though it is not mentioned 
explicitly, adverse inference is considered to be inherent in the powers of the 
tribunal to conduct the taking of evidence.295 
Institutional arbitration rules present a similar picture. Of the examined 
institutional arbitration rules, only the ICDR Rules explicitly allow the arbi­
tral tribunal to draw an adverse inference.296 However, many other rules 
equip the arbitral tribunal with the power to assess the evidence by deter­
mining its admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight.297 In drawing an 
adverse inference, the arbitral tribunal is in fact assessing the evidence by 
deciding how to weigh the fact that certain evidence has not been presented 
as requested.298 Over the years, arbitral practice has developed various cri­
teria under which it is possible to draw an adverse inference. Although these 
conditions should not be understood as strict rules, they ensure that this part 
of the assessment of evidence is more rational, predictable and equitable.299
 
2. IBA Rules
Art. 9 (5) and (6) IBA Rules expressly allow the arbitral tribunal to draw an 
adverse inference:
“If a Party fails without satisfactory explanation to produce any Document 
requested in a Request to Produce to which it has not objected in due time 
or fails to produce any Document ordered to be produced by the Arbitral 
Tribunal, the Arbitral Tribunal may infer that such document would be 
adverse to the interests of that Party.” 
“If a Party fails without satisfactory explanation to make available any oth­
er relevant evidence, including testimony, … the Arbitral Tribunal may 
infer that such evidence would be adverse to the interests of that Party.” 
292  S. 41 (5) EAA 1996.
293  S. 41 (7) (b) EAA 1996; ShepparD, S. 41 EAA 1996 n. 4; harriS et al., S. 41 EAA 1996 
n. 41E.
294  Van houtte, 200; harriS et al., S. 41 EAA 1996 n. 41E.
295  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 21; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1042 CCP 
DE n. 65.
296  Arts. 20 (7) and 21 (9) ICDR Rules.
297  See e.g. Art. 27 (4) UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 24 (2) Swiss Rules; Art. 22.1 (vi) LCIA Rules.
298  Sharpe, 550 et seqq; Van houtte, 198; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 183.
299  Sharpe, 571.
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Although in practice the main reason for which an adverse inference is 
sought is due to non­production of documents, the IBA Rules also allow this 
where ‘other evidence’ (e.g. examination of witnesses) is not presented.300 
That is why Art. 9 (5) and (6) IBA Rules must be understood in conjunction 
with Art. 3 (3) and 4 (9), which list the conditions under which document pro­
duction and the examination of witnesses can be requested. Under Art. 9 (5) 
and (6), an adverse inference may be drawn if a party fails to produce evi­
dence (which it has not objected to) without satisfactory explanation, or if the 
arbitral tribunal has ordered either document production or production of 
other evidence (e.g. examination of a witness). Therefore, the arbitral tribu­
nal has discretion to draw an adverse inference either by request of a party 
or on its own motion. 
Van houtte points out that since it is the arbitral tribunal that ulti­
mately decides on requests according to Art. 3 (3) and 4 (9) IBA Rules, 
Art. 9 (5) and (6) IBA Rules could be interpreted that no adverse inference 
can be drawn unless a direct order of the arbitral tribunal has been disre­
garded.301 Consequently, if a party fails to produce evidence upon request 
of the other party and the arbitral tribunal has not confirmed this request, 
no adverse inference can be drawn. greenBerg/LautenSchLager, on the 
other hand, argue that if a party that has been requested to produce evi­
dence fails to object to this request, it is considered to have accepted the 
request.302 As a result, they suggest that in this case, an express order to 
produce evidence seems superfluous, and if the requested party nonethe­
less fails to produce evidence, it is appropriate to draw an adverse infer­
ence. In addition, they hold that the procedural timetable is itself an indi­
rect order of the arbitral tribunal. 
However, along with greenBerg/LautenSchLager, the view taken 
here is that in such a situation, the party should nonetheless be made aware 
that an adverse inference may be drawn.303 This gives that party one last 
chance to explain why the relevant evidence has not been produced. Al­
though this warning should not be considered as a legal gateway to draw an 
adverse inference, it will certainly strengthen the evidentiary weight of that 
inference.304 
300  greenBerg/LautenSchaLger, 191 et seq.
301  Van houtte, 202.
302  greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 189.
303  Ibid.; Van houtte, 202; SachS/nieDermaier, n. 73.
304  waincymer, Evidence, 777.
59 § 2 Adverse Inference
The previous remarks have shown that the IBA Rules provide little guidance, 
but rather minimal standards regarding the circumstances in which an ad­
verse inference may be drawn. A more extensive source of guidance in this 
respect is the vast case law of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal. 
3. Iran–United States Claims Tribunal
This tribunal has had to address a lack of evidence several times, due to the 
revolutionary turmoil in Iran.305 In order to shed some light on the matter of 
adverse inference, Sharpe has highlighted the following conditions from 
these cases:306
“(1) The party seeking the adverse inference must produce all available 
evidence corroborating the inference sought;
(2) the requested evidence must be accessible to the inference opponent;
(3) the inference sought must be reasonable, consistent with facts in the 
record and logically related to the likely nature of the evidence withheld;
(4) the party seeking the adverse inference must produce prima facie 
evidence; and
(5) the inference opponent must know, or have reason to know, of its 
obligation to produce evidence rebutting the adverse inference sought.”
Several of these conditions are included to some extent in the IBA Rules. The 
first,307 however, is just partially covered by them. While Art. 3 (3) (c) (i) IBA 
Rules expressly provides that the requesting party must state that the re­
quested document is not in its possession, custody or control, Art. 4 (9) IBA 
Rules does not contain an equivalent provision regarding other evidence, 
such as witnesses. Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunal should also apply this 
criterion in regard to witnesses and other evidence. 
The second condition308 is quite similar to Art. 3 (3) (c) (ii) IBA Rules, as it 
obliges the requesting party to explain why it assumes that the requested 
documents are in the custody or control of the other party. This is unsurpris­
ing, since the arbitral tribunal has no reason to draw an adverse inference if 
it has not been shown that the other party is in fact in possession of certain 
evidence.309 Here again, no similar provision exists that would apply to other 
evidence except documents. Therefore, under the same reasoning as before, 
the second condition should also apply to other evidence. 
305  Sharpe, 551.
306  Sharpe, 551.
307  Ibid., 554 et seqq.; Van houtte, 203 et seq.; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 197.
308  Sharpe, 557 et seq; Van houtte, 204; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 197 et seq.
309  Ibid.
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The third condition310 is divided into three parts. The first part—that the infer­
ence sought be reasonable—might seem superfluous. What is meant here is that 
the arbitral tribunal can draw an adverse inference only if there is no substan­
tial suspicion that drawing it would be inconsistent with the commercial real­
ity.311 Parties can hence expect that the arbitral tribunal will be familiar with 
common business practices and will draw an adverse inference only where 
this makes sense within the broader picture (i.e. given the external facts).312 
This could mean, for instance, that in the absence of any contemporaneous 
objection, invoices or payment documents presented during the course of a 
contract are considered to be correct.313 The second part mirrors the first in 
providing that an adverse inference should also be consistent with the internal 
facts—that is, the facts of the record.314 By requiring consistency with both 
external and internal facts, these two parts go beyond the IBA Rules. The third 
part presupposes that there must be a logical connection between the nature 
of the documents withheld and the inference derived therefrom.
In the illustrative Riahi case, the respondent failed twice to prove its own­
ership of a certain amount of bearer shares.315 However, the arbitral tribunal 
refused to draw an adverse inference, based on the fact that according to Ira­
nian law, there is no obligation to register bearer shares in a company’s share 
register. Consequently, because the arbitral tribunal was not convinced that 
there was any connection, it did not draw an adverse inference.316 This third 
part goes in the same direction as Art. 9 (5) IBA Rules by stating that the ad­
verse inference cannot go further than the withheld document.317
The fourth condition318 requires that the requesting party have a factu­
al basis for the allegation according to which it seeks adverse inference.319 
310  Sharpe, 558 et seq; Van houtte, 204 et seq.; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 199 et seq.
311  Sharpe, 559; hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 154; LuttreLL, 287 et seq.; Sour­
genS et al., n. 8.12 et seqq.
312  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 154.
313  See e.g. Houston Contracting Co. v. National Iranion Oil Co., IUSCT, 22 Jul. 1988, 378­173­3.
314  See e.g. Methanex Corporation v. Government of the United States of America, ICSID, 3 
Aug. 2005, pt. II, ch. G, n. 25.
315  Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, IUSCT, 27 Feb. 
2003, 600­485­1; see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Brower, pointing out that 
the arbitral tribunal should not have rewarded the respondent for ‘stonewalling’ by 
refusing to draw an adverse inference (Y.B. Comm. Arb. 2003, n. 533 et seqq.).
316  Van houtte, 207; see also the illustrative example in LuttreLL, 287 et seq.
317  marghitoLa, 176; Van houtte, 207; SachS/nieDermaier, n. 39.
318  Sharpe, 564 et seqq.; Van houtte, 205 et seq.; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 200 
et seq.
319  o’maLLey, n. 7.41.
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More specifically, this prima facie evidence ought to be consistent, complete 
and detailed, which is not always easy to demonstrate.320 Compared to the 
IBA Rules, this condition limits the possibility to draw an adverse inference 
even further. 
The fifth condition321 relates directly to the principle of due process322 
and requires the arbitral tribunal to inform a party that fails to produce evi­
dence without sufficient reason that an adverse inference might be drawn.323 
If the arbitral tribunal fails to do so, not only do the proceedings become less 
efficient and fair, but the arbitral award might ultimately be unenforceable.324 
The IBA Rules do not mention this fifth condition. Of course, it could be 
argued that since the arbitral tribunal normally addresses the possibility of 
adverse inference in the case management conference, it is not necessary to 
repeat this warning if a party fails to produce evidence. This view was taken 
in a recent ICC case and later confirmed by the Paris Court of Appeal.325 What 
was particularly interesting here was that a party requested that certain doc­
uments be produced by the adverse party, which never responded. Neither 
the requesting party nor the arbitral tribunal commented on this failure to 
produce evidence. Eventually, the arbitral tribunal drew an adverse infer­
ence by its own motion without first consulting with the parties. Before the 
Paris Court of Appeal, the claimant stated that because the arbitral tribunal 
had not informed the parties of its intention to draw an adverse inference in 
advance, it had violated due process. However, the Paris Court of Appeal held 
that since the parties had agreed in the case management conference on the 
application of the IBA Rules, the arbitral tribunal, in applying those rules, 
was authorised to draw an adverse inference without first consulting the 
parties.326 Moreover, it held that the parties had had sufficient opportunity 
320  Sharpe, 564 et seqq.; marghitoLa, 176.
321  Sharpe, 568 et seqq; Van houtte, 205 et seq.; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 201 et seq.
322  Van houtte, 208; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 201.
323  Sharpe, 568 et seq.
324  Sharpe, 570; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 202 et seq.; Dongwoo Mann + Hummel 
Co. Ltd. v. Mann + Hummel GmbH [2008] SGHC 67; marghitoLa points out that not 
every unjustified adverse inference leads to the annulment of the arbitral award 
based on the grounds of a violation of the right to be heard. Rather, he argues that 
parties against whom an adverse inference is sought should be warned first. Thus, 
due process is upheld if parties are made aware in the case management conference 
of the possibility that the arbitral tribunal may draw an adverse inference under 
certain conditions (marghitoLa, 214 et seq.).
325  Société Dresser-Rand Group Inc. v. Société Diana Capital I F.C.R., Paris Court of Appeal, 
28 Feb. 2017, First Civil Chamber, 15/06036.
326  Ibid., n. 292.
62 Chapter 4: Sanctions of the Arbitral Tribunal
during the proceedings to explain why the relevant documents were not 
presented. Thus, the Court of Appeal reasoned that due process had been 
upheld at all times. 
This decision certainly promotes the use of adverse inference.327 Parties 
should therefore think carefully before deliberately refusing to produce evi­
dence, pursuant either to a direct order of the arbitral tribunal or to a request 
of another party. Moreover, the decision affirms that as long as the parties are 
given an opportunity to comment on the non­production of evidence, due 
process is sufficiently upheld.328 Despite this very straightforward and gen­
erally welcome decision, arbitral tribunals would be well advised to give the 
party a final opportunity to restate its reasons for non­production of evi­
dence329—if only because often the mere threat of adverse inference can be 
enough to persuade a party to comply with evidentiary orders.330 
C. Anticipated Assessment of Evidence
As stated above (see p. 60 et seqq. supra), the conditions under which an ad­
verse inference can be drawn should not be understood as mandatory.331 
This is rather a question of how the arbitral tribunal freely assesses the evi­
dence (both presented and missing) and acts according to its ‘inner convic­
tion’.332 Consequently, a party that requests the arbitral tribunal to draw an 
adverse inference has no right to the grant of its request.333 In Switzerland, 
the SFT has emphasised several times that an arbitral tribunal’s refusal to 
draw an adverse inference does not violate the right to be heard, but rather 
falls within the scope of its free assessment of evidence.334 In this respect, 
the SFT also refers to the ‘anticipated assessment of evidence’, which will be 
subject to closer scrutiny (see p. 272 et seqq. infra).335 Simply put, this con­
cept allows the arbitral tribunal, for example, to refuse to examine further 
327  De weStgaVer/ZinatuLLina, Will Adverse Inferences Help Make Document Pro­
duction in International Arbitration More Efficient?.
328  Ibid.
329  Sharpe, 570; Van houtte, 209; waincymer, Evidence, 777.
330  Sharpe, 550.
331  greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 188.
332  o’maLLey, 7.39; Van houtte, 198.
333  SachS/nieDermaier, n. 66.
334  DFT 4A_450/2007 of 9 Jan. 2008, cons. 4.2.2; DFT 4A_2/2007 of 28 Mar. 2007, cons. 4; 
DFT 4P.22/1996 of 25 Jul. 1997, cons. 3c, in: ASA Bull. 2000, 103.
335  Art. 157 CCP CH; FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7312.
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evidence as it considers the fact already proven.336 Accordingly, this assess­
ment of evidence can be examined only under the very limited scope of a 
violation of public policy.337
As a consequence, the arbitral tribunal can—but need not—draw an ad­
verse inference if a party refuses to produce evidence.338 The same applies in 
civil state court proceedings: pursuant to Art. 164 CCP CH, if a party refuses 
to cooperate without valid reasons, the court shall take this into account 
when appraising the evidence. The SFT has held that this provision does not 
instruct the court to automatically draw an adverse inference, but rather 
leaves the respective consequences to the court’s free assessment of evi­
dence.339 It has further stated that although this fact must be assessed to the 
detriment of the non­compliant party, a de facto reversal of the burden of 
proof would go too far. 340 
D. Drawing of an Adverse Inference in Practice
In practice, however, arbitral tribunals are often hesitant to draw an adverse 
inference because of a potential violation of due process.341 Although the 
arbitral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion must always be balanced with 
the principle of due process, the fear of annulment or non­enforcement of 
the arbitral award is often unfounded.342 As previously pointed out (see 
p. 59, 63 supra), state courts are less likely to set aside an arbitral award if the 
parties had sufficient opportunity to argue on the point of whether an ad­
verse inference is appropriate. This is true even where it turns out that the 
adverse inference was in fact unjustified.343 Moreover, one should bear in 
336  See e.g. DFT 4A_427/2017 of 22 Jan. 2018, cons. 5.1.1; DFT 4A_277/2017 of 28 Aug. 2017, 
cons. 3.1.
337  Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA CH; DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.1.
338  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 21; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1358. In 
this respect, arbitrators should bear in mind that if they allow an adverse inference 
only under very severe conditions, parties have no more incentives to comply with 
evidentiary orders (marghitoLa, 177).
339  DFT 140 III 264, cons. 2.3.
340  Ibid.; BK­rüetSchi, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 7; BSK­SchmiD, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 2; Sut­
ter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 6.
341  Queen Mary Survey (2012), 21; greenBerg/LautenSchLager, 180, 202; Born, Int. 
Comm. Arb., 2393; LuttreLL, 293 et seqq.; SourgenS et al., n. 8.46.
342  Van houtte, 214.
343  marghitoLa, 214 et seq. He argues that an unjustified adverse inference is not a viola­
tion of equal treatment of the parties, and that this principle should not be misused to 
examine whether the arbitral tribunal’s discretion has been proportionate in regard 
to evidentiary measures.
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mind the (even worse) alternative: allowing a party to deliberately disre­
gard an evidentiary order of the arbitral tribunal. Both common sense and 
a basic understanding of justice require that a non­compliant party be sanc­
tioned in such a case (‘venire contra factum proprium’—that is, ‘no one may 
set himself in contradiction to his own previous conduct’).344 Faced with a 
hesitant tribunal, a party would be well advised to substantiate the conse­
quences of not drawing an adverse inference and its possible influence on 
the arbitral award.345 In addition, since common law is more familiar with 
the concept of adverse inference, the legal background of an arbitrator 
should be considered.346 All in all, where a party fails to produce evidence 
without substantial reasons, the arbitral tribunal should not be too reluc­
tant to use this powerful tool.347 
E. Summary 
As stated previously, adverse inference is the sanction most commonly im­
posed where a party fails to produce evidence without satisfactory reason in 
international arbitration (see p. 56 et seqq. supra). Although it is mentioned 
in very few institutional arbitration rules, it is common sense that the right to 
draw an adverse inference derives from the arbitral tribunal’s duty and right 
to freely assess the evidence. In contrast, although they say very little about 
the ‘how’ and ‘when’, the IBA Rules empower the arbitral tribunal to draw an 
adverse inference under certain conditions. Therefore, the conditions 
carved out by Sharpe provide arbitrators with helpful guidance on the cir­
cumstances under which this sanction should be imposed. These require­
ments are not engraved in stone, but should rather be applied on a case­by­
case basis. In doing so, the arbitral tribunal must pay particular attention to 
ensure that the threshold of prima facie evidence is not too high for the re­
questing party. In addition, it has been shown that the decision on whether 
to draw an adverse inference always involves a balancing act between freely 
assessing the evidence and observing due process. In this regard it seems 
fair—albeit perhaps not strictly necessary—to grant the reluctant party a final 
chance to comply with the evidentiary order. Furthermore, the mere threat 
of drawing an adverse inference can often induce parties to produce the evi­
dence in question. 
344  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2393.
345  LuttreLL, 294 et seq.
346  Ibid., 295.
347  hoSang, Adverse Inferences, 804.
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Despite the broad acceptance of this measure, arbitral tribunals seem to be 
rather reluctant to draw adverse inferences in practice. Concerns regarding 
the possible annulment or non­enforcement of an arbitral award because of 
an (even unjustified) adverse inference have been disproved. It is thus hoped 
that arbitral tribunals and state courts will take brave steps forward by apply­
ing this concept more often. This is especially true given that adverse infer­
ence is by far the most effective tool to sanction a party that refuses to pro­
duce evidence. However, whether other state courts will commit to adverse 
inference based on the far­reaching model of the Paris Court of Appeal re­
mains to be seen. 
§ 3 Cost Sanctions
A. Introduction
In addition to drawing an adverse inference, the arbitral tribunal can sanction 
non­compliant parties through the allocation of costs. The most important 
monetary sanctions with regard to evidence are addressed below. The ques­
tion to be answered here is whether these cost sanctions are worthy alterna­
tives to an adverse inference. 
B. Allocating the Costs
The most common way to sanction a non­compliant party is through the allo­
cation of costs in the arbitral award. This principle is widely accepted in inter­
national arbitration.348 In this case, the arbitral tribunal deviates from the 
common principle that costs ‘follow the event’—that is, the costs reflect the 
parties’ relative success and failure.349 Consequently, a prevailing party may 
nonetheless be sanctioned to bear the costs of arbitration (partially or in full) 
due to non­compliance.350 Therefore, in the absence of agreement between 
the parties, several leges arbitri and institutional arbitration rules allow the 
arbitral tribunal, in allocating costs, to consider the respective circumstances 
of the case, such as the conduct of a party during the proceedings.351 Art. 28.4 
LCIA Rules, as one of the most explicit provisions in this regard, states: 
348  o’maLLey, n. 7.43; BLackaBy et al., n. 9.96; roSeLL, 117 et seq.
349  S. 61 (2) EAA 1996; Art 28.4 1st sentence LCIA Rules; roSeLL, 116.
350  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 213.
351  Arbitration Rules: see e.g. Art. 42 (1) UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 37 (5) ICC Rules; Art. 34 
ICDR Rules; Art. 33.3 DIS Rules; Leges arbitri: see e.g. § 1057 (1) CCP DE; Art. 1467 CCP 
FR; S. 61 (2) EAA 1996.
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“The Arbitral Tribunal may also take into account the parties’ conduct in 
the arbitration, including any co­operation in facilitating the proceedings 
as to time and cost and any non­co­operation resulting in undue delay and 
unnecessary expense. Any decision on costs by the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
be made with reasons in the award containing such decision.”
Similarly, Art. 33.3 DIS Rules reads as follows:
“The arbitral tribunal shall make decisions concerning the costs of the 
arbitration in its discretion. In so doing, it shall take into account all 
circumstances that it considers to be relevant. Such circumstances may 
include the outcome of the arbitration and the extent to which the par­
ties have conducted the arbitration efficiently.”352
As it is the case with adverse inference, a party on whom a monetary sanction 
might be imposed should be warned first in order to observe due process.353 
Focusing specifically on the process of taking evidence, Art. 9 (7) IBA Rules 
reads as follows:
“If the Arbitral Tribunal determines that a Party has failed to conduct itself 
in good faith in the taking of evidence, the Arbitral Tribunal may, in ad­
dition to any other measures available under these Rules, take such fail­
ure into account in its assignment of the costs of the arbitration, including 
costs arising out of or in connection with the taking of evidence.”
Unsurprisingly, the concept of ‘good faith’ is understood very differently 
among various legal cultures. As previously discussed, in one legal system, 
interaction between lawyers and potential witnesses prior to the hearing is 
considered standard procedure; while in another, it is considered unethical 
(see p. 43 et seqq. supra). That is why the concept of ‘good faith’ should not be 
culturally motivated, but should rather represent an objective standard.354 
Therefore, to act in good faith means first and foremost to cooperate in the 
taking of evidence by presenting the requested evidence in accordance with 
the procedural timetable.355 Furthermore, it includes refraining from ac­
tions that would threaten or hinder another party’s access to evidence.356 
352  See also ScharDt, 35.
353  reeD, 100 et seq; roSeLL, 118.
354  o’maLLey, n. 7.44.
355  Ibid., n. 7.46 et seqq.
356  Ibid., n. 7.52.
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Although the possibility to sanction an obstructionist party in allocating the 
costs in the arbitral award is widely accepted, this rarely happens in prac­
tice.357 This is all the more astonishing given that practitioners seem to em­
brace the fact that improper conduct by a party will be reflected in the allo­
cation of costs.358 One explanation for the reluctance of arbitral tribunals to 
allocate costs other than by following the event is that the actual costs caused 
by the party’s non­compliance must be shown, which can be hard to prove at 
times.359 Still, in a number of ICC cases, the arbitral tribunal allocated the 
costs at the expense of parties that manipulated and unnecessarily delayed 
the arbitral proceeding.360 
C. Sanctions Against Party Representatives 
1. Introduction
In addition to the possibility to sanction non­compliant parties through the 
allocation of costs, recent discussions have highlighted the consequences of 
misconduct by party representatives and the issue of counsel ethics in gen­
eral.361 As ‘guerrilla tactics’, party representatives might make deliberately 
false statements, suppress and conceal documents or influence parties and/
or witnesses to do so. In such cases, it is unclear whether the arbitral tribunal 
is authorised to sanction the party representative directly. To curb such mis­
behaviour and level the playing field between conflicting professional ethical 
rules, at least two institutions have produced ethical guidelines and rules 
thus far.362 A general examination of the usefulness of guidelines and rules 
regarding the conduct of party representatives is beyond the scope of this 
book, which rather explores whether these could be helpful as sanctions in 
the taking of evidence.363 
357  reeD, 100.
358  Queen Mary Survey (2012), 41.
359  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 213.
360  Manufacturer v. Buyer, ICC Case No. 8486 (1996), n. 26, in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 172 et 
seq.; Agent v. Principal and Managing director of principal, ICC Case No. 7453 (1994), 
n. 44, in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1997, 124; Buyer Y v. Seller A and others, ICC Case No. 7661 
(1996), n. 52 et seq., in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1997, 163.
361  See e.g. park, 409 et seqq.; SuSSman, 239 et seqq.; geiSinger, 17 et seqq.; hwang/hon, 
658 et seqq.; Lau, 559 et seqq.; hoDgeS, 599 et seqq.; DaSSer, Guidelines, 634 et seqq.
362  geiSinger et al., 5. hoDgeS, 616; SuSSman, 251; DaSSer, Guidelines, 641 et seq. DaSSer 
argues that in terms of equality of arms, ‘leveling the playing field’ should take place 
in each individual arbitral proceeding, rather than according to an international 
guideline (‘We do not need to level the world if we can level the hearing room.’, 641).
363  For an introduction to guidelines, rules and other para­regulatory texts in interna­
tional arbitration, see ASA Special Series no. 37.
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2. IBA Guidelines 
The relatively new IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International 
Arbitration (henceforth ‘IBA Guidelines’) from 2013 may serve as a first exam­
ple. These detailed guidelines address various issues, such as counsel miscon­
duct with regard to submissions to the tribunal, document disclosure and the 
handling of witnesses and experts.364 According to the IBA Guidelines, ‘mis­
conduct’ is defined very broadly as ‘a breach of the present Guidelines or any 
other conduct that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be contrary to the 
duties of a Party Representative’.365 The main feature of the IBA Guidelines is 
found in Guideline 26, which states that the arbitral tribunal is empowered to 
impose sanctions in case of misconduct by a party representative. Accordingly, 
it can thus (a) admonish the party representative, (b) draw an adverse infer­
ence, (c) apportion costs appropriately, and (d) take any other appropriate 
measures in order to preserve the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. 
In stark contrast to the IBA Rules, the IBA Guidelines have been subject 
to harsh criticism since their introduction.366 The main concern relates to the 
ability of the arbitrators, as the competent body, to decide the matter in dis­
pute and to sanction a party representative at the same time. As a result, the 
arbitral tribunal might easily be tempted to show bias against parties and 
their representatives.367 This potentially endangers not only the arbitral tri­
bunal’s impartiality, but also the relationship between parties and their rep­
resentatives.368 In other words, this double role not only distracts the arbitral 
tribunal from its main purpose of deciding on the merits of the case, but also 
creates an unhealthy tension between the tribunal and the party represent­
atives, who will be much more likely to challenge the members of the arbitral 
tribunal because of possible bias against them.369 
364  For an extended overview of the IBA Guidelines, see waincymer, Regulatory Devel-
opments, 534 et seqq.; SuSSman, 252 et seqq.; rogerS, n. 3.89 et seqq.
365  IBA Guidelines, 3; waincymer, Regulatory Developments, 544.
366  SchneiDer, IBA Guidelines, 497 et seq.; DaSSer, Guidelines, 637 et seq.; hoDgeS, 613 
et seq.; Lau, 577 et seq.; Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2854 et seq.; hwang/hon, 658 et seq.; 
for the official ASA position, see geiSinger et al., 1 et seq.; for a mediating position see 
waincymer, Regulatory Developments, 550 et seq.
367  aShforD, Art. 26­27­18.
368  geiSinger et al., 2; DaSSer, Guidelines, 655, 660. He points out that parties would be 
unwilling to be interrupted by an investigation of counsel conduct which (in most 
countries) would fall under the competence of professional bodies such as the bar 
council or other supervisory authorities; for a different view, see Lau, 582 et seq.
369  hwang/hon, 659; hoDgeS, 616; aShforD, 27­27­12 et seqq. After all, although not 
mentioned expressly in the IBA Guidelines, the official commentary states that before 
imposing any sanctions, the arbitral tribunal ought to hear the parties and the im­
pugned representative (IBA Guidelines, 17). 
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As regards the effectiveness of the sanctions mentioned in the IBA Guide­
lines, several concerns are noteworthy. Of the four sanctions stated in Guide­
line 26, only sanction (a), which provides for the admonishment of a party 
representative, is a real sanction against counsel.370 Sanctions (b) and (c), 
which involve drawing an adverse inference or apportioning the costs, al­
ready lie within the remit of the arbitral tribunal. 371 Finally, sanction (d) al­
lows the arbitral tribunal to take appropriate measures to ensure the fairness 
and integrity of the proceedings. This provision has been drafted extremely 
broadly and is thus highly dubious, if not dangerous, in terms of the principle 
of legality. 372 Thus, the IBA Guidelines largely provide ‘sanctions’ which are 
already available to the arbitral tribunal. In addition, because sanctions (a) 
and (d) are drafted so broadly, there is always the danger of a party abusing 
the guidelines by making false and unfounded accusations of unethical be­
haviour of the adverse party’s representative.373 
Because of the numerous shortcomings of the IBA Guidelines, their adop­
tion by parties, counsel and arbitral tribunals remains lacklustre.374 The 
Queen Mary survey (2015) showed that the IBA Guidelines lack support among 
international arbitration practitioners; fewer than half of the survey respond­
ents agreed that the conduct of party representatives should not be further 
regulated, but that tribunals should instead use the currently available sanc­
tions.375 Notwithstanding the various issues relating to the IBA Guidelines, 
they seem to be at least partially used as guidelines (but not as binding rules).376 
370  DaSSer, Guidelines, 649.
371  Ibid., 649 et seq.; see also waincymer, Regulatory Developments, 520, 545. He states 
that sanctioning an innocent party with costs for the behaviour of its representative 
is problematic, since the representative is not part of the arbitration agreement and 
is therefore acting as a third party. Thus, the IBA Guidelines 26 (c) do not constitute a 
basis to burden a party representative personally with such costs; for a different view, 
see aShforD, n. 1­3­24 et seqq., 26­27­9 et seqq. He argues for direct jurisdiction over 
party representatives and therefore the possibility to sanction them in cases of mis­
conduct even if those representatives are not part of the arbitration agreement.
372  waincmyer, Regulatory Developments, 544 et seq.; DaSSer, Guidelines, 651; aShforD, 
n. 26­27­36.
373  hwang/hon, 659; SchneiDer, IBA Guidelines, 500; geiSinger et al., 2; DaSSer, Guide-
lines, 651 et seq.; aShforD, 26­27­15.
374  For a different view, see rogerS, n. 3.100 et seq. In her opinion, international arbitra­
tion is in desperate need of clarity on the proper conduct of party representatives: 
‘Attorneys need more guidance about what constitutes proper conduct. Parties need 
to understand better how to plan their legal representation and related case strategy. 
Arbitrators need more clear guidance and support in making rulings on ethical issues. 
And … national bar associations … need assurance that there is a reliable regime in 
place to protect client and societal interests implicated in attorney conducts’ (n. 3.98).
375  Queen Mary Survey (2015), 41. This view is confirmed in the more recent study by Lau, 571.
376  Ibid., 565; IBA Report (2016), 74 et seqq.
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3. LCIA Guidelines 
The second example is the LCIA Rules, which are thus far the first and only 
rules to include provisions regulating the conduct of party representatives to 
‘promote the good and equal conduct of the parties’ legal representative’.377 
To some degree inspired by the IBA Guidelines, the LCIA Rules, which were 
revised in 2014, now contain an annex with general guidelines concerning 
party representatives (henceforth the ‘LCIA Guidelines’).378 Since according 
to the LCIA Rules, party representatives can act as such only after agreeing 
on the provisions set forth in the annex, the LCIA Guidelines apply automat­
ically and there is no opt­out clause.379 
Unlike the IBA Guidelines, the LCIA Rules do not define the term ‘mis­
conduct’, but refer more generally to violation of the LCIA Guidelines.380 The 
annex itself lists the possible types of misconduct of party representatives, 
such as making false statements, procuring or assisting in the preparation of 
false evidence and knowingly concealing documents. According to Art. 18.6 
LCIA Rules, the arbitral tribunal, after consulting the parties and letting the 
parties’ representatives explain themselves, may impose cascading sanc­
tions as follows: (i) a written reprimand, (ii) a written caution as to future 
conduct in the arbitration, and (iii) finally, any other measure necessary to 
fulfil the general duties set forth in Art. 14.4 LCIA Rules. While the first two 
sanctions might already be sufficient to induce a party representative to com­
ply with the LCIA Guidelines, the third requires a higher standard.381 ‘Any 
other measure necessary’ can be imposed if this meets the requirements of 
due process under Art. 14.4 LCIA Rules. This could mean to report the mis­
conduct to a local professional authority or even exclude the party represent­
ative from the arbitration.382 
Needless to say, such severe sanctions should be imposed only in ex­
treme situations and after due consideration. Unlike under the IBA Guide­
lines, and because the sanctions in Art. 18.6 LCIA Rules are meant to be 
377  LCIA Guidelines n. 1; Mistelis­neSBitt/DarowSki, Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 5.
378  Because the Annex applies to every arbitration under the revised LCIA Rules, the 
name of the guidelines, as compared to ‘rules’ or ‘codes’, is misleading. Nonetheless, 
the Annex is not intended to derogate from mandatory laws or professional codes of 
conduct which apply to party representatives in the arbitration (LCIA Guidelines, n. 1; 
Scherer et al., Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 21).
379  Art. 18.5 LCIA Rules; Scherer et al., Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 22.
380  Art 18.6 LCIA Rules.
381  Scherer et al., Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 63.
382  Scherer et al., Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 63 et seqq.
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imposed directly against a party representative and not against the party it­
self, adverse inference and allocation of costs are not sanctions available un­
der the LCIA Rules.383 
There are plausible reasons to believe that the revised LCIA Rules will be 
of much greater significance and relevance than the IBA Guidelines. First, 
they enjoy greater legitimacy, since the parties agree indirectly to apply them 
by choosing the LCIA Rules in their arbitration agreement as the applicable 
procedural rules.384 Because the party representatives must agree to comply 
with these rules, the arbitral tribunal is authorised to impose sanctions on 
them directly.385 Second, compared to the IBA Guidelines, the LCIA Guide­
lines provide rather weak sanctions, but include strict requirements. As pre­
viously mentioned, the IBA Guidelines contain some sanctions which are 
already within the arbitral tribunal’s remit to impose (see p. 70 supra). The 
LCIA Guidelines, on the other hand, contain more effective measures to con­
trol the behaviour of party representatives. In addition, the sanction of tak­
ing ‘other measures’ is narrowly drafted and requires that high standards be 
met. Third, according to recent data, practitioners suggest that if there is to 
be tighter regulation of party representatives, this should be done through 
institutional arbitration rules such as the LCIA Guidelines, rather than 
through the IBA Guidelines.386 However, the extent to which the LCIA Guide­
lines help to control the conduct of party representatives remains to be seen. 
4. Result
The previous remarks have sketched out the current debate on the regulation 
of party representatives’ conduct in international arbitration. While some of 
these sanctions may be helpful in the taking of evidence, the arbitral tribunal 
should not be the competent body to impose them. While it is crucial that 
counsel misconduct is addressed and sanctioned, the arbitral tribunal should 
not have to play a double role of deciding on the merits of the case and sanc­
tioning non­compliant party representatives. As explained, this role creates 
a risk of an impartial arbitral tribunal, making the arbitral award more vul­
nerable to challenge on the grounds of violation of due process or arbitrator 
383  Ibid., Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 65; aShforD, Art. 26­27­32; for a different view, see Mistelis­ 
neSBitt/DarowSki, Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 7. They argue that the behaviour of party 
representatives should be considered when allocating the costs (Art. 28.4 LCIA Rules).
384  park, 419; Scherer et al., Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 22 et seqq.
385  Art. 18.5 LCIA Rules; Scherer et al., Art. 18 LCIA Rules n. 51 et seqq.; DaSSer, Guide-
lines, 659.
386  Queen Mary Survey (2015), 41.
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bias against party representatives. Only time will tell whether the compe­
tence to sanction non­compliant and/or obstructionist party representatives 
will be left to national bar councils or even, as suggested by the ASA, a global 
arbitration ethics council.387 
D. Monetary Penalties 
1. Introduction
Instead of assessing the costs to the detriment of the non­compliant party, in 
some jurisdictions arbitral tribunals are authorised to impose monetary pen­
alties. Even the mere threat of such penalties often induces a party to comply 
with evidentiary orders.388 The penalties are imposed either as a single lump 
sum or as a certain amount of money multiplied by the period of time for 
which the party is non­compliant.389 In most jurisdictions, these penalties 
are of a private nature and the amount, which is fixed by the arbitral tribunal, 
must be paid to the opposing party, rather than to the arbitral tribunal or a 
state court.390 The main purpose is therefore not to compensate a loss, but to 
punish a party for its misbehaviour.391 
2. Legal Basis
France, among other jurisdictions, is familiar with the concept of monetary 
penalties (so­called ‘astreintes’).392 Art. 1467 (3) CCP FR reads as follows:393
“If a party is in possession of an item of evidence, the arbitral tribunal 
may order that party to submit such evidence according to the terms and 
conditions the tribunal decides and, as need be, under penalty.”
The Dutch and Belgian leges arbitri include similar provisions; but astreintes 
are not permissible under Swedish law.394 In other countries, however, no 
387  geiSinger, 26 et seqq.; the work of the ASA-Working group in building a global arbi­
tration ethics council is on hold, at least for the moment.
388  LanDroVe/greuter, 527 et seq.
389  mourre, Judicial Penalties, 355; hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 220; Vogenauer­ 
ScheLhaaS, Art. 7.2.4 PICC n. 5.
390  LeVy, 26; LanDroVe/greuter, 529.
391  mourre, Judicial Penalties, 356.
392  For a brief historical overview of astreintes in France, see LanDroVe/greuter, 526 et seq.
393  According to Art. 1506  (3) CCP FR, Art. 1467 CCP FR applies not only to domestic arbi­
tration, but also to international arbitration, unless the parties agree otherwise; see 
also Art. 1468 CCP FR in regard to astreintes concerning interim measures.
394  Art. 1056 CCP NL; Art. 1700 (4) JC BE; S. 25 (3) SAA SE.
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such provisions can be found.395 Moreover, the examined institutional arbi­
tration rules do not allow for the possibility to impose astreintes—at least, not 
expressly.396 Regarding the lex mercatoria, only Art. 7.2.4 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) clearly empowers 
the arbitral tribunal to order astreintes. Still, as ScheLhaaS points out, this 
provision is largely inspired by French law and thus does not reflect a gener­
al principle of law.397 Finally, in the absence of any agreement between the 
parties, arbitral tribunals seem reluctant to impose monetary penalties. 
Even in France, the homeland of astreintes, they are imposed only rarely.398 
Hence, in the absence of any tangible legal basis, the question arises as 
to whether the arbitral tribunal can nonetheless order an astreinte. Since this 
question must be answered individually for each country, the focus below is 
on the situation in Switzerland. This issue must be separated from the prob­
lem of enforcing an astreinte, which is not within the scope of this book.
3. Astreintes in Switzerland
The Swiss lex arbitri is silent with regard to astreintes: it neither recognises 
nor denies them, but leaves this to the parties to agree in the arbitral proceed­
ings.399 While several authors recommend their application in both Swiss 
domestic and international arbitration, there is no consensus as to the con­
ditions under which this should actually be possible. The ‘inherent power 
theory’ could serve as inspiration here. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal, in 
fulfilling its jurisdictional power, has certain (inherent) powers and can con­
sequently order astreintes.400 Prior to the introduction of astreintes into 
French law, the Paris Court of Appeal reasoned that the power of the arbitral 
tribunal to impose monetary penalties is a necessary extension of its power.401 
395  For a brief overview, see mourre, Judicial Penalties, 361.
396  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 222 et seq.; moSimann, 136.
397  Vogenauer­ScheLhaaS, Art. 7.2.4 PICC n. 1 et seq.; LanDroVe/greuter, 544.
398  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 227 et seq.; see e.g. ICC Case No. 13490 (2007), 
where the respondent failed to produce certain documents. In the award, the arbitral 
tribunal repeated its order of document production paired with a daily fine (astreinte) 
of EUR 3,000, beginning one month after notification of the award until the respond­
ent complied with the document production order.
399  Art. 182 (1) PILA CH.
400  LanDroVe/greuter, 544 et seq.; mourre, Judicial Penalties, 362 et seq.; moSimann, 
137; hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 225 et seq.
401  Société Otor Participations et autres v. Carlyle Holdings 1 et autre, Paris Court of Ap­
peal, 7 Oct. 2004, in: Rev. Arb. 2005, 740. It is noteworthy that this decision was made 
prior to the implementation of astreintes as a mean of monetary penalty in the 
French lex arbitri.
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This book does not support this view. First, besides the fact that Swiss law 
contains no explicit legal basis to impose astreintes in arbitration, the inher­
ent power theory is a very vague foundation. This is one reason why astreintes 
were subsequently expressly included in the French lex arbitri. Second, this 
theory obviously lacks foreseeability—in particular for foreign parties, which 
could not anticipate the application of such a construct if it is stated in neither 
the lex arbitri nor the parties’ agreement.402 
Other authors propose—quite similar to the aforementioned theory of 
inherent powers—that the arbitration agreement be interpreted to determine 
whether the parties have (even tacitly) empowered the arbitral tribunal to 
impose monetary penalties (‘implicit consent theory’).403 But here again, this 
book does not support this view. Since this reasoning served to support the 
arbitral tribunal’s power to order interim measures before it was enshrined 
in almost all leges arbitri and institutional arbitration rules, it would go too 
far to use this theory to support such a drastic sanction as monetary penal­
ties.404 In addition, as is the case for evidentiary matters more broadly, at the 
time of agreeing to arbitrate, the parties will not usually consider the ques­
tion of whether monetary penalties should be imposed in case of non­com­
pliance.405 To conclude, therefore, that the parties have nonetheless agreed 
upon the application of astreintes would appear to be mere speculation.406 
Based on the previous remarks, this book supports the prevailing view in 
Switzerland that no astreintes can be ordered in the absence of explicit agree­
ment between the parties, unless the respective lex arbitri contains an explic­
it provision in this regard.407 Still, although rarely seen in practice, the parties 
can empower the arbitral tribunal to order astreintes or choose a lex arbitri 
which is familiar with this concept.408 
402  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 225 et seqq.; marghitoLa, 180.
403  Art. 182 (2) PILA CH; gaiLLarD/SaVage, n. 1274; LeVy, 29; mourre, Judicial Penalties, 
362 et seq.; concerning interim measures, see Boog, n. 156 et seq.; girSBerger/VoSer 
point out that the arbitral tribunal’s power to order an astreinte is justified only if it is 
enforceable. Therefore, they suggest that the arbitral tribunal can impose it and then 
confirm it in a partial award (n. 1110).
404  hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 226.
405  mourre, Judicial Penalties, 364; hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 226.
406  moSimann, 138. In regard to astreintes in connection with interim measures, Boog 
argues that as long as the parties do not expressly agree otherwise, they have implic­
itly empowered the arbitral tribunal to order astreintes to ensure a maximum of legal 
protection (n. 156 et seq.).
407  Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1263; moSimann, 138; hoSang, Obstructionist Behaviour, 
227; marhgitoLa, 180; gökSu, n. 302.
408  marghitoLa, 180.
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4. Result
Astreintes as monetary penalties in international arbitration are used to pun­
ish a party for non­compliance. They can thus be a very powerful tool, forcing 
the reluctant party to comply with procedural orders and reinforcing the 
position of the arbitral tribunal.409 Still, very few jurisdictions acknowledge 
this legal concept. In Switzerland, for instance, there is no legal basis for issu­
ing astreintes, even though several authors have suggested their application. 
Although this is seldom done in practice, parties could voluntarily empower 
the arbitral tribunal to impose monetary penalties in case of non­compli­
ance. Even where the parties or the respective lex arbitri allows the arbitral 
tribunal to apply such sanctions, this should be done only after due consid­
eration, given that astreintes are drastic sanctions. To sum up, this book con­
siders that an arbitral tribunal should order astreintes only if the parties have 
explicitly agreed on this or if this is enshrined in the respective lex arbitri. 
E. Summary
The goal of this chapter was to examine whether cost sanctions are a worthy 
alternative to the drawing of an adverse inference. This question must be 
answered separately for each type of cost sanction. As discussed, the alloca­
tion of costs in the arbitral award is the most common way to sanction parties 
through costs, even though this is seldom done in practice. The fact that 
many institutional arbitration rules allow the arbitrators to take the parties’ 
behaviour into account in allocating the costs should encourage arbitral tri­
bunals to make use of this right. This applies all the more since the mere 
threat of allocating costs to the disadvantage of a non­compliant party can 
induce it to play by the rules. Thus, compared to the drawing of an adverse 
inference, allocating the costs accordingly is a viable—albeit less important—
alternative. 
With regard to the sanctioning of party representatives, the relatively 
new guidelines and rules reveal many shortcomings and discrepancies. To­
gether with the prevailing view in doctrine, this book supports the opinion 
that competence to sanction a party representative in international arbitra­
tion should not fall within the remit of the arbitral tribunal, but should rather 
be left to national bar councils or even a global arbitration ethics council. 
Hence, to sanction a party representative is no alternative to drawing an ad­
verse inference. 
409  LanDroVe/greuter, 537.
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Finally, although astreintes are available in some jurisdictions, there is no 
consensus in international arbitration about this legal concept. The only 
way to apply them, if not provided for in the respective lex arbitri, is by 
means of the parties’ agreement, which seems to happen very rarely. To sum 
up, as treintes are considered as an alternative to adverse inference only if 
the parties have empowered the arbitral tribunal to impose such penalties 
in case of non­compliance. 
§ 4 Conclusion
This chapter has set out the various sanctions that an arbitral tribunal can 
impose if parties do not voluntarily present evidence. In order to observe due 
process at all times and give a reluctant party a final chance to comply, an 
arbitral tribunal would be well advised to inform the parties of its intention 
before actually imposing a sanction. 
From the point of view of the arbitral tribunal, sanctions are rather weak 
measures, since they cannot retrospectively undo the damage done to the 
proceedings as a result of non­compliance.410 Nonetheless, some of the 
abovementioned measures can prove very helpful. Adverse inference is an 
important tool if a party refuses to reveal a piece of evidence. The legal frame­
work as stated in institutional arbitration rules and the IBA Rules alike, as 
well as recent support from national courts, should therefore encourage ar­
bitral tribunals not to be too hesitant and to use adverse inference by assess­
ing the evidence.411
Regarding cost sanctions, it has been demonstrated that an arbitral tri­
bunal can to some degree sanction a non­compliant party by allocating costs 
against it in the arbitral award. However, difficulties can arise in this regard 
in calculating the actual damages caused by the party’s non­compliance.412 
Nonetheless, arbitral tribunals should deviate from the principle that costs 
follow the event where parties have hindered the taking of evidence. As re­
gards sanctions against party representatives in international arbitration, this 
book has strongly argued against the sanction system as set forth in the IBA 
Guidelines. Although a general discussion of counsel ethics is welcome, and 
the initial initiatives of the IBA and the LCIA Guidelines are well intended, the 
arbitral tribunal should not be tasked with deciding on these matters. Rather, 
410  reeD, 100.
411  hoSang, Adverse Inferences, 804 et seq.
412  reeD, 100.
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this should be left to either national bar councils or perhaps a global arbitra­
tion ethics council. Finally, monetary penalties such as astreintes should be 
imposed only if the respective lex arbitri contains such a sanction or if the 
parties have expressly agreed on their application. 
This chapter has revealed that the arbitral tribunal is anything but pow­
erless when faced with a party that is reluctant to produce evidence. Never­
theless, as the next chapter will demonstrate, there are situations in every 
arbitration where the arbitral tribunal’s power is limited in many ways.
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Chapter 5: 
Limits to the Taking of Evidence
§ 1 Introduction
Parties who are willing to settle their disputes through arbitration choose 
this private system of justice with all its numerous advantages, such as pro­
cedural flexibility and speed, as well as the confidentiality of the proceed­
ings and the finality of the arbitral award.413 In addition, state courts usual­
ly do not get involved in the arbitral proceedings; the arbitrators therefore 
enjoy wide discretion in conducting the taking of evidence without interfer­
ence.414 In reflecting on these advantages, however, one might be tempted 
to forget that this great freedom has its flipside and always comes at a price. 
Regarding the taking of evidence, several important distinctions between 
state courts and arbitral tribunals are worth mentioning.415 This chapter 
identifies the three main limitations of the arbitral tribunal regarding the 
power to gather evidence, which should pave the way towards a better un­
derstanding of why and when arbitral tribunals can and should resort to 
state courts for assistance. 
§ 2  Temporary Lack of Jurisdiction
The first limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. While 
state courts are, so to speak, always on duty, arbitral tribunals must be con­
stituted before they can act as private juridical bodies.416 Because the arbitral 
tribunal normally consists of either one or three arbitrators, its constitution 
can take quite some time.417 If the parties do not agree on the arbitrators or 
even challenge them, this process can easily take several months. With re­
gard to evidence, if parties wish to seek interim measures (e.g., securing the 
existence of evidence), state courts usually fill this jurisdictional vacuum. 
413  BLackaBy et al., n. 7.02. 
414  Dupeyron, 463 et seqq.
415  BLackaBy et al., n. 7.16 et seqq.
416  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 2450 et seq.; Schaefer, 524 et seq.
417  See e.g. coLomBini, n. 4; Art. 6 Swiss Rules; Art. 12 ICC Rules; Art. 5.2 LCIA Rules.
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While for a long time the temporary lack of jurisdiction forced parties to ap­
ply to state courts for interim relief, international arbitration has developed 
alternative mechanisms.418 They have done so primarily because turning to 
state courts often contradicts the parties’ core intention of resolving their 
disputes through arbitration and therefore excluding state court jurisdiction 
as far as possible.419 The fear that the dispute might become public and state 
courts’ inexperience with international arbitration disputes are further rea­
sons why parties prefer to seek interim relief directly from arbitration insti­
tutions.420 
Hence, in recent years, almost every arbitration institution began to in­
clude standard provisions in its rules regarding emergency arbitrators.421 
Compared to state courts, these specialised arbitrators provide for a fast, 
confidential and efficient interim award.422 Under the Swiss and ICC Rules, 
for example, an emergency arbitrator will render an arbitral award within 15 
days of the date on which the secretariat transmits the file to him or her.423 
Moreover, the possible measures that emergency arbitrators can offer are not 
limited to those available in state courts, which are often bound to the respec­
tive lex fori.424 Under most rules, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, 
provisions on emergency arbitrators apply automatically by choosing the 
respective institutional arbitration rules.425 Nonetheless, the parties can still 
specify whether they would prefer to resort to state courts or seek relief from 
an emergency arbitrator.426 Therefore, emergency arbitrators are consid­
ered a helpful supplement to interim relief from state courts.427 Once the 
418  See e.g. Art. 1449 CCP FR.
419  Santacroce, 284; Lew, 491.
420  Santacroce, 284; ehLe, Emergency Arbitration, 89.
421  See e.g. Art. 29 ICC Rules; Art. 9B LCIA Rules; Art. 6 ICDR Rules; Rule 30 SIAC Rules; 
Art. 43 Swiss Rules; waLZ, n. 13 et seqq. For a historic overview of emergency arbitra­
tors, see coLomBini, n. 7 et seqq. and ehLe, Emergency Arbitration, 87 et seqq.
422  hofmann/fuchS, 127; waLZ, n. 24 et seqq. On whether interim awards rendered by 
emergency arbitrators are considered enforceable under the NYC, see ehLe, Emer-
gency Arbitration, 99.
423  Art. 43 (7) Swiss Rules; Art. 6 (4) Appendix V ICC Rules; waLZ, n. 24 et seqq.
424  See e.g. Art. 183 (2) PILA CH; ehLe, Emergency Arbitration, 90, 97; waLZ, n. 22 et seq.
425  Regarding emergency arbitrators, most institutional arbitration rules provide for an 
opt­out­clause; see e.g. Art. 29 (6) (b) ICC Rules; Art. 9B.14 (ii) LCIA Rules; Art. 43 (1) 
Swiss Rules.
426  See e.g. Art. 29 (7) ICC Rules; Art. 9B.12 LCIA Rules; Art. 6 (7) ICDR Rules; Art. 30 (3) SIAC 
Rules; for ICC and Swiss Rules in particular, see coLomBini, n. 114 et seqq.; hofman/
fuchS, 118 et seq.; for strategic remarks regardin whether to opt for an emergency 
arbitrator or a state court, see LeVy D., 197 et seqq.
427  hofmann/fuchS, 129.
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arbitral tribunal has been constituted, however, the emergency arbitrator’s 
power ends and his or her interim award can be examined and revised freely 
by the arbitral tribunal.428 
In sum, the lack of jurisdiction prior to the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal has become a minor issue, as parties can now often choose between 
state courts and emergency arbitrators. Usually, parties will opt for emergen­
cy arbitrators, due to their effectiveness and experience with arbitration dis­
putes. Nonetheless, in some cases prior to the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, even an emergency arbitrator cannot provide enough help. For 
example, where a party requests that certain evidence be preserved because 
of the risk of potential destruction, emergency arbitrators lack coercive pow­
er to take the necessary legal steps to protect such evidence; which leads to 
the next limitation of the arbitral tribunal’s power.
§ 3 Lack of Coercive Power
The second limitation is the lack of coercive power. Quite obviously, in con­
trast to state courts, arbitral tribunals cannot directly enforce their orders 
and awards. While state courts can use coercive power given to them by the 
respective state, arbitral tribunals can act solely within the powers conferred 
upon them by the parties.429 As regards evidence, the arbitral tribunal is not 
completely helpless, as it can impose various sanctions on non­compliant 
parties. However, although adverse inference and cost sanctions are effec­
tive in many ways, they can be of limited use in certain situations—for exam­
ple, where a party cannot be held responsible for the fact that a certain piece 
of evidence is unavailable.430 In addition, if a party still refuses to produce 
evidence or even threatens to destroy relevant evidence, only state courts 
can solve the problem.431 The same applies to circumstances where a party 
intends to make an ex parte application (i.e. without hearing the adverse 
party)—for example, to freeze bank accounts of the adverse party.432 This 
428  See e.g. Art. 6 (5) ICDR Rules; Art. 43 (8) Swiss Rules; Santacroce, 284; ehLe, Emergen-
cy Arbitration, 95.
429  BLackaBy et al., n. 5.11. However, from a philosophical point of view, one must ac­
knowledge that arbitrators still have some sort of coercive power: parties will not 
wish to upset the arbitral tribunal equipped with the powers they have conferred 
upon it (ibid., n. 7.29); woLff, 233.
430  kreinDLer, 103; woLff, 286.
431  Dupeyron, 464; SteinBrück, 20 et seq.
432  BLackaBy et al., n. 7.21; hofmann/fuchS, 127 et seq. 
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competence is almost entirely reserved to state courts.433 To take account of 
these shortcomings, various leges arbitri supplement the arbitral tribunal’s 
powers by allowing national courts to step in and support the arbitral pro­
ceedings.434 
§ 4 Third Parties
The third limitation is that the arbitral tribunal’s powers are virtually always 
limited to the parties to the arbitration. Because of the consensual nature of 
arbitration, only the parties to the arbitration agreement can participate in 
the ensuing proceedings.435 As a result, the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdic­
tion over third parties—a reality which was cited as one of the three worst 
characteristics of international arbitration in a recent study.436 This is in stark 
contrast to state court litigation, where parties’ standing is determined not 
necessarily on a contractual basis, but more based on individual personal 
interests.437 In order to protect these interests, any natural person or legal 
entity is free to commence court proceedings against any other.438 
In complex international arbitral proceedings, relevant evidence is of­
ten found in the hands of third parties.439 One option in this case is to ap­
proach the third party directly in a bid to obtain the respective evidence (e.g. 
in the form of a document or witness testimony).440 However, this soon be­
comes problematic if the third party refuses to comply with the request. Un­
like state courts, which can force third parties to appear before them to tes­
tify or reveal certain documents, arbitrators have no such powers.441 The 
problem becomes even more complex if the third party resides outside the 
433  For an exception, see Art. 26 (3) Swiss Rules, which expressly allows the arbitral tribu­
nal to issue ex parte interim measures. This provision, inspired by Art. 265 (2) CCP CH, 
applies only in urgent cases, especially where communication of the request for an ex 
parte measure to the other party would prejudice the effectiveness of that measure 
(Zuberbühler et al.­oetiker, Art. 26 Swiss Rules n. 14).
434  See e.g. Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; § 1050 CCP DE; S. 13 (2) IAA SG; BLackaBy et al., n. 5.11 et 
seq.; Dupeyron, 465 et seq.
435  BrekouLakiS, 1166; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.01 n. 4 et seqq.; waincymer, 
Evidence, 53 et seq.
436  Dupeyron, 464; Schaefer, 529 et seq.; Queen Mary Survey (2018), 7 et seq.
437  BrekouLakiS, 1166.
438  Ibid.
439  o’maLLey, n. 3.93; hofmann/fuchS, 127.
440  Varga, 242.
441  krSuL, 183.
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territorial jurisdiction of the seat of arbitration.442 If the third party is in any 
way closely connected to any of the arbitration parties (i.e. in their sphere of 
influence), the arbitral tribunal can put pressure on that party to persuade 
the third party to produce the evidence as requested. However, if the third 
party still refuses to cooperate voluntarily, the evidence needed can in most 
cases be gathered only by resorting to state courts.443 
§ 5 Conclusion
This short overview has revealed that, despite the inherent procedural flex­
ibility of international arbitration, there are certain points at which only state 
courts can provide effective support. Even if an emergency arbitrator can fill 
the jurisdictional vacuum prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, 
this help is not enough if coercive power is needed—for example, if a party 
requests that evidence be preserved by means of a freezing order over cer­
tain assets of the adverse party. Last but not least, if evidence is in the control 
of third parties that are not willing to support the arbitral proceedings and 
refuse to produce the evidence voluntarily, the state courts serve as a last 
resort. 
Although arbitrators and parties usually do not like the idea of involv­
ing state courts in ongoing arbitral proceedings, their assistance is often 
crucial to ensure the ultimate effectiveness of the arbitration.444 Thus, the 
next chapter discusses the ways in which state courts can assist arbitral tri­
bunals in taking evidence, and considers whether they in fact have a legal 
obligation to support arbitral tribunals in general and in the taking of evi­
dence in particular. 
442  Ibid.
443  Ibid.




Court Assistance in 
International Arbitration
§ 1 Introduction 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, court assistance in the taking of 
evidence is sometimes the only option. This chapter takes a closer look how 
this works in general, before moving to a comparative analysis of various 
leges arbitri. The issue is approached from three different angles. The first 
concentrates on when court assistance in the taking of evidence is needed and 
how this works in practice. Thus, in a short outline, various types of court 
assistance in taking evidence will be analysed in part two. However, the mere 
fact that court assistance is possible from a practical standpoint does not nec­
essarily mean that it can or should be granted. Its legitimacy in general, and 
in the taking of evidence in particular, will therefore be examined in part 
three. This will show that both leges arbitri and (ad hoc and institutional) ar­
bitration rules contain an option to resort to state courts in order to gather 
evidence. In addition, a closer look at the intention of the parties is necessary 
in order to confirm and strengthen the legitimacy of court assistance in the 
taking of evidence. However, such legitimacy does not, in itself, necessarily 
imply an obligation to grant assistance; thus, the final part of this chapter ex­
plores whether state courts are obliged to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking 
of evidence based on federal, constitutional and international public law. 
§ 2 Measures of Court Assistance in Taking  
Evidence 
A. Introduction
Throughout the arbitral proceedings, court assistance might become nec­
essary in numerous situations. Prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribu­
nal, the validity of the arbitration agreement may be questioned or interim 
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measures sought.445 While the arbitral tribunal is being established, state 
courts can assist in relation to the appointment and challenge of arbitra­
tors.446 During the arbitral proceedings, court assistance may be granted 
in relation to interim measures and the taking of evidence.447 Once the ar­
bitral award has been rendered, it may be challenged before state courts on 
various grounds, such as violation of the right to be heard or even breach of 
the ordre public (i.e. public policy).448 Finally, at the enforcement stage, 
court assistance may be needed if a party refuses to comply with the arbi­
tral award.449 
This short outline provides only a glimpse of the situations in which court 
assistance may be necessary. As this thesis focuses on the taking of evidence, 
only measures concerning evidence will be examined.450 In this regard, one 
should be aware that numerous leges arbitri contain only short provisions in 
this regard, stating merely that assistance from state courts in the taking of 
evidence may be sought. Consequently, there is no precise catalogue of the 
possible measures available in international arbitration; the ways in which 
and the extent to which courts can assist arbitral tribunals will therefore vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.451 However, most types of assistance in rela­
tion to evidence can be classified as either interim measures or simple acts of 
court assistance in the taking of evidence. By means of various examples from 
leges arbitri, these types of assistance will be addressed next. 
B. Interim Measures
Although interim measures will not be explored extensively in this book, a 
few remarks are nonetheless necessary because of their close connection to 
the taking of evidence. While numerous leges arbitri mention interim meas­
ures, these go by different names and their extent is rarely further specified.452 
An exception to this is the UNCITRAL ML, which provides a definition in 
Art. 17 (2): 
445  Lew, 496 et seq.; BLackaBy et al., n. 7.09 et seqq.
446  Regarding the Swiss lex arbitri see Arts. 179 (2) and 180 (3) PILA CH.
447  Lew, 497 et seq.; BLackaBy et al., n. 7.13 et seqq.
448  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 16.03 n. 21 et seqq.
449  BLackaBy et al., n. 11.01 et seqq.
450  For an extensive outline of the role of state courts in arbitration, see Sutton et al., 
n. 7­001 et seqq.
451  Regarding measures taken by emergency arbitrators, see ehLe, Emergency Arbitration, 
102 et seqq.
452  BLackaBy et al., n. 7.14; Boog, n. 21 et seqq.
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“An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of 
an award or in another form, by which, at any time prior to the issuance 
of the award by which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal 
orders a party to:
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the 
dispute;
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is 
likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral 
process itself;
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent 
award may be satisfied; or
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolu­
tion of the dispute.”
As Singapore has adopted the UNCITRAL ML to a significant extent, the IAA 
SG also refers to ‘interim measures’.453 By contrast, the Swiss, German and 
French leges arbitri speak of ‘provisional and conservatory measures’;454 
while English law455 refers to ‘court powers exercisable in support of arbitral 
proceedings’. Institutional arbitration rules take a similar approach, various­
ly referring to ‘interim measures’ (ICDR Rules),456 ‘conservatory and interim 
measures’ (ICC, LCIA and DIS Rules),457 ‘interim measures of protection’ 
(Swiss Rules)458 or ‘interim relief’ (SIAC Rules)459. Whatever the specific term 
may be, the goal of such interim measures remains the same: to grant tempo­
rary protection that safeguards the parties’ rights from possible damage dur­
ing the course of arbitration.460 In the interest of simplification, the term 
‘interim measures’ shall be used hereinafter, according to the definition set 
out in Art. 17 (2) UNCITRAL ML.
Under most of the examined leges arbitri, unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise, state courts and arbitral tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction to 
order interim measures.461 Consequently, all examined institution arbitration 
453  S. 3 and 12A IAA SG.
454  Art. 183 PILA CH; § 1041 (1) CCP DE; Art. 1449 CCP FR.
455  S. 44 (2) EAA 1996.
456  Art. 24 ICDR Rules.
457  Art. 28 ICC Rules; Art. 25.1 LCIA Rules; Art. 25 DIS Rules.
458  Art. 26 Swiss Rules.
459  Rule 30 SIAC Rules.
460  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 11 n. 1; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1236.
461  ehLe, Concurrent Jurisdiction, 158; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 11.03 n. 25; see e.g. Art. 9 
UNCITRAL ML, Art. 183 PILA CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 183 PILA CH n. 4; BSK­maBiLLarD, 
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rules state that resorting to a state court to seek interim measures is not con­
sidered incompatible with the arbitration agreement or seen as a waiver there­
of.462 With regard to evidence, interim measures in relation to the preserva­
tion of evidence have significant relevance. Within the legal doctrine, such 
measures are considered almost unanimously as interim measures, even 
though the exact boundary between interim measures and ordinary meas­
ures for the taking of evidence is anything but clear­cut.463 Especially at the 
outset of arbitration, before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, parties 
may have a keen interest in ensuring that evidence is secured and preserved.464 
Examples include situations where a record of a building’s construction must 
be made at a certain time (e.g. before completion of the construction),465 or 
where a key witness must be examined because he or she is terminally ill.466
While all examined leges arbitri content themselves with rather short 
general statements that state courts can order interim measures, S. 44 (2) EAA 
1996 is very specific and lists the matters in which they are competent to do so: 
“Those matters are:
(b) the preservation of evidence;
(c) making orders relating to property which is the subject of the pro­
ceedings or as to which any question arises in the proceedings:
(i) for the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody or de­
tention of the property, or
Art. 183 PILA CH n. 5; waLZ, n. 9 et seqq. In contrast, S. 44 (5) EAA 1996 is more restric­
tive, allowing state courts only to order interim measures if the arbitral tribunal has 
‘no power or is unable for the time being to act effectively’ (merkin/fLannery, 177 et 
seq.). Under French law, the situation is comparable because once the arbitral tribu­
nal is constituted, state courts are theoretically no longer competent to order interim 
measures (Art. 1449 CCP FR). However, as shown below, this view is supported by 
neither French legal doctrine nor case law (see p. 152 et seq. infra).
462  ehLe, Concurrent Jurisdiction, 159; BLackaBy et al., n. 7.24; see e.g. Art. 26 (9) UNCI­
TRAL Rules; Art. 25.1 DIS Rules; Art. 28 (2) ICC Rules; Art. 26 (5) Swiss Rules; Rule 30 (3) 
SIAC Rules; Art. 25.3 LCIA Rules.
463  Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1247; BLackaBy et al., n. 737 et seq.; Born, Law and Practice, 
ch. 11.01 n. 18; girSBerger/VoSer, n. 1102; gökSu, n. 1905; Von SegeSSer, Interim 
Measures, 479; for a different view see waLter et al., 135 et seq. These authors suggest 
that the arbitral tribunal can shift the burden of proof in cases where a party refuses 
to produce evidence or even interfere in the preservation of evidence. This opinion 
ignores the fact that evidence is often found in the hands of third parties where a 
simple shift of the burden of proof is not accurate. In contrast, Boog argues that inter­
im measures protect first and foremost the subjective rights of a party, while meas­
ures regarding the preservation of evidence concern only a matter of fact (n. 30). As a 
result, he considers such measures as interim measures only in the broadest sense.
464  BLackaBy et al., n. 7.37.
465  Von SegeSSer, Interim Measures, 479.
466  Lew et al., 595 et seq.
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(ii) ordering that samples be taken from, or any observation be made 
of or experiment conducted upon, the property;
and for that purpose authorising any person to enter any premises in the 
possession or control of a party to the arbitration; 
(d) the sale of any goods the subject of the proceedings.”
This provision lists all types of interim measures available. Lit. (b) applies to 
cases where evidence is in the control of a third party, which the arbitral tri­
bunals cannot obtain if that third party does not comply voluntarily.467 The 
goal here is to preserve evidence (e.g. in the form of documents) which may 
cease to exist or may be impossible to find in the near future.468 Moreover, lit. 
(c) mentions orders relating to the property of third parties.469 Obviously, 
such measures exceed the powers of an arbitral tribunal. In construction 
disputes in particular, state courts may order that samples of a building be 
taken in order to prevent the property from being altered, destroyed or sold 
before the evidence is secured for use in arbitration.470 Finally, according to 
lit. (d), state courts can also order the sale of perishable goods in order to 
preserve evidence or assets.471 S. 44 (2) EAA 1996 thus sets out a few examples 
of how state courts in England can effectively support the arbitral proceed­
ings by preserving evidence through interim measures.
C. Measures of Taking Evidence
In addition to interim measures, state courts can assist in the taking of evi­
dence through a wide spectrum of possible measures, depending on the re­
spective leges arbitri. In practice, however, in most cases either the attend­
ance of witnesses or the production of documents is sought. As compared to 
interim measures, which aim to grant provisional relief (i.e. for a certain pe­
riod of time only), ordinary measures for the taking of evidence aim to estab­
lish the relevant facts of the case. As for interim measures, the examined 
467  See. e.g. Assimina Maritime Ltd. v. Pakistan Shipping Corporation & Anor [2004] EWHC 
3005 (Comm.); for the corresponding provision regarding evidence in possession of 
a party, see S. 38 (6) EAA 1996.
468  merkin/fLannery, 140 et seq. Consequently, lit. (b) is not meant to order ordinary 
disclosure by a third party (harriS et al., S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 44D).
469  The corresponding provision as regards evidence in possession of a party is stated in 
S. 38 (4) EAA 1996.
470  S. 44 (2) (c) (ii) EAA 1996; Sutton et al., n. 7–193.
471  merkin/fLannery, 183; see e.g. the example given by Lord Justice Clarke in Cetelem 
S.A. v. Roust Holdings Ltd., [2005], EWCA 618 (Civ.), n. 65.
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leges arbitri contain either general rules or detailed provisions stating that 
state courts will provide assistance to arbitral tribunals in the taking of 
evidence. 
 
Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML contents itself with a general provision:
“The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal 
may request from a competent court of this State assistance in taking 
evidence. The court may execute the request within its competence and 
according to its rules on taking evidence.”
The German and Swiss leges arbitri also contain similar short provisions.472 
In other countries, the respective provisions are more detailed. As previous­
ly shown, the arbitral tribunal’s powers in relation to the taking of evidence 
are limited to the parties (see p. 82 et seq. supra). Thus, different leges arbitri 
recognise this issue by granting assistance as regards evidence in the control 
of third parties. For instance, Art. 1469 CCP FR is quite clear in this regard:
“In case a party to the arbitral proceedings intends to rely upon a … piece 
of evidence held by a third party, it may, upon the arbitral tribunal’s in­
vitation, file a claim against that third party before the President of the 
First Instance Court in order to obtain a copy thereof, or the submission 
of the document or piece of evidence.”
“If the President considers that the request is justified, he or she shall order 
the delivery or submission of an original, copy or abstracts, as the case 
may be, of the document or evidence, under the conditions and guaran­
tees that he or she shall determine, and as need be, under penalty.”
The main advantages of resorting to state courts in the taking of evidence—
that is, their coercive powers (‘under penalty’) and jurisdiction over third 
parties—are perfectly reflected in this provision (see in detail p. 153 et seq. 
infra). 
While the CCP FR speaks only of documents, S. 13 (2) IAA SG expressly men­
tions documents and witnesses:473
“The High Court or a Judge thereof may order that a subpoena to testify 
or a subpoena to produce documents shall be issued to compel the at­
tendance before an arbitral tribunal of a witness wherever he may be 
within Singapore.”
In addition to the possibility to force third parties to produce documents or 
appear before a state court or an arbitral tribunal, one might also consider 
472  Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; § 1050 (1) CCP DE.
473  See also S. 43 (1) EAA 1996.
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expert evidence. The Dutch Arbitration Act is quite exceptional in this re­
gard, as it empowers the arbitral tribunal to request expertise on foreign law 
through the assistance of state courts.474
D. Summary 
In summary, state courts can assist by ordering either interim measures or 
ordinary measures for the taking of evidence—for example, forcing third par­
ties to appear before a state court or directly before an arbitral tribunal to 
produce documents. Although there are many significant differences among 
jurisdictions, which will be discussed later in this book (see ch. 7 infra), it shall 
suffice here to conclude that most jurisdictions take a very arbitration­friend­
ly stance by assisting arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence. 
§ 3 Court Assistance versus Court Intervention 
A. Introduction
As previously shown (see p. 85 et seqq. supra), the assistance of state courts—
in the form of either interim measures or ordinary measures for the taking of 
evidence—is a key factor in ensuring the ultimate effectiveness of arbitration 
in this regard. Before taking a closer look at the legitimacy of court assistance 
in the taking of evidence, a few general remarks about the relationship be­
tween state courts and arbitral tribunals are worth mentioning. While this 
relationship has been described as a mix of ‘forced cohabitation and true 
partnership’,475 as well as ‘judicial­arbitral cooperation’,476 pauLSSon de­
scribes the issue and the tension inherent therein as follows:477 
“The great paradox of arbitration is that it seeks the cooperation of the 
very public authorities from which it wants to free itself. ”
Indeed, parties choose arbitration precisely because they do not want to 
settle their dispute in state court proceedings. Nonetheless, the help of state 
courts is often crucial. Many jurisdictions recognise the importance of inter­
national arbitration as an alternative dispute settlement mechanism and 
474  S. 1044 CCP NL. The Dutch legislator decided that arbitral tribunals should also ben­
efit from the European Convention on Information on Foreign Law (1968), which 
entered into force in the Netherlands in 1977.
475  BLackaBy et al., n. 7.01.
476  Dupeyron, 467.
477  pauLSSon, 2.
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commit themselves to support and assist arbitral tribunals—for example, by 
being Member States of international conventions such as the NYC or by mod­
elling their leges arbitri on the UNCITRAL ML. In return, jurisdictions expect 
to have a certain degree of control during and after the arbitral process by 
implementing minimum standards (e.g. the right to be heard), and by recog­
nising and enforcing international arbitral awards subject to certain require­
ments.478 Depending on the side from which one looks at it, the involvement 
of state courts in arbitral proceedings can be seen as either helpful assistance 
or disturbing interference.479 Because this issue opens up a broad field of 
technical and legal philosophical matters which would exceed the scope of 
this book, the following remarks focus on concerns regarding evidence. 
While acknowledging that the issue must be examined separately per 
jurisdiction, several general conclusions can nonetheless be drawn. This will 
be done by considering the topic from the point of view of the UNCITRAL ML, 
on which many leges arbitri are modelled and which defines the way in which 
and the extent to which state courts can intervene in arbitral proceedings.480 
In addition, the IBA Rules—as the source regarding evidentiary matters in 
international arbitration—contain helpful guidance on how to approach state 
courts with regard to the taking of evidence. Because they apply even stricter 
standards than the IBA Rules as to how to seek assistance from state courts, 
the LCIA Rules are worth mentioning too. Finally, the question arises, from 
the parties’ perspective, as to whether the possibility to seek assistance from 
state courts in the taking of evidence is actually covered by their intention. 
B. UNCITRAL ML 
1. Court Assistance in General
Art. 5 UNCITRAL ML establishes the overarching principle of limited court 
intervention—that is, a ‘hands­off’ approach:
“In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where 
so provided in this Law.”
The drafters of the UNCITRAL ML emphasised that although the wording of 
this provision could suggest that court intervention is negative, the intention 
was to clarify the expectations of parties and arbitrators alike with regard to 
478  BLackaBy et al., n. 1.202 et seqq.
479  kreinDLer, 103; SteinBrück, 44; see also Queen Mary Survey (2015), 7. Accordingly, 
national court intervention seems to be at least for 25% of the respondents a disadvan­
tage of international arbitration.
480  For a closer analysis of various countries and their approach in this matter see ch. 7 
infra.
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the points in the arbitral proceedings at which state courts may get involved.481 
The term ‘intervention’ may thus also be read as ‘assistance’.482 Art. 5 UNCI­
TRAL ML further clarifies that state courts have no inherent powers to inter­
fere in arbitral proceedings to the surprise of the parties and the arbitral tri­
bunal, except as set out in the UNCITRAL ML.483 This involvement can be 
divided into two categories. The first category concerns issues regarding the 
appointment, challenge and termination of the mandate of arbitrators (Arts. 11, 
13 and 14), the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (Art. 16) and the setting 
aside of the arbitral award (Art. 34).484 The second category comprises issues 
regarding the taking of evidence (Art. 27), recognition of the arbitration 
agreement (Art. 8) and interim measures (Arts. 9 and 17J), as well as recogni­
tion and enforcement of interim measures (Arts. 17H and I) and arbitral 
awards (Arts. 35 and 36). 
2. Court Assistance in the Taking of Evidence
With regard to court assistance in the taking of evidence, Art. 27 UNCITRAL 
ML specifies as follows:
“The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal 
may request from a competent court of this State assistance in taking 
evidence. The court may execute the request within its competence and 
according to its rules on taking evidence.”
Apparently, it was a major undertaking to reach an international consensus 
on how courts should assist in the taking of evidence. The question, there­
fore, was not whether but how such assistance may be granted.485 The draft­
ers began with a rather long and extensive article, and ended up with a limit­
ed provision which ultimately gained enough acceptance to be adopted.486 
This very fact indicates the complexity of the subject and the inconsistencies 
among the Member States of the UNCITRAL ML. In this regard, three issues 
were of major concern. 
481  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/264 (1985), 18, n. 3; UNCITRAL, Case Law (2012), Art. 5 UNCITRAL 
ML, n. 1–3. Because Art. 5 UNCITRAL ML refers only to ‘matters governed by this Law’, 
other concerns—such as the contractual relationship between arbitrators and parties 
or fixing the costs and fees of arbitration—are not included.
482  UNCITRAL, Summary Records of the 309th meeting (1985), n. 22, 25 and 40.
483  Schaefer, 533 et seq.; Mistelis­BrekouLakiS et al., Art. 5 UNCITRAL ML, 847 et seq.
484  Art. 6 UNCITRAL ML.
485  hoLtZmann/neuhauS, Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML, 734.
486  Ibid., Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML, 735; UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/264 (1985), 58.
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First, Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML refers only to ‘court assistance in taking evi­
dence’, without further specifying the types of evidence.487 According to the 
commission report, the scope of application was meant to be limited territo­
rially.488 Member States are thus at liberty to decide how to treat a request for 
the taking of evidence—that is, whether the court itself will take the evidence 
or whether that evidence will be provided directly to the arbitral tribunal.489 
Second, concerns were voiced during the drafting process about the po­
tential abuse of requests for court assistance.490 While it was initially suggest­
ed that only the arbitral tribunal should be permitted to make requests for 
court assistance, the final draft also allows parties to do so, subject to the ap­
proval of the arbitral tribunal.491 This puts the arbitral tribunal at the centre 
of the arbitral proceedings and avoids possible dilatory tactics, as well as con­
flicts with national rules on civil procedure.492 Moreover, the arbitral tribunal 
itself can resort to state courts for assistance in the taking of evidence. Here 
again, because it takes evidence itself and decides how to assess that evidence 
itself, the arbitral tribunal should also be able to seek court assistance in this 
regard itself, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise. 
Third, Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML applies only if the seat of arbitration is in 
the territory of a Member State.493 Hence, court assistance in the taking of 
evidence is not available for a foreign arbitral tribunal or if the seat of arbitra­
tion is undetermined.494 Although some drafters would have preferred that 
foreign tribunals also be able to seek court assistance in the taking of evi­
487  Mistelis­BrekouLakiS et al., Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML, 889.
488  UNCITRAL, A/40/17 (1985), n. 223.
489  hoLtZmann/neuhauS, Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML, 735.
490  Ibid.
491  See also UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/245 (1983), n. 40. During the drafting process it has been 
suggested by some representatives that because of the adversary principle, only par­
ties should be allowed to make requests for court assistance.
492  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/246 (1984), n. 94. See e.g. Delphi Petroleum Inc. v. Derin Shipping 
and Training Ltd., Federal Court of Canada, 3 Dec. 1993, summarized in: UNCITRAL, 
A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/4, 11. In this decision, the Federal Court of Canada denied 
court assistance on the grounds of dilatory tactics of the requesting party; see further­
more Vibroflotation A.G. v. Express Builders Co. Ltd., High Court of Hong Kong, 15 Aug. 
1994, in: UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/5, 3. Here, a request for document 
production against a third party was denied because, according to the High Court of 
Hong Kong, such a request was not timely and ‘months if not years away from the 
main evidential hearing in this arbitration’.
493  Art. 1 (2) UNCITRAL ML.
494  See e.g. B.F. Jones Logistics Inc. et al. v. Rolko et al., Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
Canada, 24 Aug. 2004, CanLII 21276. In contrast, see § 1050 CCP DE, which expressly 
allows foreign arbitral tribunals to obtain court assistance in the taking of evidence.
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dence,495 this idea was abandoned on the grounds that the UNCITRAL ML 
should not determine such a complex matter. Rather, solutions should be 
achieved by means of international conventions and bilateral treaties.496 By 
contrast, the following comparative analysis will show that several jurisdic­
tions have clearly adopted a more liberal approach in this respect.497
The evidence which can be taken depends on the rules of the respective 
Member State on the taking of evidence. As the comparative analysis con­
ducted in this book will show, the reality is that many leges arbitri choose to 
offer assistance to foreign arbitral tribunals directly. However, the UNCI­
TRAL ML takes a rather conservative approach by limiting the scope of the 
available assistance to the respective measures in the jurisdiction where such 
assistance is sought. 
The territorial limitation of Art. 1 (2) UNCITRAL ML does not apply to 
interim measures for the preservation of evidence.498 This exception takes 
account of the fact that interim measures might be needed at the outset of 
arbitration, when the seat is not yet determined, or if certain evidence is lo­
cated in another jurisdiction than the seat of arbitration.499 Unfortunately, 
this does not apply to the taking of evidence (Art. 27 UNICTRAL ML). 
3. Result
The UNCITRAL ML introduces the basic principle that in order to support 
arbitration, state courts can step in during the proceedings where this pos­
sibility is provided for by the UNCITRAL ML itself. It has been shown that 
there are many situations in which state courts can support the arbitral 
proceedings. With regard to evidence, state courts can assist arbitral tribu­
nals as long as the seat of arbitration is in the territory of the respective 
Member State. An exception in this respect concerns interim measures—for 
example, in relation to the preservation of evidence. Moreover, in order to 
avoid abuse in form of dilatory tactics, requests for court assistance always 
require the approval of the arbitral tribunal. Finally, the scope of possible 
assistance will be determined by the respective national rules of civil pro­
cedure. In conclusion, it may be said that—at least from a legislative point of 
view—there is an international consensus that state courts should assist 
495  UNCITRAL, A./CN.9/WG.II/WP.44 (1983), 183, Art. E.
496  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/245 (1983), n. 42 et seq; UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/246 (1984), n. 95 
et seqq.; UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/264 (1985), 59 et seq.
497  See ch. 7 infra. 
498  Art. 17 (2) (d) UNCITRAL ML. As regards measures of preservation of evidence as in­
terim measures, see p. 87 et seqq.  supra.
499  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108 (2000), n. 74 et seqq.
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arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence if the respective requirements are 
met. Whether this view is reflected in (institutional and ad hoc) arbitration 
rules will be explored next.
C. Arbitration Rules
1. IBA Rules
The IBA Rules, which were revised in 2010, now impose strict requirements 
as regards whether and when state courts can assist in the taking of evidence. 
They provide that court assistance may be sought only if the evidence—
whether documentary evidence or witness evidence—is in the control of 
third parties.500 As regards the parties themselves, the arbitral tribunal is 
empowered to sanction a recalcitrant party for its failure to provide evidence 
by drawing an adverse inference (see p. 56 et seqq. supra). According to the 
IBA Rules, the arbitral tribunal has the widest discretion to grant or deny a 
request to seek state court assistance. Consequently, its decision is generally 
not open to challenge.501 However, the comparative section of this book will 
show how this works in different leges arbitri.502
a. Documentary Evidence
The IBA Rules acknowledge that in some situations, documents must be ob­
tained from third parties. However, strict requirements must be met in this 
regard. Art. 3 (9) IBA Rules reads as follows:
“If a Party wishes to obtain the production of Documents from a person 
or organisation who is not a Party to the arbitration and from whom the 
Party cannot obtain the Documents on its own, the Party may, within 
the time ordered by the Arbitral Tribunal, ask it to take whatever steps 
are legally available to obtain the requested Documents, or seek leave 
from the Arbitral Tribunal to take such steps itself.”
“The Party shall submit such request to the Arbitral Tribunal and to the 
other Parties in writing, and the request shall contain the particulars set 
forth in Article 3.3, as applicable.” 
“The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide on this request and shall take, author­
ize the requesting Party to take, or order any other Party to take, such 
500  There are no similar provisions in regard to expert witnesses or inspections.
501  o’maLLey, n. 4.71. A party would have to show that denying an evidence request 
would have a direct impact on the arbitral award—for example, by proving a violation 
of the right to be heard; see also the appellate remedies in Switzerland, p. 256 et seqq. 
infra.
502  See ch. 7 infra. 
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steps as the Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate if, in its discretion, 
it determines that 
(i) the Documents would be relevant to the case and material to its out­
come, 
(ii) the requirements of Article 3.3, as applicable, have been satisfied and 
(iii) none of the reasons for objection set forth in Article 9.2 applies.”
While Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML emphasises the role of the arbitral tribunal, the 
IBA Rules are even more specific in this respect.503 Parties can thus make re­
quests for court assistance only if they are unable to obtain the document 
themselves. In addition, the request itself must meet the requirements of 
Art. 3 (3) IBA Rules, as well as the absence of any reason listed in Art. 9 (2) IBA 
Rules. Instead of ‘court assistance’, the IBA Rules use the wording ‘take what­
ever steps are legally available to obtain the requested Documents’, without 
making further explanations. In legal doctrine, this wording is seen as allow­
ing the possibility to seek assistance from state courts, among other things.504 
As an alternative, an arbitral tribunal can order a party that presumably 
knows where documents of a third party are located to assist in finding them.505 
If this is not possible, the arbitral tribunal must decide on the request by con­
sidering whether the strict conditions set out in (i) to (iii) have in fact been met. 
Alternatively, the arbitral tribunal is at liberty to seek court assistance 
itself, quite similar to the possibility foreseen in Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML. 
Art. 3 (10) IBA Rules provides:
“At any time before the arbitration is concluded, the Arbitral Tribunal 
may (i) request any Party to produce Documents, (ii) request any Party 
to use its best efforts to take or (iii) itself take, any step that it considers 
appropriate to obtain Documents from any person or organisation.”
Because of the danger of a violation of equal treatment, the IBA Rules provide 
for cascading measures with regard to court assistance: the tribunal must 
first grant the parties the right to be heard and only afterwards decide wheth­
er court assistance in the taking of evidence is necessary.506
503  o’maLLey, n. 3.93.
504  Ibid., n. 3.100; ZuBerBühLer et al., Art. 3 IBA Rules n. 210; IBA Review Subcommittee 
(2010), 11.
505  See e.g. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID, ARB (AF)/00/3, 30 Apr. 
2004, n. 30. In this ICSID case, the arbitral tribunal ordered the claimant to disclose 
all relevant documents in possession of a third party to the respondent.
506  o’maLLey, n. 3.125. This course of action can be compared to the conditions to con­
sider before drawing an adverse inference (see p. 56 et seqq. supra).
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b. Witnesses
The wording of Art. 4 (9) IBA Rules is very similar to the provision on docu­
mentary evidence:
“If a Party wishes to present evidence from a person who will not appear 
voluntarily at its request, the Party may, within the time ordered by the 
Arbitral Tribunal, ask it to take whatever steps are legally available to 
obtain the testimony of that person, or seek leave from the Arbitral Tri­
bunal to take such steps itself.”
“In the case of a request to the Arbitral Tribunal, the Party shall identify 
the intended witness, shall describe the subjects on which the witness’s 
testimony is sought and shall state why such subjects are relevant to the 
case and material to its outcome.” 
“The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide on this request and shall take, author­
ize the requesting Party to take or order any other Party to take, such 
steps as the Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate if, in its discretion, 
it determines that the testimony of that witness would be relevant to the 
case and material to its outcome.”
By and large, reference may be made to the previous remarks on court assis­
tance for documentary evidence according to Art. 3 (9) IBA Rules. Because 
Art. 4 (9) IBA Rules does not mention Art. 9 (2) IBA Rules, o’maLLey rightly 
points out that, in addition to the conditions mentioned in Art. 4 (9) IBA Rules, 
the requesting party should demonstrate that none of the reasons for objec­
tion according to Art. 9 (2) IBA Rules applies.507
Regarding witnesses, the IBA Rules do not provide for the arbitral tribu­
nal to resort to state courts on its own initiative. Art. 4 (10) IBA Rules states 
only that the arbitral tribunal is competent to order the examination of wit­
nesses whose testimony has not yet been given in the arbitral proceedings. 
There is no indication that the drafters of the IBA Rules did not want to allow 
the arbitral tribunal to take ‘any step that it considers appropriate’508 in order 
to secure the attendance of witnesses. Therefore, Art. 4 (10) IBA Rules should 
be interpreted broadly by allowing the arbitral tribunal to seek court assis­
tance with the examination of witnesses on its own initiative. 
507  o’maLLey, n. 4.70.
508  Art. 3 (10) IBA Rules.
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2. Institutional Arbitration Rules
Almost all examined institutional arbitration rules are silent on the relation­
ship between state courts and the arbitral tribunal.509 In this regard, the 
LCIA Rules are an exception—Art. 22.2 states:
“By agreeing to arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement, the parties 
shall be treated as having agreed not to apply to any state court or other 
legal authority for any order available from the Arbitral Tribunal (if 
formed) under Article 22.1, except with the agreement in writing of all 
parties.”
The goal here is to strengthen the arbitration agreement by making it clear 
that where the parties agree to arbitrate under the LCIA Rules, they renounce 
the possibility to seek relief from state courts for anything that falls under the 
powers conferred on the arbitral tribunal according to Art. 22.1 LCIA Rules.510 
Consequently, this also relates to the arbitral tribunal’s power to order doc­
ument production, among other things.511 While Art. 22.2 LCIA Rules refers 
only to matters set out in Art. 22.1 LCIA Rules, there are other situations in 
which resorting to state courts is within the scope of the LCIA Rules.512 In 
comparison to the IBA Rules, Art. 22.2 LCIA Rules requires the consent of the 
other party to the arbitration to seek relief from state courts, rather than the 
approval of the arbitral tribunal. Neither the UNCITRAL ML nor the IBA Rules 
require such approval, so the LCIA Rules are thus even stricter in this regard. 
It is therefore conceivable that a party, even with the approval of the arbitral 
tribunal, may be unable to seek court assistance because the adverse party 
will not agree to it. 
3. Result
Although they differ in their degree of detail, the IBA Rules and the LCIA 
Rules both provide for the possibility to seek assistance from state courts in 
the taking of evidence. Nonetheless, they impose very strict standards under 
which this is possible. The IBA Rules are very detailed in this respect, while 
the LCIA Rules content themselves with the general remark that court assis­
tance can be sought only with the agreement of all parties. Both approaches 
509  The only exception are provisions about concurrent jurisdiction in regard to interim 
measures (see p. 87 et seq.  supra).
510  See e.g. Art. 22.1 LCIA Rules (‘additional powers’); Scherer et al., Art. 22 LCIA Rules n 38.
511  Arts. 22.1 (iv) and (v) LCIA Rules.
512  See e.g. Art. 23.5 LCIA Rules regarding the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction and Art. 25.3 
LCIA Rules concerning interim measures.
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strive to prevent parties from reaching out to state courts without the approv­
al of the arbitral tribunal or the other parties. Only this ensures that court 
assistance is actually in the interests of the respective arbitration. 
Hitherto, the question of whether parties can seek assistance from state 
courts in the taking of evidence has been answered only from the point of 
view of the UNCITRAL ML and arbitration rules. Hence, the focus now shifts 
to the intention of the parties. 
D. Intention of the Parties 
Quite understandably, a party whose adversary is requesting court assis­
tance in the taking of evidence might argue against such a course of action, 
for various understandable reasons. Most importantly, the parties will have 
chosen to arbitrate precisely because they did not want to settle their dispute 
before state courts; thus, every move in this direction could be considered an 
attempt to circumvent the arbitration agreement, including the arbitral tri­
bunal’s exclusive power over the arbitral proceedings.513 In addition, one 
might argue that the requesting party is trying to impose the practices of a 
specific legal culture as regards matters of evidence, as opposed to the 
well­balanced approach to the taking of evidence in international arbitra­
tion.514 Although these arguments are to a certain degree justified and com­
prehensible, from the parties’ point of view, cogent arguments may also be 
made to support the opposite position.
First, it is important to ask whether resorting to state courts is really a 
circumvention of the arbitration agreement. Admittedly, the agreement to 
arbitrate implies an intention to settle the dispute through arbitration and 
not through state court litigation. It also implies an intention to play by the 
rules referred to in the arbitration agreement (e.g. institutional arbitration 
rules). These rules, as well as certain leges arbitri, oblige arbitrators and par­
ties alike to act loyally—that is, ‘in good faith’—in the conduct of the proceed­
ings.515 Thus, as SeragLini and ortScheiDt argue, if parties do not act in 
good faith—for example, by withholding important evidence—court assis­
tance is in fact justified by the parties’ arbitration agreement.516 Hence, the 
fact that a recalcitrant party is not acting in compliance with the arbitration 
513  Dupeyron, 467.
514  Ibid., 467.
515  See e.g. Art. 2A (1) UNCITRAL ML; 1646 CCP FR; Art. 9 (7) IBA Rules; Art. 22 (1) ICC Rules; 
Art. 20 (7) ICDR Rules; Art. 14.5 LCIA Rules; Art. 15 (7) Swiss Rules.
516  SeragLini/ortScheiDt, n. 806.
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agreement authorises the arbitral tribunal to seek assistance from state 
courts. Presuming that the parties have not expressly excluded all types of 
court intervention, this rather extensive interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement may be applied.517 
Whether one agrees or not, this book does not consider court involve­
ment as a violation or circumvention of the arbitration agreement—quite the 
contrary. In fact, in most cases it can be seen as a confirmation of the arbitra­
tion agreement. Nonetheless, in order to avoid an extensive interpretation, 
as previously shown, the parties should define the exact conditions for seek­
ing court assistance or even exclude this possibility entirely, either when 
drafting the arbitration agreement or in the case management conference.518 
In this way, one can easier discern whether resorting to state courts indeed 
represents a circumvention of the arbitration agreement. Consequently, an 
arbitral tribunal, in allocating the costs in the arbitral award, can sanction a 
party which has incurred costs and time delays by seeking state court assis­
tance in violation of the arbitration agreement.519
Second, instead of undermining the role of the arbitral tribunal, resort­
ing to state courts can actually reinforce the arbitral tribunal’s status as the 
competent legal authority. In most situations, the arbitral tribunal has 
enough options to stop non­compliant parties (e.g. drawing an adverse infer­
ence or imposing cost sanctions). However, in extreme cases such as illegal 
(or even relevant criminal) conduct of a party, court assistance might prove 
useful or even mandatory as part of the arbitral tribunal’s task of fulfilling its 
mandate.520 Where a party seeks court assistance as a dilatory tactic (i.e. 
without seeking the arbitral tribunal’s approval), most state courts will re­
fuse to grant assistance on their own initiative anyway.521 
Third, in respect of evidence, the scope for intrusive court intervention 
is very limited.522 Although state courts must examine whether the content 
of the request is in line with the respective lex arbitri, its examination is not 
517  See also Art. 34 (2) (a) (iv) UNCITRAL ML.
518  Dupeyron, 470.
519  Ibid., 471.
520  kreinDLer, 104 et seq.
521  See p. 136, p. 155, p. 169, p. 203 et seq. and p. 233 infra. Hence, under most leges arbitri 
and institutional arbitration rules, the approval of the arbitral tribunal to seek court 
assistance must first be obtained. In addition, depending on the respective lex arbitri, 
several other requirements must be met, such as a legitimate motive to seek court 
assistance or the inability of the arbitral tribunal to obtain the evidence itself.
522  Dupeyron, 463, 467.
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usually extensive and assistance will in most cases be granted.523 Even if 
court assistance must be sought in countries with broad discovery/disclosure 
rights in their domestic civil procedure rules, the parties can define and lim­
it the scope of the taking of evidence in the case management conference.524 
Hence, the fear that state courts will impose a foreign legal culture is in most 
cases unfounded. 
Fourth, seeking state court assistance in the taking of evidence will lead 
to a better­informed arbitral tribunal, which can then render a more 
fact­grounded verdict.525 Or, to put it differently, in the worst­case scenario, 
the respective state court will refuse to grant assistance and the arbitral tri­
bunal will have to decide based on the available evidence. At best, however, 
assistance will be granted and the arbitral tribunal will be even more confi­
dent that it is rendering a fair verdict. 
E. Summary
As previously discussed, court involvement in international arbitration may 
variously be seen as helpful assistance or disturbing interference. It has been 
shown that, based on the UNCITRAL ML and (ad hoc and institutional) arbi­
tration rules, court assistance in the taking of evidence can be sought only if 
the respective conditions are met. In this regard, the approval of the arbitral 
tribunal is crucial. Regarding the parties’ intentions, in most cases court as­
sistance not only is in line with the arbitration agreement, but also reinforces 
the competence of the arbitral tribunal, which can render a more fact­ground­
ed arbitral award as a result. Based on these findings, one may conclude that 
court assistance is in fact a means of supporting the arbitral proceedings, 
rather than interfering with them. 
But does this mean that state courts must automatically provide assis­
tance if all conditions for court assistance are met? Or, to put it another way, 
are they under a legal obligation to do so? Can state courts refuse to assist 
international arbitral tribunals in gathering evidence without reason? Or are 
they bound by constitutional or even international public law, obliging them 
to grant assistance subject to certain requirements? These questions are the 
subject of the last part of this chapter. 
523  Ibid., 467.
524  See p. 29 et seqq. supra.
525  Dupeyron, 467.
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§ 4 Obligation to Assist Arbitral Tribunals 
A. Introduction
The previous analysis has shown the willingness of state courts to grant arbi­
tral tribunals assistance in the taking of evidence. On the one hand, this fact 
can be seen as welcome support from arbitration­friendly jurisdictions for in­
ternational arbitration. However, if this were the only reason why state courts 
granted assistance, it would leave the competent judge with wide discretion to 
decide whether to grant assistance in a specific case. The intention of the re­
spective legislature is therefore crucial to resolve the issue at hand in cases 
which are not regulated in detail by law.526 On the other hand, there may even 
be an obligation to assist. In order to recognise and enforce arbitral awards, all 
examined leges arbitri require that certain fundamental procedural guaran­
tees be observed in the arbitral proceedings.527 If these standards are met, the 
question arises as to whether state courts must not only recognise and enforce 
arbitral awards, but also provide assistance during the arbitral proceedings—
for example, by ordering interim measures or the disclosure of evidence. 528 
In order to answer these questions, it is crucial to understand the legis­
lature’s intention as regards support for arbitral tribunals in general. This 
may be achieved by considering superior rules of law—that is, constitutional 
law and international public law.529 If there were in fact an obligation to assist 
arbitral tribunals based on superior law, this process would involve more 
than just ‘applying the law’ and exercising judicial discretion. Consequently, 
this discretion would be significantly curtailed, with almost no room for dif­
ferent interpretation—regardless of what the competent judge might think of 
arbitration as an alternative to state court litigation.530 
Thus, in a first step, the issue will be treated by examining the require­
ments for arbitral proceedings from a constitutional point of view. Since this 
book tries to make suggestions and propositions regarding court assistance 
in international arbitral proceedings in Switzerland, the focus is on the Swiss 
526  SteinBrück, 45.
527  gökSu, n. 963. In addition, arbitral awards can be challenged only under very limited 
conditions, such as violation of the equality of the parties or the right to be heard 
(BLackaBy et al., n. 1034 et seqq.; see also e.g. Art. 190 (2) PILA CH; § 1065 (1) i.c.w. 
§ 1062 CCP DE; Art. 1520 CCP FR; S. 68 EAA 1996.
528  SchoiBL, 525 et seq.; SteinBrück, 47; with regard to the German situation, see geimer, 
113 et seqq.
529  SteinBrück, 42 et seqq.
530  Ibid., 42, 46.
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Constitution.531 This is even more the case since although all examined leges 
arbitri emphasise the importance of fundamental procedural guarantees, as 
stated in many constitutions, their scope and meaning differ greatly among 
jurisdictions.532 In a second step, the issue will be discussed in light of inter­
national conventions such as the ECHR, the NYC and the HEC. To provide the 
reader with insight at a purely European level, the ECICA and the EER will 
also be examined. 
B. Swiss Constitutional Law
1. Introduction
Constitutions usually remain silent about arbitration and this is also true of 
the Swiss constitution.533 Although the PILA CH provides for support of arbi­
tral proceedings in general, it remains doubtful whether this automatically 
results in a duty to support arbitral tribunals based on constitutional law. In 
other words, does the arbitration­friendliness foreseen in the PILA CH (Arts. 
183–185) derive from the Const. CH? In fact, neither the Const. CH nor the SFT 
nor the legal doctrine suggests expressly that state courts have an obligation 
to support arbitral tribunals.534 Still, there are important connections be­
tween the lex arbitri (PILA CH) and the Const. CH—for example, as regards 
access to justice and the right to be heard. 
The fundamental procedural guarantees are set forth in Arts. 29–32 
Const. CH and determine the procedural requirements of state court pro­
ceedings. While Art. 29 Const. CH contains general procedural guarantees, 
Art. 29a Const. CH focuses on access to justice; followed by Art. 30 Const. CH, 
which sets out a person’s right to have his or her case heard by a legally con­
stituted, competent, independent and impartial court. Finally, Arts. 31 and 
32 Const. CH address criminal matters such as the deprivation of liberty (Art. 
31) and criminal proceedings (Art. 32). With regard to the taking of evidence, 
access to justice and the right to be heard are of particular relevance and will 
thus be considered next. 
531  For the German perspective see SteinBrück, 48 et seqq.
532  pouDret/BeSSon, n. 546.
533  As an exception, many Latin American States have constitutionalized arbitration, see 
e.g. Art. 202 Const. PA; Art. 253 and 258 Const. VE; Art. 57 Const. UY; Art. 116 Const. CO; 
Art. 43 Const. CR; Art. 23 Const. SV; Art. 248 Const. PY; Arts. 62, 63 and 139 (1) Const. 
PE; see also ch. V, Art. 5 Const. FR (1791): ‘The right of citizens to finalize their disputes 
through arbitration cannot be infringed by the acts of the Legislative Power.’
534  For the German perspective, see geimer, 126 et seqq., 187 et seq. He argues that since 
the German legislator allows arbitration, there is a duty to support abirtral tribunals 
e.g. in the taking of evidence.
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2. Access to Justice
Art. 29a Const. CH reads as follows:
“In a legal dispute, every person has the right to have their case deter­
mined by a judicial authority. The Confederation and the Cantons may 
by law preclude the determination by the courts of certain exceptional 
categories of case.”
This constitutional guarantee equips ‘every person’ (i.e. natural persons and 
legal entities) with an individual right in the form of access to at least one ju­
dicial authority which determines their case, irrespective of whether it de­
rives from criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, or of whether factu­
al or legal questions are concerned.535 Moreover, in certain fields of law, ex­
ceptions and restrictions can be made at both federal and cantonal level; this 
is the case, for instance, as regards political matters such as acts of the Feder­
al Assembly or the Federal Council.536 Another example would be to limit the 
appellate proceeding before the SFT to legal questions and exclude the incor­
rect establishment of facts.537 As regards the assistance of arbitral proceed­
ings by state courts, no limitations are foreseen by law at either federal or 
cantonal level.
Usually, the arbitral proceedings will be examined retrospectively only if one 
of the parties tries to set aside the arbitral award—for example, by claiming 
that the right to be heard or the right of equal treatment has been violated.538 
One could therefore ask whether Art. 29a Const. CH could be seen as a consti­
tutional obligation to provide sufficient access to justice during the arbitral 
proceedings—for example, by providing assistance in the taking of evidence.539 
In this respect, the opinion of Waldmann and Steinbrück deserves approval. 
Accordingly, it is at the parties’ discretion to exclude state court jurisdiction 
and this also applies to access to justice.540 However, applying the case law of 
the ECtHR by analogy, this is possible only if the renunciation takes place 
535  DFT 143 III 193, cons. 5.4; DFT 141 I 172, cons. 4.4.1; SGK­kLey, Art. 29a Const. CH n. 13; 
OFK­Biaggini, Art. 29a Const. CH n. 4; BSK­waLDmann, Art. 29a Const. CH n. 4, 10.
536  Ibid., n. 18; SGK­kLey, Art. 29a Const. CH n. 20.
537  Art. 97 (1) FSCA CH, but see the exceptions listed therein.
538  Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH; see also p. 266 et seqq. infra.
539  See also SteinBrück as regards the situation in Germany (64 et seqq.) and the refer­
ence to geimer (140 and 187 et seq.); SchLoSSer, 273, 281.
540  BSK­waLDmann, Art. 29a Const. CH n. 30; SteinBrück, 66.
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voluntarily—that is, if it is ‘free, permissible and unambiguous’, and does not 
represent a complete waiver of every fundamental procedural guarantees as 
stated in Art. 6 (1) ECHR.541 
In sum, it follows that if one can exclude access, there is no constitution­
al obligation to support arbitral proceedings under its title. Parties are there­
fore free to decide the degree to which they wish to exclude state court assis­
tance in the taking of evidence. It will be shown that, even at the level of 
statutory law (i.e. Art. 184 (2) PILA CH), state courts are not automatically 
forced to provide assistance.542 Nonetheless, one must bear in mind that the 
mere fact that court assistance in the taking of evidence is not a constitution­
al obligation does not liberate state courts from the need to consider whether 
they must render assistance based on statutory law. Otherwise, this would 
result in a denial of justice. 
3. Right to be Heard 
As under most laws, according to the PILA CH, the parties and the arbitral tri­
bunal have full discretion to tailor the arbitral proceedings, subject only to the 
requirement to observe the principle of equal treatment of the parties and the 
right to be heard.543 That is why, according to Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH, arbitral 
awards can be challenged through an adversarial procedure on the grounds of 
violation of the principle of equal treatment or the right to be heard. As regards 
evidence, the right to be heard is the central procedural guarantee. Its consti­
tutional basis is found in Art. 29 (2) Const. CH. While this provision usually re­
fers only to state court proceedings, the SFT has decided and confirmed sever­
al times that it is no different from Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH and thus also applies 
to arbitral proceedings.544 Whether this also implies an obligation to assist 
arbitral tribunals, rather than just to ensure that minimum procedural guar­
antees are observed, depends on how the SFT defines the right to be heard.
Because arbitral awards can be challenged only on the limited grounds 
set out in Art. 190 PILA, there is a considerable volume of case law on the 
right to be heard, which specifies and interprets its scope of application.545 
541  Nourredine Tabbane v. Switzerland, ECtHR, App no. 41069/12, n. 26 et seq., 1 Mar. 2016; 
SteinBrück, 68.
542  See p. 250 et seqq. infra.
543  Art. 182 (3) PILA CH.
544  DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.1; DFT 4A_342/2015 of 26 Apr. 2016, cons. 4.1.1; DFT 
4A_172/2015 of 29 Sept. 2015, cons. 4.1; DFT 4A_402/2010 of 17 Feb. 2011, cons. 3.1; DFT 
130 III 235, cons. 5; DFT 128 III 234, cons. 4b; DFT 127 III 576, cons. 2c; DFT 119 II 386, 
cons. 1b; DFT 117 II 346, cons. 1a.
545  Dutoit, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 26 et seqq.; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 64 et seqq.
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Accordingly, the right to be heard is violated, for example, if the parties did 
not have the possibility to present their case and evidence, take part in the 
proceedings and be assisted and represented before the arbitral tribunal.546 
With regard to the right to present the case, the SFT has specified that the ar­
bitral tribunal has a minimum duty to consider all information, arguments, 
evidence and evidence requests presented by the parties if they are relevant 
to the decision to be rendered.547 Furthermore, the wording ‘in an adversar­
ial proceeding’548 means that a party can comment on the evidence presented 
by the adverse party and refute it with its own evidence.549 
After the previous remarks, one could easily conclude that since the 
SFT’s interpretation of the right to be heard is quite broad and this principle 
also applies to arbitral proceedings, state courts are obliged to assist in the 
gathering of evidence based on federal and constitutional law.550 However, 
while the SFT has extended the right to be heard in favour of the parties in 
certain circumstances, it has also limited this right in others. As regards evi­
dence, the SFT has stated that an arbitral tribunal does not violate the right 
to be heard if it refuses to examine evidence because the fact to be proven is 
already established or because the presented evidence will not convince the 
arbitral tribunal to change its finding.551 Thus, the possibility to examine 
witnesses and experts is not unlimited, and the arbitral tribunal can exercise 
its discretion to impose time limits or refuse to allow certain questions be­
cause of their irrelevance to the case.552 The SFT has further held that as long 
as the right to be heard is not simply ignored, which would result in a denial 
of justice, even an incorrect assessment of evidence cannot be challenged.553 
In addition, because the parties can specify that the arbitral award need not 
be reasoned, there is no constitutional right to receive a reasoned arbitral 
546  DFT 130 III 35, cons. 5; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 63.
547  DFT 4A_606/2013 of 2 Sept. 2014, cons. 5; DFT 4A_360/2011 of 31 Jan. 2012, cons. 5.1; 
DFT 4A_46/2011 of 16 May 2011, cons. 4.3.1; DFT 133 III 235, cons. 5.2; DFT 121 III 331, 
cons. 3b.
548  Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH.
549  DFT 133 III 139, cons. 6.1; haBerBeck, 1414 et seq.
550  Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH i.c.w. Art. 29 (2) Const. CH.
551  DFT 4A_342/2015 of 26 Apr. 2016, cons. 4.1.1; DFT 4A_246/2014 of 15 Jul. 2015, cons. 6.1; 
DFT 4A_386/2010 of 3 Jan. 2011, cons. 7.2. The so­called ‘anticipated assessment of 
evidence’ can therefore be examined only from the limited angle of a violation of 
public policy (Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA CH; haBerBeck, 1422 et seqq.; for a different view 
see gökSu, n. 2087).
552  DFT 4A_544/2014 of 24 Feb. 2015, cons. 3.4.
553  DFT 127 III 576, cons. 2e and f; DFT 121 III 331, cons. 3a.
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award.554 To summarise, there is no constitutional duty to support arbitral 
proceedings under the right to be heard.
4. Result
From the preceding discussion, it is difficult to argue that state courts have a 
constitutional obligation to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence. 
First and foremost, although the PILA CH provides for the possibility for 
courts to assist555 arbitral tribunals, there is no explicit constitutional basis 
suggesting the same.556 Or, to put it differently, arbitration­friendliness is not 
the same as a constitutional obligation to assist arbitral tribunals.557
Second, neither the Swiss legislature nor the SFT supports the view that 
a constitutional obligation to assist arbitral tribunals exists, based on the 
reasoning that minimum procedural guarantees must be granted in arbitral 
proceedings. By imposing strict requirements on such proceedings, such as 
equal treatment and the right to be heard, the Swiss legislature wanted to af­
ford arbitral awards equal status to state court decisions.558 In addition, in 
order to provide for fast and efficient arbitral proceedings, the reasons for 
challenging an arbitral award are very limited under the PILA CH and parties 
can generally appeal only to the SFT.559 That is why minimum procedural 
guarantees are even more important. These guarantees will be examined in 
detail in chapter eight of this book.560 Finally, as previously discussed (see 
p. 107 supra), there is no reassessment of evidence or examination of how the 
arbitral tribunal exercised its discretion to conduct the arbitral proceedings. 
Thus, the Swiss legislature and the SFT are concerned only that certain min­
imal procedural guarantees are observed during the arbitral proceedings. 
To imply a direct constitutional obligation to assist arbitral tribunals during 
the course of arbitration (i.e. in the taking of evidence) would not be in line 
with this intention.561 
554  DFT 134 III 186, cons. 6.1; DFT 133 III 235, cons. 5.2; DFT 116 II 373, cons. 7b.; for a differ­
ent view see haBerBeck, 1417 et seqq.; ZK­oetiker, Ar. 189 PILA CH n. 59 et seqq.; 
Bucher, n. 351; BeSSon, n. 400 et seq.
555  Arts. 183 (2) and 184 (2) PILA CH.
556  SteinBrück, 132 et seq.
557  Ibid., 65.
558  BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 1; gökSu, n. 1978.
559  According to Art. 192 PILA CH, parties can even exclude all appeals against the arbi­
tral award if neither party has a domicile, a place of habitual residence or a place of 
business in Switzerland. Alternatively, the partial exclusion of one or several reasons 
to challenge the arbitral award as stated in Art. 190 (2) PILA CH is also possible.
560  See p. 256 et seqq. infra. 
561  SteinBrück, 64 et seqq.
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Third, a constitutional obligation to assist arbitral tribunals would exist only if 
the ability to challenge an arbitral awards did not suffice to protect the mini­
mum procedural guarantees of the parties.562 In this case, instead of just exam­
ining retrospectively whether those guarantees were observed (i.e. after the 
arbitral award has been rendered), state courts would have to observe and pro­
tect these guarantees during the arbitral proceedings based on the constitu­
tion—for example, by assisting in the taking of evidence.563 As previously dis­
cussed, this is clearly not the case—at least, not in Switzerland. In order to make 
Switzerland an attractive forum for arbitration, the Swiss legislature requires 
the courts to take a ‘hands­off’ approach during the course of arbitration, with 
the possibility only to examine arbitral awards after they have been rendered. 
Finally, it may be summarised that Swiss courts assist arbitral tribunals 
in the taking of evidence not because of a constitutional duty, but simply be­
cause the Swiss legislature wishes to attract and support international arbi­
tral proceedings, and thus to promote Switzerland as an arbitration­friendly 
jurisdiction. Thus, in assessing whether to grant assistance, a Swiss court is 
not bound by any direct constitutional obligation, but must decide according 
to the provisions as set forth in the PILA CH.564 
C. International Public Law
1. Introduction
At least from the Swiss point of view, there is no constitutional obligation to 
assist international arbitral tribunals. Under international public law, the 
situation is not much different.565 Although several international conven­
tions state that minimum procedural guarantees must be observed in arbi­
tral proceedings, they do not expressly state how far this obligation goes and 
what it implies. Nonetheless, various important decisions have helped with 
the interpretation of the issue. In this case, the question is again whether the 
need to observe these guarantees also obliges state courts to assist arbitral 
tribunals during the arbitration proceedings—for example, with regard to the 
taking of evidence. This question will be answered next by examining sever­
al international conventions such as the ECHR,566 the NYC and the HEC. 
562  Ibid., 62.
563  Ibid.
564  Art. 183 (2) and Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; see p. 223 et seqq. infra.
565  SteinBrück, 52 et seq.
566  As its name implies, the ECHR is largely considered a purely European convention. 
However, looking at Member States such as Russia and Turkey, the examination of the 
ECHR under the title of international public law seems to be justified.
109 § 4 Obligation to Assist Arbitral Tribunals 
It is important to stress that, at the level of international public law, the min­
imum procedural guarantees are worded even more carefully and generally 
than in the Const. CH. Thus, although these conventions are meant to have a 
synchronous effect in all Member States, their adoption and execution vary 
from one jurisdiction to another.567 As stated previously in the introduction 
to this part of the chapter (see p. 103 supra), the issue of whether a possible 
obligation to assist state courts based on international public law exists can 
only partially be answered globally; it should rather be considered separately 
per jurisdiction. The following remarks will thus—where possible—concen­
trate on the issues and consequences in and for Switzerland. 
2. European Convention on Human Rights 
a. Introduction
Since its establishment in 1950, the ECHR has been adopted in 47 countries in 
Europe. It entered into force in Switzerland in 1974.568 With regard to mini­
mum procedural guarantees, Art. 6 (1) ECHR reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an inde­
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 
As one of the fundamental and by far most important provisions of the ECHR, 
Art. 6 (1) ECHR grants access to a court combined with several minimum pro­
cedural guarantees.569 Quite obviously, the wording of Art. 6 (1) ECHR is very 
general, allowing for broad interpretation. Therefore, the ECtHR has had 
many possibilities to express its views on the term ‘fair hearing’ and its mean­
ing as regards evidence.570 The ECtHR has held that this term includes, among 
other rights, equality of arms, which allows a party to present its case—in­
cluding evidence—‘under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
567  SteinBrück, 53 et seq. He states that since customary international public law (Völk-
ergewohnheitsrecht) provides no requirements with regard to arbitral proceedings, 
such a basis may be found in contractual international public law (Völkervertragsre-
cht) such as the ECHR or the NYC.
568  See the current status.
569  See ECtHR Annual Report 2018, 171 et seq. Accordingly, more than 24% of the 1068 
cases brought before the ECtHR have concerned a violation of the right to a fair trial; 
Karpenstein/Mayer­meyer, Art. 6 EMRK n. 5.
570  For an overview, see harriS D. et al., Art. 6 ECHR, 413 et seqq.; rainey et al., 291 et seqq.; 
HK-EMRK­LaDewig et al., Art. 6 EMRK n. 139 et seqq.; Karpenstein/Mayer­meyer, 
Art. 6 EMRK n. 100 et seqq.
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disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent’.571 Furthermore, it has stated that par­
ties have a right to a fair procedure for the taking of evidence—that is, to have 
the opportunity ‘to have knowledge of and comment on the observations 
filed or evidence adduced by the other party’.572 Regarding the admissibility 
of evidence and the way it should be assessed, the ECtHR has also held that 
Art. 6 (1) ECHR does not regulate these matters, but leaves them to national 
laws and courts.573 
Thus far, the SFT and the ECtHR have examined the relationship between 
the ECHR and arbitration several times. In addition, the topic is much debated 
in legal doctrine.574 Although there are all sorts of interesting questions to be 
answered in this conversation, the following remarks aim to establish wheth­
er the ECHR actually obliges Member States and their courts to assist arbitral 
tribunals in the taking of evidence, or whether they must merely ensure that 
minimum procedural guarantees were observed in the arbitral proceedings. 
b. Case Law of the ECtHR
The ECtHR has ruled several times on the applicability of the ECHR to arbitral 
proceedings in general, as well as the admissibility of a waiver of the rights 
derived from the ECHR in arbitral proceedings in particular. In contrast to 
various authors who have suggested that the ECHR does not apply to arbitral 
proceedings at all, the ECtHR has clearly stated that a ‘tribunal established 
by law’ as foreseen in Art. 6 (1) ECHR should not necessarily be understood as 
a classic court of law; ‘it may comprise a body set up to determine a limited 
number of specific issues, provided always that it offers the appropriate guar­
antees’.575 The ECHR is therefore also applicable to arbitral tribunals, at least 
to a certain degree. 
571  Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, no. 14448/88, n. 33, 27 Ocotber 1993; har­
riS D. et al., Art. 6 ECHR, 409 et seqq.; rainey et al., 291 et seqq.; Dörr et al.­graBen­
warter/paBeL, ch. 14 n. 4, 93; HK-EMRK­LaDewig et al., Art. 6 EMRK n. 96 et seqq.; 
SteinBrück, 57 et seq.; It is noteworthy that a ‘fair hearing’ according to Art. 6 (1) ECHR 
is anything but a closed term with strict requirements. Derived from the case law of the 
ECtHR, it is interpreted widely and remains open to new interpretations (harriS D. 
et al., Art. 6 ECHR, 409). In addition, whether a hearing was in fact ‘fair’ can be deter­
mined only by looking at the proceedings as a whole (rainey et al., 291).
572  Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, ECtHR, no. 12952/87, n. 63, 23 Jun. 1993.
573  Schenk v. Switzerland, ECtHR, no. 00010862/84, n. 46, 12 Jul. 1988; Roland Volkmer v. 
Germany, ECtHR, no. 39799/98, n. 4, 22 Nov. 2001; see also Tamminen v. Finnland, 
ECtHR, no. 40847/98, n. 38­42, 15 Jun. 2004, where the national court violated Art. 6 (1) 
ECHR because it refused to hear a witness for unfair and contradictory reasons. 
574  For an extensive overview, see BeSSon, 413 et seqq.; koDek, n. 8.
575  BeSSon, 401; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, no. 9006/80; 9262/81; 
9263/81; 9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81, n. 201, 8 Jul. 1986.
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In this regard, the ECtHR distinguishes between compulsory and voluntary 
arbitration.576 Consequently, if arbitration is imposed by law and the parties 
have no other option than to settle their dispute through arbitration, Art. 6 (1) 
ECHR is fully applicable.577 First and foremost, this applies to sports­related 
arbitration, where the players usually have no choice but to submit to the re­
spective federation rules, which will contain an arbitration clause.578 In con­
trast, according to the Tabbane case, if parties choose arbitration voluntarily, 
they automatically waive certain rights as set forth in the ECHR, and in this 
case the right of access to a court is not absolute.579 As a consequence, a waiv­
er per se is not a violation of the ECHR.580 Provided that the parties waive their 
rights freely, permissibly and unambiguously, the ECtHR considers that this 
does not violate the ECHR, as long as it is not a complete waiver of all rights 
under Art. 6 (1) ECHR.581 Moreover, the waiver must be accompanied by min­
imum guarantees corresponding to its gravity (e.g. to freely choose an arbitra­
tor or to be represented by a lawyer).582 Although the ECtHR does not further 
specify which rights can be waived and which cannot, it seems that this issue 
is considered on a case­by­case basis rather than according to a dogmatic rule, 
subject only to the abovementioned conditions.583 
c. Case Law of the Federal Tribunal
Not as detailed as the case law of the ECtHR, but noteworthy nonetheless, are 
the decisions of the SFT and its approach to the ECHR and arbitral proceedings. 
576  Mutu et Pechstein v. Switzerland, ECtHR, no. 40575/10 and 67674/10, n. 95, 2 Oct. 2018.
577  Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, ECtHR, no. 8588/79 and 8589/79, n. 30 et seqq., 
12 Dec. 1983. In this case, according to the Swedish Company Act of 1944, a dispute 
between a parent company and its subsidiary company had to be settled in arbitra­
tion by law. 
578  Mutu et Pechstein v. Switzerland, ECtHR, no. 40575/10 and 67674/10, n. 98, 109 et seqq., 
2 Oct. 2018. 
579  Nourredine Tabbane v. Switzerland, ECtHR, App no. 41069/12, n. 26 et seq., 1 Mar. 2016.
580  Ibid., n. 25; Deweer v. Belgium, ECtHR, no. 6903/75, n. 49, 27 Feb. 1980.
581  Mutu et Pechstein v. Switzerland, ECtHR, no. 40575/10 and 67674/10, n. 103 et seqq., 2 
Oct. 2018; Nourredine Tabbane v. Switzerland, ECtHR, App no. 41069/12, n. 26 et seq., 
1 Mar. 2016; Eiffage S.A. et autres v. Switzerland, ECtHR, no. 1742/05, 15 Sept. 2009; 
Transport Fluviais do Sado S.A. v. Portugal, ECtHR, no. 35943/02, 16 Dec. 2003; Osmo 
Suovaniemi and others v. Finland, ECtHR, no. 31737/96, 23 Feb. 1999; Pfeifer and Plankl 
v. Austria, ECtHR, no. 10802/84, 25 Feb. 1992; Karpenstein/Mayer­meyer, Art. 6 EM­
RK n. 59; BeSSon, 400.
582  Nourredine Tabbane v. Switzerland, ECtHR, App no. 41069/12, n. 16 and 27, 1 Mar. 2016; 
Osmo Suovaniemi and others v. Finland, ECtHR, no. 31737/96, 23 Feb. 1999.
583  BeSSon (405), making reference to Osmo Suovaniemi and others v. Finland, ECtHR, 
no. 31737/96, 23 Feb. 1999.
112 Chapter 6: Court Assistance in International Arbitration
In some early cases in the 1980s, the SFT stated that because the arbitral tri­
bunal is not a ‘tribunal established by law’, Art. 6 (1) ECHR does not apply to 
arbitration, where the parties are at liberty to choose the arbitrators.584 A few 
years later, the SFT changed its mind, stating that Art. 6 (1) ECHR also applies 
to private arbitral tribunals and especially with regard to the correct compo­
sition of the court and the arbitral tribunal, respectively.585 In subsequent 
decisions, the SFT clarified that since the ECHR is not mentioned under the 
reasons to challenge an arbitral award according to Art. 190 (2) PILA CH, it is 
therefore not directly applicable; but it can be used indirectly to interpret and 
substantiate this article.586 How this should work in practice has not yet been 
decided. Hence, there are no clear conditions as to how the ECHR should be 
used to interpret Art. 190 (2) PILA CH or which principles and rights apply 
with regard to arbitration. 
d. Result
Further to the previous remarks, it must be asked whether there is an obliga­
tion to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence, based on the fact that 
the ECHR is also partially applicable to arbitral proceedings. It has been 
shown that, according to the case law of the ECtHR, a ‘fair hearing’ involves 
similar principles such as the right to be heard pursuant to the Const. CH.587 
While the SFT has clearly stated that the ECHR is not directly applicable to 
arbitral proceedings, but rather serves as a means to interpret the minimum 
procedural guarantees as set forth in Art. 190 (2) PILA CH, the ECtHR is not as 
explicit. It has held that in voluntary arbitration, the ECHR is applicable in 
principle, although not without limitations. Parties can therefore waive cer­
tain rights, as long as they freely agree to this, it is permissible under law and 
the waiver is made unambiguously. 
In light of these findings, it is evident that the ECtHR obliges arbitral 
tribunals as well as national courts only to ensure that minimum procedural 
guarantees have been observed in the arbitral proceedings. Besides the fact 
584  DFT 112 Ia 166, cons. 3a with reference to a further unpublished decision of 9 Feb. 1984, 
cons. 3d. For opinions against that reasoning, see Bangert, 54 et seqq.; BeSSon, 401.
585  DFT 117 Ia 166, cons. 5a. This change in opinion can easily be explained by the reason­
ing of the Lithgow decision of the ECtHR, which has been rendered in the meantime 
(see fn 575 supra).
586  DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.2; DFT 4A_246/2014 of 15 Jul. 2015, cons. 7.2.2; DFT 4A_198/2012 
of 14 Dec. 2012, cons. 3.1; DFT 4A_238/2011 of 4 Jan. 2012, cons. 3.1.2; DFT 4A_404/2010 
of 19 Apr. 2011, cons. 3.5.3; DFT 4A_43/2010 of 29 Jul. 2010, cons. 3.6.1; DFT 4A_612/2009 
of 10 Feb. 2010, cons. 2.4.1; DFT 4A_320/2009 of 2 Jun. 2010, cons. 1.5.3; DFT 4A_370/2007 
of 21 Feb. 2007, cons. 5.3.2; DFT 4P.105/2006 of 4 Aug. 2006, cons. 7.3.
587  Ibid.; see p. 110 supra. 
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that there is no explicit obligation in the ECHR for state courts to assist tribu­
nals, various other reasons contradict the existence of such an obligation. 
First, to conclude that such an obligation exists would not be coherent with 
the aforementioned case law of the ECtHR and the SFT. Although both sug­
gest that the ECHR applies under certain conditions as regards minimum 
procedural guarantees, it would go too far to conclude that an obligation 
exists to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence.588 At least in Swit­
zerland, the ECHR serves only as a means to assist with the interpretation of 
minimum procedural guarantees as stated in Art. 190 (2) PILA CH. Conse­
quently, no further obligation can be derived therefrom. 
Second, for the same reason that was presented with regard to the 
Const. CH, a duty to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence based 
on the ECHR would exist only if state courts were obliged to supervise arbitra­
tion during the course of the proceedings themselves, and not merely after 
the arbitral award has been rendered (see p. 109 supra). This is clearly not the 
case; rather the contrary.589 By agreeing to settle the dispute through arbitra­
tion, the parties deliberately renounce certain rights provided by the ECHR.590 
Moreover, because the arbitral award takes effect only after it has been ren­
dered and a violation of procedural rules can be addressed by challenging the 
arbitral award, there is no obligation for state courts to supervise the arbitra­
tion to achieve a ‘precautionary prevention of procedural violations’.591 
3. New York Convention
a. Introduction
The NYC—which was established in 1958 and has 160 Member States—is the 
most important convention in the field of international arbitration.592 It applies 
to arbitral awards rendered in a state other than that in which recognition and 
enforcement are sought.593 Moreover, it comes into play not only as regards 
588  SteinBrück, 64.
589  koDek, n. 60 et seqq.
590  See the aforementioned decision Nourredine Tabbane v. Switzerland, ECtHR, App no. 
41069/12, n. 26 et seq., 1 Mar. 2016.
591  koDek, n. 60. According to koDek, the only exceptions would concern cases where 
the arbitral proceedings are excessively lengthy. In this respect, see R v. Switzerland, 
stating that a violation of the ECHR can be assumed only when a case is pending be­
fore a state court and not before an arbitral tribunal prior to the application made to 
the ECtHR (R v. Switzerland, ECtHR, no. 10881/84, 4 Mar. 1987). 
592  UNCITRAL NYC Guide, Preface n. 1. It entered into force on 7 Jun. 1959 and Switzerland 
joined it on 30 Aug. 1965; Wolff­LieBScher, Preliminary Remarks, n. 1; Balthasar­SoLo­
mon, n. 1; Mistelis et al.­miSteLiS/Di pietro, Introductory Remarks NYC, 1; pauLSSon, 1; 
Kronke et al.­Bagner, Art. I NYC, 20 et seq.; see the current status.
593  Art. I (1) NYC.
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the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (Arts. III–VI NYC), but also 
as regards the upholding of the arbitration agreement (Art. II NYC). If the re­
spective arbitration agreement meets the conditions of Art. II (1) NYC, state 
courts must respect that agreement. Art. II (3) NYC reads as follows:
“The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in 
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the mean­
ing of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the 
parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”
As long as the arbitration agreement is not invalid in the sense of this article, 
state courts must support it in order to respect the parties’ choice. Whether 
this obligation also includes support for arbitral tribunals in the taking of 
evidence will be considered below. 
b. Art. II (3) NYC
This question can be answered only in general if the terms ‘null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed’ are interpreted uniformly and 
not according to the respective applicable national law.594 The question has 
been answered differently in various jurisdictions. While the scope of the 
wording ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’ may 
overlap, its meaning is either understood as being internationalised or inter­
preted according to the respective national law.595 The internationalised ap­
proach, adopted by French and US scholars and courts, holds that a valid 
arbitration agreement should be interpreted in light of international stand­
ards such as international public policy596 or internationally recognised 
breach of contract defences such as duress and fraud.597 However, most oth­
er jurisdictions, such as Switzerland598 and Germany,599 refer—by analogy to 
Art. V (1) (a) NYC—to the law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a 
594  SteinBrück, 72.
595  Kronke et al.­Schramm et al., Art. II NYC, 104. 
596  Paris Court of Cassation, 30 Mar. 2004, 1st Civil Chamber, 02­12259; St. Hugh Williams 
v. NCL (Bahamas) LTD., 686 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2012); Bautisa v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 
1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).
597  Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni v. Achille 
Lauro, 712 F.3d 50 (3d Cir. 1983), in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1984, 474 et seqq.; Kronke et al.­
Schramm et al., Art. II NYC, 104; UNCITRAL NYC Guide, Art. II n. 104; Wolff­wiLSke/
fox, Art. II (3) NYC n. 307.
598  DFT 4A_279/2010 of 25 Oct. 2010, cons. 2; DFT 5C.215/1994 of 21 Mar. 1995, cons. 2b.
599  SteinBrück, 72 et seq.
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choice, to the law of the country in which the award was rendered.600 Conse­
quently, the question of whether Art. II (3) NYC obliges national courts to sup­
port arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence must be answered separately 
per jurisdiction.
Although the views on this matter differ from jurisdiction to jurisdic­
tion, there is always a tendency to uphold the arbitration agreement and thus 
to apply Art. II (3) NYC only in drastic cases.601 In order to assert or deny an 
obligation to assist arbitral tribunals, Steinbrück argues that Art. II (3) NYC 
can be interpreted either extensively or restrictively.602 In cases where an 
arbitration agreement is not ‘incapable of being performed’, but the parties 
have not agreed on the exact procedure as regards the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, national courts may be bound to support the arbitral pro­
ceedings based on the NYC by appointing an arbitrator.603 In contrast, Stein­
brück further suggests that there are also cases in which Art. II (3) NYC should 
be understood as a limitation of court assistance.604 For instance, if arbitral 
proceedings cannot be commenced or if the arbitral tribunal simply refuses 
to act despite the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, court assistance 
will not prove as helpful and could even run contrary to the parties’ inten­
tion.605 Based on the NYC, national courts can therefore assist only if it is 
within the intention of the parties. Otherwise, arbitral awards will be neither 
recognised nor enforced because the arbitral proceedings were not in ac­
cordance with the agreement of the parties.606 
c. Result
The foregoing examination shows that the NYC does not provide a clear an­
swer to the question of whether Art. II (3) NYC obliges national courts not only 
to respect arbitration agreements, but also to assist arbitral tribunals in the 
taking of evidence. Even if Art. II (3) NYC is interpreted uniformly, it remains 
dubious whether such an obligation exists. In addition, the possible restrictive 
interpretation of Art. II (3) NYC reveals that there are also situations in which 
court assistance would contradict the parties’ intention. Hence, because 
600  Ibid., 104; Y.B. Comm. Arb. 2003, n. 620 et seqq.; Wolff­wiLSke/fox, Art. II (3) NYC 
n. 290.
601  UNCITRAL NYC Guide, Art. II n. 103 et seqq.; Wolff­wiLSke/fox, Art. II (3) NYC n. 292.
602  SteinBrück, 75 et seqq.
603  Ibid., with reference to Etat d’Israël v. Société NIOC, Paris Court of Cassation, 1 Feb. 
2005, 1st Civil Chamber, in: Rev. Arb. 2005, 693 et seqq.
604  SteinBrück, 79 et seqq.
605  Kronke et al.­Schramm et al., Art. II NYC, 107; SteinBrück, 80.
606  Art. V (1) (d) NYC.
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there seems to be no clear­cut answer according to Art. II (3) NYC, the ques­
tion must be answered by considering the overall intention of the NYC. 
As its title states, the NYC aims first and foremost to facilitate the recog­
nition and enforcement of arbitral awards to the ‘greatest extent possible’.607 
The NYC therefore serves as a minimum standard, while leaving Member 
States free to apply more liberal rules.608 This is demonstrated best by Art. V 
NYC, which states that arbitral awards must be recognised and enforced un­
less certain exceptions apply, such as where one party was unable to present 
its case.609 Nonetheless, the NYC does not further specify those exceptions; 
nor does it say when arbitral awards should be enforced or annulled. It states 
merely that unless there are insurmountable obstacles, arbitral awards must 
be recognised and enforced.610
As the connection between arbitration agreements and the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards was discussed late in the drafting pro­
cess, Art. II NYC was added at the last minute to the text of the convention.611 
This explains why important issues such as the precise scope of application 
and the law governing the interpretation of Art. II NYC are not addressed. 
However, it seemed crucial to emphasise the importance of the arbitration 
agreement as the foundation of arbitration itself and ultimately the recogni­
tion and enforcement of arbitral awards.612 Hence, apart from Art. II (3) NYC, 
this article harmonises the understanding of the arbitration agreement in 
general, as well as its formal requirements. 
In sum, Art. II NYC prevents parties from having recourse to state courts 
if they have agreed to settle their dispute through arbitration. It lays the foun­
dations for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by emphasis­
ing the importance of the arbitration agreement. This is in line with the over­
all intention of the NYC: to establish general requirements as regards the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, but not to regulate the pro­
cess itself.613 Consequently, no obligation to assist arbitral tribunals during 
the proceedings (e.g. with the taking of evidence) can be derived from Art. II 
NYC or the convention as a whole.614 
607  UNCITRAL NYC Guide, Art. II n. 5.
608  Art. VII (1) NYC.
609  Art. V (1) (b) NYC.
610  Kronke et al.­kronke, Introduction, 2.
611  UNCITRAL NYC Guide, Art. II n. 2.
612  Kronke et al.­Schramm et al., Art. II NYC, 38 et seq.
613  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.04 n. 28.
614  SteinBrück, 89.
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4. Hague Evidence Convention
a. Introduction
In a further step, it will be examined whether an obligation to assist interna­
tional arbitral tribunals exists under the HEC, which was established in 1970. 
This convention has proved a very useful tool in international litigation, help­
ing parties to obtain evidence abroad by means of international judicial as­
sistance.615 So far, the HEC has been adopted by 63 Member States; it entered 
into force in Switzerland in 1995.616 Regarding arbitration, there is a broad 
consensus among Member States and legal scholars that the HEC is not appli­
cable directly to arbitral proceedings, because only ‘judicial authorities’ can 
submit requests to foreign national courts in order to obtain evidence.617 The 
reality is thus that the HEC is not used directly in arbitral proceedings. In this 
respect, a distinction must be made between the issue of the direct applica­
bility of the HEC to arbitral proceedings and its indirect use where court as­
sistance is sought in support of arbitral proceedings.618 This applies to cases 
in which an arbitral tribunal requests assistance from a state court at the seat 
of arbitration, which then sends a letter of request to a state court based in 
another jurisdiction. While this scenario does not seem to present any signif­
icant difficulties,619 the following remarks concentrate on a possible direct 
application which would force state courts of Member States to render assis­
tance in the taking of evidence based on the HEC.
615  See the HEC Questionnaire (2014), 25 et seq.
616  See the current status.
617  Art. 1 HEC; HEC Handbook (2016), n. 93; BLackaBy et al., n. 6.131; Saathof, 62; Born, 
Int. Comm. Arb., n. 2422 et seq.; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9.02 n. 32; SteinBrück, 
129 et seq.; MüKo­paBSt, Art. 1 HEC n. 9; kLauS, 302, fn 21; kneiSeL/Lecking, 153; 
gauthey/markuS, n. 831 et seqq. Even though gauthey/markuS consider the fact 
that arbitral tribunals render arbitral awards as judicial acts, they agree that they are 
certainly not ‘judicial authorities of a contracting state’. Accordingly, they are not 
within the HEC’s scope of application; see also HEC Questionnaire (2009), 40 et seq. 
According to this questionnaire, very few jurisdictions have been approached direct­
ly by arbitral tribunals based on the HEC. These requests have either been denied or 
transmitted to the respective competent state authority; HEC Questionnaire (2004), 
11 et seq.; see also the commentary of Australia as regards arbitration, noting that 
‘there is nothing within the Convention to prevent its use by two parties in circum­
stances where both parties consent to it having such additional application.’
618  wirth/hoffmann­nowotny, 70; for the procedure of indirect court assistance see 
p. 120 infra.
619  wirth/hoffmann­nowotny, 70; gauthey/markuS, n. 833; knöfeL, Judicial Assis-
tance, 284 et seqq.; HEC Recommendations (2003), n. 38; HEC Special Commission 
(1985), 1679.
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b. Drafting Process
So far, few authors suggest that the HEC should be directly applicable to arbi­
tral proceedings.620 They suggest that instead of first submitting a request to 
the competent state court at the seat of arbitration, which will then send a 
letter of request to the competent authority of the Member State in which the 
requested evidence is located, international arbitral tribunals should be able 
to submit direct requests to national courts abroad. In this case, the court 
approached would be obliged—subject to the requirements of the HEC—to 
render assistance in the taking of evidence. 
This argument is anything but new and has been proposed since the 
very beginning of the HEC drafting process, as well as during the drafting of 
the UNCITRAL ML in 1985.621 During the discussions on Art. 27 UNCITRAL 
ML (see p. 93 et seqq. supra), it was suggested that international court assis­
tance should not be governed by the UNCITRAL ML, but rather remain with­
in the field of international cooperation.622 This position can also be ex­
plained by the fact that the drafters of the UNCITRAL ML knew that, at the 
same time, a special commission of the Hague Conference on Private Inter­
national Law was discussing the possibility of using the HEC in the context of 
arbitral proceedings.623 The idea was to add an additional protocol to the 
HEC, allowing arbitral tribunals to submit direct evidence requests to the 
respective authority of a Member State.624 Within the special commission, 
opinion on this possibility was divided.625 Despite the technical feasibility of 
the protocol, the majority of commission members raised doubts about its 
usefulness.626 In the end—and probably also because the drafting process of 
the UNCITRAL ML had already been completed without the inclusion of a 
provision obliging national courts to assist international arbitral tribunals in 
the taking of evidence—the commission abandoned the idea.627 In addition, 
and in contrast to the former view, the special commission questioned the 
practicability of the protocol because of the many different types of arbitral 
620  meier, 120; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 284 et seqq.; Geimer/Schütze­knöfeL, Art. 1 
HEC, n. 16; Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013), 5.
621  rothStein, 84 et seqq.; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 299 et seqq.
622  UNCITRAL, 18th session, A/CN.9/263 (1985), 59.
623  knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 300.
624  HEC Special Commission (1985), 1679.
625  Ibid.
626  UNCITRAL, Summary Records of the 325th meeting (1985), n. 57. 
627  HEC Special Commission (1985), 1679; amram, n. 254; UNCITRAL, A/40/17 (1985), n. 225.
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tribunals (ad hoc and institutional) that exist.628 More recently, the view that 
the HEC is not applicable to arbitral proceedings in practice has also been 
reflected in the latest questionnaire of HEC Member States in 2008.629 
c. Criticism
It is beyond controversy that an arbitral tribunal is not a ‘judicial authority of 
a contracting state’, but rather a private body acting without a permanent 
jurisdiction or coercive powers.630 However, with regard to the term ‘judi­
cial’, the situation is not as clear.631 Because arbitral awards have similar ef­
fects to state court decisions, the arbitrator’s task may be considered and 
qualified as a ‘judicial’ act in the sense of Art. 1 HEC.632 Arguing strongly in 
favour of the direct applicability of the HEC to arbitral proceedings, knöfeL 
suggests that instead of interpreting Art. 1 HEC too strictly, it should rather be 
read in light of the HEC’s overall aim to ‘improve mutual judicial co­operation 
in civil or commercial matters’.633 In assimilating arbitral awards to state 
court decisions, this cooperation should also be established as regards arbi­
tration.634 Concerning the drafters’ objection that ‘it would be difficult, if not 
impossible’635 to apply the HEC to different kinds of arbitral tribunals, 
knöfeL argues further that despite the heterogeneity of arbitral proceed­
ings, Member States have a keen interest in promoting international arbitra­
tion and should consequently extend the HEC’s applicability to arbitral pro­
ceedings in their jurisdictions.636 
Moreover, and as regards disclosure proceedings, Rothstein states that 
in addition to the IBA Rules, using the HEC in arbitral proceedings could help 
to harmonise arbitral disclosure proceedings, as well as leges arbitri.637 In 
contrast to Knöfel, he suggests that instead of interpreting the HEC too broad­
ly and applying it to arbitral proceedings, it should rather be modified first in 
order to fit within the context of international arbitration.638 
628  HEC Special Commission (1985), 1679; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 301.
629  HEC Questionnaire (2009), 40 et seqq.; rothStein, 86.
630  Art. 1 HEC; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 301; gauthey/markuS, n. 832.
631  Art. 1 HEC; amram, n. 19. The term ‘judicial’ is therefore not defined.
632  gauthey/markuS, n. 831; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 301.
633  HEC Preambel; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 301.
634  Ibid.
635  HEC Special Commission (1985), 1679.
636  knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 301 et seq.
637  rothStein, 87; Art. 23 HEC.
638  rothStein, 86. 
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Indeed, the HEC’s direct applicability to arbitral proceedings could contrib­
ute to their effectiveness. In order to provide clarity, in addition to a ‘judicial 
authority’, Art. 1 HEC should include an ‘arbitral tribunal’. This amendment 
would have several procedural consequences, as discussed below, focusing 
on the situation in Switzerland. 
d. Procedural Consequences
I. Non-Exclusivity
It is worth mentioning that if arbitral tribunals could avail of the HEC direct­
ly, Switzerland would have to amend its first reservation, which declares that 
the HEC applies exclusively to its Member States.639 As Art. 184 (2) PILA CH 
also provides for court assistance in the taking of evidence in international 
arbitral proceedings, neither possibility should be given priority. While the 
HEC’s exclusive character might apply to state court proceedings, this is cer­
tainly not the case with arbitral proceedings. As a result, the HEC would 
represent just one of various possible means to obtain evidence—for instance, 
in addition to the aforementioned domestic legal basis or another interna­
tional treaty.640 Indeed, Art. 27 (c) HEC explicitly empowers Member States 
to permit, ‘by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than 
those provided for in this Convention’.641
In this regard, the US approach should also be mentioned. In Société 
Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, the US Supreme Court 
argued that by virtue of Art. 27 HEC, both the HEC and the domestic rules 
(FRCP USA) may be used to obtain evidence located in the US and thus there 
is no exclusivity.642 Switzerland could therefore amend its first reservation 
to the HEC and open up the possibility for arbitral tribunals to avail of the 
HEC directly. In a similar way to diplomatic officers, consular agents and 
commissioners (Art. 18 HEC), arbitral tribunals could therefore be empow­
ered to seek evidence.
639  See the reservations.
640  Geimer/Schütze­knöfeL, Introduction, n. 28; Art. 11a (4) PILA CH; MüKo­paBSt, Pre­
liminary Remarks n. 11 with reference to the fact Art. 1 HEC is modelled as a discretion­
ary clause; kLauS, 302: see also p. 128 et seqq. infra.
641  From the point of view of Swiss criminal law, there is no danger of ‘felonies and misde­
meanours against the state or unlawful activities on behalf of a foreign state’ pursuant 
to Art. 271 SCC CH. Since arbitral tribunals are per se private institutions, their taking 
of evidence, even through an international treaty such as the HEC, would not endan­
ger the sovereignty of any state (see BSK­huSmann, Art. 271 SCC CH n. 18 et seqq.). 
642  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); see 
also p. 208 infra. 
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If Member States were to expand the scope of application of the HEC to arbi­
tral tribunals—either by making each a separate reservation or by agreeing 
to amend the convention as a whole—this would positively influence interna­
tional arbitral proceedings. Consequently, arbitral tribunals could choose to 
seek evidence under either the HEC or the respective lex arbitri. In jurisdic­
tions which do not offer court assistance in the taking of evidence pursuant 
to their lex arbitri, but which are also Member States of the HEC, state courts 
could provide assistance based solely on the HEC without any need to amend 
national law.
II. Requesting Arbitral Tribunal
Regarding the requesting authority, the special commission’s concerns re­
garding the many types of arbitral tribunals can easily be rebutted.643 Ac­
cording to Arts. 3 (a–d) HEC, a letter of request must not only specify who is 
seeking to obtain what evidence, but also provide further information re­
garding the parties, including their names and legal representatives, as well 
as an overview of the dispute in question, including all necessary informa­
tion thereto. As a consequence, irrespective of whether the letter of request 
comes from an ad hoc or institutional arbitral tribunal, the competent au­
thority will be perfectly aware of whom it concerns. 
III. Jurisdiction
In Switzerland, the ‘central authority’ pursuant to Arts. 2 and 24 HEC is de­
termined by the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ), which usually appoints a Can­
tonal Supreme Court.644 As a result, there are 26 central authorities.645 Alter­
natively, letters of requests can be addressed to the FOJ in Berne, which acts 
as a subsidiary central authority and forwards the request to the respective 
competent Cantonal instance.646 In very few Cantons will this jurisdiction be 
different from that where court assistance in the taking of evidence is sought 
under Art. 184 (2) PILA CH. Taking the example of Berne, while the respective 
District Court renders assistance pursuant to the PILA CH, it is the Cantonal 
Supreme Court which executes letters of request in accordance with the 
643  HEC Special Commission (1985), 1679; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 301. 
644  Art. 11 PILA CH; see the database of Swiss Localities and Courts; Art. 6 HEC; see also 
Art. 7 (6a and 7) of the Organisation Ordinance for the Federal Department of Justice 
and Police (SR 172.213.1).
645  See the list of the central authorities.
646  See the second reservation of Switzerland; Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Mat­
ters CH (2013), 21.
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HEC.647 However, since this District Court acts as the single cantonal instance 
too, jurisdiction under the HEC does not substantially deviate from the situ­
ation under the PILA CH.648 
IV. Participation of the Parties and the Arbitral Tribunal
Under Art. 7 HEC, the parties concerned and their representatives can par­
ticipate in the taking of evidence. This also applies to the requesting judicial 
authority—that is, an arbitral tribunal if the respective Member State made a 
declaration in this respect.649 According to the fourth reservation of Switzer­
land, subject to the consent of the executing state court, members of the re­
questing judicial authority may be present during the taking of evidence.650 
In sum, from the point of view of due process, the HEC’s participation rights 
regarding the parties to the arbitration and the arbitral tribunal are very 
welcome and go even further than Art. 184 (2) PILA CH.651
V. Applicable Law and Procedure
Although the executing authority will normally apply its own law, this does 
not exclude the consideration of foreign procedure, ‘unless this is incompat­
ible with the internal law of the state of execution or is impossible of perfor­
mance by reason of its international practice and procedure or by reason of 
practice difficulties’.652 Applied to arbitral proceedings, it follows that the 
specific procedural rules of the respective arbitration could be taken into 
account unless one of the grounds previously mentioned applies. Conse­
quently, an arbitral tribunal could seek to cross­examine a witness or allow 
affidavits, subject to the consent of the respective witness.653 Moreover, this 
is in line with the proposed Art. 184 (3) PILA, which states that, on request, a 
state court can apply or consider different (i.e. foreign) procedural forms.654
 
VI. Costs
Regarding costs, the overall principle stated in the HEC is that in general, 
assistance in the taking of evidence will not lead to any reimbursement of 
647  Art. 8 (1) EG ZSJ BE. 
648  Art. 356 (2) (c) CCP CH by analogy.
649  Art. 8 HEC.
650  See the reservations; Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013), 25.
651  See p. 233 infra.
652  Art. 9 HEC; MüKo­paBSt, Art. 9 HEC n. 4 et seqq.; Geimer/Schütze­knöfeL, Art. 9 HEC 
n. 2 et seqq.
653  Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013), 24.
654  See in more detail p. 242 et seq. infra.
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taxes or costs of any nature.655 As an exception thereto, the state of execution 
can require the state of origin to reimburse the costs occasioned by the use 
of a special (foreign) procedure.656 Because in Swiss court proceedings court 
assistance in the taking of evidence will always lead to costs, Art. 14 HEC 
would have to be amended in order to exclude arbitral proceedings from the 
overall principle.657 Otherwise, there would be an unjustified imbalance be­
tween the cost regulations pursuant to the PILA CH and the HEC. 
VII. Duration of Proceedings
Finally, one must stress that the HEC’s direct applicability to arbitration 
could also lead to a faster and more efficient process for obtaining court as­
sistance in the taking of evidence. In this respect, it is often said that this 
process is cumbersome, time consuming and costly.658 In contrast, and ac­
cording to Art. 9 HEC, letters of request must ‘be executed expeditiously’.659 
Although this provision does not specify the timeframe within which these 
letters must be dealt with, let alone any sanction in case of delay, authorities 
of Member States are nonetheless required to handle evidence requests as 
quickly as possible.660 The most recent available statistics show that most 
evidence requests are answered within approximately four months, with 
only small divergences between jurisdictions.661 While four months can be 
a long time in international arbitration, this timeframe would be much longer 
in case of indirect court assistance—that is, through the state courts at the 
seat of arbitration, via the central authority in the assisting jurisdiction to the 
assisting court, back to the central authority, then to the court at the seat of 
arbitration and ultimately to the requesting arbitral tribunal.662 
655  Art. 14 HEC; Geimer/Schütze­knöfeL, Art. 14 HEC n. 1; MüKo­paBSt, Art. 14 HEC n. 2; 
see also Art. 26 HEC, which does not apply to Switzerland (Guideline Judicial Assistance 
in Civil Matters CH (2013), 26).
656  Art. 14 HEC i.c.w. Art. 9 (2) HEC.
657  Art. 95 (1) CCP CH; see also p. 255 et seqq. infra.
658  See e.g. BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 56.
659  See also Arts. 5 and 6 HEC, where the requested authorities are bound to act ‘promptly’ 
and ‘forthwith’.
660  MüKo­paBSt, Art. 9 HEC n. 10; Geimer/Schütze­knöfeL, Art. 9 HEC n. 15.
661  HEC Questionnaire (2014), 18 et seq. While Switzerland executes most evidence re­
quests within two months, the same requests take six months to a year to be answered 
in France and the US.
662  rothStein, 63; SchoiBL, 527 et seq.
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e. Result
The previous discussion has shown that although the HEC is barely men­
tioned in connection with arbitral proceedings, the idea of its direct applica­
tion in the field of arbitration is anything but new. The issue came up not only 
during the drafting process, but also more recently, as international arbitra­
tion has become increasingly attractive. 
While the direct applicability of the HEC to arbitration would indeed 
facilitate international arbitral proceedings, Member States still seem to pre­
fer its indirect use via state courts only.663 Were this preference to shift, noth­
ing would prevent them from extending the HEC’s scope of application to 
arbitral proceedings; as previously shown, few amendments would be nec­
essary in this respect. Since the HEC is by far the most important internation­
al convention in relation to the taking of evidence, this idea is certainly worth 
considering, although it remains to be seen whether an international consen­
sus can be reached among Member States. To sum up, at present, the HEC is 
not generally available directly for arbitral proceedings. 
5. Summary
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that there is no obligation for courts 
to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence, whether under the 
ECHR, the NYC or the HEC. Regarding the ECHR, it has been demonstrated 
that both the ECtHR and the SFT oblige arbitral tribunals only to observe 
minimum procedural guarantees during the arbitral proceedings.664 Par­
ticularly in Switzerland, the ECHR serves only as a tool to interpret those 
minimum procedural guarantees at the level of federal law. Consequently, 
there is no duty to comply with the ECHR during the arbitral proceedings, 
but only once the arbitral award has been rendered. Furthermore, the NYC—
which aims to uphold arbitration agreements—does not give a clear­cut an­
swer as to whether this also includes assisting arbitral tribunals in the taking 
of evidence.665 While there are good arguments to support answering this 
question both positively and negatively, a conclusive answer may be found 
by considering the NYC’s overall intention. Instead of imposing strict re­
quirements as regards the arbitral proceedings themselves, the NYC empha­
sises the importance of the arbitration agreement and its connection to the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. As a consequence, there is 
663  HEC Questionnaire (2009), 40 et seqq.; HEC Questionnaire (2004), 11 et seq.
664  See p. 104 et seqq. and p. 110 et seqq. supra.
665  See p. 116 et seq. supra.
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no duty to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence. Finally, as a 
more theoretical discourse (but with practical suggestions), the potential 
direct application of the HEC to arbitral proceedings has been discussed.666 
It has been pointed out that, despite the current reluctance to apply the HEC 
in arbitral proceedings, this idea is worth considering in future amend­
ments of the HEC. This would not only facilitate and accelerate arbitral 
proceedings, but also promote international arbitration as an alternative 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
D. European Law
1. Introduction
In a purely European context, and in addition to the conventions at the level 
of international public law, a European convention and a European regula­
tion are notable regarding the taking of evidence. While the European Con­
vention on International Commercial Arbitration (ECICA) addresses arbitral 
proceedings in a more general way, the European Evidence Regulation (EER) 
specifically provides for the taking of evidence in almost all EU Member 
States. The following will thus examine whether an obligation can be de­
duced from the ECICA and the EER. 
2. ECICA and the Paris Agreement 
Shortly after the establishment of the NYC, the ECICA was introduced in 1961; 
so far, it has 31 Member States, of which only 16 have ratified the convention.667 
Switzerland is not among the Member States. As a product of the UN Econom­
ic Commission for Europe, and with the goal of simplifying arbitration be­
tween Western and Eastern European countries, the ECICA addresses the 
arbitral tribunal as well as the parties, and therefore the arbitral proceedings 
themselves.668 Because it thus has a different scope from the NYC, it is often 
considered as a supplement thereto.669 
As regards the existence of a possible obligation to assist arbitral tribu­
nals, Art. IV ECICA is of major importance, since it allows the parties to tailor 
the arbitral proceedings at their widest discretion (i.e. also in relation to the 
666  See p. 118 et seqq. supra.
667  See the current status; Despite its name, there are also non­european Member States 
such as Azerbajian, Burkina Faso, Cuba and Kazakhstan. In contrast, a few European 
countries, such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, are not part of it.
668  haScher, n. 1. Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 143.
669  pitkowitZ, 93.
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taking of evidence).670 According to Art. IV (1) ECICA, if the parties choose ad 
hoc arbitration, they can designate the arbitrators, the seat of arbitration and 
the rules of the arbitral proceedings. By contrast, where the parties have 
neither agreed upon the rules of the arbitral proceedings nor appointed an 
arbitrator who could decide in this regard, the ECICA provides for either a 
special committee or the president of the respective chamber of commerce 
to do so.671 On the one hand, this mechanism has facilitated arbitral proceed­
ings between parties from Western and Eastern European countries; but in 
arbitral proceedings solely between parties from Western Member States, it 
has proved rather impractical and complicated.672 
As a result, several of these (Western) Member States entered into a sep­
arate agreement which replaced Arts. IV (2)–(7) ECICA.673 Art. 1 of the so­
called Paris Agreement reads as follows: 
“If the arbitral Agreement contains no indication regarding the measures 
referred to in paragraph 1 of Article IV of the European Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration as a whole, or some of these meas­
ures, any difficulties arising with regard to the constitution or function­
ing of the arbitral tribunal shall be submitted to the decision of the com­
petent authority at the request of the party instituting proceedings.” 674
According to this agreement, the ‘competent authority’ is responsible for 
rendering assistance, rather than a chamber of commerce or a special com­
mittee. The Paris Agreement itself does not further specify the ‘competent 
authority’. Although the unofficial German version speaks of ‘state courts’, 
the official French and English texts refer to the ‘competent authority’.675 
While the main goal of the ECICA was to simplify West­East arbitration and 
therefore to appoint special authorities (a chamber of commerce or a special 
committee) instead of state courts to grant assistance, the Paris Agreement 
changed this mechanism in relation to arbitral proceedings between its 
670  haScher, n. 33. However, considering Art. IX (1) (b) ECICA, it becomes clear that the 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award can be refused on the grounds of a 
violation of the right to present one’s case (see also Art. V (1) (b) NYC).
671  Art. IV (3) ECICA. The same procedure applies to cases where parties fail to appoint 
the arbitrators (Art. IV (2) ECICA).
672  pitkowitZ, 96.
673  Agreement Relating to Application of the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1962). Except the Republic of Moldova, which joined the 
agreement in 1998, all other Member States are Western European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg).
674  Art. 1, para. 2 Paris Agreement.
675  SteinBrück, 69 et seq.
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Member States.676 This historical background seems to indicate that the ra­
tionale behind the Paris Agreement was to shift the competence of either the 
chamber of commerce or a special committee back to the state courts as the 
authorities responsible for rendering assistance.677 
In sum, both the ECICA and the Paris Agreement foresee the possibility 
for authorities to render assistance during the arbitral proceedings—but 
nothing more. The extent to which these authorities will or must grant assis­
tance remains unclear. In addition, the international jurisdiction is not reg­
ulated. Therefore, both the ECICA and the Paris Agreement merely confirm 
that there are some situations in which court assistance may be needed and 
therefore provide mechanisms to resolve the issue, without regulating much 
more. To interpret this as an obligation to effectively support the arbitral 
tribunal would thus be too far­fetched. 
3. European Evidence Regulation
As regards evidence, in contrast to the ECICA and the Paris Agreement, the 
EER is not only newer, but also more specific.678 It entered into force in 2004 
and applies directly between all 28 EU Member States, except Denmark.679 As 
regards Switzerland, it is thus not applicable.680 As between the 28 EU Mem­
ber States, the EER replaces the HEC.681 The EER allows the courts of one 
Member State either to submit evidence requests to the competent court in 
another Member State where the evidence is located or to take evidence di­
rectly in that Member State.682 Regarding the applicability of the EER to arbi­
tral proceedings, the discussion centres on the term ‘court’ in Art. 1 EER—re­
ferring to the authority which can submit an evidence request. As with the 
term ‘judicial authority’ within the HEC, the prevailing view among authors 
of legal doctrine is that an arbitral tribunal cannot fulfil the requirements of 
a court in the sense of the EER.683 Consequently, in order to obtain evidence 
676  haScher, n. 38; SteinBrück, 68 et seqq.
677  haScher, n. 95; SteinBrück, 69 et seq.
678  SchütZe, Rechtsverfolgung, n. 317 et seqq.
679  See the current status.
680  However, the EER can be still useful in situations where Switzerland makes an evi­
dence request according to the HEC in a Member State of both the HEC and the EER. 
In this situation, the requested court could make further requests with the help of the 
EER (knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 307 et seq.).
681  Art. 21 (1) EER; EER Report (2007), 2.
682  Art. 1 EER.
683  See p. 120 supra; SchoiBL, 521 et seq.; MüKo­rauScher, Art. 1 EER, n. 1; Rauscher­Von 
hein, Art. 1 EER, n. 9 with further references; knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 303 with 
further references; EER Study (2007), 18, 102.
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abroad, an arbitral tribunal must take the indirect route of seeking assistance 
from a national court, which will then act according to the mechanism set out 
in the EER by either submitting a request to the competent foreign court or 
directly taking evidence in the respective Member State.684 
So far, there have been no cases in which an arbitral tribunal has used 
the EER and submitted an evidence request directly. Nonetheless, Knöfel 
suggests the EER’s direct applicability in order to bypass the lengthy and 
cumbersome process of indirect court assistance in the taking of evidence.685 
In this respect, he proposes—in keeping with his arguments as regards the 
HEC—that the term ‘court’ in Art. 1 EER should be interpreted functionally, 
and consequently that arbitral tribunals should fall under the scope of Art. 1 
EER.686 One must admit that the direct applicability of the EER to arbitral 
proceedings would indeed contribute to their effectiveness. In contrast to the 
HEC, which specifies no express timeframe for responding to evidence re­
quests, the EER states that they must be executed without delay or at the 
latest within 90 days of receipt.687 What is more, subject to the law of the 
Member State in which the evidence is located, the arbitral tribunal can ask 
that the taking of evidence take place according to the procedural rules as 
specified in the arbitration agreement (e.g. cross­examination).688 Finally, if 
the law of the respective Member State so provides, the parties can be present 
when the evidence is taken or can ask to take evidence directly in another 
Member State.689
In summary, although the EER’s direct applicability to arbitral proceed­
ings would facilitate the taking of evidence in international contexts, most 
authors deny such a possibility due to the clear wording of ‘courts of a Mem­
ber State’.690 Still, in light of the soaring popularity of international arbitra­
tion, the EER should be available not only for state courts of Member States, 
but also for international arbitral tribunals. Instead of interpreting the term 
684  knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 305. For the equivalent procedure under the HEC, see 
p. 118 supra.
685  knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 305.
686  Ibid., 306 et seq.; see in this respect e.g. § 1055 CCP DE and Art. 387 CCP CH (as regards 
domestic arbitration), which give arbitral awards the same effect as final and binding 
court judgments.
687  Art. 10 (1) EER. However, one should be aware that the time limit of 90 days increasingly 
seems to cause trouble in practice—see EER Impact Assessment (2018), 42 et seqq.; (EER 
Report (2007), 3; EER Study (2007), 40).
688  Art. 10 (3) EER; see also the possibility of using video and conference calls (Art. 10 (4) EER).
689  Arts. 11 (1) and 17 EER. The direct taking of evidence is only be performed on a volun­
tary basis without the need of coercive measures (Art. 17 (2) EER).
690  See also knöfeL, Judicial Assistance, 305, with further references in fn 148.
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‘court’ too broadly, the EU could thus explicitly include arbitral tribunals in 
the EER’s scope of application in a future amendment. Still, at present, no 
obligation derives from the EER to support arbitral tribunals directly in the 
taking of evidence. 
4. Result
Although the ECICA, the Paris Agreement and the EER all address court as­
sistance, their actual significance varies considerably. On the one hand, 
while the ECICA and the Paris Agreement are still in force and applicable to 
arbitral proceedings in European Member States, they have nonetheless lost 
a great deal of their importance due to the improved relationships between 
Western and Eastern European countries. On the other hand, the EER—
which could make a valuable contribution towards increasing the effective­
ness of procedures for the taking of evidence in international arbitration—is 
not currently applicable to arbitration. It follows, therefore, that state courts 
have no obligation to directly assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evi­
dence, whether under the ECICA, the Paris Agreement or the EER. 
E. Summary
This part of the chapter has discussed the possible existence of an obligation 
to assist arbitral tribunals based on superior law (i.e. either constitutional or 
international public law). As regards the Const. CH and the ECHR, it has been 
shown that they are concerned only that certain minimum procedural guar­
antees be observed during the arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, the NYC 
aims to uphold arbitration agreements and to facilitate the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, but says little about the arbitral proceedings 
themselves (e.g. the taking of evidence). For their part, the ECICA and Paris 
Agreement merely confirm that in certain situations, state courts must sup­
port arbitral proceedings and nothing more. Finally, several arguments have 
been presented in favour of the direct applicability of the HEC and the EER to 
international arbitral proceedings, which unfortunately is not currently the 
case. In sum, no obligation to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evi­
dence exists based on the Const. CH or international conventions, either Eu­
ropean or universal. Whether state courts are obliged to assist international 
arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence is therefore a question of the re­
spective national law and thus an issue of legal policy.691 
691  SteinBrück, 89.
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§ 5 Conclusion
The main focus of this chapter has been to provide the reader with a general 
understanding of court assistance in the taking of evidence in international 
arbitration. This has been done by exploring the subject from three different 
angles. While the first part focused on how this works in practice, the second 
part considered the legal bases and the intention of the parties. The third part 
then examined the possible existence of an obligation for courts to assist in 
the taking of evidence based on the Const. CH and international public law. 
In the first part, in order to arrive at a general understanding of how state 
courts can support arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence, the situations 
in which such support is needed and the means by which it is granted were 
discussed. In this regard, interim measures are central to temporarily pro­
tect the parties’ rights from possible damage during the course of arbitration; 
while ordinary measures for the taking of evidence aim to establish the rele­
vant facts of the case. The second part discussed the divergent perceptions 
of court assistance in general, and concerning the taking of evidence in par­
ticular, as either helpful assistance or disturbing intervention. The prevailing 
view in international arbitration seems to advocate a hands­off approach, 
setting strict standards regarding the involvement of state courts in arbitral 
proceedings and particularly in the taking of evidence. The UNCITRAL ML 
and (ad hoc and institutional) arbitration rules thus provide for court assis­
tance in the taking of evidence, subject to the consent of the arbitral tribunal 
or even the adverse party. From the parties’ point of view, court assistance in 
the taking of evidence not only is in line with the arbitration agreement, but 
will also reinforce the status of the arbitral tribunal and lead to a more sub­
stantiated arbitral award. As a result, it can truly be seen as assisting, rather 
than interfering in, the arbitration. The third and final part demonstrated 
that there is no obligation to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence 
under either Swiss constitutional or international public law. The decision of 
whether and to what extent the courts of a jurisdiction will grant assistance 
in the taking evidence is therefore an issue of legal policy and depends on the 
laws of the respective country. 
From an arbitration practitioner’s perspective, the lack of international 
common practice is, to put it bluntly, unsatisfactory. As pointed out (see p. 2 
supra), indirect court assistance in international arbitral proceedings is in 
most cases not an option, due to the lengthy and cumbersome process in­
volved. Parties and arbitrators have therefore a keen interest in being able to 
resort directly to foreign state courts in order to obtain evidence. As views on 
how international arbitral tribunals should be supported vary among coun­
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tries, it is indeed difficult to make general statements and suggestions. How­
ever, since this book aims to analyse the status quo concerning court assis­
tance in the taking of evidence in aid of international arbitral proceedings in 
Switzerland, a comparative analysis of several jurisdictions seems useful in 
this regard. Thus, the focus shall now shift to various other countries and 
their respective approaches—whether liberal or conservative—to the issue at 
hand. This comparative study will inform the analysis of the status quo in 
Switzerland. The following chapter therefore concentrates on the legal bases 
and technical mechanisms on the one hand and on the respective legislator’s 
intention to offer court assistance in the taking of evidence on the other hand.




Since the theoretical foundations of court assistance in the taking of evidence 
in international arbitration have been set out in the previous chapter, this 
chapter concentrates on more practical aspects. The extent to which state 
courts grant assistance varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; 
from a practitioner’s point of view, it is therefore crucial to understand these 
differences and provide for them in the tactical strategies of a case.692 In ad­
dition, this chapter lays the groundwork for the analysis of the situation in 
Switzerland that follows. This chapter therefore outlines how court assis­
tance in the taking of evidence in aid of international arbitral proceedings is 
provided in several key forums for arbitration: France, England, the USA and 
Germany.693 Although these countries are best known for their arbitra­
tion­friendly stance, the outcome as regards court assistance in the taking of 
evidence is anything but uniform. Instead of merely listing various country 
reports or even making a comprehensive comparison, the following remarks 
concentrate on elaborating key evidentiary issues. 
The first and most important issue concerns the question of whether the 
respective jurisdictions directly grant assistance in the taking of evidence to 
international arbitral tribunals—that is, without making a detour via interna­
tional judicial assistance (see p. 118 et seqq. supra). The second issue relates to 
the competence to make an evidence request and the possibility to exclude 
court assistance in the taking of evidence. The third issue focuses on the 
scope of evidence sought and the law according to which evidence may be 
sought, and from whom (i.e. the parties to the arbitration and/or third par­
ties). It will be examined whether evidence can be obtained only according 
692  Dupeyron, 472.
693  Although it is not (yet) considered one of the most popular forums for arbitration, 
recent ICC statistics have shown the importance of Germany not only in terms of 
arbitrators and parties to arbitration, but also regarding the number of disputes 
filed in Germany under the ICC Rules; for a short outline how court assistance in 
taking evidence is modeled in the USA, England and Wales as well as France, see also 
BraDShaw, 639 et seqq.
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to the respective lex arbitri or whether national civil procedure rules or even 
foreign forms of evidentiary procedure are also applicable. A section on the 
target of evidence will further show how a party or third party can defend 
itself against an evidence request. The fourth issue focuses on the compe­
tence of the juge d’appui—that is, the judge of support in the country in which 
assistance is sought. In this regard, crucial aspects such as the scope of dis­
cretion in general, and how far the juge d’appui can examine the legitimacy 
of the evidence request and the arbitration agreement, will be addressed. As 
a fifth issue, in order to avoid unnecessarily lengthening the arbitral proceed­
ings, it is important to know whether the decision of the juge d’appui as re­
gards an evidence request can be challenged and if so, on what grounds. 
§ 2 Germany
A. Introduction
Since the fundamental amendments to the German lex arbitri in 1998—name­
ly, the 10th book of the CCP DE (§ 1025 et seqq.)—arbitration in Germany has 
been facilitated in many ways and the country has become an increasingly 
attractive forum for international arbitration.694 The new provisions were 
largely an adoption of the UNCITRAL ML and therefore strive to make Ger­
many an attractive seat of arbitration by strengthening the status of arbitral 
tribunals and facilitating cooperation between arbitral tribunals and state 
courts.695 In this regard, and as stated in the UNCITRAL ML, § 1026 CCP DE 
provides that a state court may take action only insofar as provided by the 
10th book of the CCP DE.696 Because Germany—unlike Switzerland—does not 
have separate statutes for domestic and international arbitration, § 1025–1066 
CCP DE are the main source regarding arbitral proceedings.697 Nonetheless, 
the 10th book of the CCP DE sometimes refers to other provisions on German 
court litigation in other parts of the CCP DE. 
694  kreinDLer et al., n. 1.6 et seqq.; Balthasar­BaLthaSar, 379, n. 1; see also the statistical 
data of DIS arbitration in Germany.
695  Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996), 22 et seq., 34; kreinDLer et al., n. 1.32; 
woLff, 243; MüKo­münch, Vorbemerkungen zu § 1025, n. 175.
696  Art. 5 UNCITRAL ML; see also S. 1 (c) EAA 1996.
697  MüKo­münch, § 1025 CCP DE, n. 3 et seqq.; kreinDLer et al., n. 1.36.
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B. Legal Bases
Like many other leges arbitri, the CCP DE provides for court assistance in the 
taking of evidence in aid of arbitral proceedings. § 1050 CCP DE reads as 
follows:
“(1) The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tri­
bunal may request from a court assistance in taking evidence or perfor­
mance of other judicial acts which the arbitral tribunal is not empow­
ered to carry out. 
(2) Unless it regards the application as inadmissible, the court shall exe­
cute the request according to its rules on taking evidence or other judi­
cial acts. 
(3) The arbitrators are entitled to participate in any judicial taking of 
evidence and to ask questions.”
The competent court for assistance in the taking of evidence is the local court 
(Amtsgericht) in whose district the evidence request will be carried out—that 
is, the place of residence of the witness or third party.698 In proceedings be­
fore a local court under § 1050 CCP DE, the parties need not be represented 
by a lawyer admitted to the German bar.699 This can be especially relevant 
and beneficial in international arbitral proceedings with lawyers from for­
eign jurisdictions.700
Although almost all provisions of the 10th book of the CCP DE apply only 
to arbitral proceedings whose seat is located in Germany, there are certain 
exceptions.701 According to § 1025 (2) CCP DE, court assistance in the taking 
of evidence is also granted to arbitral tribunals whose seat has not yet been 
determined, as well as to international arbitral tribunals with their seat out­
side Germany. In this regard, the CCP DE goes even further than the UNCI­
TRAL ML and can be considered as a ‘deliberate German offer of cooperation 
to international arbitration’.702 To this day, such provisions are rare in leges 
698  § 1062 (4) CCP DE; Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996), 64; SchwaB/waLter, 
ch. 17 n. 11; MüKo­münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 13; rütZeL et al., 162.
699  § 1062 (4) CCP DE i.c.w. § 78 (1) CCP DE.
700  BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8; Böckstiegel et al.­SachS/Lörcher, 
§ 1050 CCP DE, n. 1; BeckKuKo­hartmann, § 1050 CCP DE n. 4; rütZeL et al., 162.
701  § 1025 (1) CCP DE.
702  Art. 1 (2) UNCITRAL ML; woLff, 244; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 28; 
SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 12; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 33; Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, 
§ 1050 n. 3 CCP DE; BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE n. 3.2; SteinBrück, 386 
et seq.; rütZeL et al., 161.
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arbitri, so the broadened scope of § 1050 CCP DE is thus truly in the interests 
of international arbitration.703 It remains to be seen whether other countries 
will be influenced by § 1025 (2) read with § 1050 CCP DE and adopt the same 
approach. So far, only Austria has implemented an almost identical provision 
based on the model of the CCP DE.704 
C. Competence to Seek Court Assistance
1. Primacy of the Arbitral Tribunal
As stated in Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML, according to § 1050 (1) CCP DE, the approv­
al of the arbitral tribunal is necessary in order to resort to state courts for 
assistance in the taking of evidence.705 This strengthens the position of the 
arbitral tribunal as the authority in charge of the arbitral proceedings. In 
addition, this provision aims to prevent possible delaying tactics of the par­
ties.706 Thus, if the arbitral tribunal considers an evidence request to be irrel­
evant or inadmissible, it can refuse consent to resort to state courts.707 In this 
regard, one could argue that this risks violating the right to be heard.708 This 
would indeed be the case if the arbitral tribunal ignored an evidence request 
completely or denied it without reasonable grounds. However, as long as the 
arbitral tribunal—which is obliged to treat the parties equally and observe the 
right to be heard—respects the mandatory provisions of the CCP DE, the par­
ties’ agreement on the procedural rules and the optional provisions of law, it 
is at liberty to conduct the arbitral proceedings at its full discretion.709 Con­
sequently, as long as it acts within these boundaries, there is no risk of violat­
ing the right to be heard.710 If a party nonetheless wants to take action against 
a refusal to resort to state courts, parties can either challenge this decision 
directly or challenge the arbitral award if the arbitral tribunal has denied the 
request without justification and this denial has in some way influenced the 
arbitral award.711  
703  See e.g. similiar provisions in S. 2 (3) i.c.w. S. 43 and 44 EAA 1996 (p. 169 infra).
704  § 577 (2) i.c.w. § 602 CCP AU; Schumacher, n. 165 fn 260.
705  See also Art. 182 (2) PILA CH; S. 43 (2) EAA 1996; SchmiDt­ahrenDtS/De Jong, 285.
706  Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996), 51.
707  Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 2; MüKo­münch, § 1025 CCP DE, n. 18; 
SteinBrück, 388; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 38; HK­Saenger, § 1050 n 2.
708  MüKo­münch, § 1025 CCP DE, n. 18.
709  § 1042 (1) and (4) CCP DE; Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996), 46 et seq.
710  MüKo­münch, § 1025 CCP DE n. 18.
711  § 1059 (1) (d) CCP DE; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 38; see p. 146 et seqq. infra.
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In addition to the possibility for a party to seek court assistance in the taking 
of evidence, the arbitral tribunal itself can make an evidence request if it 
deems this appropriate in order to establish the facts of the case.712 As a con­
sequence, § 1050 (3) CCP DE entitles the arbitral tribunal to participate in the 
taking of evidence and to ask questions.713 This right, which is not included 
in the UNCITRAL ML, allows the arbitral tribunal to get a first­hand impres­
sion of the taking of evidence.714 Therefore, arbitrators must be notified in 
advance when the taking of evidence takes place.715 Still, they are at liberty 
to make use of their right and there is no obligation to participate.716 
2. Exclusion of Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
Since arbitration is a field predominantly influenced by the parties’ discre­
tion, one might ask whether the assistance of state courts may be excluded 
by the parties. As stated in the previous chapter (see p. 100 et seqq. supra), 
court assistance in the taking of evidence is in most cases in the interests of 
the parties. However, the parties might still want to exclude assistance in the 
taking of evidence through state courts altogether—for instance, for time, 
cost or confidentiality reasons.717 In legal doctrine, in the absence of an ex­
plicit legal basis, it is controversial whether a complete waiver of § 1050 CCP 
DE is in fact possible. Schlosser takes the view that although the parties can­
not renounce the rights as foreseen in § 1050 CCP DE in advance, in the sense 
of a total waiver of minimum legal protection, a partial waiver of the right to 
resort to state courts should nevertheless be possible.718 
By contrast, Münch suggests that because assistance according to § 1050 
CCP DE serves the interests of the parties, they are also at liberty to renounce 
this assistance altogether.719 This applies even more so, he argues, because 
the arbitral tribunal must act first and foremost according to the procedural 
rules that the parties have agreed upon; only in the absence of such rules may 
712  § 1050 (1) and § 1042 (4) CCP DE.
713  In addition to the arbitral tribunal, parties are also entitled to participate in the taking 
of evidence (see § 357 CCP DE).
714  Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996), 51; woLff, 266; SteinBrück, 404 et seqq.
715  SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 17; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 18; rütZeL 
et al., 162.
716  § 1042 (4) 2nd sentence CCP DE; MüKo­münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 34; Stein/Jonas­ 
SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 17 et seq.; BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE 
n. 15; Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 30.
717  SteinBrück, 411.
718  Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 3; SteinBrück, 409 et seqq.
719  MüKo­münch, § 1025 CCP DE n. 12.
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the arbitral tribunal decide at its own discretion.720 Similarly, Wolff and 
Schütze state that if parties can exclude certain types of evidence (e.g. wit­
nesses examination), they should also be able to exclude assistance from 
state courts in taking evidence.721 
This view deserves approval and is confirmed by considering the issue 
from the basic concept of arbitration: namely, to provide a private and con­
sensual legal sphere through which parties can obtain ‘a final and binding 
decision on a dispute …, without reference to a court of law’.722 If this applies 
to arbitration in general, it must also apply to the process of taking evidence. 
Furthermore, one should bear in mind that if the parties waive the possibil­
ity to resort to state courts in one arbitration, this does not preclude them 
from seeking such assistance again in another. Consequently, the exclusion 
of § 1050 CCP DE is always temporary and not a permanent renouncement of 
minimum principles of legal protection.723
D. Spectrum of Evidence and its Target
1. Evidence According to a Party Agreement
Before exploring the scope of evidence available pursuant to the CCP DE, the 
respective state court must examine whether the parties have explicitly ex­
cluded certain evidence.724 If the parties, as previously discussed (see p. 137 
et seq. supra), can exclude court assistance as a whole, this also applies to 
different types of evidence.725 For instance, parties may exclude all evidence 
other than documentary evidence.726 This can be done either by explicitly 
excluding discovery/disclosure proceedings in the arbitration agreement or 
by way of reference to institutional arbitration or the IBA Rules.727 Still, if 
evidence is gathered contrary to a party agreement, this serves as a reason to 
annul the arbitral award.728 Most often, however, an arbitral tribunal will not 
introduce evidence which was gathered against a contrary agreement be­
tween the parties.
720  § 1050 (3) and (4) 1st sentence CCP DE.
721  Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8; woLff, 256 et seq.
722  BLackaBy et al., n. 1.04 et seq.; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 1.01 n. 3 et seqq.
723  SteinBrück, 412.
724  § 1042 (4) CCP DE; MüKo­Münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 25; SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 9; 
eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 44; woLff, 262.
725  Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8.
726  See fn 139 supra.
727  See e.g. Art. 22.2 LCIA Rules; Art. 3 (9) IBA Rules.
728  § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE. 
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2. Evidence According to the CCP DE
a. In General
According to § 1050 CCP DE, parties may seek assistance in relation to either 
the taking of evidence or ‘other judicial acts’, such as the ordering of docu­
ments to be served by public notice or abroad.729 As regards the taking of 
evidence, the requested state court will carry out the request in accordance 
with its rules on taking evidence, unless it considers this inadmissible (see 
p. 140 et seqq. infra).730 Accordingly, all sorts of evidence can be sought under 
the CCP DE, such as examination of witnesses (§ 373 et seqq. CCP DE), parties 
(§ 445 et seqq. CCP DE) and experts (§ 402 et seqq. CCP DE); production of 
documents731 (§ 142, § 415 et seqq. CCP DE); inspections (§ 371 et seqq. CCP 
DE); and the administration of oaths732 (§ 391–393, § 410, § 478–484 CCP DE).733 
The parties are entitled to participate in the taking of evidence.734
b. Independent Evidentiary Proceeding
As already discussed (see p. 87 et seq. supra), state courts and emergency ar­
bitrators have parallel competence to order interim measures prior to the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. However, because of the lack of coercive 
power, assistance from an emergency arbitrator is not always suitable in sit­
uations where the preservation of evidence is urgent and assistance from 
state courts is thus required. In such cases, § 485 et seqq. CCP DE can prove 
very helpful. In circumstances where a party fears the potential destruction 
of evidence prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal, § 485 et seqq. CCP 
DE provides for a special procedure in the form of an ‘independent eviden­
tiary proceeding’. Accordingly, and subject to the approval of the adverse 
729  Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996), 51; Böckstiegel et al.­SachS/Lörcher, 
§ 1050 CCP DE n. 1. Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 2, 14; MüKo­
münch, § 1025 CCP DE n. 7; BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE n. 3; SchwaB/
waLter, ch. 17 n. 3; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 34.
730  § 1050 (2) i.c.w. § 355 et seqq. CCP DE. This is in line with Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML, accord­
ing to which ‘the court may execute the request within its competence and according 
its rules on taking evidence’.
731  While § 142 CCP DE concerns documents from third parties, § 432 CCP DE allows state 
courts to order production of records or documents of public authorities in aid of 
arbitration.
732  Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 10; Schaefer, 536.
733  Lachmann, n. 1621; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 30, 47; Zöller­geimer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8; 
HK­Saenger, § 1050 CCP DE n. 3; MüKo­münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 6; Stein/Jonas­ 
SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 6; BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE n. 4; Prüt­
ting/Gehrlein­prütting, § 1050 CCP DE n. 2; rütZeL et al., 72 et seqq., 161.
734  § 357 CCP DE; for the attendance of the arbitral tribunal, see § 1050 (3) CCP DE.
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party, or in cases where there is a concern that evidence might be lost or will 
become difficult to use, a state court may order inspections, the examination 
of witnesses or the preparation of an expert review. Although the demarca­
tion between measures in relation to the preservation of evidence as interim 
measures and ordinary measures for the taking of evidence is not always 
apparent, German legal doctrine considers preservation measures pursuant 
to § 485 et seqq. CCP DE as interim measures in the sense of § 1033 CCP DE.735 
This provision reads as follows: 
“An arbitration agreement does not rule out that a court may order, before 
or after arbitration proceedings have commenced, and upon a party hav­
ing filed a corresponding petition, that a provisional measure or one serv­
ing to provide security be taken with regard to the subject matter of the 
dispute being dealt with in the arbitration proceedings.”
The independent evidentiary proceeding should therefore be distinguished 
from the assistance available under § 1050 CCP DE, where temporal urgency 
is not the major concern. Regardless of whether the arbitral tribunal has al­
ready been established, the preservation of evidence can be an issue in the 
arbitral proceedings themselves. Thus, because it is considered an interim 
measure, an independent evidentiary proceeding is also possible during the 
arbitral proceedings—that is, once the arbitral tribunal has been established.736
3. Foreign Types of Evidence
While the types of evidence that may be sought in accordance with the CCP 
DE usually cause no problems, it remains doubtful whether a German court 
could nonetheless apply foreign forms of taking evidence. According to a 
minority of authors, if the parties in an international arbitration agree on 
cross­examination or document production in accordance with the IBA 
Rules, the German courts must apply these foreign forms of taking evidence 
without further ado.737 
735  OLG Brandenburg, 16 Feb. 2011, 13 U 11/10, cons. II, 3; SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 12; 
MüKo­münch, § 1033 CCP DE n. 7; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1033 CCP DE n. 1; 
Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1033 CCP DE n. 5; Zöller­geimer, § 1033 CCP DE n. 9; 
Musielak/Voit­Voit, § 1033 CCP DE n. 2; Prütting/Gehrlein­prütting, § 1033 CCP DE 
n. 2; for a different view, see Lachmann, n. 2892.
736  On the question of whether the approval of the arbitral tribunal to initiate an indepen­
dent evidentiary proceeding is indeed necessary after the establishment of the arbitral 
tribunal, see Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1033 CCP DE n. 1; SteinBrück, 407 et seq.; Stein­
Brück, Note on OLG Düsseldorf, 7 Feb. 2008, I­20 W 152/07, in: 8 Iprax 424 et seqq. 
(2010); for a different view see MüKo­münch, § 1033 CCP DE n. 8 et seq.; Varga, 249.
737  Lachmann, n. 1636; SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 8.
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From the German perspective, there are several arguments against this lib­
eral approach. First of all, and quite obviously, it is against the plain wording 
of § 1050 (2) CCP DE.738 In addition, § 1026 CCP DE expressly states that state 
courts may take action only in accordance with the provisions of the 10th 
book of the CCP DE. The German courts are therefore not bound by any in­
ternal agreements between the parties on the arbitral proceedings in gener­
al and the taking of evidence in particular.739 Nonetheless, if the parties have 
explicitly excluded certain types of evidence which are permissible under 
the CCP DE, this choice must be respected.740 Second, although foreign types 
of evidence are in some cases in the interests of the parties, the intention 
behind § 1050 (2) CCP DE was to avoid broad US­style discovery proceedings.741 
Because evidence often belongs to third parties, § 1050 (2) CCP DE protects 
these third parties from unwelcome foreign intrusion.742 Although it may at 
times be accurate to interpret § 1050 CCP DE broadly in the interests of the 
parties, this is certainly not the case here.
In contrast to the aforementioned arguments against foreign types of 
evidence, Steinbrück suggests a pragmatic middle way to handle this issue. 
Although the CCP DE does not provide for any foreign forms of evidence, he 
argues, German courts ought to transform these measures until they con­
form to the CCP DE, subject to the German ordre public.743 As a sort of com­
promise, this approach still avoids US­style discovery, but at the same time 
allows the competent juge d’appui to examine the extent to which the foreign 
form of evidence can be transformed and adapted to proceedings pursuant 
to the CCP DE.744 This not only is in the interests of international arbitration, 
but also promotes Germany as a seat of arbitration. Because this view is not 
substantiated by law, it remains doubtful as to how German judges of support 
will react when confronted with an evidence request containing foreign 
types of evidence, such as cross­examination or the examination of a party 
738  § 1050 (2) CCP DE: Unless it regards the application as inadmissible, the court shall 
execute the request according to its rules on taking evidence or other judicial acts.
739  SteinBrück, 397.
740  § 1042 (3) CCP DE; SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 8; SchütZe, Ermessensgrenzen, 3; see 
also SchmiDt­ahrenDtS/De Jong, who suggest the amendment of § 1050 to ensure 
that German courts take evidence only in accordance with the agreement of the par­
ties—for example, that witnesses be cross­examined instead of only questioned by the 
judge and the arbitrator(s), respectively (285). 
741  Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996), 51.
742  SteinBrück, 398.
743  Ibid., 404.
744  Ibid., 403.
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as a witness.745 So far, few relevant decisions of German courts have been 
rendered in this regard and it remains to be seen how widely § 1050 CCP DE 
will be interpreted.746 
4. International Judicial Assistance in Taking Evidence
Besides the aforementioned assistance in the taking of evidence, state courts 
can provide assistance by requesting foreign state courts to gather evidence 
by means of international judicial assistance (e.g. through the HEC or the 
EER).747 However, this course of action is unpopular in most situations, due 
to the lengthy and costly process involved. Since these international treaties 
are not open for direct use in arbitral proceedings, the best alternative is to 
approach a state court directly in the jurisdiction in which the evidence is 
located. 
5. Target of Evidence
As regards the target of an evidence request, a distinction must be made be­
tween the parties to the arbitration and third parties.748 If a party refuses to 
reveal evidence in its control, state courts cannot force the reluctant party to 
reveal it; but this will be considered by the arbitral tribunal when assessing 
the evidence.749 In this regard, possible privilege must be taken into account 
before drawing any adverse inference.750 
The situation is different regarding third parties—for example, if there is 
a request for document production or their examination as witnesses. Under 
the CCP DE, such a request will be granted only if it could reasonably be ex­
pected by the respective third party or to the extent that such party is not 
entitled to refuse to testify.751 Accordingly, third parties can refuse to reveal 
documents or to give testimony based on personal privilege (e.g. a personal 
relationship with one of the parties as spouse or fiancé) or factual privilege 
745  Ibid.; see also SchmiDt­ahrenDtS/De Jong, suggesting that in order to facilitate the 
arbitral proceedings and ensure that the respective state court judge does not have 
to take evidence in a way that he or she is not normally entitled nor accustomed to, 
witnesses should be ordered to testify directly before the arbitral tribunal (286). 
746  rütZeL et al., 163.
747  See p. 118 et seqq. supra; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 23 et seqq.; Wieczo­
rek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 37; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 31; woLff, 253; Varga, 
247 et seq. In Germany, the HEC entered into force in 1979 (see the current status).
748  Von enZBerg/rohrSSen, 14 et seq.
749  BeckOK­Von SeLLe, § 142 CCP DE n. 17; rütZeL et al., 162.
750  rütZeL et al., 80, 163 et seq. 
751  § 142 et seqq. CCP DE i.c.w. § 385–390 CCP DE; woLff, 266; Böckstiegel et al.­SachS/
Lörcher, § 1050 CCP DE n. 9 et seq.; rütZeL et al., 80 et seqq.
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(e.g. if a document or testimony would reveal a technical or trade secret).752 
Refusing to produce a document or give testimony without sufficient grounds 
can lead to fines or even coercive detention.753 However, if the respective 
state court forces a third party to produce evidence, this decision can be 
challenged by means of a miscellaneous appeal (sofortige Beschwerde) to the 
regional court (Landgericht).754
E. Competence of the Juge d’Appui
1. Scope of Discretion
Regardless of whether the conditions pursuant to § 1050 CCP DE are fulfilled, 
the respective juge d’appui has no choice but to grant or deny assistance.755 
For instance, there is no discretion to grant assistance in cases where the 
conditions are not met because of an inadmissible requested method of tak­
ing evidence.756 Furthermore, as a basic principle of international court as­
sistance, state courts will not examine the usefulness, appropriateness or 
relevance of an evidence request. Only the arbitral tribunal is entitled to do 
so.757 Thus, if the arbitral tribunal has explicitly requested to examine a wit­
ness under oath, the juge d’appui seized is not at liberty to deem this request 
unnecessary because the witness statement is considered reliable; unless, of 
course, it is legally not permissible.758 
In contrast, if the arbitral tribunal does not specify the manner in which 
a witness should be examined and thus does not exclude the administration 
of oath, the juge d’appui can decide freely whether an oath is necessary.759 
After the evidence has been taken, the result will be introduced into the ar­
bitral proceedings. The assessment of evidence and its consequences (i.e. 
whether a fact is proved) forms part of the arbitral proceedings and not of the 
752  § 383 and § 384 as well as the exception in § 385 CCP DE. In addition to this civil proce­
dural rules, German criminal law can impose sanctions on members of certain pro­
fessions revealing client information in the context of their profession (§ 203 CC DE); 
see also rütZeL et al., 80 et seqq.
753  § 390 CCP DE.
754  § 567 (1) (2.) CCP DE.
755  Zöller­geimer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 6; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 44; HK­Saenger, § 1050 CCP 
DE n. 5.
756  § 1050 (2) CCP DE.
757  § 1042 (4) 2nd sentence CCP DE; MüKo­münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 24; SchwaB/waLter, 
ch. 17 n. 8.
758  Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 13; Musielak/Voit­Voit, § 1050 CCP DE n. 4; 
BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE n. 9; SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 16.
759  Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 13.
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state court proceedings pursuant to § 1050 CCP DE.760 As a consequence, only 
the assessment of evidence which is taken by a state court is part of the arbi­
tral proceedings, and not the taking of evidence itself.761 
2. Principle of Subsidiarity 
According to § 1050 (1) CCP DE, the respective juge d’appui will assist in the 
taking of evidence only if the arbitral tribunal is not empowered to take the 
evidence itself.762 The extent to which the arbitral tribunal must explain why 
it cannot take the evidence itself remains contentious. On the one hand, it is 
obvious that if the arbitral tribunal is legally authorised to obtain evidence 
and can do so without further ado, state courts cannot be approached for 
assistance.763 Thus, arbitral tribunals cannot resort to state courts merely 
because they consider it inconvenient to take the evidence themselves.764 
Situations in which the arbitral tribunal could act autonomously, but 
only with a disproportionately significant effort, are more problematic.765 
For example, a third­party witness located abroad may likely refuse to testi­
fy.766 Consequently, because § 1050 CCP DE does not address this situation 
and § 1026 CCP DE specifies that state courts can take action only where pro­
vided so explicitly by law, the arbitral tribunal will first have to try to examine 
the witness at his or her place of residence. Obviously, the chances of success 
are very low, so the question arises as to whether § 1050 CCP DE may be ap­
plied by analogy.767 
760  Böckstiegel et al.­SachS/Lörcher, § 1050 CCP DE n. 11; Musielak/Voit­Voit, § 1050 CCP 
DE n. 8; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 50; HK­Saenger, § 1050 CCP DE n. 7; woLff, 267.
761  Musielak/Voit­Voit, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8.
762  § 1050 (1) CCP DE.
763  SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 4; Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 7; Böck­
stiegel et al.­SachS/Lörcher, § 1050 CCP DE n. 4.
764  Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1050 CCP DE n. 7.
765  Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 11; Zöller­geimer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8; 
HK­Saenger, § 1050 CCP DE n. 4; rütZeL et al., 162 et seq.
766  woLff, 254; MüKo­münch, § 1025 CCP DE, n. 26; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 42.
767  Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 11; BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP 
DE n. 3; for a different view, see Lachmann, n. 1627. He argues that because of consid­
erable demarcation difficulties in deciding at which stage one can presume that the 
effort of the arbitral tribunal is too significant to take evidence, § 1050 CCP DE should 
be applied only stricto sensu—that is, exclusively if the arbitral tribunal is not legally 
empowered to take evidence.
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By filling this legal gap, one must consider the fact that § 1026 CCP, like its 
counterpart in Art. 5 UNCITRAL ML, strives to limit court intervention, but 
not possible assistance by state courts.768 Applying § 1050 CCP DE by analogy 
thus would allow not for additional intervention by state courts, but rather 
for assistance which goes only slightly further than the strict wording of 
§ 1050 CCP DE.769 This argument is supported by the intention of § 1050 CCP 
DE as a whole—namely, to assist arbitral tribunals where they are unable to 
effectively conduct the taking of evidence. According to Hartmann, § 1050 
CCP DE should be interpreted and applied broadly and thus encompass cases 
in which the gathering of evidence would be disproportionately burdensome 
for the arbitral tribunal.770 This is also in the interests of the parties that wish 
to gather such evidence, regardless of whether the state court seized acts 
because the arbitral tribunal cannot legally gather evidence or because it is 
almost impossible to do so.771 Apart from these arguments, there is no hint 
that the German legislature deliberately intended to exclude such situations 
from the scope of application of § 1050 CCP DE. All in all, there are several 
good reasons to apply § 1050 CCP DE by analogy in circumstances where it 
would involve a disproportionately significant effort for the arbitral tribunal 
to gather the evidence itself. 
3. Examination of the Arbitration Agreement
Because § 1050 CCP DE serves only to assist arbitral proceedings, one might 
ask whether the juge d’appui has any scope to examine the validity of the ar­
bitration agreement. This question has been subject to controversial discus­
sions in German legal doctrine. A minority of authors argue that the validity 
of the arbitration agreement can be examined only on a prima facie basis—
that is, a motion under § 1050 CCP DE must be denied if the arbitration agree­
ment is obviously invalid.772 However, the prevailing view suggests that since 
the arbitral tribunal is competent to decide on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement and therefore on its own jurisdiction (competence­competence), 
state courts are not entitled to review the validity of the arbitration agree­
768  UNCITRAL, (2012), Art. 5 UNCITRAL ML n. 1.
769  SteinBrück, 394; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 42.
770  KuKo­hartmann, § 1050 CCP DE n. 1.
771  SteinBrück, 394.
772  SchwaB/waLter, § 1050 CCP DE, n. 10; Lachmann, n. 1634; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, 
§ 1050 CCP DE, n. 13; Musielak/Voit­Voit, § 1050 CCP DE, n. 5; SteinBrück, 419 et seq.; 
HK­Saenger, § 1050 CCP DE n. 6.
145 § 2 Germany
ment under § 1050 CCP DE.773 If there is a dispute as regards the arbitration 
agreement, the parties can challenge the competence of the arbitral tribunal 
according to § 1040 (3) CCP DE. Allowing for a full review of the arbitration 
agreement in proceedings pursuant to § 1050 CCP DE would indeed circum­
vent § 1040 (3) CCP DE.774 This competence is reserved for the higher region­
al court and not the local court, pursuant to § 1050 CCP DE.775 Apart from 
that, the arbitration agreement can of course be examined in the context of 
the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award under the NYC, but not 
during court assistance in the taking of evidence.776
F. Appellate Remedies
If all conditions under § 1050 CCP DE are fulfilled, the juge d’appui will render 
his or her decision in the form of a court order (Beschluss).777 In cases where 
only one party has made an evidence request, the right to be heard must be 
granted to the adverse party prior to rendering a decision.778 Reading the 
CCP DE in its strictest sense, a remedy against an order pursuant to § 1050 
CCP DE is not possible.779 The intention is clear: to keep state court interven­
tion to a minimum and thus simplify and speed up the arbitral proceedings.780 
Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that parties can initiate an immediate mis­
cellaneous appeal (sofortige Beschwerde) to the regional court (Landgericht) 
773  § 1040 (1) CCP DE; MüKo­münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 21; Böckstiegel et al.­SachS/Lörch­
er, § 1050 CCP DE, n. 6; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 43; Zöller­geimer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 6; 
BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE n. 10; BeckKuKo­hartmann, § 1050 CCP DE 
n. 4; Wieczorek/Schütze­SchütZe, § 1033 CCP DE n. 23. SchütZe distinguishes be­
tween situations where a motion under § 1050 CCP DE is initiated by a party or the 
arbitral tribunal itself. While in the first case an examination is possible, it does not 
apply to the latter situation because of competence­competence in accordance with 
§ 1040 CCP DE.
774  For another view see Steinbrück, 420; woLff, 260.
775  § 1062 (1) (2.) CCP DE i.c.w. § 1059 (2) (1.) (a) and (c) CCP DE.
776  Art. III (3) and V (1) (a) NYC.
777  § 1063 (1) CCP DE.
778  Böckstiegel et al.­SachS/Lörcher, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8. Therefore, in order to avoid 
lengthening state court proceedings, the parties should make an evidence request 
together if they agree that certain evidence should be gathered or the arbitral tribu­
nal itself initiates a proceeding pursuant to § 1050 CCP DE (MüKo­münch, § 1050 
CCP DE n. 28).
779  § 1065 (1) i.c.w. § 1062 (1) CCP DE e contratrio.
780  BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1065 CCP DE n. 1.
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if a motion under § 1050 CCP DE is denied.781 In contrast, there is no remedy 
against a court order granting the motion.782 This follows from the fact that 
an immediate miscellaneous appeal is possible only against a decision deny­
ing a request, not granting one.783 
As previously discussed (see p. 143 supra), the proceeding under § 1050 
CCP DE should be viewed separately from the arbitral proceedings in which 
the evidence which has been taken by the state court will be assessed. That 
is why in general, violations of procedural rules during the taking of evi­
dence in accordance with § 1050 CCP DE cannot be challenged before the 
arbitral tribunal. Nevertheless, such violations can be the subject of a chal­
lenge to the arbitral award if there is a connection between the violation and 
the reasons for seeking annulment of the arbitral award pursuant to § 1059 (2) 
CCP DE.784 An example is a situation where the juge d’appui orders cross­ex­
amination of a witness, even though this has been explicitly excluded by the 
parties.785 If one can demonstrate that there is a separate agreement be­
tween the parties which has been violated, and it may be assumed that this 
violation influenced the arbitral award, the higher regional court (Oberlandes-
 gericht) may annul it.786 
Up to 2011, there seem to have been no cases in which arbitral awards 
were set aside because the arbitral tribunal disregarded an explicit agree­
ment between the parties. However, this changed in 2011 with a decision of 
the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main.787 The court reasoned that 
procedural orders which have been expressly approved by the parties and 
which amend or change the agreed procedural rules are to be seen as a sep­
arate agreement between the parties.788 In the respective case, the arbitral 
781  § 567 (1) (2.) CCP DE; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, § 1050 CCP DE n. 17; eBerL/eBerL, § 1 
n. 46; BeckOK­wiLSke/markert, § 1050 CCP DE n. 14; Musielak/Voit­Voit, § 1050 CCP 
DE n. 6; Prütting/Gehrlein­prütting, § 1050 CCP DE n. 3; for another view see MüKo­
münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 28. He refers to the competence of the Higher Regional Court 
(Oberlandesgericht) according to § 159 CCA DE.
782  SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 13; woLff, 264.
783  § 567 (1) (2.) CCP DE.
784  eBerL/eBerL, § 1 n. 50; SchwaB/waLter, ch. 17 n. 14; Böckstiegel et al.­SachS/Lörcher, 
§ 1050 CCP DE n. 11; Musielak/Voit­Voit, § 1050 CCP DE n. 8; Stein/Jonas­SchLoSSer, 
§ 1050 CCP DE n. 21 et seq.; MüKo­münch, § 1050 CCP DE n. 33.
785  § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE; MüKo­münch, § 1059 CCP DE n. 37.
786  § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE; § 1062 (1) (4) CCP DE.
787  OLG Frankfurt am Main, 17 Feb. 2011, 26 Sch 13/10; § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE; marghi­
toLa, 231 et seqq.; wagner/BüLau, 8 et seqq.; rütZeL et al., 182 et seq.
788  OLG Frankfurt am Main, 17 Feb. 2011, 26 Sch 13/10, n. 57; regarding the difference be­
tween procedural orders and party agreements, see wagner/BüLau, 13 et seq.
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tribunal refused to order document production in violation of an explicit 
agreement between the parties.789 In addition, in terms of causality, it was 
held that because of the severity of the violation, it could have influenced the 
arbitral award.790 In this respect, the Court stated that it would indeed be 
speculative to examine in too much detail whether the arbitral award could 
have turned out differently.791
Although in this case the violation of the agreement between the parties 
did not arise in the context of court assistance in the taking of evidence, the 
approach followed by the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt demonstrates 
that—as opposed to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to tailor the arbitral 
proceedings, which mostly cannot be challenged—party autonomy must be 
taken seriously and failure to do so can lead to the annulment of the arbitral 
award.792 Applied to court assistance in the taking of evidence, one can there­
fore conclude that under German law, a violation of an agreement during the 
taking of evidence will be taken seriously, provided that it influenced the 
arbitral award. 
G. Summary 
§ 1050 CCP DE takes a very arbitration­friendly stance in various ways. First 
and most importantly, it does not distinguish between domestic and inter­
national arbitration, so court assistance in the taking of evidence is also 
granted to foreign arbitral tribunals. This direct court assistance consider­
ably simplifies and shortens the process of taking evidence in international 
arbitration. 
Second, from a tactical point of view, the arbitral tribunal must approve 
a request to seek state court assistance in the taking of evidence, to avoid 
delaying tactics. The arbitral tribunal can even seek court assistance itself if 
it considers this necessary. In the ongoing proceedings, the arbitral tribunal 
can actively participate in the taking of evidence before state courts and ask 
questions, which confirms and strengthens its position. By contrast, the par­
ties can also exclude this process altogether pursuant to § 1050 CCP DE, with­
out waiving their right to minimum legal protection. 
Third, a broad spectrum of possible measures for the taking of evidence 
is available under the CCP DE. Such measures also include the independent 
789  OLG Frankfurt am Main, 17 Feb. 2011, 26 Sch 13/10, n. 64.
790  Ibid., n. 66; marghitoLa, 241.
791  OLG Frankfurt am Main, 17 Feb. 2011, 26 Sch 13/10, n. 66.
792  marghitoLa, 239 et seqq.; wagner/BüLau, 11.
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evidentiary proceeding prior to and during the arbitral proceedings, in cases 
where there is a risk that certain evidence may potentially be destroyed. Al­
though only measures for the taking of evidence that accord with the CCP DE 
are permissible, it has been shown that in cases where foreign types of evi­
dence are requested, they can theoretically be transformed and adapted to 
the extent that they correspond to the CCP DE. Concerning the target of evi­
dence, parties cannot—in contrast to witnesses—be forced to reveal evidence 
in their control. Rather, this fact will be considered when assessing the evi­
dence in the arbitral proceedings. The situation is different as regards third 
parties, which can be forced to reveal evidence in their possession, unless 
this would be unreasonable or there are legal grounds to refuse to testify or 
reveal a certain document, including a technical or trade secret.
Fourth, as regards the competence of the juge d’appui, his or her scope 
of discretion is limited. If the conditions of § 1050 CCP DE are met, assistance 
must be granted and vice versa. Moreover, the juge d’appui is not entitled to 
examine the usefulness, appropriateness or relevance of an evidence re­
quest. This exercise is left to the arbitral tribunal which conducts the taking 
of evidence. The same applies to the assessment of evidence which does not 
form part of § 1050 CCP DE, but rather of the arbitral proceedings. A further 
competence—or rather, duty—of the juge d’appui is to examine whether the 
arbitral tribunal could take the requested evidence itself. In this regard, as­
sistance should be granted not only if the arbitral tribunal is legally not enti­
tled to do so, but also where this would involve a disproportionately signifi­
cant effort. As regards the arbitration agreement, the juge d’appui has no 
power to fully examine it, because of the principle of competence­compe­
tence. The challenge to the arbitration agreement is thus part of a separate 
proceeding, according to § 1042 (3) CCP DE. 
Finally, although the CCP DE does not expressly provide for this, the 
parties can appeal to the local court if a motion under § 1050 CCP DE is de­
nied. If it is granted, an appeal is not possible. Because the proceeding ac­
cording to § 1050 CCP DE does not form part of the arbitral proceedings, vio­
lations of procedural rules during the taking of evidence before a state court 
generally cannot be challenged during the arbitral proceedings. This is pos­
sible only if there is a link between the violation of procedural rules and the 
reasons for annulling the arbitral award according to § 1059 (2) (d) CCP DE—for 
example, if the taking of evidence before a state court violated an agreement 
between the parties and influenced the arbitral award. In such case, the high­
er regional court could annul the arbitral award. As seen in the decision of 
the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt, the bar to affirm such a violation is 
not set too high. 
149 § 2 Germany
All in all, § 1050 CCP DE is a very helpful and flexible tool for international 
arbitral proceedings. Varga even argues that the fact that § 1050 CCP DE pro­
vides an easily accessible tool to gather evidence through the German courts 
should motivate parties to comply voluntarily with the arbitral tribunal’s 
orders, and thus that § 1050 CCP DE will become unnecessary in many cases.793 
Admittedly, the very arbitration­friendly German approach, which also al­
lows for the provision of court assistance in the taking of evidence to foreign 
arbitral tribunals, is remarkable. Nevertheless, it remains questionable why 
the liberal German approach has gone almost unnoticed, both nationally and 
internationally. So far, there are almost no reported relevant court decisions 
concerning the scope of application of § 1050 CCP DE.794 This might not nec­
essarily imply its insignificance, but could rather be because decisions of 
lower first instance courts (regional courts) are frequently unreported. 
In addition, German courts which receive an evidence request can assist 
in the taking of evidence only in accordance with the types of evidence set 
out in the CCP DE. As previously discussed (see p. 140 et seqq. supra), German 
legal doctrine almost unanimously argues that no foreign forms of evidence 
can be taken in international arbitral proceedings before German courts. As 
long as this view prevails, § 1050 CCP DE will very likely remain insignificant.795 
It remains to be seen whether the German courts will take a more flexible 
approach by trying to adapt an evidence request containing a foreign form of 
evidence until it is compatible with the CCP DE.796 
§ 3 France
A. Introduction
Thanks to the presence of the ICC headquarters and a very liberal arbitration 
regime, France is one of the most popular forums for international arbitra­
tion.797 This is confirmed by the pro­arbitration stance of both the Paris Court 
of Appeal and the Court of Cassation.798 The French lex arbitri was revised in 
2011, when important case law was codified and arbitration­friendly provi­
793  Varga, 236 et seq.; see also woLff, 268.
794  rütZeL et al., 163.
795  Ibid., 161.
796  SteinBrück, 422; as a possible model, see e.g. Art. 184 (2) Draft­PILA CH.
797  DerainS/kiffer, n. 1; Balthasar­BaLthaSar/ZiaDe, n. 1; mourre, France, 1; Born, 
Int. Comm. Arb., 141.
798  Balthasar­BaLthaSar/ZiaDe, n. 3; mourre, France, 2.
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sions were implemented.799 Its provisions form part of the fourth book of the 
CCP FR, which is divided into two parts. While the first part (Arts. 1442–1503 
CCP FR) applies to domestic arbitration, the second part (Arts. 1504–1527 CCP 
FR) deals with international arbitration. These articles apply where ‘interna­
tional trade interests are at stake’.800 To avoid having two different statutes 
containing identical rules for both domestic and international arbitration, 
Art. 1506 CCP FR specifies which provisions of domestic arbitration also ap­
ply to international arbitration.801 
Obviously, the provisions that apply to international arbitration are of­
ten more liberal than the domestic provisions. For instance, the arbitration 
agreement need not be in writing, while in domestic arbitration, the written 
form is mandatory.802 As discussed below (see p. 156 infra), the parties enjoy 
remarkable freedom in tailoring the arbitral proceedings by modifying 
Art. 1506 CCP FR at their discretion. Lastly, although it is not based on the 
UNCITRAL ML, the CCP FR is in many ways influenced by it.803 
B. Legal Bases 
1. Prior to the Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
The CCP FR foresees the possibility of court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence both before and after the arbitral tribunal has been established. In 
cases where evidence is sought or must be preserved prior to the constitution 
of the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal itself can order conservatory or 
provisional measures (interim measures), and even combine them with an 
astreinte.804 Still, in cases where coercive power is needed, court assistance 
in the taking of evidence is possible pursuant to Art. 1449 CCP FR:
“The existence of an arbitration agreement, insofar as the arbitral tribu­
nal has not yet been constituted, shall not preclude a party from apply­
ing to a court for measures relating to the taking of evidence or provi­
sional or conservatory measures.”
“Subject to the provisions governing conservatory attachments and judi­
cial security, application shall be made to the President of the Tribunal 
de grande instance (Court of First Instance) or of the Tribunal de com­
799  Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 142 et seq. 
800  Art. 1504 CCP FR.
801  cLay, Art. 1506 CCP FR, 179 et seqq.; JarroSSon/peLLerin, n. 85.
802  Art. 1443 and 1507 CCP FR; gaiLLarD/De LapaSSe, n. 28.
803  mourre, France, 2; DerainS/kiffer, n. 1.
804  Art. 1468 CCP FR. 
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merce (Commercial Tribunal) who shall rule on the measures relating 
to the taking of evidence in accordance with the provisions of Article 145 
and, where the matter is urgent, on the provisional or conservatory meas­
ures requested by the parties to the arbitration agreement.”
The competent state judge is either the president of the court of first instance 
or the Commercial Tribunal.805 Where the need for evidentiary measures is 
urgent—for instance, to preserve evidence from potential loss—one might 
conclude that Art. 1449 CCP FR can be used only before the arbitral tribunal 
has been established, since the provision refers only to this stage of the arbi­
tral proceedings.806 Indeed, as Gaillard/De Lapasse argue, because 
Art. 1468 (1) CCP FR provides that an arbitral tribunal is competent to order 
interim measures and combine them with an astreinte as an indirect coercive 
measure, the French legislature did not consider it necessary to implement 
parallel competence between state courts and arbitral tribunals.807 
This view has long been criticised and in French legal doctrine, it is wide­
ly accepted that in some cases after the arbitral tribunal has been established, 
the only way to impose suitable interim measures—for example, in relation to 
the preservation of evidence—is to resort to state courts.808 This parallel com­
petence should not be seen as an inconvenience, but rather as helpful assis­
tance that should facilitate smooth arbitral proceedings and effective legal 
protection.809 This view is in line not only with the generally accepted principle 
in international arbitration of parallel competence to order interim measures 
between the arbitral tribunal and state courts, but also with the position of 
Art. 1449 CCP FR in the French lex arbitri. It appears under chapter one, which 
deals with the arbitration agreement without any mention of what happens 
once the arbitral tribunal has been established.810 Furthermore, according to 
the legislative material, Art. 1449 CCP FR has been drafted in order to set the 
boundaries of court intervention prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal, 
805  Art. 1449 CCP FR thus deviates from the usual competence of the juge d’appui pursu­
ant to Art. 1505 CCP FR.
806  chainaiS, n. 70.
807  gaiLLarD/De LapaSSe, n. 14; Loquin, n. 271.
808  caLLé/Dargent, Art. 145 CCP FR n. 11; racine, n. 307; JarroSSon/peLLerin, n. 18; 
chainaiS, n. 15; Duprey, 17; auDit/D’aVout, n. 1403; Béguin/menJucq, n. 1829; 
cacharD, n. 1233; chainaiS, n. 69 et seqq.; for another view, see Dupeyron, 466; 
cLay, Art. 1449 CCP FR, 56; gaiLLarD/De LapaSSe, n. 12, 14.
809  chainaiS, n. 73, 76.
810  Arts. 1442–49 CCP FR; JarroSSon/peLLerin, n. 18.
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without mentioning the situation thereafter.811 In sum, there are good reasons 
to apply Art. 1449 CCP FR also after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. 
Hitherto, however, these opinions have not led to any amendments to 
Art. 1449 (1) CCP FR, such as deletion of the wording ‘insofar as the arbitral 
tribunal has not yet been constituted’.812 Nonetheless, under the old lex arbi-
tri, French Courts have confirmed that although Art. 145 CCP FR is no longer 
available after the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, interim measures 
according to Arts. 808 et seqq. CCP FR (see p. 158 infra) should still be available 
in urgent cases during the arbitral proceedings.813 It is therefore desirable 
that the French courts confirm this view under the new lex arbitri.
2. After the Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
Once the arbitral tribunal has been established, it itself is equipped with the 
power to force parties to produce evidence and can even attach an astreinte 
to such an order.814 Nonetheless, when third parties are involved, court as­
sistance is crucial. Thus, Art. 1469 CCP FR, inspired by Art. 184 (2) PILA CH,815 
reads as follows: 
“(1) If one of the parties to arbitral proceedings intends to rely on a nota­
rized (acte authentique) or private (acte sous seing privé) deed to which 
it was not a party, or on evidence held by a third party, it may, upon the 
arbitral tribunal’s invitation, have that third party summoned before 
the President of the Court of First Instance for the purpose of obtaining 
a copy thereof (expédition) or the production of the deed or item of 
evidence.
(2)  Articles 42 through 48 shall determine which Court of First Instance 
has territorial jurisdiction in this regard. 
(3)  Application shall be made, heard and decided as for expedited pro­
ceedings (référé).
(4) If the President considers the application well­founded, he or she 
shall order that the relevant original, copy or extract of the deed or item 
of evidence be issued or produced, under such conditions and guaran­
tees as he or she determines, and, if necessary, attach penalties to such 
order.
811  Rapport to the Premier Minister (2011), 33; JarroSSon/peLLerin, n. 18.
812  chainaiS, n. 77.
813  Paris Court of Cassation, 13 Jun. 2002, 2nd Civil Chamber, 00­20077; hory, note on 
Société Akzo Nobel et autres v. SA Elf Atochem, Versailles Court of Appeal, 8 Oct. 1998, 
2nd Chambre Civile, in: Rev. Arb. 1999, 57 et seqq.
814  Art. 1467 (3) CCP FR.
815  cLay, Arbitrage, 134; cLay, Art. 1469 CCP FR, 104; racine, n. 697.
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(5)  Such order is not readily enforceable.
(6) It may be appealed within fifteen days following service (significa­
tion) of the order.”
Quite similar to the respective provision in state court proceedings, state 
courts will provide assistance vis-à-vis recalcitrant third parties.816 Here 
again, the competent judge is the president of the court of first instance ac­
cording to the rules of territorial jurisdiction of Arts. 42–48 CCP FR—that is, 
the judge where the third party is domiciled or the evidence will be taken.817 
Because there are third parties involved, it is not the juge d’appui pursuant to 
Art. 1505 CCP FR who is competent, but rather the respective president of the 
court of first instance (also called the ‘judge of evidence’), deciding in an ex­
pedited proceeding.818 
3. Support for Foreign Arbitral Tribunal
In contrast to other leges arbitri, the French approach is quite liberal and 
sets no strict boundaries as regards the application of its lex arbitri. Arts. 1504 
et seqq. CCP FR therefore apply if ‘international trade interests are at stake’.819 
In this regard, the Paris Court of Cassation has confirmed that, irrespective 
of the applicable law, the seat of arbitration or the nationality of the parties, 
an arbitration is considered international when it affects international trade 
interests.820As an example, a dispute is considered ‘international’ if it con­
cerns a cross­border transfer of goods, even if both parties are French.821 
Thus, if more than one state is involved economically, the arbitration is con­
sidered international.822 The question of whether the international arbitra­
tion regime applies therefore depends more on economic aspects than on 
816  Art. 138 CCP FR; nougein/Dupeyré, n. 226.
817  Ibid., n. 227.
818  cLay, Art. 1469 CCP FR, 105; JarroSSon/peLLerin, n. 29; racine, n. 697; Loquin, 
n. 338.
819  Art. 1504 CCP FR; DerainS/kiffer, n. 3 et seq.; Balthasar­BaLthaSar/ZiaDe, n. 6; 
caDiet/JeuLanD, n. 1063.
820  Art. 1504 CCP FR; Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale (INSERM) v. 
Fondation Letten F. Saugstad, Paris Court of Cassation, 26 Jan. 2011, 1st Civil Chamber, 
09-10198; Société Uni-Kod v. Société Ouralkali, Paris Court of Cassation, 30 Mar. 2004, 
1st Civil Chamber, in: Rev. Arb. 2005, 959; DerainS/kiffer, n. 3 et seq.; Balthasar­
BaLthaSar/ZiaDe, n. 6; caDiet/JeuLanD, n. 1063.
821  Société Pangee v. Société Fancefert, Paris High Court, 13 Jul. 1999, in: Rev. Arb. 1995, 625 (2.).
822  M. Ch. Di Sabatino et autre v. Société Animated Ventures et autres, Paris Court of Appeal, 
7 Oct. 2014, in: Rev. Arb. 2015, 531; for other examples see caLLé/Dargent, Art. 1504 
CCP FR n. 2; cLay, Art. 1504 CCP FR, 171 et seqq.
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legal aspects; unlike in other countries, where the seat of arbitration or the 
residence of a party is a key factor in determining the applicable lex arbitri.823 
From the perspective of a foreign arbitral tribunal, this approach is wel­
come, since it allows for court assistance in the taking of evidence pursuant 
to the CCP FR without any connection to France beyond the location of evi­
dence there. 
C. Competence to Seek Court Assistance
1. Primacy of the Arbitral Tribunal
Like most leges arbitri, Art. 1469 (1) CCP FR states that the party seeking court 
assistance in the taking of evidence must first obtain the consent of the arbi­
tral tribunal.824 Since it is the arbitral tribunal that conducts the arbitral pro­
ceedings (Art. 1467 CCP FR), its prior consent strengthens its position and 
avoids dilatory tactics or unnecessary evidence requests.825 Consequently, 
when presented with an evidence request, the respective arbitral tribunal is 
at liberty to grant or decline it, and there are very limited possibilities to 
challenge its decision.826 
Unlike under Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML and other leges arbitri, the arbitral 
tribunal itself is not competent to seek court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence.827 This possibility was discussed in the drafting process of the new 
French arbitration provisions, but unfortunately was ultimately abandoned.828 
However, although the arbitral tribunal is vested with significant power to 
conduct the taking of evidence and even to order astreintes, it should also be 
able to resort to state courts for assistance in the taking of evidence.829 Not 
least, this would be in line with Art. 1467 (1) CCP FR, which allows the arbitral 
tribunal to take all ‘necessary steps’ as regards the taking of evidence. 
823  Art. 176 (1) PILA CH, S. 2 (1) EAA 1996; caLLé/Dargent, Art. 1504 CCP FR n. 1; cLay, 
Art. 1504 CCP FR, 107; Balthasar­BaLthaSar/ZiaDe, n. 6 et seqq.; for the ‘delocalisa­
tion of the seat of arbitration’, see Loquin, n. 344 et seqq.
824  cLay, Arbitrage, 135.
825  JarroSSon, 337; Loquin, n. 336.
826  JarroSSon, 337; racine, n. 697; Béguin/menJucq, n. 1948; nougein/Dupeyré, n. 227; 
SeragLini/ortScheiDt, n. 339; see also Art. 1469 (4) CCP FR, stating that document pro­
duction will be granted ‘If the President considers the application well­founded, …’.
827  nougein/Dupeyré, n. 227; cLay, Arbitrage, 135; SeragLini/ortScheiDt, n. 339.
828  Béguin/menJucq, n. 1948; see also Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; § 1050 (1) CCP DE.
829  Art. 1467 (3) CCP FR.
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2. Exclusion of Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
In contrast to the discussions in other jurisdictions, it appears that the com­
plete exclusion of court assistance in the taking of evidence as a violation of 
minimum legal protection in arbitration has not yet been discussed in French 
legal doctrine.830 Nonetheless, there are several reasons that support this 
possibility. Besides those presented in the discussion of German law (see 
p. 137 et seq. supra), the CCP FR explicitly allows for the parties to exclude 
court assistance in the taking of evidence. According to Art. 1506 CCP FR, 
subject to the mandatory rules as foreseen in Arts. 1504–1527 CCP FR, the 
parties are at liberty to exclude the listed provisions, such as those relating 
to court assistance in the taking of evidence, prior to and after the constitu­
tion of the arbitral tribunal.831 This guarantees the parties to international 
arbitral proceedings remarkable freedom, as opposed to the stricter rules 
applicable to domestic arbitration.832 In sum, although in most cases the 
complete exclusion of court assistance in the taking of evidence makes little 
sense, under French law it is nonetheless a possibility. 
D. Spectrum of Evidence and its Target
1. Evidence According to a Party Agreement
When it comes to the taking of evidence and the procedural rules, the parties 
enjoy broad discretion in tailoring the arbitral proceedings.833 As it is already 
possible to exclude any court assistance in the taking of evidence, this is all 
the more so the case in relation to specific types of evidence, such as witness 
testimonies. This may be done either by explicitly limiting the scope of dis­
covery/disclosure in the arbitration agreement or by referring to institution­
al arbitration rules or the IBA Rules.834 Thus, if the parties have explicitly 
excluded a specific type of evidence, the respective state court must respect 
this choice and decline any request in this regard.835 Likewise, if the taking 
830  auDit/D’aVout mention only that in certain situations, parties may have an interest 
in excluding court assistance and the arbitration agreement should therefore be ex­
amined in order to find out whether such an exclusion took place (n. 1400). 
831  Art. 1506 (1) i.c.w. Art. 1449 CCP FR and Art. 1506 (3) i.c.w. Art. 1469 CCP FR.
832  For instance, in international arbitral proceedings, the arbitration agreement does 
not have to be in writing (Art. 1506(1) i.c.w. Art. 1443 CCP FR e contratrio); Balthasar­
BaLthaSar/ZiaDe, n. 5; Béguin/menJucq, 1053; JarroSSon/peLLerin, n. 90.
833  Art. 1509 CCP FR.
834  See. e.g. Art. 22.2 LCIA Rules; Art. 3 (9) IBA Rules.
835  caLLé/Dargent, Art. 1509 CCP FR n. 7.
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of evidence before a state court is contrary to an explicit agreement between 
the parties, this will serve as grounds for the annulment of the arbitral award 
if it influences the arbitral award.836 In most cases, however, the arbitral tri­
bunal will be reluctant to introduce evidence into the arbitral proceedings 
which was gathered contrary to a party agreement. 
2. Evidence According to the CCP FR
a. Prior to the Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
As stated in Art. 1449 (2) CCP FR, state courts may either assist in the taking of 
evidence prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal under the condi­
tions set out in Arts. 145 et seqq. CCP FR or, in urgent cases, impose provision­
al or conservatory measures. Art. 145 CCP FR reads as follows: 
“If, before legal proceedings commence, there is a legitimate reason to 
preserve or establish evidence upon which the resolution of a dispute 
may depend, measures relating to the taking of evidence may be or­
dered, upon the request of any concerned party, by way of a petition to 
a court (sur requête) or expedited proceedings (référé).”
In contrast to interim measures, no urgency need be proved when starting a 
proceeding according to Art. 145 CCP FR.837 Before any production of evi­
dence is ordered, the requesting party must prove that there is a ‘legitimate 
reason’ for this measure—that is, that it is useful and will most likely have an 
influence on the outcome of the proceedings.838 If this condition is fulfilled, 
any measure which is ‘legally admissible’ can be ordered in the two different 
proceedings as foreseen in Art. 145 CCP FR.839 The main difference between 
a petition to a court (sur requête) and an expedited proceeding (référé) relates 
to their (non­) adversarial character.840 The adversarial expedited proceed­
ing is often needed in cases where the opinion of an expert is sought (Arts. 
232 et seqq. CCP FR) and the parties are invited to express their views on his 
or her mission.841 Meanwhile, proceedings sur requête—that is, ex parte meas­
ures—are non­adversarial and offer a wide range of possible measures, de­
rived from either Arts. 232 et seqq. CCP FR or case law, such as examination 
836  Art. 1520 (3) CCP FR; see p. 164 infra. 
837  caLLé/Dargent, Art. 145 CCP FR n. 40.
838  Dupeyron/VaLentini, 542; chainaiS, n. 21; DeVot/Laurent­BeLLue, 19.
839  Paris Court of Cassation, 27 Feb. 2014, 2nd Civil Chamber, 13­10.013.
840  Arts. 484 (expedited proceeding) and 493 (ex parte measures) CCP FR; Dupeyron/
VaLentini, 548.
841  Ibid.; caLLé/Dargent, Art. 145 CCP FR n. 78.
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of witnesses under oath842 (Arts. 199 et seqq.), document production843 by 
third parties844 (Art. 11 CCP FR), on­site investigations845 and expert reports.846 
These ex parte measures represent a highly effective tool, especially in order 
to preserve evidence without the possibility for the defendant to challenge 
such measures in an adversarial proceeding prior to their execution.847 
In urgent cases, interim measures may also be sought. Art. 808 CCP FR 
states the following: 
“In all cases of urgency, the President of the Court of First Instance may 
order in an expedited proceeding all measures that do not encounter 
any serious challenge or which the existence of the dispute justifies.”
Without going into too much detail, it is important to note that this provision 
aims primarily to preserve evidence—for example, by protecting goods 
from the threat of loss or destruction by keeping them in good condition. 
This will prove helpful not only prior to the establishment of the arbitral 
tribunal, but also thereafter. It remains to be seen whether the French legis­
lature will consider this fact in a possible future revision of its lex arbitri. 
b. After the Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted—that is, once the arbitrators 
have accepted their mandate—the possibilities for the taking of evidence are 
very limited, in terms of both the target (see p. 160 et seq. infra) and the scope 
of evidence.848 Pursuant to Art. 1469 (1) CCP FR, parties can seek to obtain 
from third parties only documents which are either notarised or private.849 
If the respective president of the court of first instance considers the evi­
dence request well founded, the third party must deliver the original docu­
ment, or a copy or extract therefrom.850 Because the respective state court 
judge can conduct the proceeding under Art. 1469 CCP FR ‘under such con­
842  Under French law, parties can be examined as witnesses (Art. 205 CCP FR).
843  Paris Court of Cassation, 11 Apr. 1995, Commercial Chamber, 92­20985; caLLé/Dargent, 
Art. 145 CCP FR n. 69.
844  Paris Court of Cassation, 26 May 2011, 2nd Civil Chamber, 10­20048; caLLé/Dargent, 
Art. 145 CCP FR n. 70.
845  DeVot/Laurent­BeLLue, 20.
846  Paris Court of Cassation, 11 Oct. 1995, 2nd Civil Chamber, 92­20496; Béguin/menJucq, 
n. 1829.
847  Paris Court of Cassation, 19 Mar. 2015, 2nd Civil Chamber, 14­14.389; Art. 493 CCP FR.
848  Art. 1456 (1) CCP FR.
849  Although only documentary evidence can be sought under Art. 1469 CCP FR and the 
word ‘private’ is not clearly defined, the range of documents seems to be very broad. 
850  Art. 1469 (4) CCP FR.
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ditions and guarantees as he or she determines’, the presence of the parties 
is also allowed, at least in theory.851
Apart from document production, no other evidence can be sought—nei­
ther an examination of witnesses nor any inspection or expert report.852 In 
the absence of any visible legislative intent to exclude such types of evidence, 
one must conclude that this is because the arbitral tribunal is competent to 
take all ‘necessary step concerning evidentiary and procedural matters’, even 
under threat of an astreinte. Still, as previously discussed, document produc­
tion is often connected to witnesses.853 This is why it would be welcome if 
Art. 1469 CCP FR were extended to examination of witnesses and other types 
of evidence. 
3. Foreign Types of Evidence
In general, it may be said that the French courts will not execute evidence 
requests relating to US­style discovery.854 Prior to constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, Art. 1449 CCP FR explicitly states that the taking of evidence must 
be conducted in compliance with Art. 145 CCP FR. As a result, only measures 
for the taking of evidence pursuant to French law, as stated in Arts. 145 et 
seqq. CCP FR, are permissible. The situation is not much different once the 
arbitral tribunal has been established. Art. 1469 (4) CCP FR states that evi­
dence requests will be granted under the conditions determined by the pres­
ident of the court of first instance.855 In practice, this is regularly done ac­
cording to French law.856 Although the parties enjoy wide discretion to tailor 
the taking of evidence within the arbitral proceedings—for instance, by 
agreeing on foreign measures for the taking of evidence—this does not apply 
to the proceeding before state courts pursuant to Art. 1469 CCP FR. Since the 
French legislature has not allowed for evidence requests in the style of US­dis­
covery, document production will therefore be ordered according to French 
law. What SteinBrück has suggested for German law—that is, that foreign 
types of evidence be adapted until they are compliant with domestic law—
thus seems not possible under French law.857 
851  Art. 1469 (4) CCP FR.
852  gaiLLarD/De LapaSSe, n. 22; cLay, Arbitrage, 134; racine, n. 697; Béguin/menJucq, 
n. 1948; SeragLini/ortScheiDt, n. 338.
853  See p. 41 supra.
854  Dupeyron/VaLentini, 542, 550; JarroSSon, 338; see also the reservation of France 
as regards Art. 23 HEC (see the reservations). 
855  Art. 1469 (4) CCP FR.
856  DeVot/Laurent­BeLLue, 20.
857  See p. 141 supra.
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4. International Judicial Assistance in Taking Evidence
As an alternative, although this is seldom used in practice, the French courts 
can also assist in the taking of evidence by means of international judicial 
assistance pursuant to the HEC or the EER.858 As previously discussed (see 
p. 2 et seqq. supra), parties are very reluctant to choose this route due to the 
lengthy and cumbersome process involved, and instead will generally seek 
court assistance pursuant to Arts. 1449 and 1469 CCP FR. 
5. Target of Evidence
Regardless of whether evidence is sought from a party to the arbitration or a 
third party, possible privileges such as commercial or technical confidenti­
ality, as well as attorney­client privilege, must be respected at all times.859 
Third parties who are parents, direct relatives or a (divorced) spouse of one 
of the parties may refuse to testify.860 Regardless of whether he or she is 
called by a party to the arbitration or a third party, if a witness refuses to 
testify without legitimate reason, he or she can be charged with a civil fine of 
up to EUR 10,000.861
Prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal, evidence can be sought 
from anyone, irrespective of the target of evidence or whether the evidence 
request has been granted by a petition to court (sur requête) or in an expedit­
ed proceeding (référé). While the target of evidence in an adversarial expe­
dited proceeding can seek to avoid the taking of evidence as a whole, or at 
least limit its extent, this is logically not possible as regards ex parte meas­
ures.862 In this proceeding, the respective measures can be avoided or mod­
ified only upon request, once they have already been executed.863 After the 
arbitral tribunal has been established, evidence can be sought only from 
third parties located in France. As regards the parties to the arbitration, the 
arbitral tribunal will usually order a party to produce evidence under threat 
of an astreinte or, as an alternative, will draw an adverse inference in case of 
non­compliance with evidence orders. Nonetheless, if the taking of evidence 
from a third party according to Art. 1469 CCP FR is requested, this takes the 
858  JarroSSon, 338. In France, the HEC entered into force in 1974 (see the current status).
859  caLLé/Dargent, Art. 145 CCP FR n. 112; DeVot/Laurent­BeLLue, 22; as regards ex­
amination of witnesses see Art. 206 CCP FR.
860  Art. 206 CCP FR.
861  Art. 207 CCP FR. 
862  DeVot/Laurent­BeLLue, 22; Arts. 484 et seqq. CCP FR (expedited proceeding) and 
Arts. 493 et seqq. CCP FR (ex parte measures).
863  Art. 497 CCP FR.
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form of an adversarial expedited proceeding, in which the third party can be 
forced to produce evidence, where necessary combined with an astreinte.864 
A third party may also appeal the decision of the respective state court with­
in 15 days of the date of grant of the evidence request.865
E. Competence of the Juge d’Appui
1. Scope of Discretion
Strictly speaking, and as previously discussed (see p. 152 supra), the judge 
who provides assistance prior to or after the constitution of the arbitral 
award is not the juge d’appui in the sense of Art. 1505 CCP FR (i.e. the president 
of the Paris Court of First Instance), but rather the respective judge where the 
evidence is located or the witness is domiciled.866 In deciding whether court 
assistance in the taking of evidence should be granted, the respective judge 
has full discretion, subject only to the requirements as stated in Arts. 1449 
and 1469 CCP FR.867 However, the judge has no scope to assess the evidence 
taken, which is left completely to the arbitral tribunal.868
Prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the respective judge will 
usually grant the request if there is a legitimate reason to gather the evi­
dence—for example, if it is useful and relevant in the context of the case at 
hand.869 If the requesting party already has enough evidence to prove its case 
or if the request itself is too vague or far reaching, it will most likely be de­
nied.870 In contrast, if the request is granted, the respective judge is at liberty 
to modify the requested evidence production pursuant to Arts. 145 et seqq. 
CCP FR ‘as to what is sufficient for the resolution of the dispute by endeavour­
ing to select the simplest and least onerous ones’.871 In proceedings as stated 
in Art. 1469 CCP FR after the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the re­
spective ‘judge of evidence’ will execute the evidence request as long as it is 
‘well­founded’. The fact that the respective state court judge can then take the 
evidence ‘under such conditions and guarantees as he or she determines’ 
864  Art. 1469 (3) CCP FR.
865  Art. 1469 (6) CCP FR; see also p. 163 et seq. infra.
866  In case of Art. 1469 CCP FR, the respective judge is called the ‘judge of evidence’.
867  JarroSSon, 337 et seq.; nougein/Dupeyré, n. 227.
868  Paris Court of Cassation, 10 Jan. 2013, 2nd Civil Chamber, 12­12.375; DeVot/Laurent­ 
BeLLue, 24; in respect of the juge d’appui in accordance with Art. 1505 CCP FR see 
Béguin/menJucq, n. 1900.
869  Dupeyron/VaLentini, 542.
870  Paris Court of Cassation, 18 Feb. 1986, 2nd Civil Chamber, 84­10620.
871  Art. 147 CCP FR.
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indicates that the judge is not strictly bound by the evidence request, but can 
modify it at his or her discretion. Lastly, if it is necessary to put pressure on 
the third party, an astreinte will be attached to the order to produce specific 
documentary evidence.
2. Principle of Subsidiarity 
Contrary to other leges arbitri, the CCP FR does not mention whether it is 
possible to have recourse to state courts if the arbitral tribunal could take the 
evidence itself.872 This makes perfect sense, since Art. 1469 CCP FR address­
es only evidence held by third parties, over which the arbitral tribunal has no 
imperium.873 Nevertheless, one might ask—as a minimum requirement—
whether state courts should not examine whether the arbitral tribunal has at 
least tried to make third parties comply with an evidence request on a volun­
tary basis.874 However, it appears that this view is supported neither by legal 
doctrine nor by French case law. 
3. Examination of the Arbitration Agreement
The question of whether the judge of evidence can express a view on the va­
lidity of the arbitration agreement has not yet been discussed, either in 
French legal doctrine or in case law. As regards competence­competence, the 
CCP FR addresses the examination of the arbitration agreement both prior 
to and after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Art. 1448 CCP FR states:
“When a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement is brought before a 
court, such court shall decline jurisdiction, except if an arbitral tribunal 
has not yet been seized of the dispute and if the arbitration agreement is 
manifestly void or manifestly not applicable.”
Consequently, in a proceeding under Art. 1449 CCP FR, the respective judge 
will examine whether the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or inappli­
cable.875 This is therefore a very restricted and limited prima facie examina­
872  In contrast, see e.g. § 1050 (1) CCP DE: The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approv­
al of the arbitral tribunal may request from a court assistance in taking evidence or 
performance of other judicial acts which the arbitral tribunal is not empowered to car-
ry out (emphasis added). 
873  SeragLini/ortScheiDt, n. 338; auDit/D’aVout, n. 1403; Béguin/menJucq, n. 1948; 
cLay, Arbitrage, 134; gaiLLarD/De LapaSSe, n. 14; JarroSSon, 336.
874  See also the suggestion for Swiss domestic arbitration in DIKE­Brunner/Steininger, 
Art. 375 CCP CH n. 7.
875  JarroSSon, 332; Béguin/menJucq, n. 1817.
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tion.876 However, in most cases—especially in institutional arbitral proceed­
ings—if an arbitration agreement is invalid, this will be discussed long before 
an evidence request is brought before state courts.877 The situation is different 
once the arbitral tribunal has been established. Art. 1455 CCP FR states:
“If an arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly not applica­
ble, the judge acting in support of the arbitration shall declare that no 
appointment need be made.”
Because this provision clearly addresses only the juge d’appui (Art. 1505 CCP 
FR), and not the judge of evidence in accordance with Art. 1469 CCP FR, the 
arbitration agreement cannot be examined under this provision. Rather, if a 
party wants to challenge the competence of the arbitral tribunal after the 
arbitral tribunal has been constituted, it can do so by challenging the arbitral 
award, where the validity of the arbitration agreement can be examined ex­
tensively.878 Finally, the examination of the arbitration agreement during 
court assistance in the taking of evidence must be distinguished from its ex­
amination in the context of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
under the NYC.879
F. Appellate Remedies
A decision on court assistance in the taking of evidence issued prior to con­
stitution of the arbitral tribunal—whether issued against a future party to the 
arbitration or a third party—can be challenged before the respective court of 
appeal within 15 days.880 The respective state court will render its decision in 
the form of a ‘décision provisoire’—that is, an interim order.881 As previously 
discussed (see p. 157 supra), unlike where evidence is ordered in an expedited 
proceeding, ex parte measures can be challenged only if they have been de­
nied.882 However, if they have already been executed, they can still be avoid­
876  Ibid.; According to the Paris Court of Cassation, the existence of a valid arbitration 
agreement already excludes the possibility that it is manifestly void or not applicable 
(foucharD, note on Paris Court of Cassation, 1 Dec. 1999, 1st Civil Chamber, in: Rev. 
Arb. 2000, 96 et seqq.).
877  JarroSSon, 332.
878  Art. 1520 (1) CCP FR; Béguin/menJucq, n. 1818; Paris Court of Cassation, 6 Oct. 2010, 
1st Civil Chamber, 08­20563.
879  Arts. III (3) and V (1) (a) NYC.
880  Art. 490 (3) CCP FR (expedited proceeding) and Art. 496 CCP FR (ex parte measures).
881  Arts. 484 CCP FR (expedited proceeding) and 493 CCP FR (ex parte measures).
882  Art. 496 CCP FR.
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ed or modified upon the request of either party.883 If an evidence request is 
presented during the arbitral proceedings, the state court’s decision can be 
appealed before the respective court of appeal within 15 days of service of the 
decision.884 As this decision is analogous to a decision issued in an expedited 
proceeding, it can be challenged whether it has been granted or denied.885 
The taking of evidence according to Arts. 1449 and 1469 CCP FR may be 
distinguished from the assessment of evidence by the arbitral tribunal. Thus, 
if a party wants to challenge the taking of evidence due to a violation of the 
procedural rules applicable to the arbitral proceedings, this can be done only 
by challenging the arbitral award on the grounds that due process has been 
violated or the arbitral tribunal has not complied with its mandate.886 As an 
example—albeit purely theoretical—consider the situation where a state court 
orders a third party to testify even though witness examination has been 
explicitly excluded by the parties.887 If this testimony has a significant influ­
ence on the arbitral award, the arbitral award may be challenged before the 
respective court of appeal within one month of the date on which the arbitral 
award is rendered.888 
G. Summary 
From an analysis of the French lex arbitri, it is clear that this not only affords 
the parties broad discretion in tailoring the arbitral proceedings, but also 
provides for assistance in the taking of evidence both prior to and after the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. First, instead of requiring the fulfilment 
of various conditions, such as the applicable law, the seat of arbitration or 
the nationality of the parties, court assistance in the taking of evidence will 
be granted as long as international trade interests are at stake.889 This sim­
plification, which is unique in international arbitration, is highly welcome—
even more so since in such cases evidence is often located in several different 
countries. In these situations, it is unnecessarily cumbersome if the availa­
bility of state court assistance hinges on whether the international arbitral 
883  Art. 497 CCP FR.
884  Art. 1469 (6) CCP FR.
885  Art. 1469 (3) i.c.w. Arts. 484 et seqq. CCP FR; cLay, Art. 1469 CCP FR, 105.
886  Arts. 1520 (3) and (4) CCP FR.
887  See also Société Filali Film Alimentaire SARL v. Société Bielloni Convertin Spa, Paris 
Court of Appeal, 4 Nov. 2014, in: Rev. Arb. 2014, 1037.
888  Ibid.; Art. 1523 CCP FR.
889  See p. 154 supra. 
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tribunal has its seat in the respective country or whether a certain law is 
applicable to the matter in dispute.890
Second, and unsurprisingly, the arbitral tribunal’s consent must be ob­
tained before court assistance in the taking of evidence can be sought. Prior 
to constitution of the arbitral tribunal, court assistance can also be requested 
ex parte. Unlike under other leges arbitri, the arbitral tribunal cannot resort 
to state courts on its own initiative. Since the arbitral tribunal is already com­
petent to conduct the taking of evidence and even to impose astreintes as it 
sees fit, this should also apply to its competence to seek court assistance by 
itself as a ‘necessary step’ concerning evidentiary matters.891 Moreover, the 
parties are at liberty to exclude court assistance in the taking of evidence al­
together or in relation to specific forms of evidence. 
Third, as regards the scope and target of evidence, the situation differs 
depending on whether the arbitral tribunal has been constituted. Prior to 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, a wide range of evidentiary measures can 
be imposed both on third parties and on the future parties to the arbitration. 
Because the types of evidence must accord with Art. 145 CCP FR, no foreign 
types of evidence may be sought. Once the arbitral tribunal has been consti­
tuted, evidence can be taken from third parties only and the scope of evi­
dence is limited to document production according to French law. Third par­
ties can even be forced to produce such evidence under threat of an astreinte. 
Since document production is often related to the examination of witnesses, 
Art. 1469 CCP FR should be extended to encompass witness examination and 
other types of evidence. Moreover, regardless of whether court assistance in 
the taking of evidence is sought prior to or after the constitution of the arbi­
tral tribunal, it would be desirable and in the interests of international arbi­
tration if state courts could take evidence according to foreign law.892
Fourth, both prior to and after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, 
the respective state court judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to 
grant or deny court assistance, and in deciding how evidence will be taken. 
As regards the principle of subsidiarity, the CCP FR makes no mention of 
whether the arbitral tribunal can take the evidence itself and if and when 
state courts come into play in this regard. This may be explained in part be­
cause Art. 1469 CCP FR refers only to third parties as targets of evidence, from 
whom the arbitral tribunal is per se unable to take evidence because of its lack 
of imperium. Furthermore, it remains doubtful whether the court must ex­
890  SteinBrück, 32.
891  Art. 1467 (1) CCP FR.
892  See e.g. the proposed Art. 184 (3) PILA CH.
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amine whether the arbitral tribunal tried to take the evidence from a third 
party on a voluntary basis. Regarding the examination of the arbitration 
agreement, once again, the situation differs depending on whether the arbi­
tral tribunal has been constituted. Prior to constitution of the arbitral tribu­
nal, examination is possible on a prima facie level only. Thereafter, the judge 
of evidence, pursuant to Art. 1469 CCP FR, is no longer competent to examine 
the arbitration agreement; this can be done only post­arbitration by challeng­
ing the arbitral award and therefore the arbitration agreement. 
Finally, the decision of state courts to assist in the taking of evidence may 
be challenged both prior to and after constitution of the arbitral tribunal. If 
evidence is taken before a state court contrary to an explicit agreement be­
tween the parties (e.g. which provides for documentary evidence only), the 
arbitral award can be challenged if this had an influence on the arbitral award. 
By and large, the French lex arbitri takes a very liberal approach as regards 
court assistance in the taking of evidence. In this regard, its application to inter­
national arbitration is highly beneficial and parties should not be too hesitant 
to initiate an evidence request if relevant evidence is located in France. On the 
one hand, this applies to situations prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal 
where the target of evidence may be caught by surprise through an ex parte 
proceeding. On the other hand, it might become necessary during the arbitral 
proceedings, even though only documents can be obtained from third parties. 
§ 4 England 
A. Introduction
England in general, and London specifically, are among the most popular 
forums for international arbitration.893 This is confirmed by the consistently 
high caseload of the LCIA and the fact that the vast majority of parties to LCIA 
arbitration are not English residents.894 The English lex arbitri is substantial­
ly codified by the Arbitration Act of 1996, which provides a detailed legal 
framework for both domestic and international arbitration.895 Case law also 
plays a vital role in further interpreting and substantiating the English lex ar-
bitri.896 The EAA 1996 came into force in 1997 and generally applies where the 
seat of arbitration is in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, irrespective of 
893  Balthasar­iLLmer, n. 1; anDrewS/LanDBrecht, n. 1; Born, Int. Comm. Arb., 148.
894  LCIA Report (2018), 8 et seq. 
895  rawDing et al., n. 18­3. 
896  EAA 1996 Report (1996), n. 9.
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the chosen substantive law.897 As set out below (see p. 196 infra), it applies to 
evidentiary and other procedural matters even if the seat of arbitration is 
outside the English territory or has not been determined.898 
Although it is not based on the UNCITRAL ML and is much broader in its 
application, the structure and language of the EAA 1996 are clearly and inten­
tionally inspired by the UNCITRAL ML.899 For instance, like Art. 5 UNCITRAL 
ML, S. 1 (c) EAA 1996 states that no court should intervene unless there is an 
explicit legal basis to do so.900 Although more broadly drafted than Art. 5 UNCI­
TRAL ML, the EAA 1996 aims to limit state court intervention.901 In this way, the 
parties have plenty of space to conduct the arbitral proceedings at their discre­
tion, subject only to the mandatory provisions as listed in schedule 1 of the EAA 
1996 and the general duty to ‘do all things necessary for the proper and expedi­
tious conduct of the arbitral proceedings’.902 Still, once the assistance of a state 
court is sought pursuant to the EAA 1996, that court has wide discretion in de­
ciding whether and to what extent such assistance should be granted or denied. 
B. Legal Bases
Under the EAA 1996, court assistance in the taking of evidence can be sought 
either by securing the attendance of witnesses (S. 43 EAA 1996) or by exercis­
ing other powers in support of arbitral proceedings (S. 44 EAA 1996). S. 43 EAA 
1996 reads as follows:
“(1)  A party to arbitral proceedings may use the same court procedures 
as are available in relation to legal proceedings to secure the attendance 
before the tribunal of a witness in order to give oral testimony or to pro­
duce documents or other material evidence.
(2)  This may only be done with the permission of the tribunal or the 
agreement of the other parties.
897  Ss. 2 (1) and 3 EAA 1996; merkin/fLannery, 15. For the sake of brevity, the following 
will only refer to the English Arbitration Act, well aware that it applies to Wales and 
Northern Ireland too. 
898  S. 2 (3) EAA 1996.
899  EAA 1996 Report (1996), n. 1, 4; anDrewS, preface (viii); ShepparD, Introduction n. 4; 
anDrewS/LanDBrecht, n. 40, 161; SteinBrück, 104.
900  This provision concerns only the first part of the EAA 1996 and, for instance, does not 
apply to consumer arbitration agreements as set out in the second part (see Ss. 89 et 
seqq. EAA 1996).
901  Instead of ‘shall’ as in Art. 5 UNCITRAL ML, the EAA 1996 uses ‘should’; EAA Report 
(1996), n. 19 et seqq.; merkin/fLannery, 10.
902  Ss. 4 and 40 EAA 1996; anDrewS, n. 1.11; Dey et al., n. 511.
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(3)  The court procedures may only be used if—
(a) the witness is in the United Kingdom, and
(b) the arbitral proceedings are being conducted in England and 
Wales or, as the case may be, Northern Ireland.
(4)  A person shall not be compelled by virtue of this section to produce 
any document or other material evidence which he could not be com­
pelled to produce in legal proceedings.”
What is more, S. 44 EAA 1996 equips the respective state court with a broad 
range of possible assistance measures for the taking of evidence:
“(1)  Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court has for the purposes 
of and in relation to arbitral proceedings the same power of making orders 
about the matters listed below as it has for the purposes of and in relation 
to legal proceedings.
(2)  Those matters are: 
(a) the taking of the evidence of witnesses;
(b) the preservation of evidence;
(c) making orders relating to property which is the subject of the pro­
ceedings or as to which any question arises in the proceedings:
(i) for the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody or de­
tention of the property, or
(ii) ordering that samples be taken from, or any observation be 
made of or experiment conducted upon, the property;
and for that purpose authorising any person to enter any premises in 
the possession or control of a party to the arbitration;
(d) the sale of any goods the subject of the proceedings;
(e) the granting of an interim injunction or the appointment of a 
receiver.
(3) If the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of 
a party or proposed party to the arbitral proceedings, make such or­
ders as it thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or 
assets.
(4) If the case is not one of urgency, only on the application of a party to 
the arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties and to the 
tribunal) made with the permission of the tribunal or the agreement in 
writing of the other parties. 
(5) In any case the court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral 
tribunal, and any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the 
parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for the time 
being to act effectively.
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(6) If the court so orders, an order made by it under this section shall 
cease to have effect in whole or in part on the order of the tribunal or of 
any such arbitral or other institution or person having power to act in 
relation to the subject­matter of the order.
(7) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the 
court under this section.”
In both cases, the competent court is usually903 the Commercial Court or the 
Circuit Commercial Court, which is part of the Business and Commercial 
Courts of England and Wales and which forms part of the High Court in Lon­
don (EWHC).904 As an exception to the rule that the EAA 1996 applies only if 
the seat of arbitration is in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, Ss. 43 and 
44 EAA 1996 are available even if the seat of arbitration is outside the English 
territory or has not yet been determined.905 In this regard, the EAA 1996 dif­
fers from the rather narrow scope of application as foreseen in the UNCI­
TRAL ML.906 Although this approach is not enshrined in many leges arbitri, 
the English legislature considers court assistance in the taking of evidence to 
support foreign arbitrations as a natural necessity.907 As a consequence, the 
HEC and the EER are in most cases superfluous in arbitral proceedings.908
C. Competence to Seek Court Assistance
1. Primacy of the Arbitral Tribunal
Court assistance in the taking of evidence under the EAA 1996 can be sought 
either autonomously by the parties if they both agree—in contrast to the usu­
al stance in international arbitration; or, as under most other leges arbitri and 
the UNCITRAL ML, with the approval of the arbitral tribunal.909 In both cas­
es, the goal is to respect party autonomy as set out in the arbitral agreement 
and the position of the arbitral tribunal in charge of the arbitration.910 How­
903  It should be noted that in some cases, some applications must be started in the Com­
mercial Court (see e.g. Rules 58.1 (2) (k) and 62.1 (3) CPR 1998; CPR 1998 Practice Direc­
tion 62.3, para. 2.3.
904  S. 105 (1) EAA 1996; S. 2 High Court and County Courts Order 1996; Dey et al., n. 551.
905  S. 2 (3) EAA 1996.
906  Art. 1 (2) UNCITRAL ML.
907  EAA Report (1996), n. 25; ShepparD, S. 2 EAA 1996 n. 4.
908  ShepparD, S. 43 EAA 1996 n. 5.
909  Ss. 43 (2) and 44 (4) EAA 1996; see also e.g. Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML; Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; 
§ 1050 (1) CCP DE.
910  EAA Report (1996), n. 213.
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ever, the situation is different in urgent cases—mostly prior to constitution of 
the arbitral tribunal—where a party may seek remedy from the court unilater­
ally in order to preserve evidence or assets.911 What is more, pursuant to S. 33 
EAA 1996, the arbitral tribunal must act fairly and impartially by giving each 
party the possibility to present its case. The arbitral tribunal is not obliged to 
agree to all evidence requests initiated by one of the parties to the arbitration; 
but likewise, it cannot unreasonably refuse an evidence request according to 
Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996 if there are reasonable grounds to grant it.912 
It remains unclear whether the arbitral tribunal itself can seek court 
assistance in the taking of evidence. Neither S. 43 nor S. 44 EAA 1996 empow­
ers the arbitral tribunal to do so explicitly. However, in the absence of any 
contrary agreement between the parties, the arbitral tribunal is empowered 
by law to decide ‘whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take 
the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law’.913 It is noteworthy and 
surprising that such an inquisitorial approach, which is generally foreign to 
common law, has found its way into the EAA 1996.914 In light of this provision 
and the overall intention of the EAA 1996, the arbitral tribunal itself should 
also be able to seek court assistance in the taking of evidence on its own ini­
tiative, pursuant to Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996.915 That said, as English case law 
has pointed out, arbitrators should not exceed their powers by, for example, 
directly and unilaterally contacting witnesses.916 To avoid such a situation, 
the parties are at liberty to limit the vast powers of the arbitral tribunal in this 
regard.917 
2. Exclusion of Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
Since arbitration is per se a sphere in which the parties have broad discretion 
in tailoring the arbitral proceedings, they may wish to exclude court assis­
tance in the taking of evidence altogether. However, under English law, this 
is only partially possible. Since S. 43 EAA 1996 is a mandatory rule, its exclu­
sion is void.918 In contrast, assistance according to S. 44 EAA 1996, as a 
911  S. 44 (3) EAA 1996; merkin/fLannery, 179.
912  harriS et al., S. 43 EAA 1996 n. 43C.
913  S. 34 (2) (g) EAA 1996.
914  merkin/fLannery, 141; harriS et al., S. 34 EAA 1996 n. 34K.
915  tomS, 17.
916  Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v. Tank [2006] EWHC 1055 (Comm.).
917  S. 34 (1) EAA 1996: It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential 
matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter.
918  S. 4 (1) i.c.w. Schedule 1 EAA 1996; ShepparD, S. 43 EAA 1996 n. 1; harriS et al., S. 43 
EAA 1996 n. 43A.
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non­mandatory provision, may be excluded.919 To make things clear, the par­
ties would be well advised to include an express statement on the exclusion of 
assistance according to S. 44 EAA 1996. In this regard, the EWHC has specified 
that in order to exclude S. 44 EAA 1996, neither a specific form of words nor a 
‘very clear express’ agreement is necessary.920 Rather, the court considered 
that a general clause excluding state court legal proceedings until the dispute 
is heard and determined by arbitrators will suffice to exclude S. 44 EAA 1996.921 
Finally, the question of a complete loss of minimum legal protection does not 
arise under the EAA 1996, since the parties cannot completely waive the right 
to court assistance in the taking of evidence under S. 43 EAA 1996. 
D. Spectrum of Evidence and its Target
1. Evidence According to a Party Agreement
In the same way that parties can exclude court assistance in the taking of 
evidence under S. 44 EAA 1996 as a whole, certain types of evidence may also 
be excluded. This is usually done by way of an explicit limitation of discovery/
disclosure in the arbitration agreement or by making reference to institution­
al arbitration rules or the IBA Rules.922 State courts must respect this choice 
by denying any evidence request which is contrary to an agreement between 
the parties. However, the chances that a state court will take evidence in vio­
lation of such an agreement are very low. This is because the arbitral tribunal 
is bound by any agreement between the parties in relation to evidentiary is­
sues, and the parties themselves will most likely not make an evidence re­
quest which is inconsistent with their own agreement.923 Nevertheless, if 
evidence is taken contrary to an explicit agreement between the parties, this 
will serve as grounds to challenge an award based on a ‘failure by the tribunal 
to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the 
parties’.924 This may be the case, for instance, if the tribunal itself initiates 
court assistance to examine a witness while the parties have agreed on doc­
umentary evidence only. If this witness examination has a substantial influ­
ence on the arbitral award, there is a good chance that a subsequent chal­
lenge to the arbitral award based on S. 68 (2) (c) EAA 1996 will succeed. 
919  S. 4 (2) i.c.w. Schedule 1 EAA 1996 e contrario; Sutton et al., n. 7–192.
920  B v. S [2011] EWHC 691 (Comm.), n. 8, 9, 78–90.
921  Ibid., n. 2.
922  See e.g. Art. 22.2 LCIA Rules; Art. 3 (9) IBA Rules.
923  S. 34 (1) EAA 1996.
924  S. 68 (2) (c) EAA 1996; see p. 180 et seqq. infra.
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2. Evidence According to the EAA 1996
a. In General
Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996 offer a wide range of measures for assistance in the 
taking of evidence. While S. 43 EAA 1996 concerns securing the attendance 
of a witness who is located in England, S. 44 EAA 1996 has a much broader 
focus. Because of the general rule that no state court should intervene except 
as provided by the EAA 1996, the list in S. 44 is exhaustive.925 
b. Securing the Attendance of Witnesses 
S. 43 EAA 1996 is inspired by Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML and serves to bring wit­
nesses before the arbitral tribunal in order to give testimony or produce doc­
uments or other material evidence. This provision therefore has a broad 
scope of application which goes beyond the mere examination of witnesses. 
As a first condition, the witness must be in England (as opposed to S. 44 (2) (a) 
EAA 1996) and, in the absence of any clear indication, he or she must proba­
bly be an English resident rather than simply be located in England at the 
time of service of the witness summons.926 
The second condition requires that arbitral proceedings be conducted 
on the English territory. Because S. 43 EAA 1996 is explicitly excluded as a 
whole from the general requirement that the seat of arbitration be within 
England (S. 2 (3) EAA 1996), arbitral proceedings can be held temporarily in 
England to make use of the powers of S. 43 EAA 1996.927 An arbitral tribunal 
with its seat in France could therefore request the English courts to examine 
a certain witness located in England, if the arbitral tribunal itself or the 
French courts cannot act effectively.928 This second condition makes it quite 
clear that S. 43 EAA 1996 is available only once the arbitral tribunal has been 
constituted.929 If both conditions are met, the court procedures of the CPR 
1998 may be used in the arbitral proceedings.930 As a consequence, a witness 
will be summoned according to Pt. 34 CPR 1998 and the respective practice 
directions will apply.931 
925  S. 1 (c) EAA 1996; merkin/fLannery, 180.
926  S. 43 (3) (a) EAA 1996; ShepparD, S. 43 EAA 1996 n. 5.
927  ShepparD, S. 43 EAA 1996 n. 5; merkin/fLannery, 170; Sutton et al., n. 7–212;  
o’caLLaghan/finniS, n. 20–112.
928  Ss. 44 (2) (a) and (5) EAA 1996.
929  This stands in sharp contrast to cases of urgency pursuant to S. 44 (3) EAA 1996 accord­
ing to which state courts can make orders for the preservation of evidence or assets.
930  S. 43 (1) EAA 1996.
931  See CPR 1998 Practice Direction 34A (depositions and court attendance by witnesses; 
paras. 1.1–3.4) and 62 (arbitration; paras. 7.1–7.3).
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Although this is mentioned under S. 43 (1) EAA 1996, the term ‘other material 
evidence’ remains unclear. In contrast, the English courts have ruled on sev­
eral occasions on the (non­) availability of disclosure from third parties under 
S. 43 EAA 1996. In BNP Paribas v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, the High Court held 
that S. 43 EAA 1996 gives no right to order disclosure from third parties.932 
Consequently, instead of applying for the production of classes of documents 
as in disclosure proceedings under Rule 31.17 CPR 1998, an application pur­
suant to S. 43 EAA 1996 must specifically identify the party to the arbitration 
agreement against which the remedy is sought and a description of the doc­
uments in question.933 Regarding disclosure, it is up to the arbitral tribunal—
and not the assisting state court—to decide whether and to what extent to 
grant disclosure.934
c. Court Powers Exercisable in Support of Arbitral Proceedings 
S. 44 EAA 1996 aims to redefine the relationship between arbitral tribunals 
and state courts by providing the state courts with several powers in case 
the arbitral tribunal cannot act, either at all or effectively.935 Also, where 
the conditions of S. 43 EAA 1996 are not met, an application pursuant to 
S. 44 (2) (a) EAA 1996 may be made.936 As can be seen in S. 44 EAA 1996, the 
state courts have considerable scope to assist in the taking of evidence. 
Consequently, under the respective conditions, the English courts may as­
sist in relation to the taking of evidence regarding witnesses937 (lit. a), pres­
ervation of evidence938 (lit. b), measures concerning property939 (lit. c), the 
932  BNP Paribas v. Deloitte & Touche LLP [2003] EWHC 2874 (Comm.), n. 12; o’caLLaghan/
finniS, n. 20–115.
933  Stuart Peter and Anor v. Skylet Andrew [2009] EWHC 1511 (QB), n. 3; Tajik Aluminium 
Plant v. Hydro Aluminium AS & Ors [2006] EWCA 1218 (Civ.), 24 et seqq.; BNP Paribas v. 
Deloitte & Touche LLP [2004] EWHC 2874 (Comm.), n. 14; see also Assimina Maritime 
Ltd. v. Pakistan Shipping Corp [2004] EWHC 3005 (Comm.), n. 16; South Tyneside Bor-
ough Council v. Wickes Building Supplies [2004] EWHC 2428 (Comm.), n. 23 (i).
934  S. 34 (2) (d) EAA 1996: ‘…whether any and if so which documents or classes of docu­
ments should be disclosed between and produced by the parties and at what stage’. 
The former rule of S. 12 (6) (b) EAA 1950 contained the state court’s power to order 
disclosure, which has been handed over to the arbitral tribunal under the EAA 1996 
(Tajik Aluminium Plant v. Hydro Aluminium AS & Ors [2006] EWCA 1218 (Civ.), n. 26; 
Sutton et al., n. 7–213).
935  EAA Report (1996), n. 214.
936  Sutton et al., n. 7–198. This applies to cases where either witnesses are located and/
or the arbitration is conducted outside of England (S. 43 (3) EAA 1996). 
937  merkin/fLannery, 180 et seqq.; Sutton et al., n. 7–198; ShepparD, S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 3.
938  merkin/fLannery, 182 et seq.; Sutton et al., n. 7–199; ShepparD, S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 4.
939  merkin/fLannery, 183; Sutton et al., n. 7–200; ShepparD, S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 5. 
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sale of goods940 (lit. d) and interim injunctions941 (lit. e). As with S. 43 EAA 
1996, third parties will not be ordered to disclose documents.942 For in­
stance, an English court will most likely grant a request from an arbitral 
tribunal with its seat in Switzerland to inspect a certain property in England 
which belongs to a party if the arbitral tribunal and the Swiss courts are 
unable to act effectively.943
In English case law, there have been some discussions on the scope of 
the assistance provided by state courts in urgent cases.944 S. 44 (3) EAA 1996 
authorises a state court to ‘make such orders as it thinks necessary for the 
purpose of preserving evidence or assets’. In Cetelem v. Roust the EWCA had 
to decide whether S. 44 (3) EAA 1996 encompasses the powers as stated in Ss. 
44 (1) and (2) EAA 1996. It held that S. 44 (3) EAA 1996 is not restricted to orders 
for the preservation of evidence or assets; the court can make any order as 
provided in subsection (2), as long as it is ‘necessary for the purpose of pre­
serving evidence or assets’.945 Furthermore, it applied a rather broad inter­
pretation of S. 44 (3) EAA 1996, defining ‘assets’ not only as tangible assets, 
but also as choses in action, including contractual rights.946 
3. Foreign Types of Evidence
Both Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996 equip state courts assisting in arbitration with 
the same powers as are available in state court proceedings.947 This seems to 
indicate that the English courts will assist in the taking of evidence only pur­
940  merkin/fLannery, 183; Sutton et al., n. 7–201.
941  Ibid., n. 7­202; merkin/fLannery, 183 et seqq.; ShepparD, S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 7;  
o’caLLaghan/finniS, n. 20­95 et seqq.
942  See p. 173 supra.
943  S. 2 (3) EAA 1996 i.c.w. Ss. 44 (2) (a) and (5) EAA 1996; harriS, S. 2 EAA 1996 n. 2E.
944  merkin/fLannery, 179 et seq.; o’caLLaghan/finniS, n. 20–61 et seqq. Regarding the 
term ‘urgency’, see Travelers Insurance Co Ltd v. Countrywide Surveyors Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 2455 (TCC), n. 4: ‘Section 44 (3) of the 1996 Act was intended to be invoked in 
exceptional circumstances where, for example, the critical evidence was about to be 
lost forever or where there was a risk that it would be destroyed or otherwise tam­
pered with, such as to make it of no probative value.’; Starlight Shipping Co v. Tai Ping 
Insurance Co Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1893 (Comm.), n. 22: ‘Urgency, in this context must 
have reference to the question whether or not arbitrators could reach any decision on 
the point in any relevant timescale.’
945  Cetelem SA v. Roust Holding Ltd [2005] EWCA 618 (Civ.), n. 49.
946  Ibid., n. 57; see also AB v. CD [2014] EWHC 1 (QB), n. 19 et seq.; Euroil Ltd v. Cameroon 
Offshore Petroleum Sarl [2014] EWHC 12 (Comm.), n. 12 et seq.; harriS et al., S. 44 EAA 
1996 n. 44H; ShepparD, S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 7; Sutton et al., S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 7­194; 
o’caLLaghan/finniS, n. 20–62.
947  S. 43 (1) and S. 44 (1) EAA 1996.
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suant to the CPR 1998.948 Assisting state courts are therefore not bound by 
any agreement between the parties concerning either a foreign law applica­
ble to the substance of the dispute or foreign procedural rules governing the 
arbitral proceedings when assisting in the taking of evidence. As a conse­
quence, the method as proposed by Steinbrück under German law—that is, 
to adapt foreign types of evidence until they are compliant with domestic 
law—seems questionable under English law.949 In Commerce & Industry Insur-
ance Co. (Canada) v. Lloyd’s Underwriters, the EWHC denied a request to ex­
amine a witness according to US­style discovery.950 Unsurprisingly, this re­
quest was considered ‘inappropriate’ in the sense of S. 2 (3) EAA 1996.951 It is 
therefore possible that English courts may allow evidence requests according 
to a foreign law and adapt them to comply with English law, as long as they do 
not substantially differ from proceedings under the CPR 1998.
4. International Judicial Assistance in Taking Evidence
In common with the approach taken under German and French law, Ss. 43 
and 44 EAA 1996 overcome the difficulties presented by the HEC and EER—
that is, the lengthy and cumbersome process involved—by providing direct 
assistance to international arbitral tribunals.952 The parties to arbitration 
thus will most likely not initiate a request by means of the HEC or EER, but 
directly approach an English court based on Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996.953 Theo­
retically, it seems possible that an arbitral tribunal may also approach an 
English court in order to request court assistance via another foreign state 
court. However, due to the lengthy process that this would involve, the arbi­
tral tribunal is more likely to try to approach that foreign court directly. 
5. Target of Evidence
Regarding the target of evidence, a clear distinction must be drawn between 
Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996. While the former serves to force third parties to pro­
duce evidence, the latter is available only against the parties to the arbitra­
tion. To secure the attendance of witnesses according to S. 43 EAA 1996, third 
parties can be ordered, by means of a witness summons, to give testimony or 
948  tomS, 15.
949  See p. 141 et seq. supra. 
950  Commerce and Industry Co, Canada v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyds of London [2002] 
EWHC 2 All ER, 211.
951  Ibid.
952  ShepparD, S. 43 EAA 1996 n. 5.
953  In Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the HEC entered into force in 1976 (see the 
current status).
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produce evidence for an ongoing arbitration. However, one must bear in 
mind that a third party who receives a witness summons can object if privi­
lege applies or if the requested documents are not relevant to the proceed­
ings. S. 43 (4) EAA 1996 is quite clear on this point:
“A person shall not be compelled by virtue of this section to produce any 
document or other material evidence which he could not be compelled 
to produce in legal proceedings.”
For instance, nobody can be forced to reveal documents which are protected 
by attorney­client privilege.954 To set aside a witness summons, the potential 
witness must make an application to the court that issued it (in arbitration, 
usually the EWHC).955 In contrast, a witness who fails to comply with a wit­
ness summons without sufficient reason risks being in contempt of court, 
which may incur a fine or even imprisonment.956 Finally, as previously men­
tioned (see p. 173 supra), state courts cannot order disclosure of documents 
from a third­party witness under S. 43 EAA 1996. 
On the other hand, there is some debate as to whether S. 44 EAA 1996 can 
be used against third parties. The legislative materials of the EAA 1996 state 
merely that S. 44 EAA 1996 may have effect on third parties without saying 
that they are a direct target.957 In Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holding v. Unitech Ltd. 
it was held that because of the wording in S. 44 EAA 1996, which states ‘for the 
purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings’, S. 44 EAA 1996 applies 
only between the parties to the arbitration.958 Moreover, because this provi­
sion applies even if the seat of arbitration is outside the English territory, the 
respective judge will consider it unlikely that a state court could make orders 
against third parties domiciled anywhere in the world.959 This view is argua­
bly correct, even though it would be desirable if S. 44 EAA 1996 had the same 
broad scope of application in proceedings as S. 43 EAA 1996. 
954  Rules 31.3 (1) (b) and 31.19 CPR 1998; Sutton et al., n. 7–213; ShepparD, S. 43 EAA 1996 
n. 6; harriS et al., S. 43 EAA 1996 n. 43G; BurrowS, n. 22.61.
955  Rule 34.3 (4) CPR 1998; CPR 1998 Practice Direction 34A, para. 2.2.
956  Rule 34.10 CPR 1998; Pt. 81 CPR 1998; CPR 1998 Practice Direction 34A, para. 4.11; 
o’caLLaghan/finniS, n. 20–114; Sutton et al., n. 7–214; see also the official form of a 
witness summons.
957  EAA Report (1996), n. 214.
958  Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holding v. Unitech Ltd. & Ors [2014] EWHC 3704 (Comm.), n. 48; 
confirmed in DTEK Trading S.A. v. Morozov & Anor [2017] EWHC 94 (Comm.); for a 
summary of the previous contrary case law see PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank 
v. Sergey Maksimov & Ors [2013] EWHC 3203 (Comm.), n. 72 et seqq.
959  Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holding v. Unitech Ltd. & Ors [2014] EWHC 3704 (Comm.), n. 49.
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E. Competence of the Juge d’Appui
1. Scope of Discretion
Court assistance in the taking of evidence according to the English lex arbitri 
must always be read in combination with S. 2 (3) EAA 1996 (last para.):
“The court may refuse to exercise any such power if, in the opinion of the 
court, the fact that the seat of the arbitration is outside England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland, or that when designated or determined the 
seat is likely to be outside England and Wales or Northern Ireland, makes 
it inappropriate to do so.”
State courts therefore have wide discretion in deciding whether to grant or 
deny assistance in the taking of evidence and the boundary of this provision 
must be determined by case law. The aim of S. 2 (3) EAA 1996 is to avoid pos­
sible conflicts with another jurisdiction.960 In case of a conflict, the respec­
tive state court is therefore entitled to deny its assistance. An example is 
Commerce & Industry Insurance Co. (Canada) v. Lloyd’s Underwriters.961 In 
arbitral proceedings conducted in New York, a claimant requested an ex par-
te order for two witnesses in England to attend for examination under US law, 
to make a deposition in a discovery proceeding. Although the court argued 
that it had jurisdiction based on S. 2 (3) i.c.w. S. 44 (2) (a) EAA 1996, they refused 
the request on several grounds. First, the EWHC held that discovery proceed­
ings do not form part of English law and consequently state courts have no 
power to order a witness for examination for the sole purpose of determining 
whether he or she has information which may help in the case at hand: 
“The procedure adopted under the curial law differs in this respect from 
that which applies under our law in a way which, on this ground alone, 
makes it inappropriate in my view to make the order now being sought.” 962
This would suggest that as long as the foreign law—or rather, the way of taking 
evidence under a foreign law—does not substantially differ from English law, 
an evidence request may be considered ‘appropriate’. It is therefore at least 
conceivable that English courts could adapt evidence requests pursuant to 
960  EAA Supplementary Report (1997), n. 15.
961  Commerce and Industry Co, Canada v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyds of London [2002] 
EWHC 2 All ER (Comm.); merkin/fLannery, 181 et seq.; iLLmer/SteinBrück, 337 et 
seq.; harriS et al., S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 44H.
962  Commerce and Industry Co, Canada v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyds of London [2002] 
EWHC 2 All ER (Comm.), 205.
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foreign law until they are compatible with English law.963 Although this first 
argument in itself was sufficient to reject the request, the EWHC further stat­
ed that the requesting party had presented no evidence regarding the impor­
tance of the examination to the arbitration:
“The greater the likely inconvenience to the witness, the greater the need 
to satisfy the court that he can give evidence which is necessary for the 
just determination of the dispute.” 964
As the application had been made ex parte, this statement is unsurprising; it 
would most likely not been made if the arbitral tribunal itself or a party with 
the consent of the arbitral tribunal had initiated the request. This decision 
shows how the English courts can use their discretion according to S. 2 (3) 
EAA 1996 to find a balance between assisting foreign arbitral proceedings 
and protecting third­party witnesses based in England.965 
2. Principle of Subsidiarity 
Irrespective of whether the matter is urgent, according to S. 44 (5) EAA 1996, 
state courts can act only insofar as the arbitral tribunal cannot take the evi­
dence itself: 
“In any case the court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral 
tribunal, and any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the 
parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for the time 
being to act effectively.”
They can therefore act only if the arbitral tribunal either has no power or is 
unable to act quickly or effectively enough.966 This applies to situations 
where the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted967 or lacks coercive 
power—for example, to enforce a freezing order or restrain a (third) party 
from doing something.968 Logically, this does not apply to S. 43 EAA 1996, 
where the parties per se cannot force a third party to produce evidence. As far 
as can be seen, cases in which the taking of evidence by the arbitral tribunal 
963  For this approach under German law, see p. 141 supra.
964  Commerce and Industry Co, Canada v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyds of London [2002] 
EWHC 2 All ER (Comm.), 211.
965  iLLmer/SteinBrück, 338.
966  EAA Report (1996), n. 215; for the similar German approach, see § 1050 (1) CCP DE.
967  Euroil Ltd. v. Cameroon Offshore Petroleum SARL [2014] EWHC 12 (Comm.), n. 11; Per-
masteelisa Japan KK v. Bouyguesstroi & Anor [2007] EWHC 3508 (TCC), n. 42; Cetelem 
S.A. v. Roust Holdings Ltd., [2005], EWCA 618 (Civ.), n. 71; Dey et al., n. 554.
968  merkin/fLannery, 177 et seq. with reference to Pacific Maritime (Asia) Ltd. v. Holy-
stone Overseas Ltd [2007] EWHC 2319 (Comm.), n. 80. 
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would involve a disproportionately significant effort, and where state court 
assistance is therefore sought according to S. 44 EAA 1996, have not been the 
subject of any debate in English legal doctrine or case law. Still, this scenario 
could easily be included under the term ‘unable … to act effectively’.969
S. 44 (5) EAA 1996 acknowledges the overall principle of the EAA 1996 by 
giving the arbitral tribunal full control over the arbitral proceedings.970 Be­
cause the arbitral tribunal is vested with the necessary powers, not at least as 
regards evidentiary issues, under S. 44 EAA 1996 state courts will examine 
whether the arbitral tribunal itself could not act effectively.971 Also, because 
S. 44 (5) EAA 1996 makes direct reference to arbitration institutions, state 
courts must consider whether, in an arbitration held under institutional ar­
bitration rules, an emergency arbitrator could act more effectively.972 In­
deed, in an LCIA arbitration in 2016 (Gerald Metals SA v. Timis & Ors), it was 
held that parties cannot resort to state courts for a ‘second attempt’ if the 
relief sought through an emergency arbitrator is unsuccessful.973 Finally, 
according to S. 44 (6) EAA 1996, state courts are competent to decide that any 
order made under S. 44 EAA 1996 may be varied or set aside by the arbitral 
tribunal once it has been constituted or any time during the arbitral proceed­
ings.974 It is therefore at the discretion of the respective court to pronounce 
on the longevity of its orders.975
3. Examination of the Arbitration Agreement
Thus far, the possibility to examine the arbitration agreement under Ss. 43 
and 44 EAA 1996 does not seem to have been the subject of debate in English 
legal doctrine or case law. According to S. 30 (1) (a) EAA 1996, the compe­
tence­competence principle means that the arbitral tribunal is competent to 
decide whether there is a valid arbitration agreement.976 If there is a dispute 
regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement, a party may object to the 
969  S. 44 (5) EAA 1996.
970  S. 34 EAA 1996; o’caLLaghan/finniS, S. 44 EAA 1996 n. 20­71.
971  As regards the power of the arbitral tribunal to order disclosure instead of state courts 
see NB Three Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd [2004] EWHC 2001 (Comm.), n. 14.
972  Sutton et al., n. 7–195; see e.g. Art. 29 ICC Rules; Art. 43 Swiss Rules; Rule 30 SIAC Rules.
973  Gerald Metals SA v. Timis & Ors [2016] EWHC 2327, n. 7.
974  merkin/fLannery, 199.
975  Sutton et al., n. 9–197. Because an arbitral tribunal has no power over third parties, 
Sutton et al. suggest that the state court in charge can make an order that lasts for the 
duration of the proceedings.
976  EAA Report (1996), n. 137 et seqq.; harriS et al., S. 30 EAA 1996 n. 30C; see also S. 9 (4) 
EAA 1996 as regards the examination of the arbitration agreement under a stay of 
legal proceedings.
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arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to S. 31 EAA 1996 and state courts 
therefore will not examine the arbitration agreement under Ss. 43 and 44 
EAA 1996.977 Furthermore, the examination of the arbitration agreement is 
possible in the context of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
under the NYC.978
F. Appellate Remedies
As regards orders under S. 44 EAA 1996, the leave of the court is required for 
any appeal.979 In comparison to other leges arbitri, this provision is unique.980 
It aims to limit the role of the court and ensures a high degree of finality—re­
garding not only S. 44 EAA 1996, but also many other provisions in the EAA 
1996.981 Consequently, if a state court finds that there are no flaws in an order 
of S. 44 EAA 1996 that would constitute sufficient grounds for an appeal, the 
request under S. 44 (7) EAA 1996 will most likely be denied. Since this provi­
sion gives wide discretion to the respective state court, it remains to be seen 
whether English courts will interpret this broadly or narrowly. However, 
there seems to be a consensus that it is possible to apply to the EWHC without 
permission if the state court did not have jurisdiction at the outset982 or if the 
court’s refusal to leave to appeal was arbitrary, unfair or even against Art. 6 
EHRC.983 Applying the rules of appellate remedies against an arbitral award 
by analogy, an appeal may be filed with the EWHC in London within 28 days 
of the parties being notified of the decision under S. 44 EAA 1996.984 
In the absence of any explicit legal bases, the aforementioned appeal 
procedure also applies to S. 43 EAA 1996. In this regard, the procedure men­
tioned under S. 44 EAA 1996 likewise applies accordingly. A distinction must 
977  Sutton et al., n. 2–012.
978  Arts. III (3) and V (1) (a) NYC.
979  S. 44 (7) EAA 1996.
980  See e.g. the approach under German (p. 146 et seqq. supra), French (p. 163 et seq. su-
pra), US (p. 212 et seq. infra) and Swiss law (p. 256 et seqq. infra). 
981  See e.g. Ss. 12 (6), 17 (4), 18 (5), 21 (6), 24 (6), 25 (5) and 42 (5) EAA 1996; Cetelem SA v. Roust 
Holding Ltd [2005] EWCA 618 (Civ.), n. 24: CGU International Insurance Plc & Ors v. As-
traZeneca Insurance Co Ltd [2006] EWCA 1340 (Civ.), n. 3 as regards S. 69 EAA 1996 
(appeal on point of law): ‘It enacts a concern, in the interest of party autonomy, priva­
cy and finality, that such awards should not be readily transferred to the courts for 
appellate review.’; Sutton et al., n. 8–128.
982  Cetelem SA v. Roust Holding Ltd [2005] EWCA 618 (Civ.), n. 25.
983  CGU International Insurance Plc & Ors v. AstraZeneca Insurance Co Ltd [2006] EWCA 
1340 (Civ.), n. 98.
984  S. 70 (3) EAA 1996.
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be made, however, regarding the assessment of evidence, which falls under 
the exclusive competence of the arbitral tribunal and not any state court 
under S. 43 or 44 EAA 1996. 
The threshold for challenging an arbitral award is high. Although 
S. 68 (2) (c) EAA 1996 provides that an arbitral award may be set aside due to a 
‘failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the 
procedure agreed by the parties’, this can be done only by showing that the 
conditions set out in S. 68 (1) EAA 1996 are met. Accordingly, a party must 
demonstrate that there has been a serious irregularity which affected the 
arbitral tribunal, the proceedings or the award. This is no easy task; thus, the 
EAA 1996 ensures a high degree of finality regarding arbitral awards.985 With 
regard to the timeframe for appeal, according to S. 70 (3) EAA 1996, an appeal 
must be brought before the EWHC within 28 days of the date of the award.
G. Summary 
Like the approaches taken in the leges arbitri of Germany and France, the Eng­
lish approach is very liberal in many ways and seeks to preserve party auton­
omy and contractual choice. First, although the EAA 1996 usually applies only 
if the seat of arbitration is in the English territory, court assistance in the tak­
ing of evidence is explicitly excluded from this requirement. The parties are 
therefore at liberty to make requests for the attendance of witnesses or to avail 
of additional state court powers in support of the arbitral proceedings. 
Second, unlike other leges arbitri, the arbitral tribunal’s consent to seek 
court assistance is not necessary if both parties agree to this course of ac­
tion.986 In exceptional urgent cases, a party may resort to a state court ex 
parte in order to preserve evidence or assets. In the absence of any explicit 
legal basis, the arbitral tribunal, in executing its mandate to decide whether 
and to what extent it should take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and 
law, can seek court assistance in taking evidence itself. If the parties wish to 
exclude this possibility, they can only exclude the powers according to S. 44 
EAA 1996; this is not possible with regard to S. 43 EAA 1996, which has man­
datory application. 
Third, while the attendance of a witness to testify or produce evidence 
under S. 43 EAA 1996 can be requested only if that witness is located and the 
arbitral proceedings are conducted in England, the spectrum of possible 
measures under S. 44 EAA 1996 is much broader. According to S. 43 EAA 1996, 
985  merkin/fLannery, 305.
986  See e.g. p. 169 supra.
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third parties can be forced to appear before an arbitral tribunal to give evi­
dence, but this provision cannot be used to request disclosure from third 
parties under the CPR 1998. Because S. 43 EAA 1996 relates to third parties, 
they do not have to reveal evidence which is irrelevant or protected by privi­
lege. In contrast, orders under S. 44 EAA 1996 can be imposed only on the 
parties to the arbitration. Unlike S. 43 EAA 1996, if the case is urgent and evi­
dence or assets must be preserved, S. 44 EAA 1996 plays a role even before the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. As regards foreign types of evidence 
which are requested to be executed before an English court, this depends on 
how narrowly the appropriateness rule set out in S. 2 (3) EAA 1996 is interpret­
ed; a clear­cut answer in this regard is therefore not possible. 
Fourth, the respective juge d’appui has wide discretion in deciding 
whether and to what extent court assistance in the taking of evidence should 
be granted. As previously discussed (see p. 177 et seqq. supra), state courts can 
deny court assistance in the taking of evidence solely on the grounds that the 
seat of arbitration, which is or will likely be outside of England, would make 
this inappropriate. Obviously, this leaves a lot of room for interpretation. As 
regards evidence, English courts seem to deny evidence requests from for­
eign arbitral tribunals if they are substantially different from English law. In 
addition, the importance of the taking of evidence and its link to the outcome 
of the arbitration must be demonstrated in order to obtain assistance. As a 
consequence, the English courts will consider the usefulness, appropriate­
ness and relevance of the request, unlike under German law, for example. 
Moreover, assistance will be granted only if the arbitral tribunal cannot take 
the evidence itself. This is mostly the case if the arbitral tribunal has not yet 
been constituted or if evidence is sought from third parties. This should also 
apply to situations where the taking of evidence by the arbitral tribunal 
would involve a disproportionately significant effort. Finally, a state court 
whose assistance is sought under Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996 is not entitled to 
conduct a full examination of the arbitration agreement, but only on a prima 
facie basis. The extensive examination forms part of a separate procedure 
under the EAA 1996 (see p. 179 supra). 
Finally, to minimise state court involvement in arbitral proceedings, the 
leave of the assisting state court is required to make an appeal. The threshold 
for granting or denying such a request remains at the discretion of the respec­
tive state court. However, if it never actually had jurisdiction or if the refusal 
to appeal was arbitrary, unfair or in breach of Art. 6 EHRC, the parties can 
appeal to the EWHC. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the EAA 1996 
imposes a high threshold for challenging an arbitral award and therefore 
guarantees a high degree of finality.
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All in all, the English lex arbitri and case law take a very pro­arbitration 
stance. Therefore, if the parties wish to force witnesses to appear before the 
arbitral tribunal or use the powers of the English courts to support arbitral 
proceedings, they should not be too hesitant to initiate an evidence request. 
However, the issue of whether the English courts will consider evidence ap­
propriate nonetheless remains. 
§ 5 USA
A. Introduction
In recent years, international arbitration in the USA has become increasingly 
popular. The caseload of the ICDR continues to grow, promoting the USA as 
an attractive forum for arbitration.987 Unlike the detailed provisions of Eng­
lish law, the approach under US law is in many ways different. On the one 
hand, the US courts have adopted a very arbitration­friendly stance, ac­
knowledging and enforcing arbitral agreements and awards. On the other 
hand, however, the US lex arbitri is one of the most wide­ranging and com­
plex arbitral legal frameworks at the federal, state and international levels.988 
This is also true when it comes to assisting international arbitral tribunals in 
gathering evidence.989 Since a comprehensive examination of the relevant 
procedures in all fifty states would exceed the scope of the present discus­
sion, the following analysis will concentrate on the issue at a purely federal 
and international level, including federal court decisions applying federal 
and international law. 
Arbitration at the federal level is mainly governed by the Federal Arbi­
tration Act (FAA USA), which was first enacted in 1925 and forms part of the 
USC (Title 9). In contrast to other leges arbitri, it is not based on the UNIC­
TRAL ML, which has served as a model for the laws in only eight out of fifty 
US states.990 Due to the age of the FAA USA, many aspects of arbitration 
have been defined by case law over time.991 Besides chapter one, which 
mainly governs domestic arbitration matters, the NYC and the so­called 
987  In 2019, the ICDR dealt with 9,737 commercial cases; see the 2019 statistics.
988  Shore et al., Introduction, 6.
989  o’maLLey, n. 3.107.
990  This applies for the states of California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisi­
ana, Oregon and Texas (see the current status); for a summary of the predominant ar­
bitral legal frameworks among the fifty states, see amirfar et al., 1 et seqq.; SaLomon/
frieDrich, Obtaining Evidence, 558 et seqq.
991  Balthasar­nieDermaier, n. 5.
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Panama Convention992 are applicable, due to their implementation into the 
FAA USA in 1970 and 1990 in chapters two and three respectively.993 While 
the FAA USA sometimes applies to international arbitral proceedings –for 
instance, to refer the parties to arbitration or vacate an arbitral award—this 
does not apply to evidentiary issues if the seat of arbitration is outside the 
US.994 Thus, § 7 FAA USA, which governs the possibility to summon witness­
es to assist with arbitration—applies only to arbitral proceedings with their 
seat in the USA; international arbitral proceedings with their seat abroad are 
therefore excluded.995 The question thus arises as to whether there are oth­
er possibilities to obtain evidence located in the USA to assist in internation­
al arbitration.
B. Legal Bases
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
The FRCP USA provide for a wide range of different discovery measures in 
state court litigation.996 In international arbitration, however, it is common­
ly accepted that broad discovery rights are not available, subject to a diver­
gent agreement between the parties, the arbitration rules and the discretion 
of the arbitral tribunal.997 The reasons for this resistance towards broad dis­
covery are clear when the matter is considered from the parties’ point of 
view, since they are seeking a faster, less expensive alternative to state court 
litigation. Moreover, the parties in international arbitration often have differ­
ent ideas and approaches as to how to the taking of evidence should be con­
ducted (see p. 7 et seqq. supra). 
992  Inter­American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.
993  SaLomon/frieDrich, Obtaining Evidence, 555.
994  § 206 and § 303 FAA USA; see also Art. II (3) NYC; SteinBrück, 168 et seqq.; NYC Bar 
Committee Report (2010), 38; as regards vacating an arbitral award under the FAA 
USA see p. 212 et seq. infra.
995  § 7 FAA USA only confers enforcement authority on the ‘district court for the district 
in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting; see also National Broad-
casting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, (2d Cir.1999), in: Y.B. Comm. 
Arb. 1999, 886; frieDman/LaVauD, 4; SaLomon/frieDrich, FAA, 352 et seqq.
996  Rule 26­37 FRCP USA; SaLomon/frieDrich, Obtaining Evidence, 587 et seqq.
997  DeLaney/fruchter, 21; see also Art. 21 (10) ICDR Rules: ‘Depositions, interrogatories, 
and requests to admit as developed for use in US court procedures generally are not 
appropriate procedures for obtaining information in an arbitration under these 
Rules.’
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What is more, the US courts have confirmed several times that pre­trial dis­
covery is generally not available in arbitral proceedings.998 Nevertheless, 
discovery has been granted in arbitral proceedings with their seats outside 
the USA in very few exceptional urgent cases—primarily maritime cases—in 
order to preserve evidence.999 As an example, in Deiulemar Compagna v. 
Pacific Eternity, a US District Court ordered an inspection of a damaged en­
gine of a ship which was soon scheduled to leave US waters. In the ongoing 
proceedings, the Court of Appeals of the 4th Cir. stated that although discov­
ery rules typically do not apply to arbitral disputes, their application in the 
present case was justified due to ‘extraordinary circumstances’, as otherwise 
the requested information would be unavailable.1000 
As far as can be seen, this case law in maritime law has not yet led to any 
similar decisions in other areas of law, let alone to a common principle re­
garding when and under what conditions foreign arbitral tribunals can seek 
discovery under the FRCP USA. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that direct dis­
covery pursuant to the FRCP USA is not altogether excluded in international 
arbitration, but is reserved for extraordinary circumstances, which seem to 
be defined on a case­by­case basis. Furthermore, discovery under the FRCP 
USA might be available through 28 USC § 1782. 
2. 28 USC § 1782
a. General Scope of Application
US statute law provides a powerful litigation and investigation tool, empow­
ering US district courts to assist in discovery in aid of a ‘foreign or internation­
al tribunal’. 28 USC § 1782 (hereinafter ‘§ 1782’) reads as follows:
“(a)  The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found 
may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a docu­
ment or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international 
tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal ac­
cusation. 
The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request 
made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of 
998  Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1980), n. 5: ‘When contracting parties stipulate 
that disputes will be submitted to arbitration, they relinquish the right to certain pro­
cedural niceties which are normally associated with a formal trial. … One of these 
accoutrements is the right to pre­trial discovery.’
999  In re Application of the Petition of Compania Chilena de Navegacion, 2004 WL 1084243 
(E.D.N.Y 2004); Deiulemar Compagna v. M/V. Allegra, 198 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999); In Re 
Deiulemar di Navigazione S.P.A., 153 F.R.D. 592, 593 (E.D. La.1994); SteinBrück, 188 et seq.
1000  Deiulemar Compagna v. M/V. Allegra, 198 F.3d 473, 476, 479 (4th Cir. 1999).
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any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be 
given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person 
appointed by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person ap­
pointed has power to administer any necessary oath and take the testi­
mony or statement. 
The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in 
whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the 
international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or produc­
ing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order does not 
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the 
document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to 
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable 
privilege.
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States from 
voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document 
or other thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribu­
nal before any person and in any manner acceptable to him.”
However, the application of § 1782 in international arbitration remains un­
clear. The increasing split among US courts and in legal doctrine not only is 
confusing, but also suggests that, to be on the safe side, arbitration practition­
ers should resist trying to make use of § 1782, especially in private commercial 
arbitration. However, the following examination shows that this conclusion 
is not appropriate in all circumstances. This follows from a closer look at US 
case law, especially a ground­breaking Supreme Court decision from 2004. 
Therefore, before examining § 1782 according to the common structure, as 
with the previous examined leges arbitri, the questionable applicability of 
this section in arbitration must first be discussed. 
b. Legislative Background
§ 1782 was enacted in 1948 to assist foreign state courts with discovery.1001 In 
1964 the word ‘court’ in § 1782 was replaced with the wording ‘foreign or in­
ternational tribunal’, to broaden the scope of this section and avoid its appli­
1001  H.R. Rep. 1052, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963), 9; Bento, 32 et seqq.; The history of discov­
ery in aid of foreign proceedings goes indeed much further back; see Intel Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 et seqq. (2004); martineZ­fraga, 38 
et seqq.; BeaLe et al., 56 et seqq.; o’maLLey/eaton, 112 et seqq.; NYC Bar Committee 
Report (2010), 2 et seqq.
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cation being restricted merely to conventional courts.1002 It was expected 
that other countries would initiate similar reforms.1003 Reading this passage, 
one might easily conclude that arbitral tribunals are included.1004 Unfortu­
nately, however, US Congress (hereinafter ‘Congress’) never defined the term 
‘foreign or international tribunal’ sufficiently specifically.1005 It merely stated 
the following:
“The word ‘tribunal’ is used to make it clear that assistance is not confined 
to proceedings before conventional courts. For example, it is intended 
that the courts have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are 
pending before investigating magistrates in foreign countries. (…). In view 
of the constant growth of administrative and quasi­judicial proceedings 
all over the world, the necessity for obtaining evidence in the United 
States may be as impelling in proceedings before a foreign administrative 
tribunal or quasi­judicial agency as in proceedings before a conventional 
foreign court. Subsection (a) therefore provides the possibility of U.S. ju­
dicial assistance in connection with all such proceedings.”1006
Although the wording remains vague, one may conclude that Congress’ over­
all intention was to broaden the scope of international court assistance in the 
taking of evidence by increasing the powers of district courts in this respect.1007
c. Case Law
I. Introduction
In light of the legislative history, it is unsurprising that for a long time, the use 
of § 1782 in international arbitral proceedings was non­existent or denied.1008 
1002  H.R. Rep. 1052, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963), 9; Sen. Rep. 1580, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1964), 
3788; eLuL/moSquera, n. 408. In addition, the replacement meant a combination 
between the former 22 USC § 270 to 270g which only addressed international tribu­
nals, while the former 28 USC § 1782 to 1785 referred to foreign courts. The revisions 
in 1964 has therefore resulted in a combination of both provisions (see also Smit, In-
ternational Tribunals, 1264 et seqq.; Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 3).
1003  H.R. Rep. 1052, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963), 20; Smit, International Litigation, 1019; 
martineZ­fraga, 38; Bento, 54 et seq. 
1004  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9 n. 30.
1005  eLuL/moSquera, n. 393 et seq.
1006  H.R. Rep. 1052, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963), 9.
1007  In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago peti-
tion Jospeh Azar, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 1988).
1008  Application of Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); National Broadcast-
ing Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, (2d Cir.1999), in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 
1999, 884 et seqq.; Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International, (5th Cir. 1999), 
in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 2000, 918 et seqq.
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Accordingly, arbitral tribunals and parties were forced to gather evidence in 
the USA through international judicial assistance under treaties such as the 
HEC.1009 This situation changed dramatically following the Supreme Court’s 
decision Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (hereinafter ‘Intel’) in 
2004.1010 As a logical consequence, this shift in case law has led to a broad 
debate in legal doctrine and a split among various circuits. It therefore re­
mains very unclear whether there is in fact a legal basis for US­style discovery 
in aid of international arbitration. Nevertheless, there are some commonali­
ties among the decisions of various circuits. The following discussion tries to 
shed some light on the applicability of § 1782 by analysing various US court 
decisions prior to and after Intel. Needless to say, given the vast case law on 
§ 1782, the discussion focuses on a selective examination rather than a com­
prehensive overview. 
II. Decisions prior to Intel 
Following the amendment of § 1782 in 1964, US courts from the 2d and 5th Cir. 
had several possibilities to express their views on the term ‘foreign or inter­
national tribunal’.1011 In Application of Technostroyexport, an NY district 
court (2d Cir.) stated bluntly that an arbitrator or an arbitration panel is a 
tribunal in the sense of § 1782.1012 However, the court did not further elabo­
rate on its decision, but denied the request for discovery because it had been 
made ex parte. The same applied in Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co., Ltd., where discov­
ery was sought in arbitral proceedings in England, but was denied because 
the district court (5th Cir.) considered the request an attempt to circumvent 
English disclosure rules.1013 Here again, the district court mentioned noth­
ing regarding the applicability of § 1782 to arbitral proceedings. By contrast, 
in Application of Medway Power Ltd., an NY district court (2d Cir.) denied 
discovery in aid of an arbitration held under the EAA 1996 because an arbitral 
tribunal was not considered a ‘foreign and international tribunal’.1014 The 
1009  For the relationship between the HEC and § 1782, see p. 208 infra. As an exception to 
this, there have been a few rare cases in which arbitral tribunals have been supported 
by ordering discovery according to the FRCP USA (see p. 185 supra).
1010  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004); Strong, 302 et seq.
1011  See e.g. in the case of a letter rogatory by a Director of Inspection under the Income 
Tax Act of the Government of India in Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection 
of Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
1012  Application of Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1013  In re Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co., Ltd., 896 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1995).
1014  Application of Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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court argued that in amending § 1782, Congress intended to assist only official 
‘governmental agencies exercising a judicial or quasi­judicial’ role, and that 
consequently arbitral tribunals are excluded.1015 
Two years later, in 1999, the decision in National Broadcasting Company, 
Inc. and NBC Europe, Inc., v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. (hereinafter ‘NBC’) was 
even clearer:1016 the 2d Cir. held that an ICC arbitration conducted in Mexico 
was not a proceeding under a foreign or international tribunal in the sense of 
§ 1782.1017 The court held that although it has been argued that the term ‘for­
eign or international tribunal’ is ambiguous and does not necessarily include 
or exclude arbitral tribunals, the legislative history shows that Congress had 
in mind only ‘governmental entities, such as administrative or investigative 
courts, acting as state instrumentalities or with the authority of the state’.1018 
This stems from the fact that the term ‘international tribunal’ in the new § 1782 
came from the former 22 USC § 270–270g, enacted in 1930 to compel witnesses 
to appear in state arbitral proceedings between Canada and the USA.1019 
Furthermore, the court held that allowing foreign arbitral tribunals to 
make use of § 1782 would be in stark contrast to court assistance in the taking 
of evidence in domestic arbitration pursuant to § 7 FAA USA, which is far 
more limited.1020 This result, the court reasoned, could not have been intend­
ed by Congress. Finally, the 2d Cir. Court of Appeals argued that the applica­
tion of wide­ranging discovery rights under § 1782 to arbitration would also 
contradict the basic principle of arbitration: that is, to provide an efficient 
and cost­effective alternative to litigation.1021 If it were applied to internation­
al arbitration, there would be a risk that a party could ex parte initiate discov­
ery according to § 1782 and therefore misuse this option for tactical reasons, 
which would not be in the interests of arbitration. 
1015  Ibid., 402, 403 et seq. In addition, reference was made to Application of Technostroyex-
port, 853 F. Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994; made in the same 2d Cir.) stating that this decision 
has been rendered on no precedent authority and therefore it was not binding (404).
1016  National Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, (2d Cir.1999), 
in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 884 et seqq.; BeaLe et al., 61 et seqq.; roBertSon/frieDman, 
68 et seq.
1017  The decision confirmed was In re Application of National Broadcasting Co., No. M­77, 
1998 WL 1994 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
1018  National Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, (2d Cir.1999), 
in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 888.
1019  Smit, International Tribunals, 1264 et seqq.
1020  See p. 183 supra; see also SaLomon/frieDrich, Obtaining Evidence, 554 et seqq.; Na-
tional Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, (2d Cir.1999), in: 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 886.
1021  Ibid., 890 et seq.
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Shortly after NBC, the 5th Cir. rendered a very similar decision in an invest­
ment arbitration between Kazakhstan and a US investor. In Republic of Ka-
zakhstan v. Biedermann Int. (hereinafter ‘Republic of Kazakhstan’), the Court 
of Appeals of the 5th Cir. largely followed the reasoning in NBC.1022 In doing 
so, it emphasised the comparison between § 1782 and § 7 FAA USA. Accord­
ingly, the latter provision permits arbitration panels to serve a witness sum­
mons only within the federal district in which the arbitrators, or a majority 
of them, are sitting. Under § 1782, however, not only foreign and internation­
al tribunals, but also ‘every interested party’, can initiate discovery requests. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals stated:
“It is not likely that Congress would have chosen to authorize federal 
courts to assure broader discovery in aid of foreign private arbitration 
than is afforded its domestic dispute­resolution counterpart. … Empow­
ering arbitrators or, worse, the parties, in private international disputes 
to seek ancillary discovery through the federal courts does not benefit 
the arbitration process.”1023
The decisions prior to Intel leave little room for interpretation; private inter­
national tribunals are clearly excluded from the scope of application of § 1782. 
First, only ‘state­sponsored’ entities will thus benefit from discovery rights 
under § 1782. Second, if § 1782 were used in international arbitration, there 
would be a clear imbalance between domestic and international arbitration 
held in the USA. Third, the often time­consuming discovery process is at odds 
with the very essence and goal of international arbitration, which is to provide 
an efficient and cost­effective instrument to settle international commercial 
disputes. In sum, the use of § 1782 in international arbitral proceedings 
seemed out of the question for the time being—at least in the 2d and 5th Cirs. 
III. Intel
i. Factual Background
In the 2004 Intel case, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (hereinafter ‘AMD’) 
filed an antitrust complaint against Intel Corporation (hereinafter ‘Intel’) 
before the Directorate­General for Competition (DG-Competition) of the 
1022  Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International, (5th Cir. 1999), in: Y.B. Comm. 
Arb. 2000, 918 et seqq.; BeaLe et al., 63 et seq.; roBertSon/frieDman, 69 et seqq.
1023  Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International, (5th Cir. 1999), in: Y.B. Comm. 
Arb. 2000, 921 et seq.
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Commission of the European Communities.1024 Pursuing this complaint, 
AMD applied to the District Court for the Northern District of California, 
requesting Intel to produce certain documents in accordance with § 1782. 
After the Californian district court denied the application because it lacked 
authority, the Court of Appeals of the 9th Cir. reversed this decision, order­
ing the district court to rule on the merits of AMD’s application. Subse­
quently, Intel appealed to the Supreme Court, which issued several guide­
lines on how to deal with requests under § 1782 before remanding the case 
to the district court. 
Without doubt, Intel represents a landmark in the history of § 1782, since 
it paved the way for discovery in international arbitral proceedings where 
evidence is sought to be obtained in the USA.1025 Although this decision was 
rendered obiter dicta—that is, with non­binding effect for lower courts, be­
cause it was not primarily about a foreign arbitral tribunal—the Supreme 
Court offered some helpful insight into how to interpret and apply § 1782, 
which at times runs contrary to what was decided by the 2d and 5th Cirs. (see 
p. 188 et seqq. supra).1026 The consequences of Intel are thus crucial as regards 
obtaining evidence in the USA for international arbitration. The following 
analysis focuses on how the US Supreme Court in Intel tackled the three main 
reasons raised in NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan against the use of § 1782 in 
arbitral proceedings, as well as the ‘Intel factors’. 
ii. ‘Foreign and International Tribunal’ 
The first and most important issue concerns the term ‘foreign and interna­
tional tribunal’. As seen in the cases prior to Intel, by looking at the historical 
background of § 1782, several courts reached the clear conclusion that Con­
gress did not intend to include arbitral tribunals at all.1027 Although not 
speaking explicitly of arbitral tribunals, it is still startling that in Intel, Justice 
Ginsburg stated very quickly that since the DG-Competition is an adjudica­
tive body involved in taking evidence and acting as a first­instance decision 
maker whose decisions can be reviewed, it may be considered a ‘foreign or 
1024  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004); martineZ­fraga, 
44; BeaLe et al., 64 et seqq.; o’maLLey/eaton, 114; NYC Bar Committee Report (2010), 
19 et seqq.
1025  martineZ­fraga, 43.
1026  Ibid., 45.
1027  See p. 188 et seqq. supra.
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international tribunal’ in the sense of § 1782.1028 To support this view, she 
made reference to Smit, who served as director of the Columbia Law School 
project—in which Justice Ginsburg herself was an associate director—which 
assisted the law commission in drafting the new § 1782.1029 According to a 
passage in an article written by Smit in 1965, one year after the enactment of 
§ 1782, the term ‘tribunal’ encompasses:
“All bodies exercising adjudicatory powers, and includes investigating 
magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi­judicial 
agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and ad­
ministrative courts …, but also arbitral tribunals or single arbitrators.”1030 
Besides the fact that arbitral tribunals are explicitly mentioned by Smit, one 
might easily also consider them to be first­instance decision makers, taking 
evidence in the arbitral proceedings and rendering an arbitral award which 
is subject to review depending on the respective lex arbitri.1031 Accordingly, 
§ 1782 could be used in aid of international arbitration, irrespective of any 
other requirement such as the applicable law, the seat of arbitration or the 
nationality of the parties. Despite this very arbitration­friendly approach tak­
en in Intel, one must acknowledge that Smit adopted this same liberal ap­
proach back in 1965, a year after § 1782 was revised.1032 In an earlier publica­
tion of Smit from 1962, to which Congress explicitly referred in the legislative 
materials on § 1782, (private) international arbitral tribunals are not men­
tioned at all.1033 However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that Congress deliberately excluded arbitral tribunals from the scope of ap­
plication of this provision.
Looking at the legislative history of § 1782, it may be assumed that al­
though Congress adopted rather broad wording, it is hard to justify an in­
terpretation that the primary focus was on private international arbitral 
tribunals as understood today.1034 In 1964, although international arbitra­
1028  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 et seq, (2004); martineZ­ 
fraga, 45; maLament, 1219 et seq. It is noteworthy that in 1964, the time of the im­
portant amendment to § 1782, the DG-Competition had not yet been founded (see 
o’maLLey/eaton, 118).
1029  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004); VaLentine, 397.
1030  Ibid.; Smit, International Litigation, fn 71; Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 5 et seqq.
1031  martineZ­fraga, 46.
1032  maLament, 1224; Strong, 303 et seq.
1033  Smit, International Aspects, 1031 et seqq.; see also Smit, International Tribunals, 1264 
et seqq. (1962).
1034  rothStein, 79.
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tion was slowly gaining importance, it had not yet become the instrument of 
choice to settle international commercial disputes. This can be seen in the 
fact that multilateral treaties concerning international arbitration such as 
the NYC and the Panama Convention had not yet been ratified in the USA.1035 
By the same token, however, the USA was by no means a ‘dead man’s land’ 
for arbitration at this time.1036 Following the end of World War II, the USA 
entered into several treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, espe­
cially between 1946 and 1968,1037 which often included clauses on the recip­
rocal acknowledgment and enforcement of arbitral awards.1038 What is 
more, in 1966 the USA ratified the ICSID Convention.1039 It may thus be con­
cluded that—contrary to what was held in NBC—Congress neither expressly 
included nor excluded international arbitral tribunals from the scope of 
application of § 1782.1040 Rather, the clear aim was to improve international 
court assistance—albeit that at the time, this was mainly in the field of inter­
national litigation.1041 In this regard, Intel goes even further by emphasising 
the broad scope given to the term ‘foreign and international tribunal’. 
iii. Domestic v. International Arbitration
The second issue concerns the difference between domestic and international 
arbitration.1042 Regarding the difference between § 1782 and § 7 FAA USA, the 
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion from that in NBC and Republic 
of Kazakhstan.1043 The latter decisions suggested that Congress could not have 
intended to introduce a disparity between domestic and international arbitra­
tion with regard to who can request discovery, which district court may decide 
and what evidence may be sought. The reasoning in Intel was rather different:
“Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not 
direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to deter­
mine whether analogous proceedings exist here.”1044
1035  Strong, 304; rothStein, 72 et seqq. The NYC was ratified in 1970 and the Panama 
Convention in 1990; see the current status of the NYC, and the Panama Convention. 
1036  Contra goDfrey, 503.
1037  coyLe, 308; SteinBrück, 215 et seq.; iLLmer/SteinBrück, 332 et seq.
1038  SteinBrück, 216; see e.g. the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation be­
tween the USA and Germany from 1956, Art. VI (2).
1039  See the current status.
1040  National Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC T V. (2d Cir.1999), 
in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 888; SteinBrück, 213; maLament, 1224.
1041  martineZ­fraga, 40.
1042  See p. 183 supra; maLament, 1234 et seqq.
1043  See p. 189 et seqq. supra.
1044  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 263 (2004).
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First, the Supreme Court makes it clear that there is no legal basis or principle 
stating that domestic and international arbitration must be treated equally.1045 
§ 1782 only and specifically addresses tribunals abroad and says nothing of 
the situation in domestic arbitration, which is a separate issue.1046 Going one 
step further, Smit even argued that instead of narrowing § 1782, either § 7 FAA 
USA should be revised based on the model of § 1782 or § 1782 should also be 
applied to domestic arbitration.1047 One must also bear in mind that a district 
court whose assistance is sought under § 1782 always has wide discretion to 
decide whether and to what extent to grant such assistance.1048 Consequent­
ly, in the case of requests made ex parte, assistance may depend on the con­
sent of the arbitral tribunal in charge.1049 
Second, as previously discussed, in some circumstances § 7 FAA USA 
can even be invoked in international arbitral proceedings.1050 In the same 
manner, § 7 FAA USA does not purely apply to domestic arbitration; it can also 
be applied to domestic arbitration in the USA, as long there is an internation­
al arbitral tribunal seated in the country.1051 From a systematic point of view, 
Intel therefore suggests that the differences between domestic and interna­
tional court assistance in the taking of evidence are no reason to deny this 
assistance to foreign arbitral tribunals. 
iv. Discovery in Arbitral Proceedings: Intel Factors 
Third, it remains to be considered whether the use of § 1782 in international 
arbitral proceedings would in fact run contrary to the essence and nature of 
1045  See also Hallmark Capital Corporation, 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956 et seq. (D. Minn. 2007); 
Regarding the different approaches to arbitrability in domestic and international 
arbitration, see Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985); Scherk 
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
1046  NYC Bar Committee Report (2010), 38 et seq.
1047  Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 7, fn 31. He even argues that US courts have inherent 
power to order discovery according to 28 USC § 1782 in domestic arbitration.
1048  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 et seqq. (2004): ‘A district 
court is not required to grant a § 1782 (a) discovery application simply because it has 
the authority to do so.’; maLament, 1232 et seq., 1236.
1049  See e.g. Application of Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1050  See p. 183 supra; SteinBrück, 222.
1051  Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 7 et seq. He argues for the broadest possible interpreta­
tion of ‘international’, which is if any of the parties or arbitrators is not a citizen or 
resident of the USA; for the difference between ‘foreign and international’ tribunal, 
see also NYC Bar Committee Report (2010), 32 et seqq.
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arbitration.1052 Indeed, discovery under the FRCP USA—subject to a diver­
gent agreement between the parties—is uncommon in international arbitral 
proceedings,1053 and can end up in lengthy and cumbersome battles over 
discovery requests.1054 Moreover, according to § 1782, any ‘interested person’ 
can initiate a request for discovery, even without the prior consent of the ar­
bitral tribunal. Consequently, as argued in NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan, 
there is a danger that § 1782 may be misused for tactical reasons by either 
party.1055 The question of discovery should therefore be answered prior to 
the arbitral proceedings by the parties themselves or, in the absence of any 
agreement, by the arbitral tribunal.1056 
In Intel, however, to address the concern over allegedly lengthy disco­
very proceedings, the Supreme Court stated:
“The dissent sees a need for ‘categorical limits’ to ward off ‘expensive, 
time­consuming battles about discovery’. … There is no evidence what­
soever, in the 40 years since § 1782 (a)’s adoption, … of the cost, delays, 
and forced settlements the dissent hypothesizes.”1057
In light of the broad discussion of the appropriateness of US discovery, the 
Supreme Court’s respective remarks are incisive. Besides the statutory re­
quirements, Justice Ginsburg then set out several discretionary guidelines to 
deal with discovery requests under § 1782. Simply put, a court presented with 
a § 1782 request always has wide discretion to decide whether to grant or deny 
1052  National Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, (2d Cir.1999), in: 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 890; Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International, (5th 
Cir. 1999), in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 2000, 922 et seq.; see also the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Breyer in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 et seqq. (2004).
1053  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9.01 n. 19; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1329; girSBerger/
VoSer, n. 994; VáraDy et al., 674; martineZ­fraga, 55; goDfrey, 506 et seq.; see also 
Art. 21 (10) ICDR Rules.
1054  Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International, (5th Cir. 1999), in: Y.B. Comm. 
Arb. 2000, 922 et seq.; conLey, 67 et seq.
1055  Ibid.; National Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, (2d Cir. 
1999), in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 890.
1056  Ibid.; Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International, (5th Cir. 1999), in: Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 2000, 922 et seq.
1057  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264, fn 17 (2004); maLament, 
1233. This fact is even acknowledged in a decision denying the use of § 1782 in arbitral 
proceedings; see La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica v. El Paso, 617 F.Supp.2d 481, 
487 (S.D. Tex. 2008): ‘The Supreme Court may yet be moved by the stronger gravita­
tional pull of international comity, concomitant with international commerce, to 
apply § 1782 to arbitral tribunals.’
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it.1058 In this regard, the court ought to examine not only who is seeking dis­
covery, but also from whom and for what reason.1059 More specifically, the 
Supreme Court identified five discretionary factors which district courts 
ought to consider:
“1. The person from whom discovery is sought. § 1782 will most likely not 
be granted if it is invoked against a party over which the arbitral tribunal 
has jurisdiction.1060 As previously discussed, under most institutional 
arbitration rules, the arbitral tribunal can order a party to produce evi­
dence and even impose sanctions in case of non­compliance.1061 In con­
trast, without § 1782, evidence from non­participants would be unob­
tainable.”1062
“2.  The nature of the foreign tribunal as a first­instance decision maker 
whose decision is subject to review, as well as the character of the pro­
ceedings underway abroad—that is, the rules applicable to the arbitral 
proceedings concerning discovery (e.g. institutional arbitration rules or 
the IBA Rules), as well as the stage at which the arbitral proceedings 
currently stand.”1063 
“3. The receptivity of the foreign tribunal to court assistance under 
§ 1782.1064 If assistance is not desired—for instance, because the arbitral 
tribunal refused to give its consent to a request under § 1782—it will most 
likely be denied.”
“4. Whether the § 1782 request is an attempt to circumvent foreign evi­
dence­gathering restrictions.”1065
“5. Whether the § 1782 request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.1066 
Such requests for ‘fishing expeditions’ may be rejected or restricted.”1067
1058  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 (2004): ‘The statute author­
izes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide assistance … .’ For an 
extensive outline of the Intel factors see Bento, 50 et seqq.
1059  Ibid., 264, 264 et seqq.
1060  Ibid., 264.
1061  See p. 27 et seqq. and p. 57 et seqq. supra.
1062  Ibid.
1063  Ibid., 243, 264; BeaLe et al., 100; see e.g. Caratube Intl. Oil Company, Llp., 730 F. Supp. 
2d 101, 106 et seq. (D.C.C. 2010).
1064  BeaLe et al., 97 et seqq.; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 
(2004).
1065  Ibid., 244 et seq., 265.
1066  Ibid., 245, 265.
1067  BeaLe et al., 101.
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At first sight, these factors, together with the statutory requirements of § 1782, 
seem clear enough to equip district courts with the necessary guidance to 
grant or deny discovery requests.1068 However, because the decision did not 
expressly address arbitral tribunals, it remained unclear how US courts would 
react to Intel.
IV. Decisions after Intel 
The decisions following Intel could not differ more with regard to their inter­
pretation of the case itself and the ensuing consequences in the respective 
disputes.1069 While in some circuits there seems to be a logical line of case law, 
the picture in others is very inconsistent. For the sake of clarity, the following 
decisions have been presented chronologically, according to their circuit. One 
must pay close attention to the distinction between decisions of district and 
circuit courts on the one hand, and the fact that in some circuits, district courts 
do not follow the previous rulings of the respective circuit courts on the other.
i. 2d Circuit
After Intel, in dealing with requests pursuant to § 1782, district courts in the 2d 
Cir. took a more liberal view as opposed to the prior stance taken in NBC in 
1999.1070 For instance, in OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., based 
on the criteria in Intel, it was held that a private SCC arbitration was within the 
scope of § 1782.1071 In other decisions, district courts cited a misguided line of 
case law differentiating between purely private arbitrations and those con­
ducted by UNCITRAL, which was seen as ‘a body operating under the United 
Nations’.1072 Quite obviously, although the UNCITRAL Rules were drafted by 
UNCITRAL, this commission itself—unlike arbitration institutions—is not an 
administering body in arbitral proceedings conducted under the UNCITRAL 
Rules.1073 
1068  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 266 (2004): ‘Having held that 
§ 1782 (a) authorizes, but does not require, discovery assistance, we leave it to the courts 
below to ensure an airing adequate to determine what, if any, assistance is appropriate.’
1069  Strong, 303; NYC Bar Committee Report (2010), 21 et seqq.; Bento, 110 et seqq. 
1070  See also the NYC Bar Committee Report (2010), strongly arguing for the use of § 1782 
in aid of international arbitral proceedings (44 et seq.).
1071  Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., 2009 WL 2877156, 1 (D. Conn. 2009).
1072  Ibid., 4; In re Arbitration between Norfolk Southern Corporation et al., 626 F. Supp. 2d 
882, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see also the investment arbitration disputes in this respect; In 
re Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Case 1:15­MC­00018, 5 et seq. 
(D. n. Mar. I. 2016; Chevron Corp. v. Jonathan S. Shefftz, 754 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 
2010); Strong, 311 et seqq.; Oxus Gold PLC, MISC 06­82 (D.N.J. 2007).
1073  Strong, 308; timár/kraayVanger, 70.
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In the 2016 case of Kleimar N.V., an NY district court confirmed an ex parte 
application under § 1782 in aid of arbitration held in London under the 
LMAA.1074 Regarding the precedent in NBC, rendered in the same circuit, the 
district court bluntly stated that unfortunately, the 2d Cir. has not yet ap­
proved the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Intel.1075 Quite unusually, by citing 
several decisions rendered outside the 2d Cir., the district court considered 
itself no longer bound by NBC in light of these persuasive decisions.1076 Con­
sequently, after confirming that the requirements of Intel had been met, the 
request made under § 1782 was granted. This reasoning was recently con­
firmed in 2019 in In re Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, in which an NY 
district court granted § 1782 discovery in aid of an arbitration held under the 
LCIA Rules.1077
ii. 5th and 3d Circuit
By contrast, the 5th Cir.—which handed down the decision in Republic of Ka-
zakhstan in 1999—stood firmly behind its precedent and denied an ex parte 
request under § 1782 in aid of an arbitration in Switzerland.1078 In La Commis-
sion Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica v. El Paso, the district court noted that in Intel, 
the Supreme Court never intended to include arbitral tribunals, even though 
it cited Smit’s article in which arbitral tribunals were explicitly mentioned.1079 
The 5th Cir. argued that this reference was made only to justify that § 1782 
applies to quasi­judicial agencies and administrative courts such as the 
1074  Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also the related request in the 7th 
Cir. which has also been granted: N.V. v. Benxi Iron & Steel Am., Ltd., No. 17­cv­01287 
(N.D. Ill. 2017).
1075  Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 517, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
1076  Ibid., 521 et seq. citing Consorcio Ecuatoriano v. JAS Forwarding (USA), 685 F.3d 987 
(11th Cir. 2012); Winning (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 09­22659 (S.D. Fla. 2010; 11th Cir.); 
In re Owl Shipping, LLC, No. 14­5655 (D.N.J. 2014; 3d Cir.).
1077  In re Children’s Inv. Fund Found. (UK), Sir Christopher Hohn, & Axon Partners, LP, No. 
18­MC­104 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
1078  La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica v. El Paso, 617 F.Supp.2d 481 (S.D. Tex. 2008); 
confirmed in El Paso Corp. v. La Comission Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica, 341 Fed. Appx. 31 
(5th Cir. 2009). Respecting the arbitral tribunal’s opinion that itself would have de­
nied a request for discovery because it had been made ex parte, the District Court of 
the S.D. of Texas noted that even if it had the power to order discovery under § 1782, 
it would not do so ‘out of respect for the efficient administration of the Swiss arbitra­
tion’ (La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica v. El Paso, 617 F.Supp.2d 481, 487 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008).
1079  La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica v. El Paso, 617 F.Supp.2d 481, 486 (S.D. Tex. 
2008); BeaLe et al., 74 et seqq.; o’maLLey/eaton, 116.
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DG-Competition.1080 Ironically, the same request for documents submitted 
to the District Court of Delaware in the 3d Cir. led to a different result. This 
court simply stated that Intel indicated that § 1782 applies to foreign private 
arbitration, but unfortunately did not explain why.1081 In the subsequent 
appeal, the Court of Appeals of the 3d Cir. dismissed the appeal without ex­
pressing itself further on § 1782, because the parties merely waited for the 
arbitral award to be rendered; the whole issue has thus become moot.1082 
iii. 11th Circuit
In the 11th Cir., several other district courts applied a functional approach to 
the issue as illustrated in Intel, arguing that ‘it is the function of the body that 
makes it a “tribunal”, not its formal identity as “governmental” or “private” 
institution’, but rather its adjudicatory function:1083
“Where a body makes adjudicative decisions responsive to a complaint 
and reviewable in court, it falls within the widely accepted definition of 
‘tribunal’, the reasoning of Intel, and the scope of § 1782 (a), regardless of 
whether the body is, governmental or private.”
Thus, in Roz Trading Ltd., a Georgia district court concluded that an arbitral 
panel of the International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber in Vienna fell within the scope of § 1782.1084 Conversely, in Opera-
dora DB Mexico a district court from the same circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion regarding an ICC arbitral tribunal, upholding the reasoning in 
NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan that the word ‘tribunal’ refers only to gov­
ernmental (i.e. state­sponsored) entities.1085 In addition, it held that the re­
1080  La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica v. El Paso, 617 F.Supp.2d 481, 486 (S.D. Tex. 
2008): ‘Smit does not speak for the Supreme Court. Until, and, if, the Supreme Court 
itself adopts Hans Smit’s statements as its own within the text of the opinion itself, 
Hans Smit’s opinions on arbitral tribunals has no more weight and authority than any 
other article. Smit’s opinion is not even Supreme Court dicta.’
1081  Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica del Rio Lempa v. Nejapa Power Company, LLC, WL 
4809035 (D. Del. 2008).
1082  Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica del Rio Lempa v. Nejapa Power Company LLC, 341 
Fed. Appx. 821 (3d Cir. 2009).
1083  See e.g. In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
1084  Ibid.
  Ibid., 1226; BeaLe et al., 69 et seqq.
1085  Operadora DB Mexico, S.A. DE C.V., Case No. 6:09­cv­Orl­22G JK., 23 (M.D. Fla. 2009): 
‘Because the ICC Panel is the product of a private agreement to resolve disputes inde­
pendently of state­sponsored tribunals, the court finds that Congress and the Su­
preme Court would not casually extend § 1782 to such proceeding without some de­
liberation.’ See also o’maLLey/eaton, 117 et seq.
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view process of the ICC arbitration did not satisfy the requirements of Intel 
because the arbitral award was ‘judicially reviewable’ only within very nar­
row boundaries.1086 
One year later, in Winning (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd. which was conducted 
under the LMAA, another district court again reached a different conclu­
sion.1087 Because the arbitration at hand was governed by the EAA 1996 and 
the arbitral award was therefore reviewable by an English court, the arbitral 
tribunal was considered a first­instance decision maker in the sense of Intel.1088 
Unfortunately, no further explanations of the differences between the re­
view process under ICC and LMAA arbitration were given. In 2012, however, 
Consorcio Ecuatoriano v. JAS Forwarding (USA) shed some light on this issue, 
at least in the 11th Cir.1089 The Court of Appeals held that the Centre of Arbi­
tration and Conciliation of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce in Ecuador 
does render first­instance decisions which are subject to judicial review.1090 
Unfortunately, in 2014 the same court vacated this ruling without examining 
the phrase ‘foreign or international tribunal’.1091 However, it did emphasise 
the functional approach taken by the Supreme Court in Intel and cited Smit’s 
article which explicitly mentioned arbitration tribunals.1092
iv. Other Circuits
In other circuits, the situation is even more confusing. District courts in the 
1st and 8th Cirs. have considered § 1782 applicable to arbitrations under the 
ICC Rules, as well as to an Israeli arbitration, based mainly on the legislative 
history of § 1782 and the reasoning in Intel.1093 Furthermore, interpreting the 
word ‘foreign tribunal’ broadly and stating that congress intended to broad­
en the scope of § 1782, the 6th Cir. reversed the prior district court’s order and 
1086  Operadora DB Mexico, S.A. DE C.V., Case No. 6:09­cv­Orl­22G JK., 20 et seq. (M.D. Fla. 
2009).
1087  Winning (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 09­22659 (S.D. Fla. 2010); BeaLe et al., 83 et seq.; 
regarding arbitration under the LMAA see also Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 517 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Owl Shipping, LLC, No. 14­5655 (D.N.J. 2014).
1088  Ibid., 18 et seq.
1089  Consorcio Ecuatoriano v. JAS Forwarding (USA), 685 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2012); VáraDy 
et al., 692 et seq.; maLament, 1229 et seq.
1090  Consorcio Ecuatoriano v. JAS Forwarding (USA), 685 F.3d 987, 996 et seqq. (11th Cir. 2012).
1091  Consorcio Ecuatoriano v. JAS Forwarding (USA), 747 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).
1092  Ibid., 1270 fn 4; maLament, 1216 et seq., 1221 et seq.
1093  In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Mass. 2008; 1st Cir.); Hallmark Capital 
Corporation, 534 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Minn. 2007; 8th Cir.) see also the decisions regard­
ing investment arbitration mentioned in BLackman/StiefLer, fn 40 et seq.; Strong, 
306 et seqq.; aLforD, 136, fn 56.
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remanded the case so the district court determines again if discovery pursu­
ant to § 1782 could be granted.1094 Their counterparts in the 4th, 9th and 10th 
Cirs., however, denied its application. In Finserve Group Ltd., a district court 
of the 4th Cir. argued, concerning an LCIA arbitration in London, that ‘the 
Court questions whether the LCIA would be considered to be a ‘foreign tribu­
nal’ under the statute, as there appears there is no judicial review’.1095 With­
out further discussing this point, the request was denied as the LCIA was not 
receptive to the request.1096 
What is more, in several decisions of the 9th Cir., requests for court as­
sistance in arbitration under § 1782 were denied based on the reasoning of the 
2d and 5th Cirs. prior to Intel. In Dubey, the district court distinguished be­
tween ‘purely private arbitrations established by private contract and 
state­sponsored arbitral bodies’ such as the DG-Competition.1097 By follow­
ing the reasoning in NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan, it denied a request un­
der § 1782 requesting discovery in an AAA arbitration held in California.1098 A 
decision rendered in the 10th Cir. likewise found an ICC arbitration to be 
outside the scope of § 1782.1099 
Finally, district court decisions both granting and denying requests for 
court assistance in arbitration under § 1782 have been handed down in the 
7th Cir. In Norfolk Southern Corp., a district court agreed to the flawed as­
sumption that § 1782 does not apply to purely private arbitral tribunals, but 
does apply to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules and administrated by 
UNCITRAL itself.1100 Moreover, it followed NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan 
by making a clear distinction between state­sponsored tribunals and purely 
private arbitral tribunals.1101 The same reasoning was applied in TJAC Water-
loo, a construction dispute in which a request under § 1782 was denied to a 
1094  Abdul Latif Jameel Trans. Co. v. Fedex Corp., No. 19­5315, 10 et seqq., 18 (6th Cir. 2019); 
Bento, 119 et seqq. 
1095  Finserve Group Ltd., No. 4:11­mc­2044­RBH, 4 (D.S.C. 2011); regarding judicial review, 
see also the decisions from the 11th Cir., p. 199 et seq. supra.
1096  Finserve Group Ltd., No. 4:11­mc­2044­RBH, 5 (D.S.C. 2011); see also In re Servotronics, 
Inc., No. 2:18­mc­00364­DCN (D.S.C. 2018).
1097  Dubey, 949 F. Supp. 2d 990, 994 (D.C. California 2013).
1098  See also the subsequent decisions after Dubey in the 9th Cir.; Grupo Unidos Por El Ca-
nal S.A., No. 14­mc­80277­JST (N.D. Cal. 2015); In re Government of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, 1:15­MC­00018 (D. n. Mar. I. 2016).
1099  Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14­mc­00226­MSK-KMT, 15 et seq. (D.C. Colo. 2015).
1100  In re Arbitration between Norfolk Southern Corporation et al, 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 
(N.D. Ill. 2009); see also p. 197 supra. 
1101  Ibid.
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private arbitration held in London.1102 In another decision which was closely 
connected to Kleimar (see p. 198 supra), a district court within the 7th Cir. 
applied a similar functional approach to that applied in the 11th Cir. and held 
that the LMAA is a foreign tribunal according to § 1782.1103 
v. Summary
Unfortunately, there is not only a split among the circuits, but at times also 
within them. In light of this, it is difficult to determine commonalities. This 
problem is vividly demonstrated in requests made under § 1782 in the same 
dispute, which ended in conflicting decisions in different circuits.1104 None­
theless, one can detect several lines of argumentation among the US courts. 
With regard to those decisions which denied the application of § 1782 to arbi­
tration, it seems commonly accepted among these courts that § 1782 does at 
least apply to state­sponsored tribunals whose decisions are subject to re­
view, as stated in Intel.1105 Therefore, most courts in the 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, 
10th and 11th Cirs. have excluded only arbitral tribunals from the scope of 
application of § 1782. A minority of decisions within these circuits have dis­
tinguished between purely private arbitration and arbitration conducted 
under the UNICTRAL Rules. As previously discussed, this assumption is 
clearly misguided.1106 In contrast, decisions granting requests under § 1782 
in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 8th Cirs. have been justified either by referring to the 
legislative history of Intel or by applying a functional approach to the issue. 
The use of this approach has led to varied results. 
d. Intermediate Result
The foregoing discussion has focused on the use of § 1782 by US courts in the 
field of international arbitration. The result is disturbing, to put it mildly. At 
this point, only a clear­cut decision from the Supreme Court or an amend­
ment of § 1782 would afford sufficient guidance and clarity on whether and 
under what conditions this section is applicable to arbitration. In the mean­
time, US courts are left with the legislative history of § 1782 and the reasoning 
in Intel. Regarding the legislative materials, it has been shown that Congress 
1102  TJAC Waterloo, LLC, No. 3:16­mc­9CAN (N.D. Ind. 2016).
1103  N.V. v. Benxi Iron & Steel Am., Ltd., No. 17­cv­01287, 12 et seqq. (N.D. Ill. 2017).
1104  The several decisions rendered in the dispute between La Comision Ejecutive Hidroe-
lectrica and El Paso show vividly how inconsistently § 1782 is handled among US 
courts; see p. 198 supra.
1105  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 254 et seq. (2004).
1106  See p. 197 supra.
202 Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis
neither expressly included nor excluded arbitral tribunals from the scope of 
application of § 1782. Although the primary focus of this provision is not arbi­
tration, the goal was to improve international court assistance in general. 
With regard to the tension between court assistance in the taking of evidence 
in domestic (under the FAA USA) and foreign (under § 1782) arbitration, it has 
been demonstrated that there is no obligation to treat requests equally. 
Still, the main question remains as to whether US­style discovery in fact 
runs contrary to the essence of arbitration and the expectations of arbitrators 
and the parties. According to Intel, if § 1782 is read not only with the statutory 
requirements which have been further interpreted by the Supreme Court, but 
also with the five discretionary factors set out in Intel, the risk of imposing US 
discovery in foreign proceedings is considerably minimised. The question at 
hand has been treated differently not only by various US courts, but also in 
legal doctrine. A minority of authors have embraced the reasoning of NBC and 
Republic of Kazakhstan, arguing that neither the legislative history nor Intel 
itself suggests that § 1782 should be used in relation to arbitral proceedings.1107 
Yet the majority seem to have embraced the use of § 1782 in arbitration.1108 
These authors mainly argue that, together with the Intel factors, § 1782 can be 
used in arbitration without disturbing the proceedings. They further argue 
that an appropriate use of § 1782 may be very beneficial. Whether this is in fact 
true will be analysed in the following section, applying the same structure as 
was followed in the previous examinations of leges arbitri. 
C. Competence to Seek Court Assistance
1. Primacy of the Arbitral Tribunal 
A request under § 1782 is initiated through either a letter rogatory, a request 
by a foreign or international tribunal or a simple application by ‘any interest­
ed person’. This latter possibility presents one of the main problems arising 
from § 1782: the ‘interested person’ might be either a party to the arbitration 
or even a third party.1109 As previously discussed, this was strongly criticised 
1107  Strong, 315 et seqq.; goDfrey, 475 et seqq.; conLey, 45 et seqq.
1108  Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9 n. 30; BLackaBy et al., n. 7.44; maLament, 1217 et seqq.; 
BeaLe et al., 51 et seqq.; NYC Bar Committee Report (2010), 1 et seqq.; SteinBrück, 
205 et seqq.; kraayVanger et al., 161 et seqq.; iLLmer/SteinBrück, 329 et seqq.; 
Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 5 et seqq.; differentiated o’maLLey/eaton, 118; roth­
Stein, 61 et seqq.
1109  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 et seq., 256 (2004): ‘No 
doubt litigants are included among, and may be the most common example of, the 
‘interested person(s)’ who may invoke § 1782 (a) … .’
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in NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan.1110 While there is no danger if the arbitral 
tribunal itself is allowed to make a request, the situation is different if assis­
tance is sought ex parte either by one of the parties to the arbitration or by any 
other person. Practice shows that § 1782 is mostly invoked ex parte and, as a 
consequence, the primacy of the arbitral tribunal is obviously undermined.1111 
Although in Intel the Supreme Court imposed no ‘categorical limits’ on the 
wording of § 1782, it stated that the receptivity of the foreign tribunal to court 
assistance (the third Intel factor) should be taken into account.1112 This cen­
tral requirement has been acknowledged in a number of cases, with requests 
under § 1782 often denied because they had not been approved by the arbitral 
tribunal.1113 It is therefore unsurprising that authors who favour the use of 
§ 1782 in international arbitration consider the approval of the arbitral tribu­
nal to be a key prerequisite.1114 
What is more, the approval of the arbitral tribunal addresses in part the 
second and fourth Intel factors, taking into account the ‘character of the pro­
ceedings underway abroad’ by examining whether the request under § 1782 
is an attempt to circumvent foreign evidence­gathering restrictions.1115 As 
previously discussed (see p. 96 et seqq. supra), many institutional arbitration 
rules as well as the IBA Rules require the arbitral tribunal’s consent on evi­
dentiary matters such as court assistance in the taking of evidence.1116 The 
arbitral tribunal, as opposed to the respective state court, is therefore best 
placed to decide whether and to what extent assistance should be granted.1117 
Within these boundaries, the arbitral tribunal is unlikely to risk violating the 
right to be heard by deciding what is best for the respective arbitration. This 
1110  See p. 189 et seq. supra.
1111  goDfrey, 510; conLey, 66; rothStein, 64 et seq.
1112  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 et seq., 264 (2004).
1113  Application of Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Hallmark Cap-
ital Corporation, 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D. Minn. 2007); In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 
F. Supp. 2d 233, 241 (D. Mass 2008; 1st Cir.); see also In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 
2d 1221, 1229 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Instead of seeking the approval of the arbitral tribunal 
in charge, the district court in Georgia assumed receptivity merely on the grounds 
that the rules applicable to the arbitral proceedings under the Arbitral Center of the 
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in Vienna allowed for foreign court assistance 
in the taking of evidence (BeaLe et al., 97 et seq.).
1114  maLament, 1241; BeaLe et al., 97 et seqq.; Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 8 et seq.; NYC 
Bar Committee Report (2010), 30 et seqq.; kraayVanger et al., 164; iLLmer/Stein­
Brück, 341 et seq.; Born, Law and Practice, ch. 9 n. 30.
1115  See p. 196 supra; BeaLe et al., 100 et seq., 102.
1116  See e.g. Art. 27 (4) UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 25 (7) Swiss Rules; Art. 25 (3) ICC Rules; 
Art. 3 (9) IBA Rules.
1117  NYC Committee Report (2010), 31.
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would be the case only if the evidence sought were absolutely relevant to the 
case and the arbitral tribunal’s refusal would therefore be disproportionate 
and unnecessary.
Intel further suggests that the foreign arbitration need not be pending, 
but only in ‘reasonable contemplation’.1118 Applied to arbitral proceedings, 
it follows that § 1782 can be used even before the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal. As the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted, one might ask 
how a state court should deal with the receptivity factor in such situations. 
As already demonstrated, many institutional arbitration rules provide for the 
appointment of emergency arbitrators in such situations (see p. 80 supra).1119 
Thus, if the arbitration is governed by an institution which provides for the 
appointment of an emergency arbitrator, the consent of that emergency ar­
bitrator should be sought first. By contrast, if there is no emergency arbitrator 
available, a request under § 1782 should generally be denied.1120 Still, in cir­
cumstances where evidence might be lost or destroyed and assistance under 
§ 1782 is sought ex parte, the respective state court should exercise its discre­
tion in favour of arbitration. The arbitral tribunal which will subsequently be 
constituted can still refuse to introduce the evidence taken under § 1782 into 
the proceedings when assessing the evidence.1121 
2. Exclusion of Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
Both the plain wording of § 1782 and the discretionary factors set out in Intel 
support a conclusion that the parties can exclude court assistance in the 
taking of evidence pursuant to § 1782. This may be done in the arbitration 
agreement either explicitly or by reference to a set of institutional arbitration 
rules and/or the IBA Rules. While the former possibility might be used from 
time to time, the latter scenario is much more common.1122 At the outset of a 
dispute, it can be difficult to predict where evidence might be sought in the 
subsequent proceedings. Thus, the exclusion of § 1782 is usually not ad­
dressed directly in the arbitration agreement, but rather in arbitration rules 
in relation to court assistance in the taking of evidence.1123 Taking the second 
1118  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 et seq. (2004); see also In 
re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d 
868, 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1989), a decision also rendered by Justice Ginsburg, who at this 
time worked as a circuit judge.
1119  See e.g. Art. 29 ICC Rules; Rules 30 SIAC Rules; Art. 43 Swiss Rules.
1120  rothStein, 79.
1121  Ibid., 80; see e.g. Art. 9 (1) IBA Rules.
1122  martineZ­fraga, 87 et seqq.
1123  See e.g. Art. 22.2 LCIA Rules; Arts. 3 (9) and 4 (9) IBA Rules.
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Intel factor into account—that is, the nature of the proceedings underway 
abroad—it follows that state courts should respect the parties’ choice to ex­
clude § 1782 altogether.1124 As a result, such a renunciation should not be at 
odds with the right to minimum legal protection.
D. Spectrum of Evidence and its Target
1. Evidence According to a Party Agreement
Like the exclusion of § 1782 as a whole, a state court whose assistance is sought 
under § 1782 should consider whether the parties excluded certain types of 
evidence in the arbitration agreement or by reference to arbitration rules 
(third Intel factor). Thus, the state court should consider whether the parties 
have agreed on certain evidentiary mechanisms, such as those stated in the 
IBA Rules. Here again, the fourth Intel factor addresses the issue when dis­
cussing the circumvention of foreign evidence­gathering restrictions. As an 
example, in Caratube International Oil Company, the District Court of Colum­
bia denied discovery because the requesting party tried to circumvent not 
only the agreed ICSID Convention, but also the IBA Rules.1125 Besides arbitra­
tion rules, the fourth Intel factor also addresses laws that forbid discovery.1126 
Even if the respective state court grants discovery despite a divergent agree­
ment between the parties, this will serve as a reason to annul the arbitral 
award.1127 Usually, however, the arbitral tribunal will not even introduce 
evidence into the arbitral proceeding which was gathered without authori­
sation under § 1782. 
2. Evidence According to 28 USC § 1782 
In the process of taking evidence, either state courts (i.e. federal courts in the 
US) will follow the foreign ‘practice and procedure’ (see p. 186 supra) or, if the 
order does not prescribe otherwise, the FRCP USA (Rules 26 et seqq. FRCP 
USA) will apply.1128 Thus, one might ask to what extent they will do so. Read­
ing § 1782, it is evident that it mentions only two types of evidence—witness 
testimony and document production:
“The district court … may order him to give his testimony or statement or 
to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding … .”
1124  See p. 196 supra.
1125  Caratube International Oil Company, Llp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 et seqq. (D.D.C. 
2010); Art. 43 ICSID Convention; Art. 3 (9) IBA Rules.
1126  See e.g. § 1050 (2) CCP DE.
1127  S. 10 (a) (4) FAA USA; Art. V (1) (c) NYC; see also p. 213 infra.
1128  § 1782 (a).
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Distinguishing between testimony and statements, Congress intended that 
district courts could also order that parties and other individuals whose 
statements would not be considered ‘testimony’ under foreign law be heard.1129 
In addition, because § 1782 primarily serves to obtain evidence from third 
parties, interrogatories (Rule 33 FRCP USA) and admissions (Rule 36 FRCP 
USA), which are specifically tailored to preparations for trial, are not usually 
available through § 1782.1130 ‘Testimony’ therefore refers to classical deposi­
tions—that is, a witness examination before a court­authorised person to ask 
certain questions relevant to the case.1131 Regarding document production, 
§ 1782 distinguishes between documents and ‘other things’. According to 
Rule 34 FRCP USA, this includes not only documents in the common sense, 
but also electronically stored information. In addition, it remains unclear 
what is meant by the term ‘other things’. In the absence of any indication in 
§ 1782, it would seem that this does not refer to inspections in the sense of 
Rule 34 (a) (2) FRCP USA, but rather to objects in one’s possession which may 
be subject to inspection and tests, such as machines or motors.1132 
3. Foreign Types of Evidence
While in most cases a court whose assistance is sought under § 1782 will pro­
ceed according to the FRCP USA, it might also take into account the foreign 
practice and procedure. 1133 As a consequence, US courts can take evidence 
according to the rules agreed in the arbitration. Nevertheless, whether a US 
court will in fact take evidence according to foreign law depends mostly on the 
discretion of the respective state court.1134 As seen in other leges arbitri, state 
courts usually take evidence according to their own law only.1135 Therefore, 
this provision illustrates the very open US approach to international court 
assistance. 
This notwithstanding, it is unsurprising that evidence is usually taken 
according to the FRCP USA. Often, parties deliberately choose to initiate a 
request under § 1782 precisely because US discovery is much broader than 
1129  Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 1026.
1130  In re Order for Labor Court of Brazil, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2006); In re 
Ishiara Chemical Co., Ltd., 121 F. Supp. 2d 209, 224 et seq. (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
1131  Rule 27 et seqq. FRCP USA.
1132  Advisory Committee FRCP USA (1970). 
1133  § 1782: ‘The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole 
or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country of the international tribunal, 
for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing.’
1134  Smit, International Litigation, 1028.
1135  See e.g. as regards Germany; p. 140 et seqq. supra.
207 § 5 USA
that available under most laws. If the request is made with the consent of the 
arbitral tribunal and the statutory requirements and the other discretionary 
factors are fulfilled, discovery will most likely be granted. In contrast, if a re­
quest under § 1782 is sought ex parte, usually to circumvent foreign evi­
dence­gathering restrictions (fourth Intel factor), the request should be de­
nied, in order to uphold the parties’ agreement whereby evidentiary issues 
should be governed by the arbitral tribunal. Consequently, there is no ‘foreign 
discoverability’ rule, based on either § 1782 or its legislative history, according 
to which requests must also be permissible under foreign law.1136 It may be 
summarised that although § 1782 allows for evidence to be taken according to 
foreign law, this is seldom done because requests under § 1782 are usually 
made in an attempt to avail of the broad discovery foreseen in the FRCP USA. 
4. International Judicial Assistance in Taking Evidence
Instead of choosing § 1782 to obtain evidence located in the USA, the parties 
may also choose to use the HEC as a time­tested tool.1137 Indeed, it has been 
argued that since the USA is a Member Party to the HEC, the only way to obtain 
evidence through international court assistance is via this convention. Even 
though the HEC does indeed serve as a relevant convention in this field, it 
would be sub­optimal if this were the only way to obtain evidence in the USA. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has shed light on this issue by making clear 
that the HEC is only one alternative to the FRCP USA, rather than the exclusive 
procedure through which court assistance in international arbitration may 
be obtained.1138 This follows not only from the Supreme Court’s decision, but 
also from the text of the HEC itself.1139 Among other reasons, this seems to be 
justified given the often lengthy and costly process involved in obtaining evi­
dence through the HEC, compared to that under the FRCP USA.1140 In sum, 
through the lens of an arbitration practitioner, it is welcome that the HEC 
route is just one, and not the only, way to obtain evidence in the USA.1141 
1136  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 259 et seqq. (2004): ‘A foreign 
nation may limit discovery within its domain for reasons peculiar to its own legal prac­
tices, culture, or traditions—reasons that do not necessarily signal objection to aid from 
United States Federal Courts’ (261); see also Bayer, 146 F.3d 188, 193 et seq. (3d Cir. 1998).
1137  In the USA, the HEC entered into force in 1972; see the current status.
1138  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
1139  Art. 27 (c) HEC: ‘The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contract­
ing State from—… c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evi­
dence other than those provided for in this Convention.’
1140  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543 (1987); 
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 657 F. Sup. 2d 525, 530 (D.N.J. 2009); 
aBDoLLahi, 778 et seqq.
1141  Ibid., 800.
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5. Target of Evidence
As regards the target of evidence, evidence can be taken only from a ‘person’ 
who ‘resides or is found’ in a certain district. This person need not necessar­
ily be domiciled there; it seems to suffice if he or she is staying in the district 
temporarily.1142 If the target of evidence is a legal entity, the party request­
ing assistance under § 1782 must show that this entity undertakes ‘systemat­
ic and continuous local activities’ in the district.1143 In Intel, an important 
difference was made between the parties to the arbitration and third par­
ties.1144 Because the foreign or international tribunal has jurisdiction over 
the parties—as opposed to third parties—discovery requests against a party 
to the ongoing proceedings will most likely be denied (first Intel factor).1145 
Applied to arbitral proceedings, if certain evidence could be produced by a 
party but it refuses to do so, the arbitral tribunal can respond by drawing an 
adverse inference or allocating the costs accordingly.1146 By granting re­
quests under § 1782 mainly in cases where evidence lies outside the reach of 
the parties to the arbitration, the risk of misuse of this section by a party to 
the arbitration is dramatically reduced.1147 In addition, US courts will pro­
vide assistance where arbitral tribunals cannot obtain evidence because of 
their lack of imperium.1148 
Irrespective of whether the target of evidence is a party to the arbitra­
tion or a third party, § 1782 makes it clear that privileges apply at all times:
“A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to 
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable 
privilege.” 
While the legislative history does not further explain which privileges un­
der which law apply, US courts seem to respect them under both US and 
foreign law, as long as there is ‘authoritative proof’ that privilege exists 
1142  Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 9 et seq.; In re Edelmann, 295 F.3d 171, 179 et seqq. (2d Cir. 
2002). Regarding the requirement that a person can be forced to attend a hearing 
only within 100 miles of where he or she resides or regularly transacts business, see 
Rule 45 (c) (1) (A) FRCP USA); In re Edelmann, 295 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2002).
1143  Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 10; eLuL/moSquera, n. 398; Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 
517, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In Re Godfrey, 526 F. Supp. 2d 417, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Qualcomm 
Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Regarding the non­extraterritorial scope 
of § 1782, see also Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 10 et seqq.
1144  Ibid., 264.
1145  Ibid.; BeaLe et al., 99 et seq.; maLament, 1240. 2.
1146  See p. 56 et seqq. supra.
1147  BeaLe et al., 99 et seq.
1148  Ibid.
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under foreign law.1149 According to the FRCP USA, the scope of discovery is 
as follows:
“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs 
of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the ac­
tion, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the pro­
posed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”1150
A person faced with a request to produce evidence pursuant to § 1782 can 
initiate a motion to quash or modify a discovery order (‘protective order’) by 
showing that discovery would force that person to reveal ‘a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information’.1151 If 
the person fails to obey the discovery order without sufficient reason, the 
court can, for instance, draw an adverse inference and treat the non­compli­
ance as contempt of court.1152 In addition, the disobedient party can be 
forced to pay the expenses caused by the failure to produce evidence.1153
In addition to the statutory factors, the fifth Intel factor states that undu­
ly intrusive or burdensome requests pursuant to § 1782 should be rejected or 
restricted.1154 As a consequence, fishing expeditions—such as requests for 
extensive categories of documents, for documents which are sought in bad 
faith for the purpose of harassment or for irrelevant material—will be de­
nied.1155 In this regard, a little ‘inconvenience alone will not justify an order 
to quash a subpoena that seeks potentially relevant testimony’.1156 In order 
to maximize the chances that a court will grant discovery under § 1782, par­
ties would be well advised to narrow their discovery requests accordingly. 
1149  In re Veiga, 746 F. Sup. 2d 8, 26 (D.D.C. 2010); Metallgesellschaft AG v. Hodapp, 121 F.3d 
77, 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
1150  Rule 26 (b) (1) FRCP USA.
1151  Rule 26 (c) (1) (g) FRCP USA; Rule 45 (d) (3) (iii) FRCP USA.
1152  Rule 37 (b) (2) (A) FRCP USA.
1153  Rule 37 (b) (2) (B) FRCP USA.
1154  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 265 (2004).
1155  In re Petition for Asia Mar. Pac. Ltd., 253 F. Supp. 3d 701, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Bran-
di-Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 673 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Euromepa S.A. 
v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1995).
1156  Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 297 F.R.D. 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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E. Competence of the Juge d’Appui
1. Scope of Discretion 
The previous discussion has shown that the use of § 1782 is always discretion­
ary. This follows not only from the discretionary Intel factors, but also from 
§ 1782 itself.1157 When this section is supplemented by the discretionary fac­
tors, the concerns raised in NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan can be largely 
eliminated. In this regard, the arbitral tribunal’s consent to a § 1782 request 
plays a central role.1158 Further, the fear of excessive discovery in interna­
tional arbitration seems to be unfounded, given that the discretionary factors 
ensure that discovery is granted only in limited circumstances.1159 Moreover, 
one should bear in mind that discretion is the byword not only before the 
state courts, but also before the arbitral tribunal, which will carefully weigh 
whether and how to introduce and assess evidence gathered under § 1782. 
For instance, if the parties agreed to proceed according to the IBA Rules, 
there are several requirements regarding whether and under what circum­
stances evidence can be introduced into the arbitral proceedings (see p. 36 et 
seqq., p. 42 et seqq. supra).1160 
2. Principle of Subsidiarity 
§ 1782 is silent regarding whether a foreign or international tribunal can take 
the requested evidence itself. Intel states only that discovery will most likely 
be denied if it is sought against a party over which the foreign or internation­
al tribunal has jurisdiction, as opposed to third parties which are out of 
reach. Because there is no ‘exhaustion requirement’ to seek discovery under 
§ 1782, it is left to the discretion of the state court in charge to ‘consider a par­
ty’s failure first to attempt discovery measures in the foreign jurisdiction’.1161 
In Malev Hungarian Airlines, the Court of Appeals of the 2d Cir. stated that any 
‘exhaustion requirement’ would be in conflict with the purpose of § 1782: 
1157  The word ‘may’ is found six times in § 1782; Smit, Section 1782 Revisited, 15.
1158  In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 241 (D. Mass. 2008): ‘In a situation where 
the foreign tribunal restricts discovery, granting the application could undermine 
the statute’s objective.’
1159  BeaLe et al., 96.
1160  See e.g. Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14­mc­00226­MSK-KMT, 23 (D.C. Colo. 2015).
1161  eLuL/moSquera, n. 406; In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1229 et seq. (N.D. 
Ga. 2006); In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 241 (D.C. Mass. 2008); Eurome-
pa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1098 (2d Cir. 1995); Malev Hungarian Airlines, 
964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992).
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namely, to improve international court assistance and to prompt foreign 
juris dictions to introduce similar provisions based on the US model.1162 This 
again demonstrates the very liberal approach taken by the USA. 
3. Examination of the Arbitration Agreement
Aside from the need to verify what the arbitration agreement says about the 
applicable arbitration rules, there is little debate in US legal doctrine regard­
ing the examination of the arbitration agreement.1163 As it is still controver­
sial whether § 1782 actually applies to arbitral proceedings, the examination 
of the arbitration agreement plays a crucial role—albeit mainly with the aim 
of distinguishing between arbitral proceedings and state court litigation. 
State courts whose assistance is sought under § 1782 will therefore take a 
closer look at the second Intel factor by examining the nature of the foreign 
tribunal as a first­instance decision maker whose decisions are subject to re­
view. Because of the vast divergence among US circuits, a prior study of deci­
sions on § 1782 is crucial to test the receptivity of US courts to requests for 
assistance in arbitral tribunals. Moreover, the arbitration agreement can of 
course be examined in the context of the recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award under the NYC.1164
F. Appellate Remedies
As previously discussed (see p. 210 supra), the target of evidence under § 1782 
can initiate a motion to quash or modify the discovery request.1165 If it is 
granted nevertheless, the parties can appeal the ‘judgment’ within 30 days 
of entry of the decision with the respective court of appeals in the circuit in 
which the relevant district court is based.1166 The review mainly involves 
questions of law and not findings of fact (unless they were ‘clearly erro­
neous’).1167 The court of appeals may either deny the appeal or reverse and 
remand the case to the district court with instructions in the sense of its 
decision.1168 
1162  Ibid.
1163  BeaLe et al., 104 et seqq.
1164  Arts. III (3) and V (1) (a) NYC.
1165  Rule 26 (c) (1) (g) FRCP USA; Rule 45 (d) (3) (iii) FRCP USA.
1166  Rule 54 FRCP USA; 28 USC § 1291 and § 1294 (1); Rule 4 (a) (1) (A) FRAP USA.
1167  Rule 52 (a) (6) FRCP USA; hay, n. 211.
1168  Ibid.
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The question of how to vacate an arbitral award based on the taking of evi­
dence pursuant to § 1782 is different. In the USA, this process is regulated by 
the FAA USA.1169 Accordingly, an international arbitral award rendered in 
the USA can be vacated upon the application of any party by the district court 
at the place where the arbitral award was rendered within three months of 
the date on which it was rendered.1170 This might be the case where the arbi­
tral tribunal allowed a request under § 1782 despite an explicit agreement to 
the contrary between the parties. If the taking of evidence had a significant 
influence on the arbitral award, this could serve as a reason to vacate the ar­
bitral award because the arbitrator(s) violated due process or exceeded their 
powers.1171 In this regard, US courts usually establish a high bar for such 
applications, acknowledging the broad discretion of arbitrators in relation to 
evidentiary matters.1172
G. Summary 
The foregoing examination of court assistance in the taking of evidence in the 
USA is the most complex so far, with regard to both the legal bases and the 
extent to which evidence can be taken. First, the question of the legal bases 
for assistance of international arbitral tribunals is very ambiguous; the ongo­
ing dispute as to whether § 1782 applies to international arbitration will there­
fore most likely continue. In this regard, a clear answer from the Supreme 
Court would be highly desirable.1173 In the meantime, considering the second 
Intel factor—that is, to examine the nature of the foreign tribunal as a first­in­
stance decision maker—US courts whose assistance is sought under § 1782 are 
equipped with guidelines to assess whether such assistance should be grant­
ed. As an alternative, one might ask whether this question should rather be 
answered at the legislative level by explicitly mentioning arbitral tribunals in 
§ 1782.1174 Until then, as the previous overview of case law has demonstrated, 
it is crucial to understand which circuits are more likely to grant a request 
under § 1782 for assistance in international arbitral proceedings. Finally, it is 
1169  orLowSki, n. 506; for the dispute in legal doctrine as to whether § 10 FAA USA also 
applies to international arbitration, see ibid., 507 et seq.
1170  § 10 (a) and § 12 FAA USA.
1171  § 10 (a) (4) FAA USA; orLowSki, n. 521 et seqq.
1172  Ibid.; see e.g. Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 
99, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).
1173  timár/kraayVanger, 71.
1174  rothStein, 79.
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important to bear in mind that without § 1782, international arbitral tribunals 
would have to take the lengthy and burdensome route of seeking interna­
tional court assistance through the HEC.1175 
Second, the competence to make a request pursuant to § 1782 has been 
one of the main arguments against its use in international arbitration.1176 In 
contrast to the arbitral tribunal, which can initiate a request according to 
§ 1782 in certain circuits, the ability for ‘any interested person’ to do likewise 
is problematic. § 1782, as it stands today, should thus be read together with 
the third Intel factor, taking into account the receptivity of the arbitral tribu­
nal. Although practice shows that § 1782 is almost always sought ex parte, 
such requests should be granted only in exceptional urgent cases. At the 
legislative level, in order to avoid delaying tactics, § 1782 could be amended 
by allowing the parties to arbitration to make such requests only with the 
prior consent of the arbitral tribunal.1177 Moreover, the parties are at liberty 
to exclude discovery under § 1782 altogether. 
Third, the scope of evidence is limited to document production, witness 
testimony and inspection of objects. In most cases, evidence is obtained un­
der the FRCP USA or, as an alternative, in accordance with foreign law. How­
ever, usually the person seeking discovery under § 1782 does so to make use 
of broad discovery rights which are mostly unavailable in other jurisdictions. 
Regarding the target of evidence, evidence can be gathered from natural 
persons or legal entities. If the target is a party to the arbitration (as opposed 
to a third party), assistance should be denied, since the arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction over that party and thus has means to address any non­compli­
ance in evidentiary matters (first Intel factor). Still, if discovery is ordered 
against a third party, privileges may apply to shield that person from giving 
evidence. This is not only foreseen in § 1782, but also addressed in the fifth 
Intel factor, which prohibits unduly intrusive or burdensome requests. 
Fourth, even more so than under English law (see p. 177 et seqq. supra), 
the US courts enjoy wide discretion to grant or deny assistance in the taking 
of evidence. This is obvious not only from an examination of § 1782, but first 
and foremost from an examination of the Intel factors, which provide guide­
1175  As an exception to this, see the rare cases in which court assistance in the taking ofev­
idence has been granted under § 7 FAA USA (p. 183 supra). This problem was even 
acknowledged in NBC, but ultimately considered less significant in light of the trouble 
which would arise from the applicability of § 1782 to international arbitration (Nation-
al Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV, 165 F.3d 184, fn 8 (2d 
Cir.1999); Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1999, 890.
1176  See p. 190 supra.
1177  rothStein, 79.
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lines for the exercise of this discretion. The Intel factors address crucial as­
pects such as the consent of the arbitral tribunal to request discovery and the 
autonomy of the parties to determine how the arbitration should be conduct­
ed. Furthermore, delaying tactics are avoided by paying attention to the rea­
son for requesting discovery under § 1782 and considering whether the re­
quest is an attempted ‘fishing expedition’. Moreover, there is no ‘exhaustion 
requirement’, obliging state courts to consider whether the requested evi­
dence could have been obtained in the foreign proceedings. Finally, because 
the applicability of § 1782 to arbitral proceedings remains unclear to date, a 
state court will examine the arbitration agreement to determine whether 
arbitration is underway and, if so, what the parties have agreed in their arbi­
tration agreement. 
Finally, a decision under § 1782 granting or denying discovery can be 
challenged by either party before the respective court of appeals. However, 
as assistance under § 1782 is often sought ex parte, the battle between parties 
before the respective district court can take quite a long time. What is more, 
if the assistance is granted under § 1782 contrary to an explicit agreement 
between the parties and influences the arbitral award, the arbitral award 
may even be vacated before the district court where the arbitral award was 
rendered. In this regard, the bar is set high, since the US courts respect the 
discretion of the parties, arbitrators and arbitration itself as an alternative 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
In contrast to the leges arbitri previously examined in this chapter, the 
US approach is in many ways different and more complex. Regarding US 
discovery, although the approach to international arbitration (with justifi­
cation) appears largely hands­off, it has been shown that if § 1782 is read and 
applied together with the Intel factors, its use will not endanger the arbitral 
proceedings, but will rather be highly beneficial. Hitherto, the fears ex­
pressed in NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan have remained unjustified. Not 
least, this is evident from the relatively few cases in which § 1782 has been 
applied to arbitral proceedings.1178 Still, given the ambiguity regarding 
§ 1782 and its use in international arbitration, further guidance from the 
Supreme Court—or, even better, the amendment of this section—would be 
highly welcome. 
1178  BeaLe et al., 109.
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§ 6 Conclusion
Under the previous comparative analysis, court assistance in the taking of 
evidence has been addressed from various angles. In this regard, several 
findings are of major importance for the subsequent examination and evalu­
ation of the situation in Switzerland. First, as regards the subject of direct 
assistance, all examined leges arbitri allow for the provision of assistance ir­
respective of additional requirements, such as the location of the seat of ar­
bitration or the nationality of the parties. Evidence located in these countries 
can therefore be obtained within a shorter timeframe than under interna­
tional treaties such as the HEC. However, in the USA, it remains doubtful 
whether a request under § 1782 will in fact be granted; the result will depend 
mainly on how the district courts interpret § 1782 and the Intel factors.1179 
Second, as regards the competence to seek court assistance in the taking 
of evidence, the approaches diverge. While under German and French law, 
the arbitral tribunal’s approval must be obtained before seeking assistance, 
this does not apply in England and the USA. Under the EAA 1996, assistance 
can be granted if—as an alternative to the arbitral tribunal’s consent—both 
parties agree to the request. The approach under § 1782 is quite different: 
court assistance may be sought by ‘any interested person’. As previously dis­
cussed, this section should always be read together with the third Intel factor, 
concerning the receptivity of the arbitral tribunal to the request for assis­
tance.1180 All in all, while the arbitral tribunal’s approval is central, there may 
be cases in which ex parte requests are granted due to exceptional circum­
stances, such as the imminent loss of evidence, both prior to and after con­
stitution of the arbitral tribunal. Finally, with regard to the parties’ discretion 
to tailor the arbitral proceedings, court assistance in the taking of evidence 
can in most cases be excluded. One exception to this is in England, where the 
attendance of witnesses (S. 43 EAA 1996) cannot be waived due to its manda­
tory nature.1181 
Third, court assistance in the taking of evidence will be granted either 
strictly, according to the law at the place where the evidence is sought, or 
even pursuant to the law and procedure of the requesting foreign arbitral 
tribunal. While the former situation applies under German and French law, 
the latter is possible in England and the USA. What is common in all four ju­
risdictions is that at times, evidence will be taken not only according to the 
1179  See p. 202 supra.
1180  See p. 203 supra.
1181  See p. 170 supra.
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respective lex arbitri, but also pursuant to national rules of civil procedure. 
Specifically, in the USA, the availability of the broad discovery rights under 
the FRCP USA in international arbitration has led to heated debates. Howev­
er, if discovery is granted after taking into account the Intel factors, discovery 
will be much narrower.1182 Concerning the target of evidence, evidence can 
mainly be obtained from third parties over whom the arbitral tribunal has no 
jurisdiction. This is best illustrated in France, where the arbitral tribunal is 
vested with the power to impose astreintes on non­compliant parties.1183 
Fourth, state courts requested to assist in the taking of evidence enjoy 
wide discretion. Except in Germany, where this discretion seems limited, if 
the respective conditions are fulfilled, the courts in all other examined juris­
dictions are at liberty to grant or deny assistance. This is particularly clear in 
the USA, where court discretion plays a key role in applying the Intel factors. 
Furthermore, while in some jurisdictions, such as Germany and England, 
evidence will be taken only if the arbitral tribunal itself is unable to do so, this 
view has been explicitly rejected by the US courts.1184 Finally, the arbitration 
agreement should not be examined. Accordingly, in a first step, state courts 
will explore whether the evidence request stems from an arbitral tribunal, 
before analysing in a second step whether the agreement includes any provi­
sions on evidentiary matters. 
Finally, all examined jurisdictions provide for appellate proceedings 
against a decision of a state court granting or denying court assistance. More­
over, if court assistance in the taking of evidence is in any way a violation of 
the procedural rules as agreed by the parties, this can serve as a reason to 
annul the arbitral award. In this regard, the appellate procedure under Eng­
lish law is unique. Accordingly, to limit the role of the court and ensure a high 
degree of finality, the approval of the state court that rendered the decision 
is necessary to challenge an arbitral award. 
1182  See p. 203 supra.
1183  See p. 153 supra.







The preceding comparative analysis has laid the foundations for an exami­
nation of the Swiss status quo. Thus, where appropriate, the findings of the 
previous chapter will be considered in assessing how Switzerland deals with 
court assistance in the taking of evidence. After a general introduction to 
Switzerland as a forum for arbitration and the dualistic nature of its lex arbi-
tri, the subject will be examined in detail according to the structure followed 
in the preceding comparative analysis. In doing so, some tactical insights will 
be presented on how best to increase the chances of successfully obtaining 
court assistance in the taking of evidence. 
B. Popularity of Switzerland as a Seat of Arbitration
International arbitration in Switzerland enjoys a long tradition dating back 
to the 19th century, when Geneva was named as the seat of arbitration in a 
dispute between the US and the UK arising from the American Civil War.1185 
Ever since, Geneva has enjoyed a sterling reputation as a forum for interstate 
dispute settlement—not least thanks to the presence of the WTO Dispute Set­
tlement Body and the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.1186 
International arbitration has also become increasingly influential in the 
private sector and today Switzerland is one of the most important forums for 
international arbitration worldwide.1187 This is evident in the increasing 
1185  FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7168; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 1.105; 
Arroyo­hofBauer, n. 1.; For an extensive overview of arbitration in Switzerland, see 
the Swiss Historical Dictionary.
1186  See the recent decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body and the OSCE Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration; regarding other arbitral tribunals and similar bodies, 
see kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 1.109.
1187  Int. Arbitration in CH Study (2017), 22; EU Study (2014), 181; FCDisp PILA CH Revision 
(2018), 7167 et seq.; Scherer, 3; Arroyo­hofBauer, n. 10.
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number of international arbitrations held in Switzerland under both the ICC 
and the Swiss Rules.1188 For instance, in 2017 a total of 810 new ICC cases were 
filed, involving parties from more than 142 countries; Geneva and Zurich 
were among those cities most frequently selected as seats of arbitration.1189 
In addition to arbitrators from England and France, Swiss arbitrators are 
frequently chosen as a highly professionalised and sophisticated group of 
practitioners.1190 Moreover, in 2008, several cantonal chambers of com­
merce founded the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution (SCAI), which 
governs domestic and international arbitration under the Swiss Rules.1191 
The SCAI’s caseload is consistently high and is usually dominated by interna­
tional arbitration.1192 In addition to arbitration under the ICC and the Swiss 
Rules, several specialist arbitration institutions are active in the area of 
sports and intellectual property.1193 
Several key factors underpin Switzerland’s popularity as a forum for 
arbitration.1194 The country’s traditional neutrality and political stability are 
crucial in this regard1195—especially when parties to arbitration may fear the 
partiality of the courts in their home countries. The aim is to settle disputes 
in a stable country, with both a clear and easily intelligible lex arbitri and 
arbitration­friendly case law. 
The PILA CH, which entered into force in 1987, governs international 
arbitration and currently consistent of just 19 articles.1196 It is available in 
several languages and is commonly considered concise and modern. As an 
overall approach, the PILA CH emphasises the autonomy of the parties and 
limits inference by state courts.1197 For instance, the parties are free to 
1188  kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 1.110 et seqq.; Arroyo­hofBauer, n. 1.
1189  ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin 2018, 52, 60; EU Study (2014), 181; Queen Mary Survey 
(2018), 9 et seq.
1190  ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin 2018, 58 et seq.
1191  This institution, originally named the Swiss Chamber Court of Arbitration and Medi­
ation was renamed as the SCAI in 2012; see the historial overview.
1192  SCAI Statistics (2018), 4.
1193  See FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7182 et seq.; the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS), headquartered in Lausanne and established in 1983; the Basketball Arbitral 
Tribunal (BAT), headquartered in Geneva and established in 2006; the World Intellec­
tual Property Organization (WIPO), headquartered in Geneva and established in 1994.
1194  Int. Arbitration in CH Study (2017), 22 et seq.
1195  Arroyo­hofBauer, n. 30.
1196  Arts. 176­194 PILA CH.
1197  Arts. 182 (1) and 183­185 PILA CH.
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choose the applicable procedural rules (e.g. by referring to a set of institu­
tional arbitration rules).1198 Moreover, the SFT, as a ‘one­stop shop’, is the 
only court with competence to set aside arbitral awards, and then usually 
only within a six­month period.1199 Because of the very restrictive grounds 
on which arbitral awards may be challenged, fewer than 10% of such attempts 
generally succeed.1200 Finally, Switzerland’s geographical location at the 
heart of Europe and its sophisticated infrastructure (e.g. hotels, conference 
venues) cannot be underestimated.1201 
C. Open Dualism of the Lex Arbitri
Switzerland has adopted a dualistic system in its lex arbitri.1202 Conse­
quently, unlike in countries such as Germany and England, which have 
monistic leges arbitri, there are separate sets of rules for domestic and in­
ternational arbitration. While domestic arbitration is governed by the third 
part of the CCP CH (Arts. 353–399; entered into force in 2011), the 12th chap­
ter of the PILA CH sets out the rules for international arbitration (Arts. 176­
194; entered into force in 1987).1203 This chapter of the PILA CH exclusively 
governs international arbitration, except where it refers directly to the CCP 
CH (e.g. regarding the taking of evidence).1204 Thus, in general, in the ab­
sence of any reference in this regard, the analogous application of the CCP 
CH is excluded.1205 Nevertheless, the parties are free to opt out of the 12th 
chapter of the PILA CH and instead apply the third part of the CCP CH (and 
vice versa).1206 In this regard, the ‘open dualism’ between the PILA CH and 
1198  Art. 182 (1) PILA CH.
1199  Art. 191 PILA CH; DaSSer/wóJtowicZ, 282.
1200  Ibid., 280; EU Study (2014), 183.
1201  Arroyo­hofBauer, n. 35; regarding the recent data on the influence of international 
arbitration on the Swiss market, see Int. Arbitration in CH Study (2017), 33 et seq.
1202  amBauen, n. 9, 24 et seqq.; Arroyo­Jermini/BernarDoni, ch. I, pt. II, n. 1.
1203  The rules on arbitration served as a model in the drafting of the domestic arbitration 
rules of the CCP CH (FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7392).
1204  Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; CR­Bucher, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 37; Dutoit, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 14; 
see also the effort under the revised PILA CH to provide a comprehensive lex arbitri 
(FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7173).
1205  ZK­oetiker, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 2, 116; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 88; Arroyo­oreLLi, 
Art. 176 PILA CH n. 3; BSK­pfiffner/hochStraSSer, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 4.
1206  Art. 176 (2) PILA CH; Art. 353 (2) CCP CH; for the strict requirements of such an opt­out, 
see DFT 4A_256/2013 of 19 Nov. 2013, cons. 1.2.3 et seq.; ZK­oetiker, Art. 176 PILA CH 
n. 97 et seqq.; Arroyo­oreLLi, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 28 et seqq.; Berger/keLLerhaLS, 
n. 107 et seqq.; BSK­pfiffner/hochStraSSer, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 40 et seqq.
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CCP CH undermines the broad discretion of the parties to tailor the arbitral 
proceedings according to their needs.1207 
According to Art. 176 PILA CH, the rules of international arbitration ap­
ply to all arbitrations if the seat of arbitration is in Switzerland and if (at the 
time the arbitration agreement is concluded)1208 at least one of the parties 
does not have its domicile, its registered office or its habitual residence in 
Switzerland.1209 The applicability of the 12th chapter of the PILA CH there­
fore depends on a formal requirement, rather than on a substantive require­
ment such as an international connection (i.e. the ‘internationality’ of the 
dispute).1210 Since the requirement of Art. 176 PILA CH is not geographical, 
the arbitral proceedings can be conducted elsewhere (i.e. outside Switzer­
land).1211 The approach here is therefore in line with the general stance 
adopted under German, English and US law, and does not go as far as the very 
liberal French approach, which requires only that ‘international trade inter­
ests are at stake’.1212 
In this regard, the UNCITRAL ML goes further too. Its rules apply in 
general to ‘international commercial arbitration’, giving the terms ‘interna­
tional’ and ‘commercial’ very broad definitions.1213 Still, as regards assis­
tance in the taking of evidence (Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML), this will be granted 
only if the seat of arbitration is within the territory in which the UNCITRAL 
ML is enacted.1214 Although the UNCITRAL ML was established in 1985, two 
years before the PILA CH entered into force, it initially had no significant di­
rect influence on the Swiss lex arbitri.1215 However, in light of the success of 
the UNCITRAL ML and its influence on many leges arbitri, the Swiss legisla­
ture recently decided to modernise the PILA CH to align it with the latest in­
1207  In the ongoing revision of the PILA CH, the idea of a monistic Code unique was pro­
posed, but ultimately rejected (see FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7175 et seq.); for a 
historical overview and criticism of the open dualism, see amBauen, n. 24 et seqq., 
570 et seqq.
1208  See Art. 176 (1) Draft­PILA CH.
1209  For the definition of domicile and habitual residence of a natural person, see Art. 20 
PILA; for corporate bodies, see Art. 21 PILA CH.
1210  DFT 4P.115/2003 of 16 Oct. 2003, cons. 2.1; Arroyo­oreLLi, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 21; 
ZK­oetiker, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 96; Dutoit, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 3; CR­Bucher, Art. 176 
PILA CH n. 11; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 2.28 et seqq.; amBauen, n. 40 et seqq.
1211  kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 2.11; BSK­pfiffner/hochStraSSer, Art. 176 PILA 
CH n. 19.
1212  § 1025 (1) CCP DE; S. 2 (1) EAA 1996; Art. 1504 CCP FR; § 7 FAA USA; amBauen, n. 12 et seqq.
1213  Art. 1 (3) UNCITRAL ML; Digest of Case Law (2012), Art. 1 UNCITRAL ML, n. 1.
1214  Art. 1 (2) UNCITRAL ML.
1215  amBauen, n. 38.
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ternational standards.1216 The UNCITRAL ML has therefore had a certain 
impact on the Swiss lex arbitri. At the time of the publication of this book 
(2020), the revision of the PILA CH is completed and the date of the entry into 
force will most likely by the 1 January 2020.1217
§ 2 Legal Bases
A. Overview
The PILA CH provides for assistance in arbitration on multiple levels and in 
various forms. At the beginning of the proceedings, court assistance might be 
needed with regard to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the ap­
pointment of the arbitrator(s) (Arts. 179 and 180 PILA CH).1218 During the arbi­
tral proceedings, assistance may be sought in relation to the taking of evi­
dence (Art. 184 PILA CH), but also in respect of interim measures to preserve 
evidence (Art. 183 PILA CH) and other forms of court assistance (Art. 185 PILA 
CH). Once the arbitral award has been rendered, state courts can provide as­
sistance regarding recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award (Art. 194 
PILA CH) and the certificate of enforceability (Art. 193 PILA CH). 
B. Court Assistance in Taking Evidence (Art. 184 PILA CH)
1. Jurisdiction
Regarding the taking of evidence, Art. 184 PILA CH reads as follows:
“(1)  The arbitral tribunal shall itself conduct the taking of evidence.
(2) If the assistance of state judiciary authorities is necessary for the tak­
ing of evidence, the arbitral tribunal or a party with the consent of the 
arbitral tribunal may request the assistance of the state judge at the seat 
of the arbitral tribunal.”
The official French version of section 2 will be amended too, as it erroneous­
ly states that the parties (plural), and not a single party can request assis­
tance (see fn 1274). In addition, according to the  revision, a proposed new 
para. (3) states:
“(3)  The state court shall apply its own law. On request, it can apply or 
consider different procedural forms.” 
1216  FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7185; Int. Arbitration in CH Study (2017), 51; EU Study 
(2014), 181.
1217  For an overview of the amendments, see FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7171 et seqq.
1218  gökSu, n. 293.
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Art. 184 (2) PILA CH provides that the state court ‘at the seat of the arbitral 
tribunal’ is competent to render assistance (territorial jurisdiction). Sub­
ject­matter jurisdiction is determined by cantonal law, which usually falls 
within the competence of a regional or cantonal supreme court.1219 In this 
regard, Lalive et al. argue that in addition to state courts, recourse may be 
had to other judicial or administrative authorities, such as the Federal De­
partment of Justice and Police or a Swiss embassy.1220 Although Art. 184 (2) 
PILA CH indeed refers to the ‘assistance of state judiciary authorities’, such 
assistance must in fact be sought from a judge. Therefore, most authors in 
legal doctrine argue that the competent juge d’appui alone is obliged to ren­
der assistance if the respective requirements are fulfilled.1221 As a conse­
quence, if assistance is rendered by a state judicial authority other than the 
state courts, this is done on a completely voluntary basis.1222
2. Centralised Juge d’Appui?
During the revision of the PILA CH, the potential establishment of a single 
competent authority with responsibility for handling requests for court as­
sistance in arbitration was discussed. The few proponents of this view sug­
gested that such a centralised, specialised authority would enhance the effi­
ciency of arbitration.1223 Instead of having to identify the competent juge 
d’appui in each canton, such requests would be handled by a single authority, 
most certainly affiliated to the SFT.1224 As an alternative, it was proposed that 
each of the 26 cantons should determine a single authority, instead of multi­
ple competent courts within each canton.1225 Due to the few requests issued 
1219  Art. 3 CCP CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 70; Art. 356 (2) (c) CCP CH; gökSu, 
n. 306; CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 14; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1363; see e.g. for the 
Canton of Basle (§ 93 (1) (4) Court Organisation Act BS; Cantonal Supreme Court), Berne 
(Art. 8 (1) Introductory Act BE; District Court), Geneva (Art. 86 (1) Judiciary Organisa­
tion Act GE; District Court) and Zurich (§ 32 Court and Authorities Organisation Act 
ZH; District Court).
1220  See also rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 266. 
1221  Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 73; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 72; BSK­Schnei­
Der/Scherer, Art. 184 n. 59 et seq.; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1364; Stacher, n. 338; 
gökSu, n. 307; SchneiDer, 67 et seq.; waLter et al., 162 et seq.
1222  SchneiDer, 67; BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 n. 60.
1223  Expl. Rep. Revision PILA CH (2017), 15.
1224  See e.g. Opinions Revision PILA CH (2017), ICC CH (3).
1225  Ibid.: Bar Association of the Canton of Fribourg (132), SCAI (189), University of St. Gal­
len (278 et seqq.). Prof. Sester of the University of St. Gallen even proposed that com­
mon ‘judiciary administrative activities’ in relation with the formation of the arbitral 
tribunal and the appointment of arbitrators should be governed by one single author­
ity, while assistance in relation with interim measures and the taking of evidence 
should be left to Cantonal Courts.
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for court assistance in the taking of evidence, the federalist structure of Swit­
zerland and the questionable feasibility of such an authority, this idea of a 
centralised juge d’appui was rejected at the outset of the debate.1226 Indeed, 
given how few such requests are issued, it would seem disproportionate to 
establish such an authority at this point in time.1227 However, it remains to be 
seen whether this situation will change significantly in the future, since the 
Swiss legislature intends to open up the possibility for foreign arbitral tribu­
nals to seek court assistance directly in Switzerland.1228 If this happens, it 
would make sense to establish an additional chamber in the SFT to handle 
requests for court assistance. 
This idea of a centralised juge d’appui does not seem to have been dis­
cussed in relation to the previously examined leges arbitri. This might be due 
to the different geographical sizes of these countries; in fact, a central author­
ity might further complicate the process rather than simplifying it. 
3. Restricted Assistance for Foreign Arbitral Tribunals
As previously discussed, court assistance under Art. 184 (2) PILA CH is ren­
dered only if the seat of arbitration is located in Switzerland and if at least one 
of the parties does not have its domicile, its registered office or its habitual 
residence in Switzerland.1229 From the perspective of an arbitration practi­
tioner, this implies that an arbitral tribunal with its seat in a foreign country 
will seek court assistance only in very limited situations, which is far from 
satisfactory. Understandably, the delay this would cause to the respective pro­
ceedings and the costs of initiating a request for court assistance through a 
state court at the seat of arbitration, which would then transfer it to the Swiss 
court, would be most unwelcome.1230 As seen under the previously examined 
leges arbitri, the need for assistance of foreign arbitral tribunals is considered 
self­evident. It is thus time to scrutinise the situation more closely. 
a. Situation de lege lata
Hitherto, it was not considered possible for foreign arbitral tribunals to ob­
tain court assistance in the taking of evidence, due to the clear wording of 
Art. 176 (1) read with Art. 184 (2) PILA CH. However, in situations where it is not 
1226  Ibid., ASA (7), Prof. Bucher (86), Swiss Bar Association (183), University of Lucerne 
(273); Int. Arbitration in CH Study (2017), 41; Expl. Rep. Revision PILA CH (2017), 15; 
FCDisp PILA CH Revison (2018), 7178 et seq.
1227  ZK­oetiker, Art. 176 PILA CH n. 119.
1228  FCDisp PILA CH Revison (2018), 7198 et seq. 
1229  See p. 222 supra; Art. 176 (1) PILA CH; Arroyo­Veit, Art 184 PILA CH n. 74.
1230  Ibid.
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possible to obtain court assistance in the foreign country, Art. 3 PILA CH 
provides for so­called ‘emergency jurisdiction’:
“If this Code does not provide for jurisdiction in Switzerland and if pro­
ceedings abroad are impossible or cannot reasonably be required to be 
brought, the Swiss judicial or administrative authorities at the place 
with which the facts of the case are sufficiently connected shall have 
jurisdiction.”
This article embodies an ‘absolute subsidiary’ rule of jurisdiction, aimed at 
avoiding a denial of justice. Because of its exceptional nature, it applies only 
under strict conditions.1231 First, the PILA CH must offer no other jurisdic­
tion in Switzerland, whether based on the PILA CH itself or on any interna­
tional treaty.1232 Second, there must be a sufficient connection to Switzer­
land—for example, because a witness is domiciled or documents are located 
in Switzerland. Third, proceedings abroad must be ‘impossible or cannot 
reasonably be required to be brought’. Given that most countries provide for 
court assistance in the taking of evidence,1233 situations in which it is in fact 
impossible to establish jurisdiction are thus very rare; this will be the case 
only if there is in fact a denial of justice. 
The emergency jurisdiction under Art. 3 PILA CH has seldom been dis­
cussed and, as far as can be seen, there are no reported cases in which this 
article has been invoked to justify jurisdiction in Switzerland to support a for­
eign arbitration directly. Nonetheless, inspired by a decision of the Paris Court 
of First Instance, in which emergency jurisdiction was established in France 
as regards the appointment of an arbitrator, Arfazadeh has suggested that in 
theory, Art. 3 PILA CH could also be used in aid of arbitration in Switzerland.1234 
One might further ask whether this is also possible with regard to the 
taking of evidence. Indeed, Steinbrück proposes that in order to ensure effec­
tive access to justice, the Swiss courts can use Art. 3 PILA CH to directly sup­
port foreign arbitral tribunals.1235 As an example, he mentions the examina­
tion of a witness based in Switzerland whose testimony is crucial to an arbi­
tration held abroad.1236 In such a scenario, it is clear that the PILA CH offers 
1231  DFT 4C_379/2006 of 22. May 2007, cons. 3.4; BSK­Berti/DroeSe, Art. 3 PILA CH n. 2a, 
7; ZK­müLLer­chen, Art. 3 PILA CH n. 3.
1232  Art. 1 (2) PILA CH; othenin­girarD, 261.
1233  See e.g. S. 43 and 44 EAA 1996; § 1050 CCP DE; Art. 1449 and 1469 CCP FR.
1234  arfaZaDeh, 328; see also foucharD, note on Paris High Court, 11 May 1987, in: Rev. 
Arb. 1988, 699 et seqq.; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 820.
1235  SteinBrück, 131 et seqq.
1236  Ibid., 132.
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no jurisdiction in Switzerland (first requirement); and because the witness is 
located in Switzerland, there is a sufficient connection (second require­
ment).1237 Quite obviously, the problem lies in the third requirement—that is, 
that proceedings abroad are impossible or cannot reasonably be required to 
be brought. As seen in the comparative analysis, most countries provide for 
court assistance in the taking of evidence. Therefore, court assistance will 
usually be possible, except in rare cases of a denial of justice. 
It is questionable whether the lengthy and cumbersome process of ob­
taining court assistance from the respective Swiss court via a foreign state 
court would in fact fall within the ‘cannot reasonably be required to be 
brought’ standard. With regard to court assistance in the taking of evidence 
in arbitration, this question has not been asked or answered in Swiss legal 
doctrine or case law. In general, however, in the case of overly long proceed­
ings or corrupt justice systems, Art. 3 PILA CH provides for emergency juris­
diction.1238 In conclusion, it is conceivable that the Swiss courts may support 
foreign arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence based on Art. 3 PILA CH in 
case of a denial of justice or if the potential duration of the procedure abroad 
would be unreasonable. The potential application of Art. 3 PILA CH must 
therefore be decided on a case­by­case basis and lies within the discretion of 
the respective state court judge.1239 While this discussion is interesting from 
a theoretical point of view, it seems superfluous in light of the current devel­
opments regarding the ongoing revision of the PILA CH. 
b. Situation de lege ferenda
Since its establishment in 1987, Art. 184 (2) PILA CH has gone mostly unnoticed 
and has had little significance in practice.1240 Most likely, this is because for­
eign arbitral tribunals cannot approach the Swiss courts directly to seek court 
assistance in the taking of evidence.1241 Thus, parties have seldom opted for 
a cumbersome detour, via the state courts at the place of the seat of arbitra­
tion, to the jurisdiction in which the evidence is located. This dilemma has 
1237  Art. 176 (1) i.c.w. 184  (2) PILA CH; BSK­Berti/DroeSe, Art. 3 PILA CH n. 10; ZK­müLLer­
chen, Art. 3 PILA CH n. 6, 24. 
1238  ZK­müLLer­chen, Art. 3 PILA CH n. 21; see e.g. the recent data about the length of 
proceedings within the EU: 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard, 12 et seqq.; for a more global 
view, see the Swiss country index on judicial assistance.
1239  BSK­Berti/DroeSe, Art. 3 PILA CH n. 8.
1240  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 56.
1241  Art. 176 (1) i.c.w. Art. 184 (2) PILA CH. As discussed previously, Art. 3 PILA CH could 
serve to provide an emergency jurisdiction in exceptional cases (see p. 225 et seqq. 
supra).
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been criticised in legal doctrine and came up for discussion in relation to the 
revision of the PILA CH.1242 Subsequently—and as under German, French and 
English law—the new Art. 185a (2) PILA CH provides for the direct provision of 
court assistance in the taking of evidence to foreign arbitral tribunals:1243
“An arbitral tribunal with its seat abroad or a party of a foreign arbitral 
proceeding can, with the consent of the arbitral tribunal, request the 
assistance of the state court at the place where the taking of evidence will 
take place. Art. 184 (2) and (3) apply by analogy. ”
As a result, it is clear that the Swiss legislature intends to allow foreign arbitral 
tribunals to seek court assistance in the taking of evidence directly from the 
respective competent Swiss court.1244 Furthermore, it is intended that this 
will also apply to court assistance regarding interim measures.1245 At this 
point in time, the consequences of this amendment are not fully apparent. 
However, it is clear that this should make the PILA CH more user friendly and 
should be warmly welcomed by international arbitration practitioners. This 
modification is also in line with the position taken under German, French, 
English and US law. In future, if evidence is located in Switzerland, a foreign 
arbitral tribunal will thus be more likely to agree to seek court assistance in 
the taking of evidence. It remains to be seen whether a dramatic increase in 
the number of requests submitted to the Swiss courts will lead to discussions 
on the potential establishment of a centralised authority to handle such re­
quests.1246 
C. Interim Measures (Art. 183 PILA CH)
1. In General
The distinction between the taking of evidence and interim measures for the 
preservation of evidence is not always clear.1247 In general, it is possible to 
distinguish between taking evidence (i.e. establishing facts) and interim 
1242  ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 87; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1370; wirth/hof­
mann­nowotny, 71; Rep. Consultation Procedure PILA CH (2018), 11; see also Opinions 
Revision PILA CH (2017): ASA (19 et seq.), ICC CH (165), University of Lausanne (242).
1243  § 1025 (2) CCP DE; S. 2 (3) EAA 1996; Art. 1504 CCP FR.
1244  FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7199.
1245  Art. 185a (1) PILA CH.
1246  See p. 224 et seq. supra.
1247  Boog, n. 30; see also Art. 374 CCP CH, which applies to Swiss domestic arbitration. 
Unlike in Art. 183 PILA CH, measures to protect evidence fall explicitly under interim 
measures (BSK­haBegger, Art. 374 CCP CH n. 12).
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measures aimed at temporarily protecting the parties’ rights from possible 
harm during an arbitration. As previously discussed (see p. 87 supra), meas­
ures for the preservation of evidence can be considered as falling somewhere 
between measures for the taking of evidence and interim measures: they 
help to establish the facts of the case, but only for a limited period.1248 
Arts. 183 (1) and (2) PILA CH state as follows:
“(1) Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, the arbitral tribunal may, 
on motion of one party, order provisional or conservatory measures.
(2) If the party concerned does not voluntarily comply with these meas­
ures, the arbitral tribunal may request the assistance of the state court; 
it shall apply its own law.”
It is undisputed that the arbitral tribunal and state courts have parallel com­
petence to order interim measures.1249 The state courts are usually ap­
proached either where the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted and 
there is no emergency arbitrator, or where a party does not comply voluntar­
ily with an interim measure ordered by the arbitral tribunal. Alternatively, 
state courts will assist where the parties have excluded the arbitral tribunal’s 
competence to order interim measures.1250 Prior to the revision of the PILA 
CH, foreign arbitral tribunals could not directly seek court assistance from 
Swiss courts. As with the taking of evidence (Art. 184 PILA CH), the new 
Art. 185a (1) PILA CH would introduce a welcome change in this respect:
“An arbitral tribunal with its seat abroad or a party of a foreign arbitral 
proceeding can, with the consent of the arbitral tribunal, request the 
assistance of the state court at the place where the provisional or con­
servatory measure ought to be executed. Art. 183 (2) and (3) apply by 
analogy.”
The local jurisdiction is determined by cantonal law, which usually provides 
for the competence of a regional or cantonal supreme court.1251 
1248  Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1247; LaLiVe et al., Art. 183 PILA CH n. 6; rüeDe/haDen­
feLDt, 253; contra waLter et al., 135 et seq.
1249  ZK­oetiker, Art. 183 PILA CH n. 4; BSK­maBiLLarD, Art. 183 PILA CH n. 5; see also p. 87 
supra.
1250  BSK­maBiLLarD, Art. 183 PILA CH n. 5; CHK­furrer et al., Art. 182–186 PILA CH n. 12.
1251  Art. 3 CCP CH; see e.g. for the Canton of Basle (§ 93 (1) (4) Court Organisation Act BS; 
Cantonal Supreme Court), Berne (Art. 8 (1) Introductory Act BE; District Court), Ge­
neva (Art. 86 (1) Judiciary Organisation Act GE; District Court) and Zurich (§ 32 Court 
and Authorities Organisation Act ZH; District Court).
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2. Precautionary Taking of Evidence (Art. 158 CCP CH)
The precautionary taking of evidence and its importance to arbitration must 
also be considered in this regard. This is a special procedure under Swiss law, 
as it allows for evidence to be taken even before the arbitral proceedings have 
started. Art. 158 CCP CH reads as follows:
“(1) The court shall take evidence at any time if: (a) the law grants the right 
to do so; (b) the applicant shows credibly that the evidence is at risk or 
that it has a legitimate interest.
(2) The provisions regarding interim measures apply.”
In addition to the enforcement of a legal right, Art. 158 CCP CH has two main 
goals: to protect evidence which is likely to be lost or destroyed, or to help the 
parties to weigh their chances of success in future court proceedings.1252 It 
is therefore quite similar to the independent evidentiary proceeding under 
German law, under which evidence that might be lost or destroyed may be 
gathered.1253
Measures to preserve evidence lie somewhere between interim meas­
ures (i.e. measures to protect a party’s rights for a limited period) on the one 
hand and measures for the taking of evidence (i.e. establishing the facts of a 
case) on the other.1254 This is illustrated by Art. 158 CCP CH: while it refers to 
the taking of evidence, the ‘provisions regarding interim measures’ apply 
simultaneously. Consequently, the provisions on summary proceedings 
(Arts. 248 et seqq. CCP CH) and those on interim measures (Arts. 261 et seqq. 
CCP CH) apply simultaneously. 
In addition, in Swiss domestic arbitration, Art. 374 (1) CCP CH explicitly 
includes measures for the protection of evidence under the title of interim 
measures.1255 Unsurprisingly, the prevailing view in Swiss legal doctrine is 
that measures for the protection of evidence fall within the scope of interim 
measures in the sense of Art. 183 PILA CH.1256 Nevertheless, it remains doubt­
1252  DFT 138 III 76, cons. 2.4.2; Sutter­Somm et al.­feLLmann, Art. 158 CCP CH n. 17.
1253  See p. 139 et seq. supra.
1254  See p. 87 supra.
1255  BSK­haBegger, Art. 374 CCP CH n. 12. haBegger argues, without further explana­
tion, that the precautionary taking of evidence is excluded from interim measures, at 
least in Swiss domestic arbitration.
1256  Arroyo­Boog, Art. 183 PILA CH n. 10; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 35; Berger/
keLLerhaLS, n. 1247; Dutoit, Art. 183 PILA CH n. 5; LaLiVe et al., Art. 183 PILA CH n. 6; 
rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 253; contra Boog, n. 30; waLter et al., 135; for Swiss domestic 
arbitration see BSK­haBegger, Art. 374 CCP CH n. 12.
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ful whether Art. 158 CCP CH could be used to assess one’s chances of success 
in advance of arbitration, where evidence is not in danger and in need of 
protection and preservation.1257 This question has been subject to limited 
discussion in Swiss legal doctrine.1258 
wySS considers the precautionary taking of evidence as an extension of 
the measures available under Art. 183 PILA CH.1259 He argues that since the 
state courts and the arbitral tribunal have parallel competence to order in­
terim measures, the possibility to weigh one’s chances of success under 
Art. 158 CCP CH should also be available in the case of international arbitra­
tion. He therefore argues for an extensive interpretation of Art. 183 PILA CH, 
emphasising that international arbitral tribunals are not limited to interim 
measures according to the CCP CH, and that the power to assess evidence 
rests with the arbitral tribunal alone.1260
On the other hand, as Schweizer rightly points out, the precautionary 
taking of evidence to weigh the chances of success in future proceedings goes 
beyond the mere protection and preservation of evidence; thus, Art. 158 CCP 
CH is not captured within the parameters of Art. 183 PILA CH.1261 As the arbi­
tral tribunal is the competent authority to take evidence, the possibility to 
use Art. 158 CCP CH to obtain interim measures pursuant to Art. 183 PILA CH 
would undermine the arbitral tribunal’s competence to take evidence.1262 
Indeed, a clear distinction must be drawn between the goals and inten­
tions of the precautionary taking of evidence (Art. 158 CCP CH), interim meas­
ures and the taking of evidence in international arbitration (Arts. 183 and 184 
PILA CH). As previously discussed, Art. 183 PILA CH provides for the possibil­
ity to protect and preserve evidence (see p. 228 supra). In this sense, protect­
ing evidence under Art. 158 CCP CH is congruent with Art. 183 PILA CH. This 
does not apply to that part of Art. 158 CCP CH mentioning ‘a legitimate inter­
est’, which hints at the possibility to assess one’s chances of success in future 
proceedings. The precautionary taking of evidence in this sense clearly falls 
within the competence of the arbitral tribunal alone (Art. 184 (1) PILA CH). 
The possibility to assess one’s chances in future proceedings under Art. 158 
CCP CH should therefore be excluded in the case of both domestic and inter­
national arbitration. 
1257  wySS, 201.
1258  Ibid.; SchweiZer, 23.
1259  wySS, 202.
1260  Ibid.
1261  SchweiZer, 24; see also BSK­haBegger, Art. 374 CCP CH n. 12.
1262  SchweiZer, 24.
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As a result, requests submitted to state courts under Art. 158 CCP CH with the 
sole goal of assessing one’s chances of success in a future arbitration, where 
no evidence is in danger, should be denied; and the parties’ decision to settle 
their dispute through arbitration rather than before state courts should be 
respected and maintained.1263 
D. Other Court Assistance (Art. 185 PILA CH)
For the sake of completeness, Art. 185 PILA CH is noteworthy as it serves as a 
catch­all provision, ensuring the smooth progress of the arbitration through 
the availability of comprehensive assistance throughout the proceedings in 
cases where the arbitral tribunal’s powers are insufficient:1264
“Where further judicial assistance is necessary, the judge at the arbitral 
tribunal’s seat shall have jurisdiction.” 
These may include situations where a state court whose assistance is sought 
under Art. 185 PILA CH reminds the arbitral tribunal to render its award in 
the manner agreed by the parties (Art. 189 PILA CH), or where a party makes 
a complaint because of a denial of justice by the arbitral tribunal.1265 With 
regard to the taking of evidence, Art. 185 PILA CH applies only if Arts. 183 and 
184 PILA CH are less suitable to the situation. Since these two articles mainly 
cover assistance in the taking of evidence, there is little scope for Art. 185 PILA 
CH to apply; it thus plays a subordinate role, as mentioned in the examples 
above. Unlike the two other provisions governing court assistance, Art. 185 
PILA CH is available only for arbitration seated in Switzerland and the 
Art. 185a PILA CH introduces no improvements in this regard. Finally, accord­
ing to cantonal law, the competent courts to handle requests pursuant to 
Art. 185 PILA CH are either regional or cantonal supreme courts.1266 
1263  SchweiZer, 24; contra BSK­SchneiDer /Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 56; CR­Bucher, 
Art. 184 PILA CH n. 22; wySS, 202; see also Cantonal Commercial Court of Zurich, 
HE180200­O of 9 Aug. 2018, cons. 4.3 et seqq., in: ZR 2018, 230 et seqq.; Cantonal Su­
preme Court of Zurich, LB120081 of 31 Oct. 2012, cons. 3.3, in: ZR 2013, 149 et seqq. 
1264  Arroyo­knoLL, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 1; Dutoit, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 1; BSK­maBiLLarD, 
Art. 185 PILA CH n. 1; CR­Bucher, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 1; waLter et al., 170. For the re­
spective provision in Swiss domestic arbitration, see Art. 375 (2) CCP CH.
1265  Arroyo­knoLL, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 19 et seq.; ZK­oetiker, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 4; 
BSK­maBiLLarD, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 7 et seqq.; CR­Bucher, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 8 et 
seqq.; waLter et al., 171 et seqq.; LaLiVe et al., Art. 185 PILA CH n. 5.
1266  Canton of Basle (§ 93 (1) (4) Court Organisation Act BS; Cantonal Supreme Court), 
Berne (Art. 8 (1) Introductory Act BE; District Court), Geneva (Art. 86 (1) Judiciary 
Organisation Act GE; District Court) and Zurich (§ 32 Court and Authorities Organisa­
tion Act ZH; District Court).
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§ 3 Applicable Procedural Law
Before the revision of the PILA CH, there was some doubt about the applica­
ble procedural law in cases where state courts provide assistance to arbitral 
tribunals.1267 However, according to the prevailing view in Swiss legal doc­
trine, summary proceedings pursuant to Arts. 248 et seqq. CCP CH apply.1268 
According to the new Art. 251a (c) CCP CH, these proceedings are explicitly 
applicable to the taking of evidence pursuant to Art. 184 (2) PILA CH.1269 Con­
sequently, an application under Art. 184 (2) PILA CH must take the form of a 
signed application; in simple or urgent cases, it may even be filed orally on 
record.1270 In most cases, the respective state court will not hold a hearing, 
but will rather decide on the basis of the case files.1271 Unless the request does 
not seem obviously inadmissible or unfounded, the opposing party (i.e. the 
target of evidence) has the opportunity to comment on the application orally 
or in writing.1272 
§ 4 Competence to Seek Court Assistance
A. Primacy of the Arbitral Tribunal
Unsurprisingly, and as under most other examined leges arbitri, the approv­
al of the arbitral tribunal must first be obtained before seeking the assistance 
of the Swiss courts.1273 The request can be made either by the arbitral tribu­
nal itself or by a party with the consent of the arbitral tribunal.1274 However, 
a request based on an agreement between the parties alone, as under English 
1267  Before the enactment of the PILA CH in 1989, Art. 45 of the Intercantonal Arbitration 
Convention CH of 1969 expressly referred to the summary proceedings as regards the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal; gökSu, n. 313.
1268  Ibid.; thorenS­aLaDJem, 531; BSK­weBer­Stecher, Art. 356 CCP CH n. 5.
1269  FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7206.
1270  Art. 252 i.c.w. Art. 130 CCP CH.
1271  Art. 256 (1) CCP CH.
1272  Art. 253 CCP CH.
1273  See e.g. Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML; § 1050 (1) CCP DE; Art. 1469 i.c.w. Art. 1506 CCP FR; 
Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 70.
1274  ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 73; gökSu, n. 330. The official French version of 
Art. 184 (2) PILA CH is misleading, since it allows only both parties (les parties) to seek 
court assistance. The prevailing view therefore suggests that the official German and 
Italian versions mentioning only ‘a party’ deserve priority and thus no agreement 
between the parties is necessary (Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1361 fn 89; BSK­SchneiDer/
Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 58; CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 12; SchneiDer, 57; 
LaLiVe et al., Art. 184 PILA CH n. 8).
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law, is not possible.1275 Since the arbitral tribunal itself is competent to seek 
court assistance on its own motion, it should also be entitled to participate in 
the taking of evidence.1276 Although this option is expressly stated in Swiss 
domestic arbitration law, there is no urgent need to amend Art. 184 (2) PILA 
CH. As previously explained (see p. 223 supra), this follows from the fact that 
Art. 184 (2) PILA CH expressly entitles the arbitral tribunal itself to seek court 
assistance.1277 As a result, and to ensure the parties’ right to be heard, the 
arbitral tribunal should be allowed to be present during the taking of evi­
dence. In addition, if one party alone is seeking court assistance, state courts 
will most likely demand that a written order be presented in order to verify 
the respective arbitral tribunal’s consent.1278 
As previously discussed (see p. 27 et seqq. supra), the arbitral tribunal is 
vested with significant discretion to determine whether court assistance is in 
fact necessary or whether the relevant facts of the case have already been 
proven. From the perspective of the arbitral tribunal, a request for court as­
sistance is therefore a right rather than a duty.1279 In several cases, a party 
claimed that the arbitral tribunal had violated its right to be heard by denying 
a request to seek court assistance. In this respect, the SFT made it clear that 
this right had not been violated simply because the arbitral tribunal had not 
requested court assistance on its own initiative without being invited to do 
so by one of the parties. Rather, this would be the case only if the request were 
denied without valid reason (e.g. where the possible evidence would be rele­
vant to the outcome of the respective case).1280 More recently, in a case in 
which the arbitral tribunal refused to hear a witness, the SFT confirmed its 
previous case law stating that the refusal to hear a certain witness does not 
violate the right to be heard if the tribunal considers the testimony improper 
to demonstrate the relevant facts or insufficient to change its opinion.1281
SchneiDer/Scherer argue that where an arbitral tribunal refuses a 
request for court assistance without sufficient reason (and violates the right 
to be heard), a party can nonetheless challenge this violation before a state 
1275  See p. 169 supra. 
1276  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 62.
1277  Contra Ibid. with reference to Art. 375 (3) CCP CH; see also the nearly identical provi­
sion in § 1050 (3) CCP DE.
1278  waLter et al., 165; SchneiDer, 56 et seq.
1279  See e.g. the case cited in ASA Bull. 2005, 469 et seqq.; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1362; 
Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 70.
1280  DFT 4P.217/1992 of 15 Mar. 1993, cons. 7b, in: ASA Bull. 1993, 408.
1281  DFT 4A_335/2012 of 30 Jan. 2013, cons. 2 with reference to DFT 134 I 140, cons. 5.3; DFT 
131 I 153, cons. 3.
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court.1282 However, as the two authors acknowledge, since state courts will 
not examine the relevance, usefulness or appropriateness of the evidence 
requested, a state court is unlikely to grant court assistance where the arbi­
tral tribunal has not approved such request.1283 Even if it does so, the arbitral 
tribunal will have total liberty to decide whether to introduce the evidence 
into the arbitral proceedings.1284
B. Exclusion of Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
1. Current Opinions in Legal Doctrine
Thus far, because court assistance in the taking of evidence in arbitrations 
held in Switzerland (Art. 184 PILA CH) has seldom been sought, its exclusion 
has not been discussed extensively in Swiss legal doctrine.1285 By contrast, 
the topic has been the subject of vigorous debate under German and, less 
extensively, English law.1286 As regards the PILA CH, amBauen argues that 
because the parties have a right to participate in the taking of evidence (as 
part of the right to be heard), the advance exclusion of this right is not possi­
ble.1287 Or, to put it differently, parties cannot deprive themselves of the pos­
sibility to play an active role in the taking of evidence. In contrast, amBauen 
does not mention the possibility of excluding court assistance during the 
arbitral proceedings. However, the following discussion will show that under 
certain circumstances, this is possible—both prior to and during the arbitral 
proceedings. 
2. Right of Minimum Legal Protection
To begin, one must be aware that the freedom of the parties to tailor the ap­
plicable procedural rules at their (almost) full discretion (Art. 182 (1) PILA CH) 
1282  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 58; contra SchneiDer, 57.
1283  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 58; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1365; 
Zk­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 71; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 71; Bucher, n. 217; 
rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 266; waLter et al., 166.
1284  CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 22.
1285  Regarding Art. 185 PILA CH (other court assistance), maBiLLarD argues, without fur­
ther explanation, that the parties cannot renounce this sort of court assistance—see 
BSK­maBiLLarD, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 21; for the exclusion of interim measures ordered 
by state courts (Art. 183 (2) PILA CH), see also haaS, 347 et seqq.; kaufmann­kohLer/
rigoZZi, n. 6.105 et seqq.; waLter et al., 146.
1286  See p. 137 et seqq. and p. 170 et seq. supra.
1287  amBauen, n. 284 and 244 with reference to DFT 124 I 241, cons. 2; DFT 4A_528/2011 
of 23 Jan. 2012, cons. 2.1; rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 263; ZK­oetiker, Art. 182 PILA CH 
n. 47 et seqq.
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is limited by Art. 182 (3) PILA CH, which states that the arbitral tribunal must 
ensure the equal treatment of the parties and their right to be heard. As pre­
viously discussed (see p. 106 et seqq. supra), these procedural guarantees 
must be considered within the context of their constitutional background, 
enshrined in Art. 29 (2) Const. CH. Therefore, parties cannot completely 
waive their right to legal protection, even if they wish to do so. By contrast, 
by tailoring the arbitral proceedings at their discretion, they can exclude 
certain types of evidence. One option is to agree to apply the IBA Rules or, 
more specifically, to resolve the dispute based on documentary evidence 
only.1288 The parties can also agree to exclude expert opinions or to exclude 
admissions made in settlement discussions.1289 But does the fact that differ­
ent types of evidence may be excluded automatically lead to a conclusion that 
this also applies to court assistance in the taking of evidence? Or to put it an­
other way, can the parties agree to exclude court assistance in the taking of 
evidence by not waiving their right to minimum legal protection completely? 
Although there is no clear indication either in the PILA CH itself or in legal 
doctrine, there are several arguments in favour of such an exclusion. 
3. Reasons in Favour of an Exclusion of Art. 184 (2) PILA CH
First of all, if the issue is considered within the context of the main objective 
of arbitration—that is, to allow parties with comparable negotiating power to 
voluntarily decide to settle their disputes in large part without the help or 
interference of state courts—there are good reasons to believe that the parties 
can completely waive assistance under Art. 184 PILA CH. However, in some 
situations, the party will not have voluntarily entered into the arbitration 
agreement. For example, many sportspeople and athletes have no option—
short of stopping playing their sport—but to agree to the dispute settlement 
mechanisms of their respective organisation if a dispute arises.1290 While it 
makes sense to have a single forum in such situations, it is important to ask 
whether this provides a similar level of minimum legal protection—in terms 
of both equivalence and effectiveness—compared to the state courts.1291 
1288  Art. 42 (1) (c) Swiss Rules; BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 14, 34.
1289  Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 14; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1318; rüeDe/haDen­
feLDt, 262 et seq.
1290  See e.g. Art. 37 (3) CAS Code: ‘In agreeing to submit any dispute subject to the ordinary 
arbitration procedure or to the appeal arbitration procedure to these Procedural 
Rules, the parties expressly waive their rights to request any such measures from 
state authorities or tribunals. …’; haaS, 358; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 6.106 et 
seqq.; BSK­patocchi/Jermini, Art. 192 PILA CH n. 3b; DFT 133 III 235, cons. 4.3.2.2.
1291  haaS, 359.
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Quite obviously, the answer to this question must be determined on a case­
by­case basis. The issue is even more delicate prior to constitution of the ar­
bitral tribunal. If there is no emergency arbitrator competent to take evi­
dence, the right to minimum legal protection will certainly be violated;1292 
but just because the respective arbitration institution provides for an emer­
gency arbitrator (equivalence), this will not necessarily be as effective as a 
state court (effectiveness). Here, other elements—such as the types of evi­
dence sought and the speed of the proceeding—come into play.1293 Regarding 
the former issue, the possible measures available to emergency arbitrators 
and/or arbitral tribunals tend to be even broader than those available to state 
courts (as long as the parties have not excluded certain types of evidence). In 
addition, given the speed with which emergency arbitrators operate and the 
expedited procedures available under the rules of many arbitration institu­
tions, there is no disadvantage in choosing arbitration in this regard.1294 Fur­
thermore, arbitral tribunals lack coercive power to enforce their orders—for 
instance, where a recalcitrant witness refuses to appear for examination; but 
haaS argues that the impact of state court orders is often similarly limited, 
especially in international cases.1295 
To summarise, given both the similarities and differences between the 
taking of evidence by arbitral tribunals and state courts respectively, one 
may conclude that—depending on the respective case—arbitral tribunals and 
emergency arbitrators alone can provide a similar level of minimum legal 
protection in terms of equivalence and effectiveness. As a result, the parties 
can only partially waive their right to minimum legal protection by excluding 
the possibility of court assistance in the taking of evidence under Art. 184 (2) 
PILA CH.
Second, if there is only a very loose connection to Switzerland—that is, if 
none of the parties has its domicile, habitual residence or business establish­
ment in Switzerland—the possibility to make such an exclusion should be even 
greater. One may argue by analogy that if the parties, by virtue of Art. 192 (1) 
PILA CH, can almost fully waive the action for annulment or limit the grounds 
to challenge an arbitral award, the exclusion of Art. 184 (2) PILA CH—which 
1292  kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 6.108; haaS, 360; see e.g. Art. 29 ICC Rules; Art. 9B 
LCIA Rules; Art. 6 ICDR Rules; Rule 30 SIAC Rules; Art. 43 Swiss Rules.
1293  haaS, 362.
1294  For emergency arbitrator and expedited proceedings, see e.g. Appendix V and VI ICC 
Rules.
1295  haaS, 363; Boog, n. 106 et seqq.
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merely concerns a procedural question—should also be possible.1296 Art. 192 (1) 
PILA CH aims to make arbitration more efficient, providing that if the arbitra­
tion has no real connection to Switzerland, the parties can waive the possi­
bility of judicial review.1297 In addition, Swiss courts should not be preoccu­
pied by dilatory actions with no real connection to Switzerland.1298 The SFT 
has held that in the interests of efficiency and to respect the autonomy of the 
parties, such an exclusion does not violate any public interest.1299 By and 
large, the ECtHR has confirmed the SFT’s position and stated that as long as 
such an exclusion is ‘free, permissible and unambiguous’, there is no viola­
tion of Art. 6 (1) ECHR.1300 This reasoning may also be applied to the exclusion 
of court assistance in the taking of evidence. In sum, parties with only a loose 
connection to Switzerland should be able to exclude court assistance in the 
taking of evidence by applying Art. 192 (1) PILA CH by analogy. This can ben­
efit the arbitration in terms of both equivalence and effectiveness. 
Finally, it should be remembered that this exclusion is only temporary. 
If the parties subsequently wish to resort to state courts, they can easily 
change their minds by entering into a separate agreement during the arbitra­
tion regarding the possibility to seek assistance from state courts in the tak­
ing of evidence.1301 Consequently, their waiver of legal minimum protection 
is likewise partial. Of course, the situation is different if one party refuses to 
conclude a separate agreement contrary to the first one. In such circumstanc­
es, the parties’ prior agreement to voluntarily exclude the assistance of state 
courts must be respected. 
4. Conclusion
In summary, it is clear that the question of whether the parties can exclude 
Art. 184 (2) PILA CH must be answered individually for each and every case. 
If the parties have entered into arbitration voluntarily, the exclusion should 
be considered valid in order to respect the parties’ choice. By contrast, if one 
of the parties was de facto forced to settle the dispute through arbitration, one 
must consider whether the arbitral tribunal (or the emergency arbitrator) 
1296  Art. 192 (1) PILA CH. However, the parties cannot exclude so­called ‘revision’, which 
aims to correct an arbitral award in cases of newly discovered significant facts or de­
cisive evidence, or if the decision was influenced to the detriment of a party con­
cerned by a felony or misdemeanour (FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7201 et seq.).
1297  ZK­oetiker, Art. 192 PILA CH n. 1; Arroyo­BaiZeau, Art. 192 PILA CH n. 2.
1298  BSK­patocchi/Jermini, Art. 192 PILA CH n. 1.
1299  DFT 4A_238/2011 of 4 January 2012, cons. 3.2.
1300  Nourredine Tabbane v. Switzerland, ECtHR, App no. 41069/12, n. 26 et seq., 1 Mar. 2016.
1301  SteinBrück, 412.
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can provide an equivalent level of legal protection to state courts. If so, there 
is only a partial waiver of minimum legal protection and thus the exclusion of 
Art. 184 (2) PILA CH is valid. As sports­related arbitral proceedings remain a 
minority in the sphere of international commercial arbitration, it is expected 
that in most cases, the parties will be free to exclude court assistance pursuant 
to Art. 184 (2) PILA CH. In addition, where the parties have only a loose con­
nection to Switzerland, the exclusion of court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence is even more justified, provided that the arbitration is also voluntary. 
Finally, the waiver of minimum legal protection is mostly partial, since the 
parties can include this assistance in a subsequent separate agreement. 
§ 5 Spectrum of Evidence and its Target 
A. Evidence According to a Party Agreement
The discretion of the parties to tailor the arbitral proceedings is a key hall­
mark of international arbitration.1302 In the absence of such a choice, the 
arbitral tribunal will determine the procedure to be followed by the parties.1303 
Regardless of which procedural rules are chosen, the arbitral tribunal must 
ensure the equal treatment of the parties and their right to be heard.1304 The 
parties are therefore at liberty to exclude certain types of evidence, such as 
witness testimony, and to agree to settle their dispute solely based on docu­
mentary evidence. This agreement binds not only the parties themselves, but 
also the arbitrators.1305 In contrast to the other examined leges arbitri, the 
fact that an arbitral tribunal takes evidence contrary to an explicit agreement 
between the parties does not serve as grounds to annul the arbitral award 
under the PILA CH.1306 Nonetheless, the arbitral award may be annulled if a 
party can show that the arbitral tribunal somehow violated the right to equal 
treatment, the right to be heard or even public policy.1307 
1302  Art. 182 (1) PILA CH; Arroyo­knoLL, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 1; BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, 
Art. 182 PILA CH n. 1.
1303  Art. 182 (2) PILA CH.
1304  Art. 182 (3) PILA CH.
1305  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 10.
1306  § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE; Art. 1520 (3) CCP FR; S. 68 (2) (c) EAA 1996; S. 10 (a) (4) FAA USA; 
DFT 4P.23/2006 of 27 Mar. 2006, cons. 4.2; DFT 117 II 346, cons. 1a; BSK­pfiSterer, 
Art. 190 PILA CH n. 61.
1307  Art. 190 (2) (d and e) PILA CH; see also p. 266 et seqq. infra.
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B. Evidence According to the PILA CH
Art. 184 (2) PILA CH remains silent on the different types of evidence, stating 
only that ‘the judge shall apply his own law’. It follows, therefore, that the 
respective court will take evidence according to the CCP CH.1308 In addition, 
by virtue of Art. 11a PILA CH, the respective state court may take into ac­
count foreign procedures (see p. 242 et seqq. infra) or take evidence in ac­
cordance with international treaties.1309 In most cases, however, evidence 
will be taken according to the CCP CH. Art. 168 (1) CCP CH designates the 
following evidence as admissible: testimony (lit. a), physical records (lit. b), 
inspections (lit. c), expert opinions (lit. d), written statements (lit. e) and 
questioning and statements of the parties (lit. f ). In order to ensure a fair 
procedure and legal certainty, this list is exhaustive.1310 Unlike under 
French law, for example, neither the PILA CH nor the CCP CH distinguishes 
between the evidence which can be sought prior to or after constitution of 
the arbitral tribunal.1311
Prior to the taking of evidence, in order to uphold the parties’ right to be 
heard, they should be informed of the time and place of the hearing.1312 This 
allows them to participate and experience the proceedings first hand.1313 In 
addition, by analogy from Art. 375 (3) CCP CH, the parties should be allowed 
to ask questions during the taking of evidence.1314 This also applies to the 
arbitral tribunal, which has the right (but not the duty) to take an active part 
in the taking of evidence, especially in cases where the arbitral tribunal has 
an interest in hearing the (chief) witnesses’ examination first hand.1315
Hitherto, Art. 184 (2) PILA CH has primarily been invoked in order to 
force a recalcitrant witness to give testimony. However, such cases remain 
rare. In a recent case from 2015, albeit on a purely domestic level, two wit­
1308  ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 75; BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 61; 
SchneiDer, 60 et seqq.; CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 15; gökSu, n. 308.
1309  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 64; CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 20; 
ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 83. In this respect, see e.g. the European Convention 
on Information on Foreign Law (1968) (entered into force in Switzerland in 1970).
1310  FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7320; DFT 141 III 433, cons. 2.5.1.
1311  See p. 151 et seqq. supra.
1312  Art. 182 (3) PILA CH; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1369; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH 
n. 79; waLter et al., 168; SchneiDer, 65.
1313  CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 16; rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 264; Bucher, n. 218.
1314  gökSu, n. 321, 1554; SchneiDer, 65.
1315  Ibid., n. 340; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 84; rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 267; Schnei­
Der, 65 et seq.; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 84; SchneiDer, 66; rüeDe/haDen­
feLDt, 267.
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nesses were obliged to appear directly before the respective arbitral tribunal 
in Geneva to give testimony.1316 Not only was the request answered within 
less than a week, but the witnesses were also ordered to appear directly be­
fore the arbitral tribunal.1317 In this regard, Art. 184 (2) PILA CH does not ex­
press itself on the technical details of the taking of evidence (i.e. how exactly 
this should take place). While SchneiDer/Scherer, LaLiVe et al. and 
rüeDe/haDenfeLDt suggest that the evidence will always be taken before 
the requested state court, Berger/keLLerhaLS, oetiker and gökSu sug­
gest that, depending on the situation, the evidence may be taken before ei­
ther the arbitral tribunal or the respective state court.1318 
This opinion deserves approval. If the arbitral proceedings are being 
conducted in Switzerland, the taking of evidence directly before the arbitral 
tribunal is the most convenient option, since the arbitrators are already fa­
miliar with the respective case and in particular with the applicable proce­
dural rules.1319 In addition, this saves the respective state court judge from 
having to take evidence in a way to which he or she is not normally accus­
tomed.1320 Moreover, the translation costs can also be significantly reduced.1321 
However, in an international arbitration with its seat outside Switzer­
land, evidence will most likely be taken before a state court. In this case, it 
would be disproportionate to relocate the arbitration to Switzerland for the 
taking of evidence. If the evidence is taken by a state court, the results will be 
forwarded to the arbitral tribunal and the parties (at best in the form of the 
minutes from the witness examination or site inspection).1322 From a com­
parative point of view, the place where the evidence is taken is of no impor­
tance under German law, since § 1050 (3) CCP DE explicitly states that arbitra­
tors can participate in the taking of evidence. The same seems to apply under 
French, English and US law, although this is not explicit.1323
1316  thorenS­aLaDJem, 547 et seq.; VittoZ, 921 et seqq.
1317  See also S. 43 (1) EAA 1996: A party to arbitral proceedings may use the same court 
procedures as are available in relation to legal proceedings to secure the attendance 
before the tribunal of a witness in order to give oral testimony or to produce docu­
ments or other material evidence (emphasis added).
1318  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 62; LaLiVe et al., Art. 184 PILA CH n. 7; 
rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 267; contra Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1367; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 
PILA CH n. 78 et seq.; gökSu, n. 321.
1319  This seems to be a constant practice in Geneva; see ASA Bull. 1990, 283 et seqq.
1320  SchmiDt­ahrenDtS/De Jong, 286.
1321  Ibid.
1322  Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1369; BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 62; 
SchneiDer, 66; waLter et al., 169.
1323  Arts. 1449 and 1469 CCP FR; Ss. 43 and 44 EAA 1996; § 1782. 
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C. Foreign Types of Evidence
The possibilities for the parties to tailor the taking of evidence according to 
their discretion are limited when state courts come into play. Faced with a 
request for court assistance in the taking of evidence pursuant to Art. 184 (2) 
PILA CH, the respective state court will normally apply its own law, irrespec­
tive of what the parties have agreed in the arbitration agreement.1324 In Swit­
zerland, therefore, it follows that foreign types of evidence such as affidavits 
and cross­examination will usually be excluded.1325 Still, one may consider 
Arts. 11a (2) and (3) PILA CH: 
“(2)  Upon petition of the requesting authority, foreign legal procedures 
may also be observed or taken into account, if necessary, for the enforce­
ment of a claim abroad unless there are important reasons pertaining to 
the affected party not to do so.
(3)  The Swiss judicial or administrative authorities may issue docu­
ments or take an affidavit from an applicant in accordance with a form 
of foreign law if the Swiss form is not recognized abroad and if a claim 
meriting protection could not be asserted there.” 
The prevailing view in Swiss legal doctrine suggests that this provision may 
be applied to international arbitration by analogy.1326 It therefore allows a 
Swiss court to recognise foreign forms of evidence (e.g. from the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award).1327 More recently, the Swiss legislature 
considered this fact in the drafting process of the revised PILA CH by propos­
ing explicitly that a state court will usually apply its own law but, on request, 
will take into account foreign procedures (Art. 184 (3) PILA CH).1328 This rep­
resents a certain harmonisation with US law, explicitly allowing for evidence 
to be taken according to foreign law.1329 However, this is not the case as re­
gards German, French and English law.1330
1324  Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 77.
1325  See e.g. a recent unpublished decision of the District Court of Zurich, FR160295­L/U 
of 27. May 2016, cited in BSK­haBegger, Art. 375 PILA CH n. 76a.
1326  ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 77; BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 61; 
Berger/keLLerhaLS, 1366; CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 15; gökSu, n. 308; Dutoit, 
Art. 184 PILA CH n. 3; LaLiVe et al., Art. 184 PILA CH n. 7; Bucher, n. 218; waLter et 
al., 167; SchneiDer, 62 et seq.
1327  Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 77.
1328  FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7198.
1329  See p. 207 et seq. supra.
1330  See p. 140 et seqq., p. 159 and p. 174 et seq.  supra.
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For instance, if cross­examination of a witness is requested, the examination 
must be recorded on video or the witness must be sworn in in a certain man­
ner, the respective state court has broad discretion to grant such a request.1331 
Nevertheless, Arts. 11a (2) and (3) apply only where there is no international 
treaty such as the HEC and the scope of application is not broader than that 
under such treaties.1332 In such case, as regards the taking of evidence, the 
Hague Convention on Civil Procedure (HCP) must be considered at all times.1333 
However, since the HEC deals specifically with the taking of evidence and 
replaces the HCP’s respective provisions, the HCP’s scope of application has 
become increasingly limited.1334 
Besides the petition of the requesting authority (either a foreign state 
court or a foreign arbitral tribunal (Art. 185a PILA CH), the consideration of a 
foreign procedure may be necessary to enforce a claim abroad. For instance, 
this applies to situations where the evidence must be taken in a specific form 
in order to have full evidentiary force abroad (e.g. a witness examination 
under oath).1335 Lastly, a state court will consider foreign types of evidence 
only if there are no important reasons not to do so, such as personal privacy 
or the right to refuse testimony.1336 
Because the consideration of foreign types of evidence is fully in the 
hands of the respective state court, there is no right thereto.1337 There have 
been few reported cases in this regard and the Swiss courts tend to be reluc­
tant to consider foreign types of evidence in aid of arbitration.1338 Regarding 
the new possibility foreseen in Art. 185a PILA CH to directly approach a Swiss 
court for assistance in the taking of evidence in in arbitration, it remains to 
be seen whether requests to consider foreign types of evidence will be made 
more frequently. 
1331  ZK­roDrigueZ/VoLken, Art. 11a PILA CH n. 9, 12, 15 et seqq.; CR­Bucher, Art. 11­11a 
PILA CH n. 21; BSK­Berti/DroeSe, Art. 11a PILA CH n. 6.
1332  Art. 9 HEC; Art. 14 (2) HCP; ZK­roDrigueZ/VoLken, Art. 11a PILA CH n. 10; CR­Bucher, 
Art. 11­11a PILA CH n. 22.
1333  Art. 11a (4) PILA CH; Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013), 33.
1334  Art. 29 HEC; ZK­roDrigueZ/VoLken, Art. 11a PILA CH n. 22; Dutoit, Art. 11a PILA CH 
n. 8; DFT 132 III 291, cons. 2.
1335  ZK­roDrigueZ/VoLken, Art. 11a PILA CH n. 11.
1336  Ibid.; see also Art. 11 HEC; Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013), 25 
et seq.
1337  Dutoit, Art. 11a PILA CH n. 3; gauthey/markuS, n. 427.
1338  See e.g. an unpublished decision of the District Court of Zurich, FR160295­L/U of 27. 
May 2016, cited in BSK­haBegger, Art. 375 PILA CH n. 76a.
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D. Availability of Pre-trial Discovery of Documents? 
 While it is undoubtedly hard to predict the degree to which the Swiss courts 
will consider foreign types of evidence, it seems clear that there are some 
reservations regarding US­style pre­trial discovery. However, because it is 
foreseen that foreign arbitral tribunals will be able to approach the Swiss 
courts directly (Art. 185a (2) PILA CH), such requests may be made more fre­
quently in the future. If they concern US­style pre­trial discovery, the respec­
tive state court will most likely orient itself according to the practice under 
Art. 23 HEC. Accordingly, a Member State of the HEC may declare that it will 
not execute ‘letters of request for the purpose of obtaining pre­trial discovery 
of documents as known in Common Law countries’.1339 Switzerland made 
use of this possibility in the form of a partial reservation:1340 
“6.  In accordance with Article 23, Switzerland declares that Letters of 
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre­trial discovery of docu­
ments will not be executed if:
a)  the request has no direct and necessary link with the proceed­
ings in question; or
b)  a person is required to indicate what documents relating to the 
case are or were in his/her possession or keeping or at his/her dis­
posal; or
c)  a person is required to produce documents other than those 
mentioned in the request for legal assistance, which are probably in 
his/her possession or keeping or at his/her disposal; or
d)  interests worthy of protection of the concerned persons are en­
dangered.”
Generally speaking, the aim of this reservation is to avoid ‘fishing expedi­
tions’.1341 Therefore, any requests regarding documents with no connection 
to the case or non­specified classes of documents over an unlimited time­
frame will be denied.1342 These include, for instance, requests to a Swiss 
bank to provide evidence of all connections (e.g. foundations, trusts, corpo­
rations) with correspondence and records of a certain person (directly or 
1339  This article was initiated by England and many Member States made use of their right 
(see the various reservations); gauthey/markuS, n. 696; MüKo­paBSt, Art. 23 HEC n. 4.
1340  No. 6 of Switzerland’s reservation.
1341  Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013), 27; DFT 132 III 291, cons. 2.1; 
gauthey/markuS, n. 696; kLauS, 308.
1342  Ibid.
244 Chapter 8: Swiss Perspective
indirectly, and with no regard to the exact reason) held with that bank.1343 
Since Art. 23 HEC speaks only of ‘documents’, witness examination may not 
be requested, except where it relates to the existence, power of disposition 
or extent of the requested document(s).1344 Regarding witnesses, the respec­
tive provisions on privilege and the right to refuse testimony apply according 
to the law of the state of execution, the state of origin of the request or even 
another state, by virtue of a separate declaration.1345 
Lit. a–c impose no new requirements as regards the relevance of docu­
ment production in Swiss civil procedure, but merely repeat that ‘evidence 
is required to prove facts that are legally relevant and disputed’ (Art. 150 (1) 
CCP CH).1346 These limitations seem to be in line with the reservations of 
numerous other Member States.1347 Thus, as the Cantonal Court of Zurich 
has held, it does not matter whether a specific request actually originated 
from a common law country (Art. 23 HEC).1348 Only lit. d represents a Swiss 
speciality and serves as a general clause which does not refer to the Swiss 
ordre public, but instead aims to protect the interests of the relevant person.1349 
This applies, for instance, to the protection of commercial and technical con­
fidentiality.1350 
In sum, the Swiss courts will be rather hesitant when faced with requests 
for pre­trial discovery of documents. However, Switzerland has only partial­
ly excluded the possibility of granting requests for pre­trial discovery. In this 
respect, requesting parties would be well advised to consider the grounds 
listed in No. 6 (a­d) of Switzerland’s reservation to Art. 23 HEC. In a case in 
which a US court requested a Swiss bank to produce certain documents from 
one of its clients, the SFT granted the request and reasoned that a direct and 
1343  Cantonal Supreme Court of Zurich, RU160027­O/U of 6 Dec. 2016, cons. 5.4.
1344  FCDisp HEC CH (1993), 1301; Geimer/Schütze­knöfeL, Art. 23 HEC n. 10; MüKo­paBSt, 
Art. 23 HEC n. 7.
1345  Art. 11 HEC; for the parties’ and third parties’ right to refuse to give testimony in Swit­
zerland, see Arts. 156 and 163 et seqq. CCP CH.
1346  DFT 132 III 291, cons. 2.1; kLauS, 308.
1347  See fn 1339 supra; DFT 4A_315/2017 of 17 Jan. 2018, cons. 5.3.1; FCDisp HEC CH (1993), 
1301.
1348  Ibid.; Cantonal Supreme Court of Zurich, RU160027­O/U of 6 Dec. 2016, cons. 5.3; see 
also Cantonal Supreme Court of Zurich, decree of 23 Oct. 2001, cons. 4, in: ZR 2002, 
262 et seqq.; contra Geimer/Schütze­knöfeL, Art. 23 HEC, n. 11.
1349  DFT 4A_315/2017 of 17 Jan. 2018, cons. 5.3.1; DFT 4A_399/2007 of 4 Dec. 2007, cons. 5.3; 
DFT 132 III 291, cons. 2.1; FCDisp HEC CH (1993), 1301.
1350  Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013), 27; in this respect, see also 
Art. 56 CCP CH: The court shall take appropriate measures to ensure that taking evi­
dence does not infringe the legitimate interests of any parties or third party, such as 
business secrets; BSK­guyan, Art. 156 CCP CH n. 2.
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necessary link with the proceedings in question had been shown (lit. a).1351 
Moreover, it argued that lit. d does not prevent a Swiss court from forcing a 
Swiss bank to deny banking secrecy to a certain client, as long as the various 
interests of the concerned person are considered sufficiently protected.1352
E. International Judicial Assistance in Taking Evidence
In cases where evidence is not located in Switzerland, the Swiss courts may 
themselves be requested to seek international court assistance (e.g. by means 
of the HEC or other international treaties such as the European Convention 
on Information on Foreign Law).1353 As the previous comparative analysis of 
several leges arbitri has shown, arbitral tribunals can often directly approach 
state courts at the place where the evidence is located. This strongly suggests 
that in order to save time and costs, the Swiss courts will most likely not be 
approached to initiate a request to a foreign state court at the place where the 
evidence is located. 
F. Target of Evidence
1. Parties to the Arbitration
The classic distinction between the parties to the arbitration and third par­
ties must also be drawn here. While state courts can force recalcitrant third 
parties to give testimony, this is not possible in the case of the parties to the 
arbitration. This is made clear by the first Intel factor, which suggests that 
requests for evidence from a party to the arbitration, over which the respec­
tive arbitral tribunal already has jurisdiction, will be denied.1354 Thus, the 
prevailing view in Switzerland is that the arbitral tribunal should consider 
the behaviour of a non­compliant party when assessing the evidence.1355 This 
could involve drawing an adverse inference under the conditions previously 
1351  DFT 4A_399/2007 of 4 Dec. 2007, cons. 5.2.
1352  Ibid., cons. 5.3.
1353  ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 76; Dutoit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 4; BSK­SchneiDer/
Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 63; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1368; gökSu, n. 322; LaLiVe 
et al., Art. 184 PILA CH n. 6; Bucher, n. 219; for mutual assistance between Swiss 
Courts see Arts. 194­196 CCP CH.
1354  See p. 196 supra. 
1355  ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 80; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1367; BSK­SchneiDer/
Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 62; SchneiDer, 53; rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 265; Bucher, 
n. 216; contra LaLiVe et al., Art. 184 PILA CH n. 6; waLter et al., 164. The last two 
groups of authors suggest that besides third parties, Art. 184 (2) PILA CH serves to 
force recalcitrant parties to give testimony or produce documents too.
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discussed (see p. 56 et seqq. supra). In this regard, the French approach is 
somewhat different, as it expressly empowers the arbitral tribunal to impose 
an astreinte in case of non­compliance.1356
In an arbitration in the Canton of Ticino in 1998, a party refused to allow 
the inspection of a machine in its possession.1357 Consequently, the arbitral 
tribunal sought court assistance in order to force that party to allow the in­
spection, under threat of criminal sanctions according to Art. 292 SCC CH. 
The Supreme Cantonal Court of Ticino stated that there is no legal basis to 
force a recalcitrant party to comply with an evidentiary order. Rather, this 
fact should be considered by the arbitral tribunal in assessing the evidence.1358 
In another (ad hoc) arbitration in Geneva, an attempt to force a party to give 
testimony was halted by the arbitral tribunal.1359 As the relevant party had 
refused to testify before the arbitral tribunal, the adverse party requested the 
arbitral tribunal to send a letter rogatory to a Spanish state court at the place 
where the recalcitrant party was domiciled. However, the arbitral tribunal 
denied the request, stating that a state court cannot force a party to testify 
based on either cantonal or federal law.1360
The situation is similar in state court proceedings. Based on Art. 160 (1) 
CCP CH, the parties have a duty to cooperate in the taking of evidence—that 
is, to give testimony, produce documentary evidence (except legal corre­
spondence with lawyers) and allow expert examinations of their person or 
property. The right to refuse to cooperate in the taking of evidence is limited 
to cases in which the disclosure of a secret would breach professional confi­
dentiality (Art. 321 SCC CH), or where the taking of evidence would expose a 
close associate to criminal prosecution or civil liability (Art. 165 CCP CH).1361 
However, according to Art. 164 CCP CH, ‘if a party refuses to cooperate with­
out valid reasons, the court shall take this into account when appraising the 
evidence’. For instance, if a party refuses to reveal a document in its posses­
sion, the court may assume that the document’s contents are as claimed by 
the adverse party.1362 That said, however, the respective state court will as­
sess the evidence freely (Art. 157 CCP CH), and the mere refusal of a party to 
produce evidence will not automatically lead to a reversal of the burden of 
1356  Art. 1467 (3) CCP FR; see also p. 73 supra. 
1357  knoepfLer, 599 et seqq.
1358  Ibid., 600.
1359  ASA Bull. 2005, 469 et seqq.
1360  Ibid., 473.
1361  Art. 163 CCP CH;
1362  BSK­SchmiD, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 2; BK­rüetSchi, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 5.
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proof.1363 This will apply only in case of an abuse of rights, where a recalci­
trant party refers to the lack of evidence of the adverse party (for which it in 
fact is responsible).1364 
2. Third Parties
In contrast to the parties to the arbitration, third parties have a comprehensive 
right to refuse to cooperate in the taking of evidence. This holds true not only 
under Swiss law, but also under the other examined lex arbitri.1365 Although 
third parties have a certain duty to cooperate in the taking of evidence, there 
are many possible conflicts, such as within families or professions.1366 In Swit­
zerland, third parties have both an absolute right to refuse and a limited right 
to refuse.1367 In the former case, the third party may refuse to cooperate alto­
gether; this is not the case in the latter. According to Art. 165 CCP CH, individu­
als with a close relationship to a party (e.g. through marriage, cohabitation, 
shared parenthood, fostering or a parental or sibling relationship) can com­
pletely refuse to cooperate. In order to protect family and partnership, the 
Swiss legislature allows such individuals to avoid a severe conflict of loyalty.1368 
In contrast, Art. 166 CCP CH lists certain cases in which a third party must 
demonstrate the existence of a moral conflict in order to justify a refusal to 
cooperate. These include situations where the taking of evidence would ex­
pose that individual or a close associate to criminal prosecution or civil liabil­
ity (lit. a), or would cause a breach of professional confidentiality (lit. b).1369 
Unlike under Art. 165 CCP CH, where the third party need show only the ful­
filment of one of the conditions listed in this article, without further explana­
tion, Art. 166 CCP CH is stricter in terms of substantiation.1370 Thus, the third 
party must ‘show credibly’ why one of the grounds listed in this article ap­
plies. It is only natural that elaborations in this respect are rather vague, since 
the respective third party wishes to prevent disclosure of the fact in question.1371
1363  DFT 140 III 264, cons. 2.3; BK­rüetSchi, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 7; Sutter­Somm et al.­haSen­
BöhLer, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 5 et seq.; BSK­SchmiD, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 2.
1364  BK­rüetSchi, Art. 164 CCP CH n. 7.
1365  See p. 142 et seq., p. 160 et seq., p. 175 et seq. supra and p. 209 et seq. supra. 
1366  Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Vorbemerkungen Arts. 165­167 CCP CH n. 10.
1367  Arts. 165 and 166 CCP CH.
1368  DFT 2A.599/2006 of 5 Apr. 2007, cons. 4.2; Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Vorbe­
merkungen zu den Arts. 165­167 CCP CH n. 4; BK­rüetSchi, Art. 165 CCP CH n. 2.
1369  This applies, for instance, to lawyers, notaries, doctors, dentists etc. (Art. 321 (1) SCC CH); 
see also BSK­SchmiD, Art. 166 CCP CH n. 5 et seqq.
1370  Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 165 CCP CH n. 23.
1371  BK­rüetSchi, Art. 166 CCP CH n. 3.
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Because third parties per se are not part of the ongoing arbitration, the usual 
measures that may be taken against recalcitrant parties that refuse to coop­
erate in the assessment of evidence are useless.1372 The CCP CH thus sets out 
a broad spectrum of measures that may be implemented against a recalci­
trant third party.1373 However, if the respective refusal is justified based on 
grounds foreseen in Arts. 165 and 166 CCP CH, the state courts cannot consid­
er a certain alleged fact as proven (Art. 162 CCP CH). This article thus limits 
the principle of free assessment of evidence according to Art. 157 CCP CH.1374 
Otherwise, the right of third parties to refuse to cooperate would be point­
less.1375 In contrast, if the refusal is indeed unjustified, the respective state 
court can impose one or more of the following sanctions (Art. 167 CCP CH):
“(1)  If a third party refuses to cooperate without justification, the court may:
a. impose a disciplinary fine up to 1,000 Swiss francs;
b. threaten sanctions under Article 292 SCC;
c. order the use of compulsory measures;
d. charge the third party the costs caused by the refusal.
(2)  The default of a third party has the same consequences as refusing to 
cooperate without a valid reason.
(3)  The third party may challenge the court’s order by way of objection.”
In sanctioning a party, the respective state court must consider the principle 
of proportionality.1376 Therefore, depending on the case, a state court will 
usually begin by imposing indirect coercive measures (lit. a and b)—for exam­
ple, the threat to impose a disciplinary fine—and will enforce it only if the 
third party continues to refuse to comply.1377 The same applies with regard 
to the threat of sanctions under Art. 292 SCC CH (‘contempt of official orders’), 
according to which a penal sanction in the form of a fine of up to CHF 10,000 
may be imposed.1378 In terms of proportionality, a state court should first test 
whether a disciplinary fine (lit. a) is effective enough before making a crimi­
nal complaint and handing the matter over to the criminal authorities.1379 
1372  Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 9.
1373  Art. 167 CCP CH; see also the two cases cited in thorenS­aLaDJem, 546 et seq.
1374  BK­rüetSchi, Art. 162 CCP CH n. 1.
1375  BSK­SchmiD, Art. 162 CCP CH n. 2; Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 162 CCP CH n. 4.
1376  Ibid., Art. 167 CCP CH n. 23; in case of a default of a party and its consequences, see 
Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 25b et seq.
1377  DIKE­higi, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 11; BSK­SchmiD, Art. 162 CCP CH n. 3a; BK­rüetSchi, 
Art. 162 CCP CH n. 5.
1378  Art. 292 i.c.w. 106 (1) SCC CH; Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 14.
1379  BK­rüetSchi, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 8; Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 17.
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Moreover, according to lit. c, a state court order can be enforced by means of 
a direct coercive measure. For instance, third parties can be forced to reveal 
specific documents in their possession, although ‘fishing expeditions’ are 
prohibited.1380 Regarding the inspection of property, assistance from the po­
lice may become necessary to enforce a court order. With regard to witnesses, 
practice shows that in most situations it does not make sense to enforce their 
appearance through police assistance, since the value of their evidence will 
be questionable at best.1381 The mere threat that a recalcitrant third party may 
be charged with any costs ensuing from its refusal (lit. c) may be more effective 
in increasing the pressure to appear.1382 The costs­by­cause principle applies, 
for instance, in circumstances where a court hearing or inspection must be 
rescheduled due to the non­appearance of the respective third party.1383
Finally, Art. 167 (3) CCP CH states that the third party may challenge the 
court’s order by way of objection. While this holds true for Swiss civil pro­
ceedings in general, it seems questionable whether this also applies to court 
assistance in the taking of evidence under Art. 184 (2) PILA CH. This question 
is examined in further detail below.1384
§ 6 Competence of the Juge d’Appui
A. Scope of Discretion
Although Art. 184 (2) PILA CH is not formulated as a facultative provision 
(Kann-Vorschrift), the state courts still have a wide discretion in deciding 
whether and how to grant court assistance in the taking of evidence. The 
admissibility of the request will therefore be examined in various ways.1385 
The same applies under French, English and US law.1386 In this regard, the 
English approach—with its ‘appropriateness threshold’ set out in S. 2 (3) EAA 
1996—and the Intel factors under US law should be emphasised. However, the 
discretion under Swiss law appears to be broader than that under German 
law, where assistance must be granted if the requirements of § 1050 CCP DE 
1380  Ibid.; BK­rüetSchi, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 12.
1381  Ibid.
1382  Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 19.
1383  Ibid.
1384  See p. 259 et seqq. infra.
1385  See e.g. Art. 27 UNCITRAL ML (‘… The court may execute the request …’ (emphasis 
added)); § 1782 (a) (‘The district court … may order him to give his testimony … ‘(em­
phasis added)).
1386  See p. 161, p. 177 et seqq. and p. 211 supra.
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are met.1387 Accordingly, Swiss state courts will analyse procedural require­
ments such as a legitimate interest; the jurisdiction of the court; the capacity to 
be a party and to take legal action; that the case is not subject to proceedings 
elsewhere or the subject of a legally binding decision; and that the advance and 
security for costs have been paid.1388 In addition to the state court’s jurisdiction 
and the admissibility of the evidence request itself, the principle of subsidiarity 
and the examination of the arbitration agreement deserve a closer look. 
First, with regard to the respective territorial and subject­matter jurisdic­
tion, it has previously been shown (see p. 224 supra) that, depending on the 
cantonal law, the ‘state court at the seat of the arbitral tribunal’ is in most 
cases a district court (first instance) or cantonal supreme court (second in­
stance).1389 This also applies to the alternative jurisdiction based on the new 
Art. 185a (2) PILA CH—that is, where a foreign arbitral tribunal directly seeks 
court assistance at the place where the evidence will be taken. If the relevant 
state court considers itself competent, it will examine the evidence request 
more specifically.
In this second step, the court will consider whether the evidence request 
complies with the procedural rules determined by the parties.1390 For in­
stance, if the parties have agreed to settle their dispute based on documenta­
ry evidence only, a request to examine a witness should be denied in order to 
respect the parties’ choice.1391 Likewise, faced with a request involving a for­
eign type of evidence, the respective judge cannot deviate from this, as long 
as it is compatible with Swiss law.1392 Consequently, if the examination of a 
witness has been requested, a state court cannot order the witness to make a 
written statement only.1393 The same applies to a witness examination under 
oath: the state court cannot skip administration of the oath on the grounds 
that it already considers the witness’s testimony to be credible.1394 Finally, the 
taking of evidence itself is a separate process from the assessment of evidence. 
1387  See p. 143 supra.
1388  Art. 59 CCP CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 71; SchneiDer, 60.
1389  Art. 3 CCP CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 70; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1365: see 
e.g. for the Canton of Basle (§ 93 (1) (4) Court Organisation Act BS; Cantonal Supreme 
Court), Berne (Art. 8 (1) Introductory Act BE; District Court), Geneva (Art. 86 (1) Judi­
ciary Organisation Act GE; District Court) and Zurich (§ 32 Court and Authorities 
Organisation Act ZH; District Court).
1390  Art. 182 PILA CH; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 76; waLter et al., 165.
1391  See e.g. the standard Swiss Rules arbitration clause.
1392  CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 15; see also the new possibility to consider foreign 
forms of evidence (Art. 184 (3) PILA CH); p. 242 supra.
1393  Art. 190 (2) CCP CH; gökSu, n. 339.
1394  SchneiDer, 60, 65; waLter et al., 168.
251 § 6 Competence of the Juge d’Appui
State courts therefore should not examine the admissibility, relevance, ma­
teriality and weight of evidence, which falls within the exclusive competence 
of the arbitral tribunal.1395 
B. Principle of Subsidiarity 
As a basic principle of civil procedure, court assistance will be granted only 
if the party that submits the request has a legitimate interest.1396 Thus, in 
addition to considering jurisdictional matters and the taking of evidence it­
self, the respective state court must examine whether court assistance is in­
deed ‘necessary’.1397 Although the mere fact that an arbitral tribunal (or a 
party with the arbitral tribunal’s consent) has requested court assistance in 
the taking of evidence seems to indicate that assistance is indeed necessary, 
the respective state court must nonetheless examine this requirement. It 
seems clear that state courts cannot be approached merely because the arbi­
tral tribunal considers that the taking of evidence would be inconvenient and 
burdensome for it.1398 
By contrast, it remains doubtful whether court assistance in the taking 
of evidence will be considered ‘necessary’ if the arbitral tribunal could take 
the evidence itself, but only with disproportionately high effort. On the one 
hand, there is no similar provision to S. 44 (5) EAA 1996, describing scenarios 
in which the arbitral tribunal ‘has no power or is unable for the time being to 
act effectively’.1399 On the other hand, no statute or case law expressly men­
tions an ‘exhaustion requirement’, such as that set out in Malev Hungarian 
Airlines.1400 In some situations where a witness or expert witness is located 
in a foreign jurisdiction, it may seem unlikely from the outset that this person 
will testify. In order to be certain, the arbitral tribunal must at least attempt 
to summon the witness. In Swiss legal doctrine, this issue is not undisputed. 
waLter et al. and gökSu argue that as long as it is ‘legally’ possible to take 
evidence, the arbitral tribunal cannot resort to state courts for assistance.1401 
1395  Art. 9 (1) IBA Rules; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 71; gökSu, n. 337; VittoZ, 921 et 
seq.; waLter et al., 166; see also p. 107 supra.
1396  Art. 59 (2) (a) CCP CH.
1397  ‘If the assistance of state judiciary authorities is necessary for the taking of evidence …’ 
(emphasis added) (Art. 184 (2) PILA CH).
1398  gökSu, n. 298.
1399  See p. 178 et seq. supra. 
1400  Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992).
1401  waLter et al., 161. They are arguing nonetheless for a ‘reasonable interpretation’, 
admitting that seeking court assistance is already justified if the arbitral tribunal 
‘might fail’ to take the evidence; see also gökSu, 298 et seq.
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Consequently, if there is a way for the arbitral tribunal to obtain the evidence 
itself, court assistance must be denied. By contrast, the majority of authors 
take the view that significant hurdles in the taking of evidence will justify a 
request for the assistance of state courts.1402 This view deserves approval, for 
the following reasons.
Put simply, the overall aim of Art. 184 (2) PILA CH is to assist in the taking 
of evidence in arbitration.1403 This has been reinforced by the new Art. 185a 
PILA CH, which aims to assist even foreign arbitral tribunals in this regard. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the threshold for such assistance should 
not be set too high. In particular, as already seen under US law, there is no 
strict ‘exhaustion requirement’; it is merely at the discretion of the respective 
state court to grant or deny assistance.1404 However, this does not preclude 
the respective state court from examining whether the arbitral tribunal 
could not otherwise gather the evidence in question. This applies in particu­
lar prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal, when the emergency arbitra­
tor may be unable to provide sufficient support in gathering evidence.1405 In 
addition, in order to prove that court assistance in the taking of evidence is in 
fact necessary, the request should include an explanation of why the assis­
tance is sought and what the arbitral tribunal has already done in an attempt 
to gather it.1406 In doing so, court assistance under Art. 184 (2) PILA CH is 
limited to cases in which this is indeed necessary. 
C. Examination of the Arbitration Agreement
Since Art. 184 (2) PILA CH serves only to assist in the taking of evidence in 
arbitration, one might ask whether the state courts must examine the valid­
ity of the arbitration agreement. In this regard, waLter et al. suggest that the 
arbitration agreement should be examined in order to avoid inadvertently 
supporting an ‘unlawful arbitral proceeding’.1407 This should take place 
through a summary examination, irrespective how hard or time consuming 
1402  BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 57; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 72; 
VittoZ, 922; SchneiDer, 53, 56; rüeDe/haDenfeLDt, 265.
1403  See also the state court’s assistance regarding interim measures (Art. 183 (2) PILA CH) 
and other assistance (Art. 185 PILA CH).
1404  Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992).
1405  See e.g. Art. 29 ICC Rules; Art. 43 Swiss Rules; Rule 30 SIAC Rules.
1406  See also the suggestion for Swiss domestic arbitration of DIKE­Brunner/Steininger, 
Art. 375 CCP CH n. 7.
1407  waLter et al., 165.
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this might be.1408 By contrast, the prevailing view in Swiss legal doctrine is 
that when assisting in arbitration in accordance with Art. 184 (2) PILA CH, the 
state court should not examine the arbitration agreement.1409 Art. 179 (3) 
PILA CH provides that a state court presented with a request to appoint an 
arbitrator must proceed as requested, ‘unless a summary examination shows 
that no arbitration agreement exists between the parties’.1410 
The prevailing opinion deserves thus approval. As regards proceedings 
in which the juge d’appui comes into play, Art. 179 (3) PILA CH is the only pro­
vision that expressly states that the arbitration agreement can be examined 
on a prima facie basis. As under German, French and English law, this provi­
sion emphasises the so­called ‘competence­competence’ principle, accord­
ing to which the arbitral tribunal shall itself decide on its jurisdiction.1411 
Since the respective juge d’appui examines the arbitration agreement on a 
purely prima facie basis—that is, without expressing any opinion on the va­
lidity or consequence of the arbitration agreement—Art. 179 (3) PILA CH 
serves to prevent a party from engaging in arbitration only if there is not even 
the slightest suggestion of the existence of an arbitration agreement.1412 Con­
sequently, if the Swiss legislature had wanted to equip the juge d’appui with 
the same powers as regards court assistance in the taking of evidence (Art. 
184 (2) PILA CH), it would have done so expressly. 
Finally, one cannot speak of ‘unlawful arbitral proceedings’ if court as­
sistance has been requested with the consent of the arbitral tribunal and 
there has been no plea of lack of jurisdiction.1413 The situation is different 
regarding § 1782, which arguably may not apply to international arbitration 
at all.1414 Special scrutiny will therefore be paid to the second Intel factor, 
taking into account the nature of the foreign tribunal as a first­instance deci­
sion maker whose decisions are subject to review.1415
1408  Ibid.
1409  Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1365; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 71; ZK-Oetiker, 
Art. 184 piLa ch n. 71; BSk­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 62; CR­Bucher, 
Art. 184 PILA CH n. 13; girSBerger/VoSer, n. 1045; gökSu, n. 336; rüeDe/haDen­
feLDt, 266; Bucher, n. 217; SchneiDer, 59.
1410  Art. 173 (3) PILA CH; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1365; ZK­oetiker, Art. 186 PILA CH 
n. 116 et seq.
1411  Art. 186 (1) PILA CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 179 PILA CH n. 71; for the German, French and 
English approach see also p. 145 et seq., 162 et seq. and 179 et seq. supra.
1412  DFT 118 Ia 20, cons. 5b; ZK­oetiker, Art. 179 PILA CH n. 71.
1413  Art. 184 (2) and 186 (2) PILA CH; SchneiDer, 59; contra waLter et al., 165.
1414  See p. 209 supra. 
1415  See p. 196 supra.
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In sum, a state court whose assistance is sought under Art. 184 (2) PILA CH 
should not examine the arbitration agreement. This examination forms part 
of a separate procedure, in which a party can raise a plea of lack of jurisdic­
tion prior to any defence on the merits.1416 A detailed examination can also 
be conducted at the recognition and enforcement stage.1417
D. Decision on Costs
According to the CCP CH, procedural costs include the court costs and the 
parties’ costs.1418 Court costs include the expenses of taking evidence; while 
the parties’ costs cover legal representation.1419 Procedural costs are deter­
mined by the cantons, which set the tariffs.1420 As a general rule, the court 
will decide on the procedural costs in the final decision; the costs are normal­
ly charged to the unsuccessful party. However, the CCP CH remains silent on 
the issue of the costs of court assistance in the taking of evidence, where 
neither party is successful or unsuccessful. 
It therefore seems appropriate that the Swiss courts will charge the re­
questing party with the costs of taking evidence. This will either be the arbi­
tral tribunal itself or a party to the arbitration. In the former case, the arbitral 
tribunal will pay the costs and can allocate them accordingly in the arbitral 
proceedings.1421 In the latter case, the parties will most likely be charged with 
the costs subject to the definitive decision of the costs by the arbitral tribunal.1422
The PILA CH includes no provisions on an advance on costs, as in domes­
tic arbitration pursuant to Art. 378 CCP CH. Nevertheless, the arbitral tribu­
nal commonly orders an advance on the presumed costs of the arbitration 
and, for instance, assistance proceedings before state courts.1423 Even in the 
absence of any institutional arbitration rule in this respect,1424 the arbitral 
tribunal has the authority to order an advance on costs based on its right to 
1416  Art. 186 (2) PILA CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 186 PILA CH n. 55 et seqq.; BSK­Schott/cour­
VoiSier, Art. 186 PILA CH n. 88 et seqq.
1417  See p. 276 et seq. infra.
1418  Art. 95 (1) CCP CH.
1419  Arts. 95 (2) (c) and (3) (b) CCP CH.
1420  Art. 96 CCP CH.
1421  BSK­maBiLLarD, Art. 185 PILA CH n. 18; gökSu, n. 325; BSK­haBegger, Art. 375 CCP 
CH n. 81; BK­Boog/Stark­traBer, Art. 375 CCP CH n. 133.
1422  BSK­haBegger, Art. 375 CCP CH n. 81 with reference to an unpublished decision of the 
District Court of Zurich, FR160295­L/U of 27. May 2016.
1423  Berger/keLLerhaLS, 1564; BSK­haBegger, Art. 378 CCP CH n. 2.
1424  See e.g. Art. 43 UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 41 Swiss Rules; Art. 37 ICC Rules.
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determine the arbitral procedure (Art. 182 (2) PILA CH), or more generally 
from the legal relationship between the parties and the arbitral tribunal.1425 
If the advance is not paid, it may be appropriate to suspend the proceedings 
and, upon informing the parties of the consequences of non­payment, order 
their termination.1426
§ 7 Appellate Remedies, Recognition and  
Enforcement
A. Introduction
With regard to whether the parties to arbitration and third parties can appeal 
a decision to grant or deny a request pursuant to Art. 184 (2) PILA CH, a clear 
distinction must be drawn between the state court proceeding according to 
Art. 184 (2) PILA (i.e. the taking of evidence itself) and the challenge to the 
arbitral award. First off, the issue should be treated by examining the appel­
late remedies against a state court order. Both the parties and concerned 
third parties (and even the arbitral tribunal itself) may have an interest in 
directly appealing this order. This might happen if a third party invokes a 
privilege and the respective state court either allows or denies it. 
Second, one might ask whether the parties could also challenge a state 
court order indirectly by challenging the arbitral award—for instance, based 
on alleged violation of procedural rules during court assistance in the taking 
of evidence.1427 Finally, it remains to be seen whether this can be addressed 
during the recognition and enforcement stage. 
B. Challenge of the Decision of the Juge d’Appui
In both Swiss domestic and international arbitration, it remains questionable 
whether decisions concerning court assistance in the taking of evidence may 
be appealed.1428 This question has been answered differently in different 
countries. Although the CCP DE provides that a remedy cannot be sought 
1425  Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1565.
1426  See e.g. Art. 43 (4) UNCITRAL Rules; Berger/keLLerhaLS, 1569 et seqq.
1427  Regarding the situation where parties claim a violation of the right to be heard because 
the arbitral tribunal has refused to seek court assistance in the taking of evidence, see 
DFT 4P.217/1992 of 15 Mar. 1993, cons. 7b, in: ASA Bull. 1993, 408.
1428  For an overview regarding the situation in Swiss domestic arbitration, see BK­pfiSterer, 
Art. 356 CCP CH n. 19 et seqq.
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against an order pursuant to § 1050 CCP DE, this nevertheless appears to be 
possible if a request is denied.1429 The same applies under French law: de­
pending on the proceeding and the point at which an evidence request is 
granted, remedies are possible either against a decision denying an evidence 
request only or against a decision granting or denying such request.1430 By 
comparison, according to S. 44 EAA 1996, the leave of the court is required to 
appeal any order under S. 44 and (most certainly) S. 43 EAA 1996. This provi­
sion, which is unique in international arbitration, aims to ensure a high de­
gree of finality and sets strict boundaries to any intervention by state courts.1431
Under Swiss law, however, it is doubtful whether possible appellate rem­
edies may be sought. Although it has been shown that a state court whose 
assistance is sought under Art. 184 (2) PILA CH will proceed according to the 
CCP CH, the CCP CH does not apply with regard to appellate procedures. This 
is because the decision to grant or deny court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence is rendered by a sole (cantonal) instance, by either a district court (first 
instance) or a cantonal supreme court (second instance).1432 As a result, its 
decision is not subject to review by a higher cantonal instance. However, one 
might ask whether the parties can appeal to the SFT under the Federal Su­
preme Court Act (FSCA CH).1433 In such case the objection would have to be 
filed within 30 days of notification of the state court’s decision.1434 Subject to 
a different ruling of the instructing judge, an objection in civil matters has no 
suspensive effect.1435 Moreover, as there is no specific statutory basis for this, 
the minimum threshold of CHF 30,000 as the value in dispute does not apply 
to arbitration; otherwise, the parties could be deprived of their right to chal­
lenge an arbitral award in cases where this threshold is not reached.1436
1429  See p. 146 et seqq. supra.
1430  See p. 163 et seq. supra.
1431  See p. 180 et seq. supra. 
1432  Art. 356 (2) (c) CCP CH; FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7377; BSK­weBer/Stecher, Art. 356 
CCP CH n. 13; gökSu, n. 306; CR­Bucher, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 14; Berger/keLLerhaLS, 
n. 1363; Arroyo­Veit, Art. 184 PILA CH n. 73; see e.g. for the Canton of Basle (§ 93 (1) (4) 
Court Organisation Act BS; Cantonal Supreme Court), Berne (Art. 8 (1) Introductory 
Act BE; District Court), Geneva (Art. 86 (1) Judiciary Organisation Act GE; District 
Court) and Zurich (§ 32 Court and Authorities Organisation Act ZH; District Court).
1433  gökSu, n. 316.
1434  Art. 100 (1) FSCA CH; for the formal requirements see Art. 42 FSCA CH; kauf­
mann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.35.
1435  Art. 103 (1) and (3) FSCA CH; but see as regards third parties p. 260 infra; Bracher, n. 529.
1436  Left open by the SFT in DFT 142 III 521, cons. 2.3.5; DFT 4A_576/2012 of 28 Feb. 2013, 
cons. 2; DFT 4A_110/2012 of 9 Oct. 2012, cons. 1; but see the new Art. 77(1) FSCA CH; 
FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7204; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 10; CR­Buch­
er, Art. 191 PILA CH n. 17; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.44. 
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As far as can be seen, however, this question has not been answered clearly 
in Swiss statutory law, in case law or in legal doctrine.1437 Although the juge 
d’appui can support the arbitral proceedings in various ways, only Art. 180 (3) 
PILA CH refers to the finality of a decision to challenge an arbitrator. Accord­
ingly, the juge d’appui can make a final decision as long as the parties have not 
made provisions for this challenge procedure.1438 The SFT has reasoned that 
the finality of this provision can be explained by the fact that the Swiss legis­
lature limited the possibility to make such a challenge, to ensure the effec­
tiveness of arbitration.1439 Similarly, regarding the appointment of an arbi­
trator, the SFT held that if a state court refuses to appoint an arbitrator, the 
parties can object directly to the SFT, because the decision is final and de 
facto makes arbitration impossible.1440 However, if an arbitrator has been 
appointed, no objection is possible. The SFT justified this by stating that there 
is limited opportunity to appeal in arbitration, to ensure its independence 
and effectiveness.1441 Rather, the parties can challenge the arbitrator’s juris­
diction in the subsequent arbitration. 
Apart from that, no provision of the PILA CH provides further guidance 
about a possible appeal. However, since Art. 184 (2) PILA CH states that the 
state court shall ‘apply its own law’—that is, the CCP CH—the respective pro­
visions of the CCP CH regarding domestic arbitration can (largely) be applied 
by analogy.1442 
As regards the taking of evidence, an unpublished decision of the SFT in 
Swiss domestic arbitration provides some insight on the finality of state court 
decisions.1443 In this case, a party to the arbitration requested the production 
of certain documents held by a third party, the Federal Roads Office. The 
1437  But see markuS, 504 et seqq; DIKE­Stacher, Art. 356 CCP CH n. 14; BSK­pfiSterer, 
Art. 356 CCP CH n. 21. 
1438  DFT 138 III 270, cons. 2.2.1.
1439  Ibid.; DFT 128 III 330, cons. 2.2; markuS, 514. However, in cases of a violation of equal 
treatment or the right to be heard as well as if there is a denial of access to justice, 
oetiker suggests allowing an objection in civil matters to the SFT (Arts. 72 et seqq. 
FSCA CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 180 PILA CH n. 41; see also Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 915; 
BSK­peter/Brunner, Art. 180 PILA CH n. 35; girSBerger/VoSer, n. 775).
1440  DFT 4A_215/2008 of 23 Sept. 2008, cons. 1.1; DFT 121 I 81, cons. 1; DFT 118 Ia 20, cons. 2; 
see also for domestic arbitration DFT 141 III 444, cons. 2.3; hurni, 299 et seqq.
1441  DFT 115 II 294, cons. 2 et seq.; contra markuS, 506 et seqq.; for domestic arbitration, 
see also DFT 142 III 230, cons. 1.4.4. This decision states that an objection against the 
appointment of an arbitrator by a state court is possible only where a state court de­
cides at the same time about the appointment of the arbitrator and the request to 
challenge it (with reference to DFT 5P.362/2005 of 19 May 2006, cons. 1).
1442  This is expressly stated in Art. 179 (2) PILA CH.
1443  DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 Jan. 2013; ASA Bull. 2017, 616 et seq.
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Federal Roads Office refused the request, based on professional confidenti­
ality; so the arbitral tribunal requested court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence. The Cantonal Supreme Court of Ticino granted the arbitral tribunal’s 
request and ordered the production of the documents. After the Federal 
Roads Office appealed, the SFT stated that since the Cantonal Supreme Court 
of Ticino has decided as the sole instance, its decision was final and binding, 
and an objection in civil matters to the SFT thus was not possible. In its very 
short reasoning, the SFT did not elaborate further on why it refused the ob­
jection; however, this may be because the Federal Roads Office is only part of 
a federal department, with no independent right to object.1444 In any case, 
this decision has various implications—first and foremost for third parties, 
but also for the parties to arbitration. 
1. Third Parties
Unsurprisingly, the decision was criticised soon after it was rendered.1445 In 
particular, its critics pointed out that it deprived third parties of the right to 
object based only on the fact that the request arose from arbitral proceed­
ings and not state court proceedings. In contrast, the following discussion 
will show that in theory, there is nothing to prevent a third party from re­
sorting directly to the SFT by means of an objection in civil matters against 
a state court order forcing it to assist an arbitral tribunal in the taking of 
evidence.1446 
a. Legitimate Interest 
First, the third party must show that it is particularly affected by the state 
court order and that there is a legitimate interest to amend or quash it. As 
previously discussed (see p. 250 supra), Art. 167 (3) CCP CH provides for the 
possibility to challenge a court order forcing a third party to cooperate in the 
taking of evidence by way of objection. This immediate objection is justified 
by the fact that the sanctions provided in Art. 167 (1) CCP CH to force a third 
party to reveal evidence are a strong intrusion into its legal status.1447 This is 
even more so the case since the third party per se does not participate in the 
ongoing proceedings between the parties to the arbitration, and an objection 
in civil matters is its only possibility to object. In order to avoid any delay to 
1444  Art. 76 (2) FSCA CH e contrario; DFT 142 II 324, cons. 1.3.1. 
1445  BeyeLer, note on DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 Jan. 2013; gökSu, note on DFT 4A_214/2012 of 
10 Jan. 2013, 376.
1446  Arts. 72 FSCA CH et seqq.
1447  BK­rüetSchi, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 20.
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the proceedings, a third party can object only to the sanctions imposed on it 
and not merely to an order to assist in the taking of evidence without the 
threat of sanctions pursuant to Art. 167 (1) CCP CH.1448 
As previously discussed, an objection in civil matters has no suspensive 
effect, unless the instructing judge rules otherwise.1449 In this particular con­
text, it seems that such suspensive effect should be affirmed; otherwise, the 
third party’s right to refuse to cooperate would be undermined.1450 
More generally, the legitimate interest to object also follows from 
Art. 29a Const. CH, according to which every person has the right to have 
their case determined by a judicial authority, subject only to certain excep­
tions set out in federal or cantonal law. As discussed below, there seems to be 
no exception regarding third parties. Thus, if the conditions for making an 
objection in civil matters to the SFT are met, the possibility to object should 
also be allowed, against the background of the right of access to justice.1451 If 
the parties to the arbitration have expressly excluded any intervention by 
state courts, this can nonetheless be ignored, since third parties are not 
bound by any agreement between the parties. 
b. Objection Against an Interim Decision 
Second, an objection in civil matters is possible only against certain kinds of 
decisions. As regards arbitral proceedings, this objection can usually be made 
only directly against the arbitral award, based on the very limited grounds set 
out in Arts. 190­192 PILA CH.1452 Since a state court decision on assistance in 
the taking of evidence is not an arbitral award, it cannot be challenged based 
on Art. 77 (1) (a) FSCA CH. Thus, the question arises as to whether this could be 
qualified as a final or interim decision. The distinction is important, since in­
terim decisions are usually challenged only along with the final decision.1453 
According to the SFT’s broad interpretation of final decisions, it is sufficient 
that a proceeding has come to an end in a purely formal way, irrespective if 
this has happened for procedural or material reasons.1454 One might think 
that this might apply to the situation in question, where assistance is sought in 
1448  Ibid., 21; Bracher, n. 468.
1449  See p. 257 supra; Art. 103 (1) and (3) FSCA CH; Bracher, n. 529.
1450  Ibid.
1451  gökSu, note on DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 Jan. 2013, 376.
1452  Art. 77 (1) (a) FSCA CH.
1453  BSK­uhLmann, Art. 90 FSCA CH n. 1.
1454  DFT 141 III 395, cons. 2.2; DFT 133 III 629, cons. 2.2.
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a separate (state court) proceeding.1455 However, because court assistance in 
the taking of evidence is merely one procedural stage of the arbitration, the 
state court decision may be qualified as an interim decision.1456 Accordingly, 
such decisions can be challenged only along with the final decision, except 
where the interim decision has been independently notified.1457 If so, it can 
be challenged if, for instance, ‘it threatens to cause irreparable harm’.1458 This 
would be the case, for example, if someone were ordered to reveal documents 
which are protected by professional confidentiality.1459 
c. Requirement of the Lower Court
Third, a closer look at the cantonal instance that assisted in the taking of evi­
dence (i.e. the lower court) is required. According to Art. 75 (2) FSCA CH, an 
objection in civil matters is possible only against decisions of higher canton­
al courts, which decide as appeal authorities, except in cases where a federal 
act appoints a single cantonal instance (lit. a). As a consequence, it remains 
questionable whether decisions of lower cantonal courts can also be chal­
lenged before the SFT when those courts act as the sole cantonal instance.1460 
Indeed, in most of Switzerland’s 26 cantons, cantonal law appoints lower 
cantonal courts to act as the sole instance to assist in the taking of evidence.1461 
In DFT 141 III 444, this question was answered in the affirmative.1462 There­
fore, at least with regard to a third party’s right to object, one may conclude 
that this should also apply to court assistance in the taking of evidence in in­
ternational arbitration which is ordered by a sole lower cantonal court.1463 
This is even more so the case because the intention behind Art. 75 (2) FSCA CH 
could not have been to allow objections to be made to the SFT only within the 
ten cantons in which higher cantonal courts assist in the taking of evidence.1464
1455  BSK­kLett/Leemann, Art. 77 FSCA CH n. 1c; contra markuS, 517.
1456  DFT 5A_171/2009 of 15 Oct. 2009, cons. 1.5; Bracher, n. 526; BSK­kLett/Leemann, 
Art. 77 FSCA CH n. 1c.
1457  Art. 93 (1) FSCA CH.
1458  Art. 93 (1) (a) FSCA CH.
1459  DFT 4A_64/2011 of 1 Sept. 2011, cons. 3.1; DFT 129 II 183, cons. 3.2.2.
1460  DFT 141 III 444, cons. 2.2.5.
1461  DFT 141 III 444, cons. 2.2.4.1.
1462  Ibid., cons. 2.3.
1463  gökSu, note on DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 Jan. 2013, 376.
1464  For an overview of the competent authorities see BSK­weBer­Stecher, Art. 356 CCP 
CH n. 21; see also the database of Swiss localities and courts. In this respect, it is note­
worthy that the vast majority only appoints the competent court to assist in the taking 
of evidence within domestic arbitration. Against this background, there is no distinc­
tion made between domestic and international arbitration (gökSu, n. 306).
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d. Result
To sum up, there is no reason why third parties faced with an order to assist in 
arbitral proceedings cannot make an objection in civil matters to the SFT.1465 
If there is a legitimate reason and a threat of irreparable harm can be shown, 
an objection can be initiated even if the order was rendered by a (sole) lower 
cantonal instance. However, in light of the previous discussion, it remains 
highly doubtful whether this would also be the case in international arbitra­
tion.1466 Thus far, the question has not been confirmed in either domestic ar­
bitration or international arbitration. There are good reasons to believe that 
the SFT’s decision will have little influence in practice, as it is unpublished (i.e. 
it is not considered a decision of ‘fundamental importance’).1467 It is therefore 
hoped that the SFT will change its mind and allow objections in civil matters 
in this context. In this regard, a glimmer of hope may be seen in a recent deci­
sion of the District Court of Zurich, in which explicit reference was made to 
the possibility to make an objection in civil matters to the SFT.1468 However, it 
is still doubtful whether the SFT would consider such objections admissible. 
2. Parties
The situation is different as regards the parties to the arbitration and whether 
they can object to a state court order. They might seek to do so if the respective 
state court refuses to take evidence because privilege applies or if there was a 
violation of the agreed procedural rules during the taking of evidence (e.g. if a 
state court allowed cross­examination where this was excluded by the parties).
As previously discussed (see p. 261 supra), the fact that court assistance 
might be granted by a lower cantonal court (Art. 75 (2) FSCA CH) is not problem­
atic. One might therefore ask whether the foregoing discussion in relation to 
third parties may also apply to the parties themselves. In this regard, the case 
law of the SFT and other conditions, such as the existence of a legitimate inter­
est and the conditions to object to interim decisions, are of particular interest.
a. Case Law of the SFT
First, it is worth examining whether the case law of the SFT provides further 
guidance. In this regard, the aforementioned decision of the SFT regarding 
1465  Contra BSK­kLett/Leemann, Art. 77 FSCA CH n. 1b.
1466  DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 Jan. 2013.
1467  The fact that the decision is formulated in the form of ‘that’­sentences (Dass-Ent-
scheid) strenghtens this assumption; Art. 58 (1) Federal Supreme Court Regulations.
1468  Unpublished decision of the District Court of Zurich, FR160295­L/U of 27. May 2016, 
cited in BSK­haBegger, Art. 375 PILA CH n. 76a.
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the Canton of Ticino states only that it is final and that an objection to the SFT 
is therefore excluded.1469 Unfortunately, the SFT has not further examined 
the party’s authorisation to appeal.1470 With regard to the appointment and 
challenge of arbitrators, it has further been shown that the SFT usually allows 
an objection only if the state court has refused the respective request.1471 
Otherwise, this would undermine the parties’ original choice to settle their 
dispute through arbitration rather than through state court litigation. 
At this point, one might ask whether the case law regarding the appoint­
ment and challenge of arbitrators could be applied to court assistance in the 
taking of evidence. This seems to be questionable at best. The SFT allows ob­
jections to be made only in circumstances where the parties would otherwise 
have been forced to settle their dispute through state court litigation. In con­
trast, the taking of evidence is a procedural part of arbitration; if a state court 
refuses to assist, the arbitration continues and the arbitral tribunal can none­
theless render an arbitral award. As this is an interim result, the case law of 
the SFT would suggest that the parties cannot challenge a decision of the juge 
d’appui regarding the taking of evidence.1472
b. Legitimate Interest 
Second, the question arises as to whether the parties even have a legitimate 
interest (Art. 76 (1) FSCA CH) in directly objecting to the state court’s decision. 
According to Art. 76 (1) (b) FSCA CH, a party must show that it is particularly 
affected by a decision and that there is a legitimate interest to amend or quash 
it. In this regard, it is obvious that the parties cannot have a legitimate interest 
if court assistance in the taking of evidence is granted as requested.
Admittedly, a party seeking to challenge a state court decision to deny as­
sistance in the taking of evidence may be particularly affected because, for in­
stance, that evidence may be crucial to substantiate its claims in the arbitration. 
As a result, this party would be disproportionately affected by the refusal.1473 
However, the crux concerns whether this constitutes a legitimate interest. 
There are two conceivable situations in which there is a legitimate inter­
est to amend or quash a state court decision to deny court assistance in the 
taking of evidence: where the arbitral tribunal either gives its consent to the 
1469  DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 Jan. 2013.
1470  See also thorenS­aLaDJem, 536.
1471  See p. 258 supra.
1472  See also BSK­kLett/Leemann, Art. 77 FSCA CH n. 1c in fine as regards Swiss domestic 
arbitration. 
1473  BSK­kLett, Art. 76 FSCA CH n. 4a.
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objection or denies it without a valid reason. In the former case, one must 
bear in mind that the arbitral tribunal is in charge of the arbitral proceedings 
in general and the taking of evidence in particular. This is evident from the 
fact that the arbitral tribunal’s prior consent must be obtained in order to 
seek court assistance in the taking of evidence.1474 The arbitral tribunal has 
full discretion to assess the importance of a piece of evidence. As a conse­
quence, a party that wishes to challenge a state court decision regarding the 
taking of evidence must obtain the arbitral tribunal’s consent before doing 
so. Otherwise, there is no legitimate interest to object. In most cases, due to 
procedural economy and because the arbitral tribunal can render an arbitral 
award without the evidence in question, the request to object will be denied. 
However, if the evidence is crucial to the case at hand, the arbitral tribunal 
may allow an objection to be made against the state court’s refusal to grant 
assistance in the taking of evidence. In this way, the overall intention of the 
SFT to limit the possibility to appeal in (domestic and international) arbitra­
tion and the principle of procedural economy may be sustained.1475
With regard to an unjustified denial of consent to object against a state 
court decision, the case law of the SFT merits a closer look. According to the 
PILA CH, the grounds to challenge an arbitral award are very limited (e.g. a 
violation of equal treatment or the right to be heard).1476 The SFT has held that 
the right to be heard will be violated if, for instance, the arbitral tribunal de­
nies a request to seek court assistance without a valid reason—for example, 
where the evidence in question is relevant to the outcome of the case.1477 As a 
result, this could be applied by analogy to the question of whether parties can 
challenge a state court decision denying court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence. Consequently, the SFT should allow parties to object where the impor­
tance of the evidence justifies this course of action and the arbitral tribunal’s 
denial of consent to object is unjustified. This is also appropriate in the inter­
ests of procedural economy. It would thus seem better to try to gather crucial 
evidence in the arbitral proceedings themselves, rather than by subsequently 
challenging the arbitral award based on a violation of the right to be heard 
because the arbitral tribunal refused to gather that evidence itself.1478 
1474  Art. 184 (2) PILA CH; see also p. 233 supra.
1475  DFT 142 III 230, cons. 1.4.2.
1476  Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH.
1477  DFT 4P.217/1992 of 15 Mar. 1993, cons. 7b, in: ASA Bull. 1993, 408.
1478  See p. 270 et seqq. infra. 
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c. Objection Against an Interim Decision
Third, reference may be made to what has previously been discussed with 
regard to third parties (see p. 260 et seq. supra). Accordingly, one must 
demonstrate the existence of a threat of irreparable harm in order to object 
against an interim decision (Art. 93 (1) (a) FSCA CH). Apart from this, the pos­
sibility for a party to object against an interim decision ordering a third party 
to produce evidence has thus far been discussed only in state court proceed­
ings. While under Art. 167 (3) CCP CH the right of third parties to object is 
expressly stated, nothing is said about the parties to the arbitration. Brach­
er, rüetSchi and haSenBöhLer therefore argue that in general, the parties 
do not have an independent right to appeal a state court order on third­party 
cooperation in the taking of evidence.1479 As an exception, an objection may 
be possible if there is a threat of irreparable harm.1480 This might apply, for 
instance, where the court refuses to examine a terminally ill witness because 
of alleged privilege or where a decisive piece of evidence might be lost or 
destroyed.1481 There is no reason why this practice could not also be applied 
to an objection in civil matters before the SFT in arbitration. 
d. Result
By analysing the case law of the SFT regarding other proceedings in which the 
decision of the juge d’appui can be challenged, the foregoing examination has 
shown that there seem to be no similarities that would justify this possibility 
in the case of court assistance in the taking of evidence. With regard to the 
legitimate interest to object, the parties either need the consent of the arbitral 
tribunal or must show that such consent was refused without a valid reason. 
Finally, in exceptional cases, an objection in civil matters may be initiated by 
showing a threat of irreparable harm if the objection were denied.
All told, it may be concluded that the SFT will usually have plausible 
reasons to reject an objection in civil matters against a state court decision on 
the taking of evidence. However, this is not always the case. Accordingly, 
since the SFT seems to be rather strict in this respect, the respective party—
with the consent of the arbitral tribunal—must sufficiently substantiate why 
it considers such an objection appropriate. 
1479  Bracher, n. 469; BK­rüetSchi, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 22; Sutter­Somm et al.­haSen­
BöhLer, Art. 167 CCP CH n. 33.
1480  For state court proceedings see Art. 319 (b) (2.) CCP CH.
1481  DFT 4P.335/2006 of 27 Feb. 2007, cons. 1.2.4; FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7377; BK­rüetSchi, 
Art. 167 CCP CH n. 22.
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C. Challenge of the Arbitral Award
The parties may also consider challenging a court order on assistance in the 
taking of evidence indirectly, by challenging the arbitral award. This might 
be based on the fact that either the arbitral tribunal refused to allow such 
assistance to be sought or that the procedural rules agreed by the parties 
were violated during this process. Such matters may be categorised as either 
unequal treatment or violation of the right to be heard, which is a central 
pillar of international arbitration.1482 The following thus examines how par­
ties can challenge this assessment by challenging the arbitral award. 
In general, violations of due process must be addressed immediately—if 
possible, during the arbitral proceedings.1483 It would be against good faith 
to challenge a violation of procedural rules only in the proceeding to set aside 
an arbitral award if this had been possible at an earlier stage.1484 In particu­
lar, as regards an alleged violation of the right to be heard, it is considered 
abusive to invoke this only where the party is about to lose the case.1485 For 
instance, the SFT rejected a party’s claim that the right to be heard had been 
violated based on the fact that it had been unable to cross­examine a key 
witness.1486 The SFT stated that the claim had not been brought up during the 
arbitral proceedings and the party had not tried to seek court assistance.1487 
In the ongoing revision of the PILA CH’s 12th chapter, ‘immediate recourse’ 
is recognised in a new proposed para. 4 to Art. 182. Accordingly, a party 
which continues the arbitral proceedings without claiming a recognised vi­
olation of the procedural rules cannot invoke that violation at a later date—for 
example, by trying to set aside the arbitral award.1488
1. Conditions According to the FSCA CH
To promote the efficiency and effectiveness of arbitration in Switzerland, the 
Swiss legislature significantly limited the grounds for appeal.1489 Only arbitral 
1482  DFT 4A_214/2013 of 5 Aug. 2013, cons. 4.1; DFT 4A_538/2012 of 17 Jan. 2013, cons. 5.1; 
Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1356.
1483  Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 75; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.170.
1484  DFT 135 III 334, cons. 2.2; DFT 119 II 386, cons. 1a; CR­Bucher, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 40; 
BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 70. 
1485  DFT 4A_438/2018 of 17 Jan. 2019, cons. 4.3; DFT 143 III 578, cons. 3.1.2; DFT 136 III 605, 
cons. 3.2.2.
1486  DFT 4A_12/2017 of 19 Sept. 2019, cons. 4.2.2 (= DFT 143 III 578). 
1487  Ibid.
1488  FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018), 7197; see also Art. 373 (6) CCP CH.
1489  ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 1; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 2a; kauf­
mann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.01.
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awards rendered by an arbitral tribunal seated in Switzerland may be chal­
lenged according to Art. 190 PILA CH.1490 In general, the arbitral award is fi­
nal upon notification and enjoys full legal force, and there is no need for a 
separate enforcement procedure.1491 Accordingly, court intervention by the 
SFT is kept to an absolute minimum and the opportunity to examine the facts 
of the respective case is strictly curtailed.1492 In addition, the parties cannot 
claim a direct violation of the Const. CH, the ECHR or other international 
treaties, but may refer only to the grounds set out in Art. 190 (2) PILA.1493 Con­
sequently, instead of the content of the arbitral award, the examination fo­
cuses on how it was rendered.1494 Thus, the parties may not resort to the SFT 
on the grounds of a violation of the right to be heard in a bid to have the con­
tent of the arbitral award re­examined.1495
An objection in civil matters to the SFT must be filed within 30 days of 
notification of the arbitral award.1496 In the absence of any clear statutory 
basis, there is no minimum threshold for the value in dispute; otherwise, the 
parties would be deprived of their right to challenge an arbitral award in ar­
bitrations involving small claims.1497 
The restrictive approach to appeal is evident in the SFT’s status as the 
sole appellate court and the limited grounds on which the arbitral award can 
be challenged, as foreseen in the PILA CH.1498 In this respect, Arts. 190 (2) (d 
and e) PILA CH deserve a closer look:
“(2)  The award may only be challenged:
(d)  if the principle of equal treatment of the parties or the right of the 
parties to be heard was violated;
(e) if the award is incompatible with public policy.”
1490  Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1674; gökSu, n. 1983; regarding the types of decisions (final­, 
partial­ and interim decisions) see ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 20 et seqq.; 
Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 234 et seqq.; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 21.
1491  Art. 190 (1) PILA CH; Arts. III and V (1) (e) NYC: BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 7 et 
seqq.; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 5 and 10 et seqq.; gökSu, n. 1979.
1492  Art. 99 (1) FSCA CH; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 4.
1493  DFT 4A_178/2014 of 11 Jun. 2014, cons. 2.4; DFT 4A_198/2012 of 14 Dec. 2012, cons. 3.1.
1494  kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.01.
1495  DFT 4A_520/2015 of 16 Dec. 2015, cons. 3.3.1; DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.2.
1496  Art. 100 (1) FSCA CH; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.35 et seqq.
1497  Art. 174 and 190 PILA CH e contrario; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 10; CR­Bucher, 
Art. 191 PILA CH n. 17; left open by the SFT in DFT 142 III 521, cons. 2.3.5; DFT 
4A_576/2012 of 28 Feb. 2013, cons. 2; DFT 4A_110/2012 of 9 Oct. 2012, cons. 1.
1498  Art. 191 PILA CH.
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Lit. d represents the counterpart to what has already been discussed con­
cerning the discretion of the parties and the arbitral tribunal to tailor the 
arbitral proceedings.1499 As a consequence, regardless of what procedure is 
chosen, the arbitral tribunal must ensure equal treatment and the right to be 
heard; it follows that these two procedural guarantees may be subject to ex­
amination in an appeal. Thus, a party seeking to challenge an arbitral award 
must show that a violation of the right to be heard or equal treatment influ­
enced the award.1500
According to recently published data, international arbitral awards ren­
dered in Switzerland were set aside in only approximately 7–10% of cases in 
2016 and 2017.1501 Concerning the grounds listed in Arts. 190 (2) (d and e) PILA 
CH, only 5.5% (twelve out of 208 arbitral awards) of all challenges claiming a 
violation of equal treatment or the right to be heard were upheld.1502 As re­
gards an alleged violation of the ordre public, only two out of 194 arbitral 
awards were set aside—representing a mere 1% chance of success.1503 
2. Equal Treatment of the Parties
The right to equal treatment requires that parties be treated equally in com­
parable situations—that is, in respect of all procedural matters, such as the 
examination of witnesses and the parties’ submissions.1504 Accordingly, the 
arbitral proceedings must be tailored in such a way that each party has the 
same opportunity to participate and present its case.1505 Therefore, the arbi­
tral tribunal cannot deny to one party what has been granted to the other and 
vice versa.1506 
The right to equal treatment is largely considered to be congruent with 
the right to be heard.1507 However, it can still be invoked separately—for 
1499  See p. 235 supra; Art. 182 (3) PILA CH; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 81; kauf­
mann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.167.
1500  DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.1.
1501  DaSSer/wóJtowicZ, 280; these numbers apply to decisions on the merits of 
non­sports­realted arbitration (2017: setting aside of 23 out of 321 cases (7.37%), 2016: 
setting aside of 10 out of 103 cases (9.71%). 
1502  Ibid., 281. 
1503  Ibid.
1504  ZK­oetiker, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 35; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 83.
1505  DFT 4A_424/2011 of 2 Nov. 2011, cons. 2.2.
1506  DFT 4A_236/2017 of 24 Nov. 2017, cons. 4.1; Dutoit, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 6; BSK­Schnei­
Der/Scherer, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 65; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 84.
1507  DFT 4A_672/2012 of 23 Apr. 2013, cons. 4.1.1; DFT 4P.208/2004 of 14 Dec. 2004, cons. 
5.1; DFT 133 III 139, cons. 6.1; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 86.
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instance, alongside claims regarding the assessment of evidence by the arbi­
tral tribunal, which would fall under the right to be heard.1508 This follows 
from the fact that the duty to treat the parties equally begins with the consti­
tution of the arbitral tribunal and ends with the conclusion of the arbitral 
proceedings. However, it excludes the subsequent consultation process, dur­
ing which the arbitral tribunal renders its verdict.1509 Accordingly, the as­
sessment of evidence or the application of law cannot be challenged under 
the title of equal treatment, even where this is obviously untenable.1510
As a consequence, the same action of an arbitral tribunal can lead to a 
violation of both the right to be heard and equal treatment. This might apply 
where the arbitral tribunal grants one party consent to seek court assistance 
in the taking of evidence while denying the same to the adverse party without 
a valid reason. The following discussion will show that, with regard to the 
assessment of evidence, it is difficult to prove a violation of the right to be 
heard. However, if a party can show that the arbitral tribunal treated the 
parties unequally in comparable situations, the SFT might set aside the arbi­
tral award based on Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH.1511 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the right of equal treatment is 
not absolute—a certain degree of inequality must be accepted.1512 Conse­
quently, the parties have no right to expect the extension of identical time­
frames to both parties, for example.1513 Likewise, the SFT has stated that the 
parties cannot expect to have exactly the same amount of time to examine 
witnesses at the hearing.1514 Finally, the SFT has made it clear that non­con­
sideration of a rule or a crucial allegation of fact does not constitute unequal 
treatment.1515 Rather, by drafting Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH narrowly, the Swiss 
legislature avoided the scope for objections against arbitrary conduct.1516
1508  DFT 4A_672/2012 of 23 Apr. 2013, cons. 4.1.2; DFT 4A_360/2011 of 31 Jan. 2012, cons. 4.1.
1509  Ibid.
1510  Ibid.
1511  DFT 4A_672/2012 of 23. Apr. 2013, cons. 4.2.1.
1512  ZK­oetiker, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 35; CR­Bucher, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 51; kauf­
mann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.173.
1513  DFT 4A_450/2017 of 12 Mar. 2018, cons. 3.2.1; DFT 4A_405/2016 of 2 Mar. 2017, cons. 3.3; 
DFT 4A_539/2008 of 19 Feb. 2008, cons. 4; BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer, Art. 182 PILA CH 
n 66; Dutoit, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 6; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 88 et seqq.
1514  In DFT 4A_407/2012 of 20 Feb. 2013, cons. 3.4., the SFT stated that equal treatment is 
not violated even if one party had 14 hours to examine their witnesses while the ad­
verse party had 23 hours.
1515  DFT 4A_236/2017 of 24 Nov. 2017, cons. 4.2.2; DFT 4A_360/2011 of 31 Jan. 2012, cons. 4.1.
1516  Ibid.
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3. Right to be heard
Looking at the second part of Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH, a few comparative re­
marks are necessary in order to assess the Swiss approach to setting aside 
arbitral awards based on a violation of the right to be heard. With regard to 
evidence, the tension between the parties’ right to present evidence on the 
one hand and the free assessment of evidence by the arbitral tribunal on the 
other must be considered when examining whether the right to be heard has 
been violated.
a. Comparative Aspects
The comparative analysis in the previous chapter has shown that although 
the grounds to challenge an arbitral award may vary under the examined 
leges arbitri, the basic approach always aims to limit this possibility. For in­
stance, under German and English law, the arbitral award may be challenged 
if the arbitral tribunal failed to conduct the proceedings in accordance with 
the procedure agreed by the parties and this had an influence on the arbitral 
award.1517 In this regard, S. 68 (1) EAA 1996 is illustrative: it refers to the pos­
sibility to challenge an arbitral award, but only if there is a serious irregular­
ity which affected the arbitral tribunal, the proceedings or the award. While 
it may be easy to prove an irregularity, it will be much more difficult to show 
that this was ‘serious’ and also to demonstrate its influence.1518 Similarly, the 
UNCITRAL ML states that an arbitral award may be set aside if the arbitral 
proceedings were not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or if 
the arbitral award conflicts with public policy (i.e. the ordre public).1519 Final­
ly, under French and US law, the parties can challenge the arbitral award on 
the grounds that the arbitral tribunal violated the right to be heard or exceed­
ed its powers.1520 The rationale behind this common approach is that the 
arbitral tribunal acts not as a mere first instance, but rather as the sole in­
stance; the grounds for challenging the arbitral award are thus restricted.1521
As a consequence, although these leges arbitri may vary in their scope 
and in the grounds on which an arbitral award may be set aside, the aim in all 
cases is to examine procedural aspects such as the invalidity of the arbitration 
1517  § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE; S. 68 (1) (c) EAA 1996. Regarding recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards see Art. V (1) (d) NYC.
1518  merkin/fLannery, 305.
1519  Arts. 34 (2) (a) (iv) and (2) (b) (i) UNCITRAL ML.
1520  Arts. 1520 (3) and (4) CCP FR; § 10 (a) (4) FAA USA.
1521  UNCITRAL, Case Law (2012), Art. 34 UNCITRAL ML, n. 3 with reference to OLG Karls­
ruhe, 14 Sept. 2007, 10 Sch 01/07, cons. 2a.
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agreement or the composition of the arbitral tribunal, rather than reviewing 
the merits of the dispute.1522 As regards court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence, the respective appellate court should not examine whether and how 
the arbitral tribunal assessed the evidence or applied the correct law.1523 
b. Free Assessment of Evidence
As previously discussed (see p. 266 supra), the possibility to set aside an arbitral 
award is similarly restrictive in Switzerland—in some ways, even more restric­
tive. For example, while German and English law and the UNCITRAL ML all 
allow for the arbitral award to be challenged on the grounds that the arbitral 
tribunal failed to conduct the arbitral proceedings according to the procedure 
agreed by the parties, there is no comparable provision under Swiss law.1524 
Rather, because the only procedural guarantees that bind the arbitral tribunal 
are equal treatment and the right to be heard, it follows that non­compliance 
with other procedural rules agreed by the parties (e.g. institutional arbitra­
tion rules) cannot be subject to challenge according to Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA CH.1525 
Still, one might ask whether the assessment of evidence of the arbitral tribunal 
may be challenged under a violation of the right to be heard.
This right is of a formal nature, so in case of a violation, the arbitral 
award must be set aside irrespective of why the violation arose.1526 This is 
why the SFT will examine this issue first. In addition, the duty to substantiate 
the influence that such a violation had on the arbitral award is reduced to a 
certain degree. However, the party must show that the arbitral tribunal did 
not consider certain elements of the case at hand, certain pieces of evidence 
or certain legal opinions of the parties, and that this could have influenced 
1522  Mistelis et al.­BrekouLakiS et al., Art. 34 UNCITRAL ML, 1; MüKo­münch, § 1059 CCP 
DE n. 29; harriS et al., S. 68 EAA 1996 n. 68B.
1523  Mistelis et al.­BrekouLakiS et al., Art. 34 UNCITRAL ML, 1; ShepparD, S. 68 n. 2 EAA 
1996; harriS et al., S. 68 EAA 1996 n. 68I with reference to World Trade Corporation v. 
C. Czarnikow Sugar Ltd [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm.) and Schwebel v. Schwebel [2010] 
EWHC 3280 (TCC).
1524  § 1059 (2) (1.) (d) CCP DE; S. 68 (1) (c) EAA 1996; Art. 34 (2) (a) (iv) and (2) (b) (i) UNCITRAL ML.
1525  DFT 117 II 346, cons. 1a; DFT 4P.23/2006 of 27 Mar. 2006, cons. 4.2; ZK­oetiker, 
Art. 190 PILA CH n. 81; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 61; gökSu, n. 2069: but see 
Art. V (1) (d) NYC.
1526  DFT 142 III 284, cons. 4.1; DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.4; DFT 4A_532/2016 of 30 May 2017, 
cons. 4.1 with further references; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 87; CR­Bucher, 
Art. 190 PILA CH n. 83; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.167; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 
PILA CH n. 70; but see also the most recent case law, suggesting that if a violation of the 
right to be heard had no influence on the arbitral award, it does not necessarily has to 
be set aside (DFT 4A_424/2018 of 29 Jan. 2019, cons. 5.2.2; DFT 143 IV 380, cons. 1.4.1). 
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the arbitral award.1527 In addition, with regard to court assistance in the tak­
ing of evidence, the SFT has stated that the right to be heard is violated if the 
arbitral tribunal refuses to seek court assistance without a valid reason where 
the evidence in question is crucial to the case.1528 Otherwise, this would lead 
to a denial of justice.1529 As a result, the arbitral tribunal enjoys wide discre­
tion when it comes to the taking of evidence and the SFT will examine wheth­
er the right to be heard has been violated only under strict conditions.
c. Anticipated Assessment of Evidence 
In this regard, the case law of the SFT merits closer scrutiny. It has repeatedly 
held that the right to be heard corresponds in large part to the constitutional 
right enshrined in Art. 29 (2) Const. CH. Regarding its content, reference can 
be made to what has previously been discussed in this regard.1530 The right to 
be heard is substantiated through the right to evidence, which entitles each 
party to have the court accept suitable evidence that is presented to it.1531
In contrast to the right to evidence, the SFT has several times referred to 
the right of the arbitral tribunal to freely assess the evidence without violat­
ing the right to be heard or the right to evidence, respectively.1532 In this re­
gard, mention is made of the so­called ‘anticipated assessment of evidence’, 
which forms part of the free assessment of evidence.1533 
According to this concept, which has been developed in Swiss case law, 
the arbitral tribunal is at liberty to assess the importance of evidence even 
before it has been taken; this might apply, for example, where a selection 
must be made from multiple similar pieces of evidence or where sufficient 
evidence has already been gathered.1534 It therefore facilitates the efficient 
and expedient conduct of the proceedings.1535 This also applies where the 
1527  DFT 4A_592/2017 of 5 Dec. 2017, cons. 4.1.2 with further references.
1528  DFT 4P.217/1992 of 15 Mar. 1993, cons. 7b, in: ASA Bull. 1993, 408; see also DFT 142 III 
360, cons. 4.1.1; DFT 133 III 235, cons. 5.2.
1529  Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 119.
1530  See p. 106 et seqq. supra; DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.1; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 86.
1531  Art. 152 CCP CH; FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7312; DFT 4A_427/2017 of 22 Jan. 2018, cons. 
5.1.1; DFT 133 III 295, cons. 7.1; DFT 114 II 289, cons. 2a.
1532  DFT 143 III 297, cons. 9.3.2.
1533  Art. 157 CCP CH; FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7312; Arroyo­knoLL, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 45; 
Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 137; ZK­oetiker, Art. 182 PILA CH n. 47 et seqq.; 
Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1357; for a critical assessment of this concept, see haSen­
BöhLer, 5.77 et seqq.; Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 157 CCP CH n. 38 et seqq.
1534  Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer, Art. 157 CCP CH n. 32; BK­rüetSchi, Art. 152 CCP 
CH n. 57; haSenBöhLer, n. 5.71 et seqq.
1535  BK­rüetSchi, Art. 152 CCP CH n. 58.
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arbitral tribunal refuses to examine evidence any further because the facts 
have already been established or because the evidence to be presented will 
not suffice to persuade it to change its findings (e.g. if the arbitral tribunal 
refuses to examine a witness since there is already sufficient documentary 
evidence).1536 Thus, the arbitral tribunal can establish the facts based on the 
evidence which it considers suitable and substantial.1537 Moreover, the SFT 
has stated that as long as the right to be heard is not simply ignored and a 
denial of justice therefore ensues, even an incorrect assessment of evidence 
cannot be challenged.1538 This underlines the common approach to avoid 
undue court intervention in the sphere of arbitration and ensure merely that 
important procedural guarantees have been respected. Therefore, the SFT 
has stated that the anticipated assessment of evidence can be examined only 
from the limited angle of a violation of the ordre public (i.e. public policy).1539 
As an intermediate result, it may be concluded that under the right to be 
heard, the SFT will allow a challenge against the arbitral award only if the 
arbitral tribunal refused to seek court assistance without a valid reason 
where the evidence in question was crucial to the case. Apart from that, there 
is little scope to challenge an arbitral award based on a violation of the right 
to be heard, because of the arbitral tribunal’s broad discretion in terms of the 
anticipated assessment of evidence. Since this may be examined only on the 
grounds of a violation of the ordre public, the following will examine the ex­
tent to which this is in fact possible. 
4. Violation of Public Policy 
The statistical data shows that challenges to an arbitral award based on a vio­
lation of public policy fail in 99% of cases.1540 Although such challenges seem 
to be popular, the SFT has set aside just two awards based on a violation of 
1536  FCDisp CCP CH (2006), 7312; DFT 4A_427/2017 of 22 Jan. 2018, cons. 5.1.1; DFT 
4A_277/2017 of 28 Aug. 2017, cons. 3.1; DFT 4A_342/2015 of 26 Apr. 2016, cons. 4.1.1; DFT 
4A_246/2014 of 15 Jul. 2015, cons. 6.1; DFT 4A_386/2010 of 3 Jan. 2011, cons. 7.2; DFT 134 
I 140, cons. 5.3; DFT 131 I 153, cons. 3; DFT 130 II 425, cons. 2.1 with further references; 
haBerBeck, 1422 et seq.
1537  DFT 4A_427/2017 of 22 Jan. 2018, cons. 5.1.1; DFT 4A_178/2014 of 11 Jun. 2014, cons. 5.1; 
DFT 119 II 386, cons. 1b; DFT 116 II 639, cons. 4c; haSenBöhLer, n. 5.75.
1538  DFT 127 III 576, cons. 2e and 2f; DFT 121 III 331, cons. 3a.
1539  Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA CH; DFT 142 III 360, cons. 4.1.1; DFT 4A_544/2014 of 24 Feb. 2015, 
cons. 3.2.1; DFT 4A_178/2014 of 11 Jun. 2014, cons. 5.1; DFT 4P.23/2006 of 27 Mar. 2006, 
cons. 4.2; haBerBeck, 1423; kaufmann­kohLer/rigoZZi, n. 8.175; contra gökSu, 
n. 2087.
1540  DaSSer/wóJtowicZ, 280.
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public policy so far.1541 The bar is thus set significantly high. While lit. a–d 
relate to procedural questions, Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA CH provides the only 
means to review the merits of the case.1542 According to the SFT, the grounds 
listed in lit. a–d take precedence over any violation of public policy pursuant 
to lit. e, which therefore serves as a last resort.1543 Public policy can be divid­
ed into substantive and procedural public policy.1544 
With regard to the former, the SFT has adopted the following definition: 
‘An award is incompatible with public policy if it disregards the essential and 
broadly acknowledged values which, according to prevailing views in Swit­
zerland, should constitute the basis of any legal order.’1545 Such values in­
clude the sanctity of contracts, compliance with the rules of good faith, and 
the prohibition of abuse of rights and discriminatory measures.1546 The SFT 
has deliberately kept open the interpretation of substantive public policy, 
since it considers it a delicate—even dangerous—task to create an exhaustive 
list.1547 Hitherto, the SFT has set aside a single arbitral award based on a vio­
lation of substantive public policy.1548 The case concerned the threat of a 
lifelong ban from football if the respective player did not pay damages arising 
from a breach of contract.1549 As this would have excessively restricted the 
player’s personal freedom, the SFT considered this de facto lifelong ban to be 
a violation of substantive public policy.1550 In no other case has the high hur­
dle of a violation of substantive public policy been met. This has especially 
been the case regarding evidence­based matters, such as the burden and 
standard of proof1551 or the (obviously erroneous) establishment of facts.1552
1541  Ibid.
1542  Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PIL A CH n. 160; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 72.
1543  DFT 4A_682/2011 of 31 May 2012, cons. 4.3 with further references; ZK­oetiker, 
Art. 190 PILA CH n. 93; BKS­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 72.
1544  DFT 141 III 229, cons. 3.2.1; DFT 138 III 322, cons. 4.1.
1545  DFT 144 III 120, cons. 5.1; DFT 4A_312/2017 of 27 Nov. 2017, cons. 3.1; DFT 4A_304/2013 
of 3 Mar. 2014, cons. 5.1.1; DFT 132 III 389, cons. 2.2.3.
1546  DFT 144 III 120, cons. 5.1; DFT 4A_532/2016 of 30 May 2017, cons. 3.1 et seqq.; DFT 
4A_304/2013 of 3 Mar. 2014, cons. 5.1.1; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 102 et seqq.
1547  See e.g. DFT 4A_32/2016 of 20 Dec. 2016, cons. 4.1; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 103; 
Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 173 et seqq.
1548  Ibid., n. 219 et seqq.; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH 109 et seq.
1549  DFT 138 III 322; see also DFT 4A_320/2009 of 2 Jun. 2010, cons. 4.4; DFT 4A_508/2017 of 
29 Jan. 2018, cons. 4.3.
1550  Ibid., cons. 4.3.5.
1551  DFT 4A_32/2016 pf 20 Dec. 2016, cons. 4.1; DFT 4A_312/2017 of 27 Nov. 2017, cons. 3.1.
1552  DFT 127 III 576, cons. 2b; DFT 121 III 331, cons. 3a.
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It has also proved very difficult to prove a violation of procedural public policy. 
According to the SFT’s case law, an arbitral award violates procedural public 
policy if ‘it infringes fundamental and generally recognized principles of pro­
cedure, the disregard of which is intolerably contrary to the sense of justice so 
that the award seems to be absolutely incompatible with the legal system and 
values applying in a state of law’.1553 This includes, for instance, the principles 
of res judicata and ne bis in indem,1554 as well as the right to a fair proceeding1555 
and the fundamental procedural guarantees of the ECHR, but only as a means 
of ascertainment.1556 The only case thus far in which the SFT has found a vio­
lation of procedural public policy was another sports­related arbitration, in 
which the arbitral tribunal disregarded the final and binding force (res judica­
ta) of a previous decision.1557 As regards the assessment of evidence, the SFT 
has held that since procedural public policy has a mere ‘defense function’, it 
cannot serve to establish a ‘procedural arbitration code’ with which the arbi­
tral proceedings must comply.1558 As a consequence, even the erroneous or 
arbitrary application of the agreed procedural rules does not serve as grounds 
to invoke a violation of procedural public policy.1559 
On the whole, it is clear that although the parties can try to challenge an 
arbitral award based on a violation of (substantive or procedural) public policy, 
the SFT will almost certainly deny it. The parties will succeed only by demon­
strating that either ‘essential and broadly acknowledged values’ or ‘fundamen­
tal and generally recognized principles of procedure’ have been violated. 
5. Result
The previous discussion endeavoured to outline how parties can address mat­
ters regarding court assistance in the taking of evidence by trying to challenge 
the arbitral award. It was shown that in the case of alleged violations of both 
Arts. 190 (2) (d and e) PILA CH, such claims must be presented as early as pos­
sible during the arbitral proceedings. Even if a violation of equal treatment or 
1553  DFT 4A_236/2017 of 24 Nov. 2017, cons. 5.1; DFT 141 III 229, cons. 3.2.1; DFT 140 III 278, 
cons. 3.1; DFT 136 III 345, cons. 2.1; DFT 128 III 191, cons. 4a.
1554  DFT 4A_386/2010 of 3 Jan. 2011, cons. 9.3.1.
1555  DFT 4P.143/2001 of 18 Sept. 2001, cons. 3a.aa; ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n.
1556  ZK­oetiker, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 116 et seqq.; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 173 
et seqq.; BSK­pfiSterer, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 81 et seqq.; Berger/keLLerhaLS, n. 1780 
et seqq.; gökSu, n. 2140 et seqq.
1557  DFT 136 III 345; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 167 and 209 et seqq.
1558  DFT 126 III 249, cons. 3b; Arroyo­arroyo, Art. 190 PILA CH n. 174.
1559  DFT 4A_438/2018 of 17 Jan. 2019, cons. 5.2.2; DFT 4A_308/2018 of 23. Nov. 2018, cons. 
5.3.1; DFT 4A_392/2015 of 10 Dec. 2015, cons. 4.2; DFT 129 III 445, cons. 4.2.1.
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the right to be heard is invoked, the SFT requires that the violation be suffi­
ciently severe before it will consider setting aside an award. Unlike under 
other leges arbitri, under which an arbitral award may be challenged on the 
grounds that the arbitral tribunal failed to conduct the proceedings in com­
pliance with the procedure agreed by the parties, there is no comparable 
provision under Swiss law. However, if a party can show that a failure of the 
arbitral tribunal to seek court assistance in the taking of evidence resulted in 
a denial of justice, the arbitral award may be set aside. 
In most cases, the question of how and whether to gather evidence touch­
es on the arbitral tribunal’s discretion to assess the evidence. In this regard, it 
has been shown that the right to be heard is not violated if the evidence is 
taken in accordance with the concept of the anticipated assessment of evi­
dence. This central pillar of international arbitration will be subject to exam­
ination only if there is a violation of substantive or procedural public policy. 
In this regard, the SFT’s case law has demonstrated a broad reluctance to find 
such a violation, at least thus far. It may therefore be concluded that, in the 
absence of a denial of justice, indirectly attacking court assistance in the tak­
ing of evidence through challenging the arbitral award will in most cases fail. 
D. Recognition and Enforcement
Finally, parties might seek to challenge the arbitral award pursuant to 
Art. V (1) (d) NYC, which reads as follows:
“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused at the re­
quest of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes 
to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is 
sought, proof that:
(d) … the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement 
of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the 
law of the country where the arbitration took place.”
As is evident from the comparative analysis conducted in this book, this pro­
vision is mirrored in many leges arbitri.1560 It is widely accepted that Art. V 
NYC always requires a certain causality—that is, that the violation of this ar­
ticle could have influenced the arbitral award.1561 Otherwise, recognition 
and enforcement of an arbitral award would be denied too easily and a new 
arbitration would most likely lead to the same result.1562
1560  See p. 146 et seqq., p. 163 et seq., p. 180 et seq. and p. 212 et seq. supra.
1561  Kronke et al.­nacimiento, Art. V (1) (d) NYC, 298 et seq.
1562  Ibid.
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As an overall approach, the bar to deny recognition and enforcement under 
the NYC is set high and state courts enjoy wide discretion in this regard.1563 At 
this point too, it must again be mentioned that in general, violations of due 
process must be addressed immediately (i.e. during the arbitral proceed­
ings).1564 They cannot be invoked afterwards if this would have been possible 
at an earlier stage.1565
Although Art. V (1) (d) NYC is designed to protect party autonomy, the 
state courts generally take a very pro­arbitration stance by applying this ar­
ticle only rarely and thus upholding the arbitral tribunal’s discretion to tailor 
the arbitral proceedings.1566 As a consequence, recognition and enforce­
ment will not usually be denied where the arbitral tribunal was at liberty to 
govern evidentiary matters such as whether to hold an oral hearing or wheth­
er to allow a certain witness to testify.1567 
The same applies regarding court assistance in the taking of evidence. It 
therefore follows that as long as the arbitral tribunal did not act directly 
against an explicit agreement between the parties—for instance, to allow only 
document production and therefore exclude witness testimony—the arbitral 
award will most likely be upheld under the NYC. The situation is different if 
the parties excluded court assistance in the taking of evidence, but the arbi­
tral tribunal nonetheless allowed this or sought such assistance itself. Al­
though unheard­of in practice, this should constitute a reason to deny recog­
nition and enforcement pursuant to the NYC. 
E. Summary
The foregoing examination aimed to provide an overview of possible appel­
late remedies, either directly against the decision of the juge d’appui or indi­
rectly against the arbitral award. In the former case, the topic was considered 
from the perspective of third parties as well as the parties to the arbitration. 
With regard to the former, it was demonstrated that despite the recent SFT 
decision, they can still meet the requirements to make an objection in civil 
matters to the SFT. 
1563  Balthasar­SoLomon, n. 173; pauLSSon m., 158; Mistelis et al.­miSteLiS/Di pietro, Art. V 
NYC 24.
1564  See p. 266 supra.
1565  See e.g. DFT 4A_124/2010 of 4 Oct. 2010, cons. 6.3.3.1; OLG München, 15 Mar. 2006, 34 
Sch06/05; UNCITRAL NYC Guide, Art. V (1) (d) n. 51 et seqq.
1566  pauLSSon m., 191 et seq.; Kronke et al.­nacimiento, Art. V (1) (d) NYC, 282 et seq.
1567  See e.g. OLG Köln, 6 Jul. 2012, 19 Sch 8/11, n. 41; Stati v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 302 F. 
Supp. 3d 187, 207 (D.C.C. 2018).
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This stands in stark contrast to the position of the parties to the arbitration. 
Unfortunately, decisions in other cases in which the juge d’appui comes into 
play cannot be applied by analogy to court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence in arbitration. In addition, with regard to the existence of a legitimate 
interest, the previous discussion demonstrated that this can be demonstrat­
ed only if the arbitral tribunal gives its consent to the objection or denies its 
consent without a valid reason. Special attention should be paid to this con­
dition if there is crucial evidence to be gathered with the assistance of state 
courts. Often, however, the arbitral tribunal will find a way to avoid seeking 
court assistance—for example, by drawing an adverse inference.1568 Finally, 
since the decision of the juge d’appui is an interim decision, it can be chal­
lenged only if the party can prove the existence of a threat of irreparable 
harm, which is rarely the case. 
It was further examined whether matters relating to court assistance in 
the taking of evidence can be addressed by trying to set aside the arbitral 
award according to Arts. 190 (2) (d and e) PILA CH. Besides the fact that alleged 
violations of procedural rules and/or due process, as well as public policy, 
must be invoked immediately during the arbitral proceedings, it is also very 
difficult to set aside an arbitral award based on the PILA CH. Unlike other 
leges arbitri, under which parties can seek to have an arbitral award set aside 
if the procedural rules on which they agreed were not complied with, Swiss 
law does not include a comparable provision. Thus, the SFT’s case law shows 
that in the absence of a denial of justice, arbitral tribunals enjoy wide discre­
tion in conducting the arbitral proceedings, especially with regard to the 
assessment of evidence, and an arbitral award will not be set aside merely 
because this assessment was incorrect. This is especially true with regard to 
an alleged violation of public policy, which is very hard to prove and has been 
upheld only twice thus far. 
The outcome as regards the NYC has been similar. Although recognition 
and enforcement can be denied based on the fact that the arbitral proceed­
ings were not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, state courts 
will tend to uphold the arbitral award as far as possible, except where there 
has been a clear violation of the arbitration agreement. 
1568  See p. 56 et seqq. supra.
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§ 8 Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis of the Swiss status quo, it is clear that the lex ar-
bitri lays the foundations for effective and efficient domestic and internation­
al arbitration in Switzerland. In particular, the PILA CH—with its few and 
concise articles—provides a framework conducive to arbitration; as a result 
of the proposed revisions to this statute, the popularity of Switzerland as a 
forum for arbitration is expected to increase even further. This is evident 
from the following five factors.
First, as regards court assistance in the taking of evidence, under the 
new Art. 185a (2) PILA CH, assistance will also be granted directly to foreign 
arbitral tribunals. Although this is theoretically possible under Art. 3 PILA 
CH (emergency jurisdiction), it does not seem to have occurred with regard 
to court assistance in the taking of evidence. While it is too early to assess the 
importance and consequences of this amendment, it aligns Swiss law with 
the German, French and English leges arbitri, as previously discussed.1569 
While in all three of these jurisdictions court assistance can be granted di­
rectly to foreign arbitral tribunals, the French approach is by far the most 
liberal, imposing almost no requirements for the provision of court assis­
tance other than the ‘internationality’ of the respective dispute.1570 The 
stance taken under Swiss law does not go so far; but—quite similar to that 
under German and English law—it specifically provides for foreign arbitral 
tribunals to obtain direct assistance in the taking of evidence. It remains to 
be seen whether this will result in an increase in the number of evidence re­
quests submitted to Swiss courts and thus whether a centralised juge d’appui, 
as suggested during the revision of the PILA CH, may become necessary. Fi­
nally, the debate on the applicability of § 1782 under US law continues—al­
though it seems that by applying the Intel factors, a possible misuse of § 1782 
can be significantly minimised.1571
Second, the prior consent of the arbitral tribunal to seek the assistance 
of state courts comes as no surprise and the PILA CH’s revision has brought 
no changes in this regard. Thus, as under German and French law, the arbi­
tral tribunal has full control and decides whether the assistance of state 
courts is in fact necessary. It follows that the arbitral tribunal can either seek 
assistance itself, be persuaded by one or both of the parties to do so or refuse 
to follow this path. In contrast, under the EAA 1996, if both parties agree to 
1569  See p. 135, p. 154 and p. 169 supra.
1570  See p. 154 supra.
1571  See p. 185 et seqq. supra.
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seek court assistance in the taking of evidence, the consent of the arbitral 
tribunal is irrelevant. The situation under US law is even more complicated: 
in addition to the arbitral tribunal, ‘any interested person’ can seek court 
assistance. Understandably, this has caused several authors to suggest that 
the third Intel factor—that is, the receptivity of the respective arbitral tribu­
nal—should always be taken into consideration.1572
Furthermore, the possibility to exclude Art. 184 (2) PILA CH has been 
discussed. In this regard, a distinction must be made between arbitration 
that has been chosen voluntarily and that which has been imposed on a par­
ty, such as sports­related arbitration. In the latter case, special attention must 
be paid to the degree to which the respective arbitral tribunal can guarantee 
a similar level of legal protection to state courts.
Third, under the CCP CH, a broad range of evidence may be sought from 
the Swiss courts. Since Art. 11a PILA CH allows foreign types of evidence to be 
taken into consideration, a third para. will be added to Art. 184 PILA CH, ex­
pressly stating that the arbitral tribunal can consider ‘different’ (i.e. foreign) 
procedural types of evidence. Compared to the other examined leges arbitri, 
under which evidence must generally be taken in accordance with the re­
spective civil procedural rules, the Swiss approach is very liberal. The US 
approach alone is similar, taking into consideration the ‘practice and proce­
dure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign 
country or the international tribunal’.1573 Although it is hard to predict how 
far the Swiss courts will go in this regard, one may conclude with certainty 
that, for instance, requests for US­style pre­trial discovery will be denied. 
With regard to the target of evidence, a distinction between the parties 
to arbitration and third parties must be drawn here too. While a party’s fail­
ure to produce evidence without a valid reason will be considered when as­
sessing the evidence, this does not apply to third parties. Although third 
parties can be forced to give evidence, possible rights to refuse to do so based 
on the CCP CH must be respected. In comparison with the other examined 
leges arbitri, these rights seem to be rather comprehensive under Swiss law.
Fourth, as became apparent in the sixth chapter of this book, state 
courts are generally not forced to assist arbitral tribunals under either con­
stitutional or international public law. Nonetheless, the Swiss courts will not 
only exercise their own discretion, but also consider any agreement between 
the parties in this regard (e.g. to allow document production only). With re­
gard to the principle of subsidiarity and the examination of the arbitration 
1572  See p. 203  et seq. supra.
1573  See § 1782 (a) (3rd. para.). 
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agreement, it has been shown that the Swiss approach is in line with German, 
France, English and US law. Therefore, there is no strict exhaustion principle, 
allowing state courts to assist only if the respective arbitral tribunal has ab­
solutely no possibility to take the respective evidence itself. The same applies 
to the examination of the arbitration agreement, which should take place in 
a separate proceeding and not under Art. 184 PILA CH. 
Finally, in the last part of this chapter, the possibility to appeal directly 
against the decision of the juge d’appui was analysed from the perspective of 
both the parties to the arbitration and third parties. Third parties should 
have the right to object to a decision of the juge d’appui if they can show a 
threat of irreparable harm. By contrast, the parties to the arbitration can do 
so only if the arbitral tribunal gives its consent to object (as under English 
law), or if it denies such consent without a valid reason. 
Furthermore, as regards the challenge of the arbitral award based on a 
violation of procedural rules during court assistance in the taking of evi­
dence, the parties could claim a violation of either the right to be heard or 
public policy. In the former case, a party would have to show that the arbitral 
tribunal refused to seek court assistance without a valid reason even though 
the evidence was crucial to the dispute. By contrast, in the latter case, viola­
tions of public policy—although frequently claimed—have so far been admit­
ted by the SFT in just two cases. Finally, the NYC imposes strict standards to 
deny recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. Accordingly, unless 
the arbitral tribunal acted against an explicit agreement between the parties, 
the arbitral award will most likely be upheld. To sum up, as confirmed under 
the other leges arbitri, it is very difficult to have an arbitral award set aside 
based on what happened (or did not happen) during court assistance in the 
taking of evidence. 
These five factors demonstrate that the Swiss approach to court assis­
tance in the taking of evidence is becoming increasingly arbitration friendly. 
First and foremost, this is evident in the amendments to the PILA CH to assist 
foreign arbitral tribunals directly and to consider foreign types of evidence. 
As compared to the other leges arbitri analysed in this book, the openness 
towards foreign types of evidence in particular is remarkable; it remains to be 








As stated in the introductory remarks, this book aims to provide a compre­
hensive analysis of court assistance in the taking of evidence, focusing on 
whether, when and how this can take place.1574 It began with a discussion of 
the taking of evidence in international arbitration in general, before taking a 
closer look at the powers of the arbitral tribunal in this regard. Because these 
powers are limited in various ways, the focus then shifted to the main topic, 
examining it first from the perspective of constitutional and international 
public law. In a second step, the different approaches taken in the leges arbitri 
of various countries were scrutinised, in order to assist in assessing the cur­
rent situation in Switzerland. The most important findings and possible fu­
ture developments are summarised below. 
§ 2 Results
A. Complex Legal Framework
Although the legal cultures of common and civil law increasingly tend to 
overlap, a few crucial distinctions may still be observed. While civil proce­
dure in common law systems is far more party led and thus accusatorial in 
nature, its counterpart in civil law systems is largely inquisitorial (i.e. judge­
led).1575 In terms of the taking of evidence, the issue becomes more complex 
in international arbitration, where parties from different legal cultures meet 
and try to strike a balance through the respective leges arbitri, the arbitration 
agreement and arbitration rules. 
Most leges arbitri provide only a general procedural framework and ev­
idence is only briefly mentioned.1576 Thus, another option is to agree on evi­
dentiary issues in the arbitration agreement—either directly or, as in most 
1574  See p. 3 supra. 
1575  See p. 10 et seqq. supra.
1576  See p. 17 et seqq. supra. 
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cases, by reference to a set of ad hoc or institutional arbitration rules.1577 To 
some extent, institutional arbitration rules reflect the conventions of the 
legal culture within which they have been developed—for example, by ap­
pointing the arbitral tribunal as an active case manager and therefore re­
flecting an inquisitorial civil law approach.1578 In this regard, the IBA Rules 
elegantly combine common and civil law elements in order to provide a fair 
process for the taking of evidence in international arbitration.1579 The parties 
therefore enjoy unique freedom in tailoring the arbitral proceedings to their 
respective needs. 
B. Sanctions Available to the Arbitral Tribunal
When recalcitrant parties prove unwilling to produce evidence, the arbitral 
tribunal is not completely helpless and has the power to impose certain sanc­
tions. In international arbitration, adverse inference is the most effective 
sanction in this regard. In drawing an adverse inference where a party refus­
es to produce a certain piece of evidence without sufficient reason, the arbi­
tral tribunal will consider the relevant fact as proven despite the absence of 
the evidence. Although some institutional rules and the IBA Rules empower 
arbitral tribunals to draw an adverse inference, they do not provide them 
with guidelines on how to do so.1580 In this regard, the conditions of the 
Iran­United States Claims Tribunal can provide further guidance.1581 How­
ever, an adverse inference is not an automatic result where a party fails to 
produce evidence; it rather lies within the discretion of the arbitral tribunal 
to decide whether to draw an adverse inference.1582 As a result, the parties 
have no right to an adverse inference and the arbitral tribunal’s failure to do 
so will not result in a violation of the right to be heard. 
In addition to this main sanction, several institutional arbitration rules 
as well as the IBA Rules provide that the parties’ conduct during the arbitral 
proceedings can be considered in allocating the costs.1583 Instead of merely 
letting the costs follow the event, the winning party may be sanctioned too 
if, for example, it unnecessarily delayed or manipulated the arbitral proceed­
1577  See p. 23 et seqq. and p. 26 et seqq. supra. 
1578  See p. 46 et seq. supra. 
1579  See p. 31 et seqq. supra. 
1580  See p. 58 et seqq. supra. 
1581  See p. 60 et seqq. supra. 
1582  See p. 63 et seq. supra. 
1583  See p. 66 et seqq. supra. 
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ings. The possibility to punish party representatives was also discussed. Al­
though this topic has gained some attention in recent years, mainly as a result 
of the IBA and LCIA Guidelines from 2013 and 2014 respectively, the interna­
tional arbitration community has rejected this idea almost unanimously, due 
to the potential risk to the arbitral tribunal’s impartiality.1584 Thus, sanction­
ing party representatives should rather be left to national bar councils or 
even a global arbitration ethics council, as suggested by the ASA.1585
Finally, the French concept of astreintes was considered. Although 
French arbitral tribunals are competent to impose such penalties, this is not 
the case in Switzerland, under either statute law or the implicit consent the­
ory.1586 However, the situation is different if the parties have explicitly em­
powered the arbitral tribunal to impose such a monetary penalty. 
C. Limited Power of the Arbitral Tribunal
Despite the arbitral tribunal’s powers to sanction non­compliant parties, 
there are several limits when it comes to the taking of evidence. First, arbitral 
tribunals must be constituted before they can act and thus are not always ‘on 
duty’.1587 Emergency arbitrators—which are now available under the rules of 
almost all arbitration institutions—help to bridge this jurisdictional gap, so 
this limitation is increasingly becoming a minor issue.1588 Second, private 
arbitral tribunals obviously lack coercive power—that is, they cannot enforce 
their orders and awards, so compliance depends exclusively on the willing­
ness of the parties to the arbitration.1589 Third, the most significant limitation 
as regards the taking of evidence is the arbitral tribunal’s lack of power over 
third parties.1590 While the arbitral tribunal can impose sanctions on the 
parties to the arbitration, this does not apply to third parties which are not 
participants in the arbitral proceedings. If evidence is in the possession of 
third parties that do not voluntarily hand it over, the only way to obtain such 
evidence is to resort to state courts—the main topic of this book. 
1584  See p. 68 et seqq. supra. 
1585  See p. 73 supra.  
1586  See p. 74 et seqq. supra. 
1587  See p. 79 et seqq. supra. 
1588  See p. 80 supra. 
1589  See p. 81 et seq. supra.  
1590  See p. 82 et seq. supra.  
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D. Court Assistance versus Court Intervention
While state courts can provide a wide range of assistance, the main focus for 
the purposes of this book is on interim measures granting temporary protec­
tion of the parties’ rights from possible damage during the arbitration and 
measures for the taking of evidence that help to establish the facts of the 
case.1591 Although court assistance in the taking of evidence is provided for 
in the IBA Rules, among others, the question arises as to whether court assis­
tance is in the interests of the parties to the arbitration, given that they have 
specifically chosen arbitration instead of state court litigation.1592 In this re­
gard, it has been shown that in most cases, resorting to state courts does not 
circumvent the arbitration agreement, but rather strengthens it. If the par­
ties have not explicitly excluded court assistance, seeking such assistance is 
in the interest of the smooth functioning of the arbitral proceedings.1593 This 
especially applies where non­compliant parties are not acting in good faith. 
If drawing an adverse inference is insufficient, court assistance actually helps 
to reinforce the role of the arbitral tribunal as the authority in charge of the 
arbitral proceedings.1594 Furthermore, since state courts usually require the 
respective arbitral tribunal’s consent before taking action, this should not be 
regarded as a disturbing intervention in the arbitration, but rather as helpful 
assistance that equips the arbitral tribunal with more information to render 
a fairer, more considered verdict.1595
E. (No) Obligation to Assist in the Taking of Evidence
In a further step, the question of whether state courts are obliged to grant 
assistance based on Swiss constitutional or international public law was con­
sidered.1596 Although Switzerland is one of the most arbitration­friendly 
countries in the world, no such obligation may be derived from either the 
Swiss Constitution or the case law of the SFT.1597 This was confirmed by an 
analysis of international public law, which revealed that no obligation to pro­
vide court assistance may be derived from the ECHR, the NYC, the HEC or 
1591  See p. 85 et seqq. supra. 
1592  See p. 91 et seqq. supra. 
1593  See p. 100 supra. 
1594  See p. 101 supra. 
1595  See p. 102 supra. 
1596  See p. 103 et seqq. supra. 
1597  See p. 104 et seqq. supra. 
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European law.1598 The ECHR does not apply directly to arbitral proceedings 
and therefore serves only as a source of inspiration to interpret minimum 
procedural guarantees according to Art. 190 (2) PILA CH.1599 In contrast, the 
NYC’s main aim is to uphold arbitration agreements and facilitate the recog­
nition and enforcement of arbitral awards.1600 As a consequence, it says very 
little about the arbitral proceedings themselves. The same applies to Europe­
an law, under which court assistance is foreseen, but nothing more is said, 
especially as regards any obligation to provide assistance.1601
It has been suggested that the HEC could also be applied to arbitral pro­
ceedings.1602 However, according to the prevailing view in legal doctrine, 
this convention does not apply directly to arbitral proceedings, but only in­
directly (i.e. via state courts). Nevertheless, as previously discussed, the HEC 
could contribute significantly to the effectiveness of international arbitra­
tion. Still, this could be done only by amending the HEC as a whole or on a 
purely national level by amending the respective reservations of Member 
States.1603 It remains to be seen whether they will choose to do so in the near 
future. The same also applies to the EER on a purely European level.1604 
F. Inconsistency Among Different Leges Arbitri
Since there is no obligation to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evi­
dence, each country deals differently with the issue. To assist in assessing the 
Swiss status quo, the leges arbitri of four jurisdictions were analysed; the 
findings are discussed below.
1. Germany: Rising Popularity 
Although Germany is not yet among the leading forums for international 
arbitration, its importance cannot be underestimated.1605 In order to facili­
tate international arbitration, the German courts can be approached direct­
ly in order to obtain court assistance in the taking of evidence. This simple 
procedure could even induce parties to comply voluntarily with evidentiary 
1598  See p. 109 et seqq. supra. 
1599  See p. 112 et seq.   supra. 
1600  See p. 114 et seqq. supra.
1601  See p. 126 et seqq. supra.  
1602  See p. 118 et seqq. supra. 
1603  See p. 122 supra. 
1604  See p. 128 et seqq. supra. 
1605  See p. 134 et seqq. supra.
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orders of the tribunal; hence, it is likely that Germany will gain in importance 
as a forum for arbitration. Although German law takes a liberal approach in 
providing access to the courts to assist in the taking of evidence, it limits this 
by allowing evidence to be taken only according to the CCP DE.1606 In this 
regard, it is hard to predict the extent to which the German courts will none­
theless consider foreign types of evidence. Given the general pro­arbitration 
stance in Germany, it is at least conceivable that a request could be adapted 
until it is in line with the CCP DE.1607 
2. France: Ongoing Success
Mainly due to the presence of the ICC headquarters in Paris, France enjoys 
a long and successful tradition as a forum for arbitration.1608 What distin­
guishes French law from other leges arbitri is first and foremost the fact that 
the CCP FR applies based on economic reasons only—that is, if international 
trade interests are at stake.1609 As a consequence, arbitral tribunals can re­
sort to the French courts based solely on the fact that evidence is located in 
France, which makes it much easier for foreign arbitral tribunals to gather 
evidence. It is also noteworthy that the CCP FR expressly provides for ex 
parte applications as a measure of surprise prior to constitution of the arbi­
tral tribunal.1610
However, two limitations regarding the taking of evidence are worth 
mentioning. First, once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, only doc­
ument production can be sought, which stands in stark contrast to the situa­
tion prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal.1611 Second, only evidence 
that accords with French law can be taken, so it does not seem possible to 
consider foreign types of evidence.1612 
3. England: Keep Calm and Carry on Arbitrating in London
Recent statistics seem to indicate that England will retain its popularity as a 
forum for arbitration.1613 Its stable legal framework and pro­arbitration case 
law should prevail even while the Brexit discussions are ongoing. Or, to put it 
1606  See p. 140 et seqq. supra. 
1607  See p. 141 et seq. supra. 
1608  See p. 150 supra. 
1609  See p. 154 supra. 
1610  See p. 157 et seqq. supra. 
1611  See p. 158 et seq. supra. 
1612  See p. 159 supra. 
1613  See p. 166 supra. 
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in the words of one of the members of the LCIA Board: ‘Keep calm and carry 
on arbitrating in London!’1614 Irrespective of the location of the arbitral tri­
bunal’s seat, the English courts will assist in the taking of evidence. With re­
gard to securing the attendance of witnesses, it is not possible to exclude this 
possibility even by agreement between the parties.1615 What is more, the 
EAA 1996 offers a wide range of ‘powers exercisable in support of arbitral 
proceedings’, such as witness examination, preservation of evidence and 
inspections.1616 As regards foreign types of evidence, the English courts tend 
to take evidence based solely on their own law or even deny assistance be­
cause it would fall under the ‘inappropriate rule’ of S. 2 (3) EAA 1996.1617 This 
broad discretion thus cannot be underestimated. 
Finally, the English approach to appellate remedies against the juge d’ap-
pui is unique.1618 In order to limit the role of the court and ensure a high de­
gree of finality, leave of the court to appeal is always required, except in case 
of a lack of jurisdiction or denial of justice. 
4. USA: Lasting Confusion
Court assistance in the taking of evidence in the US has become a major issue 
since the powerful discovery weapon of § 1782 became partially available in 
international arbitration.1619 The 2004 Intel decision caused a considerable 
stir—not only among the international arbitration community, but also 
among several district and circuit courts.1620 Because whether § 1782 can be 
invoked in arbitral proceedings varies from state to state, a Supreme Court 
decision in this regard—or even an amendment of § 1782—is long overdue.1621 
In the meantime, however, the Intel factors leave US courts well equipped to 
assess whether an arbitral tribunal should in fact be assisted.1622 By applying 
these factors, the risk of a potential misuse of § 1782 can be dramatically re­
duced. Therefore, from the point of the practitioner, it is crucial to under­
stand which state courts are receptive to granting § 1782 requests in aid of 
arbitration. 
1614  LCIA’s response to Brexit. 
1615  See p. 170 supra. 
1616  See p. 173 et seq. supra. 
1617  See p. 175 and p. 177 et seqq. supra. 
1618  See p. 180 et seq. supra. 
1619  See p. 185 et seqq. supra.
1620  See p. 190 et seqq. supra.
1621  See p. 197 et seqq. supra.
1622  See p. 194 et seqq. supra.
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G. Switzerland’s Way Forward
Nothing suggests that the popularity of Switzerland as a forum for arbitration 
will wane in the near future—in fact, quite the opposite. Switzerland’s neu­
trality and political stability, together with its pro­arbitration case law and 
modern legal framework, contribute to its ongoing success.1623 More than 30 
years after its enactment, the PILA CH still represents a short and concise lex 
arbitri, and the revisions to the statute are only enhancing its appeal, as is 
evident from the following two amendments.
First, the Swiss legislature recently decided to facilitate the taking of 
evidence in aid of foreign arbitration and thus aims to allow such assistance 
to be granted directly to foreign arbitral tribunals.1624 Hitherto, the Swiss 
courts have provided assistance only to other state courts, and not directly 
to arbitral tribunals. This change in approach brings the Swiss lex arbitri into 
line with German, French, English and US law. Second, as a result of another 
amendment, Swiss courts, when assisting in arbitration, will be expressly 
allowed to consider foreign types of evidence, such as cross­examination.1625 
While the CCP CH already offered a broad range of evidence, the types of 
evidence that may be considered under the revised law are therefore even 
more diverse.1626 Although it is too soon to assess the consequences of these 
amendments, they should certainly enhance the attractiveness of Switzer­
land as a forum for arbitration. 
Furthermore, the appellate remedies available in Switzerland—whether 
directly against the decision of the juge d’appui or indirectly through a chal­
lenge to the arbitral award—were also subject to careful scrutiny.1627 Regard­
ing the former, it was demonstrated that third parties must demonstrate a 
threat of irreparable harm in order to appeal such a decision; while the par­
ties to the arbitration—in order to avoid jeopardising the effectiveness of the 
arbitral proceedings—require the consent of the arbitral tribunal to appeal.1628 
Regarding the latter, the reluctance of the SFT to set aside arbitral awards and 
therefore its commitment to respecting the discretion of the arbitral tribunal 
were discussed. It is thus difficult to have an arbitral award set aside based on 
what happened during court assistance in the taking of evidence. This is 
1623  See p. 219 et seqq. supra.
1624  See p. 227 et seq. supra.
1625  See p. 223 and p. 242 supra.
1626  See p. 240 et seqq. supra.
1627  See p. 256 et seqq. supra.
1628  See p. 259 et seqq. supra.
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completely in line with the other leges arbitri analysed in this book, and the 
tendency to uphold arbitral awards represents one of the key hallmarks of 
arbitration. 
§ 3 Outlook 
From the examination of the present topic, one thing has become clear: court 
assistance in the taking of evidence is above all a matter of legal policy and 
thus varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, as the comparative 
section and the chapter on the Swiss status quo have shown, there seems to 
be a clear tendency among state courts to voluntarily assist arbitral tribunals. 
If this liberal approach were also adopted in other jurisdictions, this would 
take us significantly closer to reaching an international consensus on how 
court assistance in the taking of evidence should be provided. As a next step, 
it could even be enshrined in an international convention such as the HEC.1629
Until such a consensus is reached, it remains crucial that practitioners 
understand the different mechanisms for obtaining court assistance in the 
various jurisdictions in which evidence is located. One way or another, it is 
to be expected that court assistance in the taking of evidence will become a 
more important procedural issue in international arbitration. As pointed out 
in the introduction to this book, concern seems to be growing over the arbi­
tral tribunal’s lack of power over third parties.1630 This book therefore aims 
to provide in­depth analysis of how this obstacle may be overcome. It has not 
only demonstrated how this works in practice in several of the most popular 
forums for arbitration, but also provided tactical insights which will hope­
fully be of great value in future arbitrations. 
1629  See p. 118 et seqq. supra. 




aBDoLLahi tony, The Hague Convention: A Medium for International Dis­
covery, 40 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 771 (2015). 
aLforD roger p., Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 127 (2012). 
amBauen irma, 3. Teil ZPO versus 12. Kapitel IPRG: Eine Gegenüberstellung 
im Kontext der Opting­out­Möglichkeiten: Unter besonderer Berück­
sichtigung der zwingenden Bestimmungen, der Schiedsfähigkeit und 
der Anfechtbarkeit von Schiedssprüchen (Schulthess 2016). 
amirfar catherine m. / LeiD nataLie L. / popoVa ina c., National Report 
for the United State of America (2019), in: ICCA International Handbook 
on Commercial Arbitration, Lise Bosman ed. (Kluwer Law International 
2019), (cited: amirfar et al.).
amram phiLip, Explanatory Report on the Convention of 18 March 1970 on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.
anDrewS neiL / LanDBrecht JohanneS, Schiedsverfahren und Mediation 
in England (Stämpfli 2015). 
anDrewS neiL, Arbitration and Contract Law: Common Law Perspectives 
(Springer 2016). 
arfaZaDeh homayoon, Note — 10 Janvier — 1996 — Tribunal de Grande In­
stance, 14 ASA Bull. 325 (1996). 
arroyo manueL, Chapter 2, Part II: Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, Artic­
le 190 [Finality, challenge: principle], in: Arbitration in Switzerland: The 
Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Arroyo ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law Interna­
tional 2018), (cited: arroyo­arroyo). 
aShforD peter, The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in Internatio­
nal Arbitration: A Guide (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
auDit BernarD / D’aVout LouiS, Droit international privé (8th ed., LGDJ 2018). 
Bagner hanS, Article I, in: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention, Herbert 
Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk Otto & Nicola C. Port eds. (Kluwer Law 
International 2010), (cited: kronke et al.­Bagner). 
293 
BaiZeau DomitiLLe, Chapter 2, Part II: Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, 
Article 192 [Waiver of annulment], in: Arbitration in Switzerland: The 
Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Arroyo ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law Interna­
tional 2018), (cited: Arroyo­Baizeau). 
BaLthaSar Stephan / ZiaDe roLanD, International Arbitration in France, 
in: International Commercial Arbitration: International Conventions, 
Country Reports and Comparative Analysis, 353, Stephan Balthasar ed. 
(C.H. Beck 2016), (cited: BaLthaSar­BaLthaSar/ZiaDe).
BaLthaSar Stephan, International Arbitration in Germany, in: Internatio­
nal Commercial Arbitration: International Conventions, Country Re­
ports and Comparative Analysis, 377, Stephan Balthasar ed. (C.H. Beck 
2016), (cited: BaLthaSar­BaLthaSar).
Bangert Jan, Die Bindung privater Schiedsgerichte an Art. 6 Abs. 1 EMRK, 
in: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Menschenrechte, 
Demokratie und Rechtstaat: Droits de l’homme, démocratie et Etat de 
droit: Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, 41, Stephan Breitmoser, Bern­
hard Ehrenzeller, Marco Sassòli, Walter Stoffel & Beatrice Wanger Pfeifer 
eds. (DIKE 2007). 
BeaLe kenneth / Lugar JuStin / SchwarZ franZ, Solving the § 1782 Puzz­
le: Bringing Certainty to the Debate Over 28 U.S.C. § 1782’s Application to 
International Arbitration, 47 Stan. J. Int’l L. 51 (2011), (cited: BeaLe et al.).
Béguin JacqueS / micheL menJucq, Droit du commerce international  
(2nd ed., LexisNexis 2011). 
Bento LucaS, The Globalization of Discovery: The Law and Practice under 
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (Kluwer Law International 2019). 
Berger BernharD / keLLerhaLS franZ, International and Domestic Arbi­
tration in Switzerland (3rd ed., Stämpfli 2015). 
Berti Stephen V. / DroeSe LorenZ, Art. 3, 11a, in: Basler Kommentar: Inter­
nationales Privatrecht, Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Anton K. Schny­
der, Stephen V. Berti e ds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013), (cited: 
BSK­Berti/DroeSe).
BeSch morriS / kreuZeDer manueLa, Die neue DIS-Schiedsgerichtsord­
nung, 26 RIW 256 (2018). 
294 Bibliography
BeSSon SéBaStien / thommeSen nina, Introduction to the Swiss Rules, in: 
Swiss Rules of International Arbitration: Commentary, Tobias Zuber­
bühler, Christoph Müller & Philipp Habegger eds. (2nd. ed., Schulthess 
2013), (cited: ZuBerBühLer et al.­BeSSon/thommeSen).
BeSSon SéBaStien, Arbitration and Human Rights, 24 ASA Bull. 395 (2006).
Bettinger JaSmin nicoLe, Prozessmodelle im Zivilverfahrensrecht: Erfolg 
des Haupverhandlungsmodells auch in der Schweiz? (Mohr Siebeck 
2016). 
BeyeLer martin, TI/BGer – Einsicht in Submissionsakten im Rahmen zivil­
rechtlicher Verfahren, BR DC online Nr. 303 (2013), (cited: BeyeLer, note 
on DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 January 2013). 
Biaggini gioVanni, Art. 29a Rechtsweggarantie, in: BV Kommentar: Bundes­
verfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Giovanni Biaggini 
ed. (2nd. ed., Orell Füssli 2017), (cited: OFK­Biaggini). 
BLackaBy nigeL / partaSiDeS conStantine / reDfern aLan / hunter 
martin, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th ed., 
Oxford University Press 2015), (cited: BLackaBy et al.).
BLackman Jonathan / StiefLer JeSSica, Discovery in Aid of Arbitration 
under 28 USC 1782, in: The Arbitration Review of the Americas 2018, 
25 (Law Business Research 2017). 
BLeSSing marc
 — Comparison of the Swiss Rules with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and 
Others, in: The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration 17, ASA Special 
Series no. 22 (ASA 2004), (cited: BLeSSing, Witnesses). 
 — The Law Applicable to the Arbitration Clause, in: Improving the Efficien­
cy of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the 
New York Convention, 168, Albert Jan van den Berg ed., ICCA Congress 
Series, no. 9 (Kluwer Law International 1999), (cited: BLeSSing, Applica­
ble Law).
BöckStiegeL karL­heinZ, Taking Evidence in International Commercial 
Arbitration — Legal Framework and Trends in Practice, in: The Taking 
of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration 1, Karl­Heinz Böck­
stiegel, Klaus­Peter Berger & Jens Bredow eds., Schriftenreihe der Deut­
schen Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Band 26 (Carl Heymanns 
Verlag 2010), (cited: BöckStiegeL, Beweiserhebung). 
295 Bibliography
BonD Stephen r. / paraLika mariLy / SecomB matthew, ICC Rules of Ar­
bitration, The Arbitral Proceedings, Article 26 [Hearings], in: Concise 
International Arbitration, 410, Loukas A. Mistelis ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer 
Law International 2015), (cited: miSteLiS­BonD/paraLika/SecomB). 
Boog chriStopher / Stark­traBer SonJa, Art. 375, in: Berner Kommentar: 
Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, Band III, Art. 353–399 ZPO und 
Art. 407 ZPO, Heinz Hausheer & Hans P. Walther eds. (Stämpfli 2014), 
(cited: BK­Boog/Stark­traBer). 
Boog chriStopher
 — Chapter 2, Part II: Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, Article 183 [Proce­
dure: provisional and conservatory measures], in: Arbitration in Swit­
zerland: The Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Arroyo ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer 
Law International 2018), (cited: arroyo­Boog). 
 — Die Durchsetzung einstweiliger Massnahmen in internationalen Schieds­
verfahren: Aus schweizerischer Sicht, mit rechtsvergleichenden Aspek­
ten (Schulthess 2011). 
Boog chriStopher / wimaLaSena phiLip, The 2018 DIS Rules: New Rules 
for a Renewed Institution, 36 ASA Bull. 10 (2018).
Born gary B.
 — International Arbitration: Law and Practice (2nd ed., Kluwer Law Inter­
national 2016), (cited: Born, Law and Practice).
 — International Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed., Kluwer Law Internatio­
nal 2014), (cited: Born, Int. Comm. Arb.).
Bracher nicoLaS, Mitwirkungspflichten und Verweigerungsrechte Dritter 
bei der Beweiserhebung im Zivilprozess (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2011). 
BraDShaw roBert, How to Obtain Evidence from Third Parties: A Compa­
rative View, 36 J. Int’l Arb. 629 (2019).
BrekouLakiS StaVroS L. / riBeiro John / Shore Laurence, UNCITRAL 
Model Law, Art. 5, 25, 27, 34, in: Concise International Arbitration, 
Loukas A. Mistelis ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law International 2015), (cited: 
miSteLiS­BrekouLakiS et al.). 
BrekouLakiS StaVroS, The Relevance of the Interests of Third Parties in 
Arbitration: Taking a Closer Look at the Elephant in the Room, 113 Penn 
St. L. Rev. 1165 (2009). 
296 Bibliography
Brunner aLexanDer / Steininger thomaS, ZPO 375, in: Schweizerische 
Zivilprozessordnung ZPO: Kommentar, Alexander Brunner, Dominik 
Gasser & Ivo Schwander eds. (2nd ed., DIKE 2016), (cited: DIKE­Brunner/
Steininger). 
Bucher anDreaS
 — Art. 11–11a, 176, 182, 184, 185, 190, 191, in: Commentaire Romand: Loi sur 
le droit international privé: Convention de Lugano, Andreas Bucher ed. 
(Helbing Lichtenhahn 2011), (cited: CR­Bucher).
 — Die neue internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz (Helbing 
Lichtenhahn 1989). 
BurrowS anDrew, English Private Law (3rd ed., Oxford University Press 2013).
ButcherS JuDith / kimBrough phiLip, The Arbitral Tribunal’s Role in Default 
Proceedings, 22 Arb. Int. 233 (2006). 
cacharD oLiVier, Droit du commerce international (3rd ed., LGDJ 2018). 
caDiet Loïc / JeuLanD emmanueL, Droit judiciaire privé (10th ed., Lexis­
Nexis 2017). 
caLLé pierre / Dargent Laurent, Art. 145, 1504, 1509, in: Dalloz: Code de 
procédure civile (2019. 
chainaiS céciLe, Les mesures provisoires dans le nouveau droit français de 
l’arbitrage, in: L’arbitre et le juge étatique: Études de droit comparé à la 
mémoire de Giuseppe Tarzia, 281, Achille Saletti, Jacques van Comper­
nolle & Jean­François van Drooghenbroeck eds. (Bruylant 2014). 
cLay thomaS
 — Code de l’arbitrage commenté: 2015 (LexisNexis 2015).
 — Le nouveau droit français de l’arbitrage (Lextenso 2011), (cited: cLay, 
Arbitrage). 
coLomBini marco, Vorsorglicher Rechtsschutz vor Konstituierung des 
Schiedsgerichts: Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Eilschieds­
richterverfahrens der ICC (DIKE 2016).
conLey anna, A New World of Discovery: The Ramifications of Two Recent 
Federal Courts Decisions Granting Judicial Assistance to Arbitral Tri­
bunals, 17 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 45 (2006). 
coyLe John f., The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the 
Modern Era, 51 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 302 (2013). 
297 Bibliography
craig Laurence w., Common Law Principles on the Taking of Evidence, in: 
Beweiserhebung in internationalen Schiedsverfahren 9, Karl­Heinz 
Böckstiegel ed., Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Institution für Schieds­
gerichtsbarkeit, Band 14 (Carl Heymann Verlag 2001). 
DaSSer feLix / wóJtowicZ piotr, Challenges of Swiss Arbitral Awards: 
Updated Statistical Data as of 2017, 36 ASA Bull. 276 (2018). 
DaSSer feLix
 — Equality of Arms in International Arbitration: Do Rules and Guidelines 
Level the Playing Field and Properly Regulate Conduct? — Can They? Will 
They? Should they? The Example of the IBA Guidelines on Party Repre­
sentation, in: International Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contributi­
on and Conformity, 634, Andrea Menaker ed., ICCA Congress Series, no. 
19 (Kluwer Law International 2017), (cited: DaSSer, Guidelines).
 — Schiedsgerichte und staatliche Gerichte: Nebeneinander, nacheinander, 
miteinander — ein Durcheinander?, in: 90 Jahre Fürstlicher Gerichtshof: 
Festschrift für Gert Delle Karth, 109, Hubertus Schumacher & Wigbert 
Zimmermann eds. (Jan Sramek Verlag 2013), (cited: DaSSer, Schieds­
gerichte).
De weStgaVer cLaire m. / ZinatuLLina eLLina, Will Adverse Inferences 
Help Make Document Production in International Arbitration More Effi­
cient?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (2 August 2017). 
DeLaney coLin r.p. / fruchter marcuS D., National Report of United States 
of America, in Working Session “State Court Participation in Arbitra­
tion — Help or Hindrance?”, (AIJA Annual Congress 2015).
DenniS ian h., The Law of Evidence (6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2017). 
DerainS yVeS / kiffer Laurence, National Report for France (2018), in: 
ICCA International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, Lise Bosman 
ed. (Kluwer Law International 2018). 
DeVot Damien / Laurent­BeLLue anne­Victoire, National Report of 
France, in Working Session “State Court Participation in Arbitration — 
Help or Hindrance?”, (AIJA Annual Congress 2015).
Dey richarD / tuLLoch mohini / wiLLiS amanDa, Animals, arbitration, 
aviation, in: Halsbury’s Laws, Volume 2 (5th ed., LexisNexis 2017), (cited: 
Dey et al.). 
298 Bibliography
DonDe rahuL, Court Assistance in Acquiring Evidence in International Arbi­
tration, in: 40 under 40 International Arbitration (2018), 269, Carlos 
Gonzalez­Bueno ed. (Dykinson, S.L. 2018).
Dupeyron carine / VaLentini marie, Legal Instruments Used in the Se­
arch for Evidence in Support of Arbitration: Comparative Study of 
Art. 145 of the French Code of Civil Procedure and S. 28 USC § 1782 in the 
United States, Int’l Bus. L. J. 533 (2013). 
Dupeyron carine, Shall National Courts Assist Arbitral Tribunals in Gathe­
ring Evidence?, in: International Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contri­
bution and Conformity 458, Andrea Menaker ed., ICCA Congress Series, 
no. 19 (Kluwer Law International 2017).
Duprey pierre, Présentation du nouveau decret sur l’arbitrage, in: L’arbi­
trage: principes et pratiques, 14, Les cahiers du Conseil National des 
Barreaux (Conseil National des Barreaux 2011).
Dutoit BernarD, Art. 11a, 176, 182, 183, 184, 185, in: Droit international privé 
suisse: Commentaire de la loi fédérale du 18 décembre 1987 (5th ed., 
Helbing Lichtenhahn 2016). 
eBerL Stefanie / eBerL waLter, Praktische Durchführung der Beweisauf­
nahme, in: Beweis im Schiedsverfahren 25, Walter Eberl ed. (Nomos 2015).
ehLe BernD
 — Concurrent Jurisdiction: Arbitral Tribunals and Courts Granting Inte­
rim Relief, in: International Arbitration and Mediation: From the Profes­
sional’s Perspective, 157, Anita Alibekova & Robert Carrow eds. (Yorkhill 
Law Publishing 2007), (cited: ehLe, Concurrent Jurisdiction). 
 — Emergency Arbitration in Practice, in: New Developments in Internatio­
nal Commercial Arbitration 2013, 87, Christoph Müller & Antonio Rigozzi 
eds. (Schulthess 2013), (cited: ehLe, Emergency Arbitration). 
eLSing SiegfrieD h. / townSenD John m., Bridging the Common Law­Civil 
Law Divide in Arbitration, 18 Arb. Int. 59 (2002). 
eLuL murieL h. / moSquera reBeca e., 28 U.S.C. Section 1782: U.S. Disco­
very in Aid of International Arbitration Proceedings, in: International 
Arbitration in the United States, 317, Laurence Shore et al. eds. (Kluwer 
Law International 2017). 
299 Bibliography
emanueLe ferDinanDo / JeDrey nathanieL e. / moLfa miLo, Evidence in 
International Arbitration: The Italian Perspective and Beyond (Thom­
son Reuters 2016), (cited: emanueLe et al.). 
feLLaS John / moSequera reBeca, AAA/ICDR International Arbitration 
Rules, Chapter 3, Article 23 [Former Article 20] [Hearing], in: Concise 
International Arbitration, 593, Loukas A. Mistelis ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer 
Law International 2015). 
feLLmann waLter, Art. 158 Vorsorgliche Beweisführung, in: Kommentar 
zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), Thomas Sutter­Somm, 
Franz Hasenböhler & Christoph Leuenberger eds. (3rd ed., Schulthess 
2016), (cited: Sutter­Somm et al.­feLLmann). 
foucharD phiLippe
 — Note — Cour de cassation (1re Ch. civile) 1er décembre 1999, Cour de cas­
sation (1re Ch. civile) 1er décembre 1999, Rev. Arb. 96 (2000), (cited: 
foucharD, note on Paris Court of Cassation, 1 December 1999, 1st Civil 
Chamber, in: Rev. Arb. 2000). 
 — Note — Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (Ord. référé) 11 mai 1987; 
Note — Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (Jug. référé) 22 mai 1987; 
Note — Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (Jug. référé) 23 juin 1987, 
Rev. Arb. 699 (1988), (cited: foucharD, note on Paris High Court, 11 May 
1987, in: Rev. Arb. 1988). 
frieDman mark w. / LaVauD fLoriane, UNITED STATES, in: Arbitration 
Guide: IBA Arbitration Committee (2018). 
furrer anDreaS / girSBerger DanieL / amBauen irma, Art. 182–186, in: 
Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht: Internationales Privat­
recht Art. 1–200 IPRG, Andreas Furrer, Daniel Girsberger & Markus 
Müller­Chen eds. (3rd ed., Schulthess 2016), (cited: CHK­furrer et al.). 
gaiLLarD emmanueL / De LapaSSe pierre, Le nouveau droit français de 
l’arbitrage interne et international, Recueil Dalloz 175 (2011).
gaiLLarD emmanueL / SaVage John, Fouchard Gaillard Gold on Interna­
tional Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999). 
gauthey DanieLLe / markuS aLexanDer r., L’entraide judiciaire interna­
tionale en matière civile (Stämpfli 2014). 
300 Bibliography
geimer reinhoLD
 — Note§ 1033, 1050, in: Zöller Zivilprozessordnung: mit FamG (§§ 1–185, 
200–270, 433–484) und Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, den Einführungsge­
setzen, mit Internationalem Zivilprozessrecht, EU-Verordnungen, Kos­
tenanmerkung: Kommentar, Richard Zöller ed. (32nd ed., Dr. Otto 
Schmidt 2018), (cited: ZöLLer­geimer). 
 — Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Verfassung (aus deutscher Sicht), in: Integri­
tätsprobleme im Umfeld der Justiz — Die Organisation der Rechtsbera­
tung: Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Verfassungsrecht —, 113, Peter F. 
Schlosser ed. (Gieseking 1994). 
geiSinger eLLiott, “Soft Law” and Hard Questions: ASA’s Initiative in the 
Debate on Counsel Ehtics in International Arbitration, in: The Sense 
and Non­sens of Guidelines, Rules and other Para­regulatory Texts in 
International Arbitration, ASA Special Series no. 37, Daniele Favalli ed. 
(Juris 2015).
geiSinger eLLiott / SchneiDer michaeL e. / DaSSer feLix, IBA Guidelines 
on Party Representation in International Arbitration: Comments and 
Recommendations by the Board of the Swiss Arbitration Association 
(ASA), ASA Position Paper (2014), (cited: geiSinger et al.).
girSBerger DanieL / VoSer nathaLie, International Arbitration: Compa­
rative and Swiss Perspectives (3rd ed., Schulthess 2016). 
goDfrey Jenna m., Americanization of Discovery: Why Statutory Interpre­
tation Bars 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (a)’s Application in Private International 
Arbitration Proceedings, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 475 (2010). 
gökSu tarkan
 — Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit — Anfechtung eines Editionsentscheids durch 
das ASTRA, 41 BR DC 375 (2016), (cited: gökSu, note on DFT 4A_214/2012 
of 10 January 2013). 
 — Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (DIKE 2014).
graBenwarter chriStoph / paBeL katharina, Der Grundsatz des fairen 
Verfahrens, in: EMRK/GG: Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen 
und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz: Band I, Kapitel 1–19, Oliver Dörr, 
Rainer Groter & Thilo Marauhn eds. (2nd ed., Mohr Siebeck 2013), (cited: 
Dörr et al.­graBenwarther/paBeL).  
301 Bibliography
greenBerg Simon / LautenSchLager feLix, Part I: International Commer­
cial Arbitration, Chapter 9: Adverse Inferences in International Arbitral 
Practice, in: International Arbitration and International Commercial 
Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution, 179, Stefan M. Kroll, Loukas 
A. Mistelis, Pilar Perales Viscasillas & Vikki M. Rogers eds. (Kluwer Law 
International 2011). 
guSy martin f. / hoSking JameS m., A Guide to the ICDR International Arbi­
tration Rules (2nd. ed., Oxford University Press 2019).
guSy martin f. / iLLmer martin, Die ICDR Guidelines for Arbitrators Con­
cerning Exchanges of Information — zugleich eine deutsch­U.S.­ ameri ka­
 ni sche Analyse zur Kostenreduzierung in AAA/ICDR Schiedsverfahren —, 
6 SchiedsVZ 284 (2008).
guyan peter, Art. 156, in: Basler Kommentar: Schweizerische Zivilprozess­
ordnung (ZPO), Karl Spühler, Luca Tenchio & Dominik Infanger eds. 
(3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2017), (cited: BSK­guyan).
haaS uLrich, Das Verhältnis von schiedsgerichtlichem und staatlichem vor­
läufigem Rechtsschutz — Obergericht Kanton Bern, Entscheid vom 
19.4.2012 — ZK 12 111 —, 17 ZZPInt 347 (2012). 
haBegger phiLipp, Art. 374, 375, 378, in: Basler Kommentar: Schweizerische 
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), Karl Spühler, Luca Tenchio & Dominik In­
fanger eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2017), (cited: BSK­haBegger). 
haBerBeck phiLipp h., Bundesgerichtliche Rechtsprechung zu Art. 190 Abs. 
2 lit. d IPRG, 24 AJP 1413 (2015). 
hague conference on priVate internationaL Law, Practical Handbook 
on the Operation of the Evidence Convention (HEC 2016), (cited: HEC 
hanDBook, 2016). 
hanotiau BernarD, The Conduct of the Hearings, in The Leading Arbitra­
tor’s Guide to International Arbitration, 359, Lawrence W. Newman & 
Richard D. Hill eds. (2nd ed., Juris 2008). 
harriS Bruce / pLanteroSe rowan / teckS Jonathan, The Arbitration Act 
1996: A Commentary (Wiley Blackwell 2014), (cited: harriS et al.).
harriS DaViD / o’BoyLe michaeL / warBrick coLin, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed., Oxford University Press 2014), 
(cited: harriS D. et al.).
302 Bibliography
hartmann peter, § 1050, in: Beck’scher Kurz­Kommentar, Band 1: Zivilpro­
zessordnung mit FamFG, GVG und anderen Nebengesetzen, Adolf Baum­
bach, Wolfgang Lauterbach, Jan Albers & Peter Hartmann eds. (77 ed., 
C.H. Beck 2019), (cited: Beckkuko­hartmann). 
haScher Dominique t., European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1961: Commentary, in: Y.B. Comm. Arb. XXXVI 504 (2011).
haSenBöhLer franZ
 — Art. 157, 162, Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 165–167, 165, 167, in: Kommentar 
zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), Thomas Sutter­Somm, 
Franz Hasenböhler & Christoph Leuenberger eds. (3rd ed., Schulthess 
2016), (cited: Sutter­Somm et al.­haSenBöhLer).
 — Das Beweisrecht der ZPO: Allgemeine Bestimmungen, Mitwirkungs­
pflichten und Verweigerungsrechte (Schulthess 2015). 
hay peter, US-Amerikanisches Recht: Ein Studienbuch (6th ed., C.H. Beck 
2015). 
haZarD geoffrey c., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Juris­
dictions, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1017 (1999).
higi peter, Art. 162, in: Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung ZPO: Kommen­
tar, Alexander Brunner, Dominik Gasser & Ivo Schwander eds. (2nd ed., 
DIKE 2016), (cited: DIKE­higi). 
hoDgeS pauLa, Equality of Arms in International Arbitration: Who is the 
Best Arbiter of Fairness in the Conduct of Proceedings?, in: International 
Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contribution and Conformity, 599, 
Andrea Menaker ed., ICCA Congress Series, no. 19 (Kluwer Law Interna­
tional 2017). 
hofBauer Simone, Chapter 1, Part I: History of Arbitration, in: Arbitration 
in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Arroyo ed. (2nd ed., 
Kluwer Law International 2018), (cited: arroyo­hofBauer). 
hoffmann anne k. / Shetty niSh, Evidence and Hearings, in: International 
Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age?, 197, Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 
ICCA Congress Series, no. 17 (Kluwer Law International 2013).
hofmann Dieter a. / fuchS anJa, 5 Jahre ZPO aus der Sicht des internationa­
len Zivilprozesses und der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit / 1.–2., in: 5 Jahre ZPO: 
Stolpersteine und überraschende Entwicklungen, 115, Annette Dolge ed. 
(Schulthess 2016). 
303 Bibliography
hoLtZmann howarD m. / neuhauS JoSeph e., A Guide to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History 
and Commentary (Kluwer Law International 1989). 
hory aLexanDre, Note — Cour de cassation (Ch. com.) 10 mars 1998 — Société 
Isautier v. Société Prudence Créole; Note — Cour d’appel de Versailles (2e 
Ch.) 8 octobre 1998 — Société Akzo Nobel et autres v. SA Elf Atochem, Rev. 
Arb. 57 (1999), (cited: hory, note on Société Akzo Nobel et autres v. SA Elf 
Atochem, Versailles Court of Appeal, 8 October 1998, 2nd Civil Chambre, 
in: Rev. Arb. 1999).
hoSang aLain
 — Adverse Inferences as a Consequence of the Non­Production of Docu­
ments According to the 2010 IBA Rules of Evidence in International Com­
mercial Arbitration, in: Private Law: national — global — comparative: 
Festschrift für Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60. Geburtstag, 791, Band 1, 
Andrea Büchler & Markus Müller­Chen eds. (Stämpfli 2011), (cited: 
hoSang, Adverse Inferences). 
 — Obstructionist Behavior in International Commercial Arbitration: Legal 
Analysis and Measures Available to the Arbitral Tribunal (Eleven Inter­
national Publishing 2014), (cited: hoSang, Obstructionist Behavior).
hurni chriStoph, Anfechtbarkeit von Entscheiden betreffend die Ernen­
nung von Schiedsrichtern (Art. 362 ZPO): BGE 141 III 444 und Urteil 
4A_490/2015 vom 25. Februar 2016 (Publikation vorgesehen), 152 ZBJV 
299 (2016). 
huSmann markuS, Art. 271, in: Basler Kommentar: Strafrecht: Strafgesetz­
buch, Jugendstrafgesetz, Marcel A. Niggli & Hans Wiprächtiger eds. 
(4th ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2018), (cited: BSK­huSmann). 
hwang michaeL / hon Jennifer, A New Approach to Regulating Counsel 
Conduct in International Arbitration, 33 ASA Bull. 658 (2015). 
icc DiSpute reSoLution BuLLetin, Issue 2, Julien Fouret & Samaa Haridi 
eds. (ICC 2018).
iLLmer martin / SteinBrück Ben, U.S. Discovery and Foreign Private Ar­
bitration: The Foreign Lawyer’s Perspective, 25 J. Int’l Arb. 329 (2008).
iLLmer martin, International Arbitration in England and Wales, in: Interna­
tional Commercial Arbitration: International Conventions, Country Re­
ports and Comparative Analysis, 299, Stephan Balthasar ed. (C.H. Beck 
2016), (cited: BaLthaSar­iLLmer). 
304 Bibliography
JarroSSon charLeS / peLLerin JacqueS, Le droit français de l’arbitrage 
après le décret du 13 janvier 2011, Rev. Arb. 5 (2011). 
JarroSSon charLeS, Le juge et l’instance arbitrale: le juge, l’arbitre et la 
preuve en droit français, in: L’arbitre et le juge étatique: Études de droit 
comparé à la mémoire de Giuseppe Tarzia, 331, Achille Saletti, Jacques 
van Compernolle & Jean­François van Drooghenbroeck eds. (Bruylant 
2014). 
Jermini ceSare / BernarDoni nicoLa, Chapter 1, Part II: Domestic Arbitra­
tion under the Swiss code of Civil Procedure, in: Arbitration in Switzer­
land: The Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Arroyo ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law 
International 2018), (cited: arroyo­Jermini/BernarDoni). 
karrer pierre a., The Civil and Common Law Divide: An International Ar­
bitrator Tells It Like He Sees It, in: Handbook on International Arbitra­
tion and ADR, 49, American Arbitration Association ed. (Juris 2010).
kaufmann­kohLer gaBrieLLe / rigoZZi antonio, International Arbitra­
tion: Law and Practice in Switzerland (Oxford University Press 2015). 
kiDane won L., The Culture of International Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press 2017).
kLauS phiLipp, Verfahren nach dem Haager Beweisaufnahmeübereinkom­
men, 40 ZZZ 300 (2016). 
kLett kathrin / Leemann matthiaS, Art. 77, in: Basler Kommentar: Bun­
desgerichtsgesetz, Marcel A. Niggli, Peter Uebersax, Hans Wiprächtiger 
& Lorenz Kneubühler eds. (3rd. ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2018), (cited: 
BSK­kLett/Leemann). 
kLett kathrin, Art. 76, in: Basler Kommentar: Bundesgerichtsgesetz, Mar­
cel A. Niggli, Peter Uebersax, Hans Wiprächtiger & Lorenz Kneubühler 
eds. (3rd. ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2018), (cited: BSK­kLett). 
kLey anDreaS, Art. 29a, in: Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: St. Galler 
Kommentar, Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Benjamin Schindler, Rainer J. 
Schweizer & Klaus A. Vallender eds. (3rd. ed., Schulthess 2014), (cited: 
SGK­kLey). 
kneiSeL SeBaStian / Lecking cLauDia, Verteidigungstrategien gegen die 
Anordnung der Document­Production — insbesondere nach den IBA-Re­
geln zur Beweisaufnahme in der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbar­
keit, 11 SchiedsVZ 150 (2013). 
305 Bibliography
knoepfLer francoiS, Jurisprudence suisse en matière d’arbitrage interna­
tional, 8 SZIER 599 (1998). 
knöfeL oLiVer L.
 — Haager Übereinkommen über die Beweisaufnahme im Ausland in Zivil­ 
und Handelssachen vom 18. März 1970, in: Internationaler Rechtsverkehr 
in Zivil­ und Handelssachen: Loseblatt­Handbuch mit Texten, Kommen­
tierungen und Länderberichten: Band I, Reinhold Geimer & Rolf. A 
Schütze eds. (53 ed., C.H. Beck 2017), (cited: geimer/SchütZe­knöfeL). 
 —  Judicial Assistance in the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Aid of Arbitra­
tion: A German Perspective, 5 J. Priv. Int. L. 281 (2009), (cited: knöfeL, 
Judicial Assistance). 
knoLL Joachim, Chapter 2, Part II: Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, Art. 182, 
185, in: Arbitration in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Ar­
royo ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law International 2018), (cited: arroyo­knoLL). 
koDek georg e., Verfassung und Grundrechte, in: Schiedsverfahrensrecht: 
Band 1 1, Christoph Liebscher, Paul Oberhammer & Walter H. Rechberger 
eds. (Springer 2012). 
kraayVanger Jan / richter maLte / wenDLer Jan, US-Beweishilfe in 
Schiedsverfahren — ein Anschlag auf die internationale Schiedsgerichts­
barkeit?, 6 SchiedsVZ 161 (2008), (cited: kraayVanger et al.). 
kreinDLer richarD h., Chapter 2 §2.05: The Role of State Courts in Assisting 
Arbitral Tribunals Confronted with Guerrilla Tactics, in: Guerilla Tactics 
in International Arbitration, 93, Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske 
eds. (Kluwer Law International 2013).
kreinDLer richarD / woLff reinmar / rieDer markuS S., Commercial 
Arbitration in Germany (Oxford University Press 2016), (cited: kreinDLer 
et al.). 
kronke herBert, Introduction: The New York Convention Fifty Years on: 
Overview and Assessment, in: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention, 
Herbert Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk Otto & Nicola Christine Port 
eds. (Kluwer Law International 2010), (cited: kronke et al.­kronke).
krSuL timothy c., The Limits on Enforcement of Arbitral Third­Party Subpo­
enas: Should They be Loosened?, in: Handbook on Arbitration Practice, 
181, American Arbitration Association ed. (Juris 2010). 
306 Bibliography
kühn woLfgang, Common Law vs Civil Law Proceedings in International 
Commercial Arbitration, in: Festschrift für Hans­Jochem Lüer zum 70. 
Geburtstag, 3, Wilhelm Moll ed. (C.H. Beck 2008). 
Lachmann JenS p., Handbuch für die Schiedsgerichtspraxis (3rd ed., Dr. Otto 
Schmidt 2008). 
LaLiVe pierre / pouDret Jean­françoiS / reymonD cLauDe, Le droit de 
l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse: Edition annotée et com­
mentée du Concordat sur l’arbitrage du 27 mars 1969 et des dispositions 
sur l’arbitrage international de la Loi fédérale du 18 décembre 1987 sur le 
droit international privé (Payot 1989), (cited: LaLiVe et al.).
LanDroVe Juan c. / greuter JameS J., The Civil Astreinte as an Incentive 
Measure in Litigation and International Arbitration Practice in Switzer­
land: Is There a Need for Incorporation?, in: L’harmonisation internati­
onal du droit, 523, Christine Chappuis, Bénédict Foëx & Thomas Kadner 
Graziano eds. (Schulthess 2007).
Lau chriStopher, Do Rules and Guidelines Level the Playing Field and Pro­
perly Regulate Conduct? — An Arbitrator’s Perspective, in: International 
Arbitration and the Rules of Law: Contribution and Conformity, 559, 
Andrea Menaker ed., ICCA Congress Series, no. 19 (Kluwer Law Interna­
tional 2017).
Lcia, 2018 Annual Casework Report (2018).
LeVy DanieL, Emergency Arbitrators: Characters in Search of Author, in: 
International Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contribution and Confor­
mity, 180, Andrea Menaker ed., ICCA Congress Series, no. 19 (Kluwer 
Law International 2017), (cited: LeVy D.).
LeVy Laurent, Les Astreintes et l’arbitrage international en Suisse, 19 ASA 
Bull. 21 (2001), (cited: LeVy). 
Lew JuLian D.m. / miSteLiS LoukaS a. / kröLL Stefan m., Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003), 
(cited: Lew et al.).
Lew JuLian, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International 
Arbitration Process?, 24 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 489 (2009).
307 Bibliography
LieBScher chriStoph, Preliminary Remarks, in: New York Convention: Con­
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
of 10 June 1958: Commentary, Reinmar Wolff ed. (2nd ed., C.H. Beck 2018), 
(cited: woLff­LieBScher). 
Loquin éric, L’arbitrage du commerce international (Lextenso 2015).
LuttreLL Sam, Ten Things to Consider When Seeking Adverse Inferences in 
International Arbitration, in: 40 under 40 International Arbitration 
(2018), 281, Carlos Gonzales­Bueno ed. (Dykinson, S.L. 2018).
maBiLLarD ramon, Art. 183, 185, in: Basler Kommentar: Internationales Pri­
vatrecht, Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Anton K. Schnyder, Stephen V. 
Berti eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013), (cited: BSK­maBiLLarD).
maLament Laura e., Making or Breaking Your Billion Dollar Case: U.S. Judi­
cial Assistance to Private International Arbitration Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1782(a), 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1213 (2014). 
marghitoLa reto, Document Production in International Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2015).
markuS aLexanDer r., Rechtsmittel gegen Entscheide des juge d’appui bei 
der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit der Schweiz, 31 ASA Bull. 
504 (2013). 
martineZ­fraga peDro J., The American Influence on International Com­
mercial Arbitration: doctrinal developments and discovery methods 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). 
mciLwarth michaeL / SaVage John, International Arbitration and Mediation: 
A Practical Guide (Kluwer Law International 2010). 
meier anDreaS L., Die Anwendung des Haager Beweisübereinkommens in 
der Schweiz: Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beweisaufnahme 
für U.S.­amerikanische Zivilprozesse (Helbing Lichtenhahn 1999). 
mekat martin c., Cross Examination: Das Kreuzverhör in der deutschen 
Schiedsverfahrenspraxis, 15 SchiedsVZ 119 (2017). 
merkin roBert / fLannery LouiS, Arbitration Act 1996 (5th ed., Routledge 
2014).
meyer frank, Art. 6 EMRK, in: Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte 
und Grundfreiheiten: Kommentar, Ulrich Karpenstein & Franz C. Mayer 
eds. (2nd ed., C.H. Beck 2015), (cited: karpenStein/mayer­meyer). 
308 Bibliography
meyer­LaDewig JenS / harrenDorf Stefan / könig Stefan, Art. 6 EMRK, 
in: Handkommentar Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Jens 
Meyer Ladewig, Martin Nettesheim & von Stefan Raumer eds. (4th ed., 
Nomos 2017), (cited: HK-EMRK­LaDewig et al.). 
miSteLiS LoukaS a. / Di pietro Domenico, Introductory remarks, Art. V 
[Grounds to refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards], in: Concise 
International Arbitration, Loukas A. Mistelis ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law 
International 2015), (cited: miSteLiS­miSteLiS/Di pietro). 
moLitoriS michaeL, Der Zeugenbeweis im Schiedsverfahren, in: Beweis im 
Schiedsverfahren, 73, Walter Eberl ed. (Nomos 2015).
moSimann oLiVier L., Anti­Suit Injunctions in International Commercial 
Arbitration (Eleven International Publishing 2010). 
mourre aLexiS
 — FRANCE, in: Arbitration Guide: IBA Arbitration Committee (2012), 
(cited: mourre, France). 
 — Judicial Penalties and Specific Performance in International Arbitration, 
in: Performance as a Remedy: Non­Monetary Relief in International Ar­
bitration, 335, Michael E. Schneider & Joachim Knoll eds. (Juris 2011), 
(cited: mourre, Judicial Penalties).
müLLer­chen markuS, Art. 3, in: Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG, Band I, 
Art. 1–108, Markus Müller­Chen & Corinne Widmer Lüchinger eds. (3rd 
ed., Schulthess 2018), (cited: ZK­müLLer­chen). 
münch Joachim, Vorbemerkungen zu § 1025, § 1025, 1033, 1050, 1059, in: 
Münchner Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung: mit Gerichtsverfas­
sungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Band 3, Thomas Rauscher & Wolfgang 
Krüger eds. (5th ed., C.H. Beck 2017), (cited: MüKo­münch).
nacimiento patricia, Article V (1) (d), in: Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Conven­
tion, Herbert Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk Otto & Nicola C. Port eds. 
(Kluwer Law International 2010), (cited: kronke et al.­nacimiento). 
nater­BaSS gaBrieLLe / rouVineZ chriStina, Article 24, in: Swiss Rules of 
International Arbitration: Commentary, Tobias Zuberbühler, Christoph 
Müller & Philipp Habegger eds. (2nd. ed., Schulthess 2013), (cited: 
ZuBerBühLer et al.­nater­BaSS/rouVineZ).
309 Bibliography
neSBitt Simon / DarowSki michaeL, LCIA Arbitration Rules, Article 18 and 
Annex to the LCIA Rules [Legal Representatives], in: Concise Interna­
tional Arbitration, 521, Loukas A. Mistelis ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law In­
ternational 2015), (cited: miSteLiS­neSBitt/DarowSki). 
newman Lawrence w., Cross­Examination in International Arbitration – 
Opportunities and Challenges, in: The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to 
International Arbitration, 403, Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill 
eds. (2nd ed., Juris 2008).
nieDermaier tiLman, International Arbitration in the U.S., in: International 
Commercial Arbitration: International Conventions, Country Reports 
and Comparative Analysis, 660, Stephan Balthasar ed. (C.H. Beck 2016), 
(cited: BaLthaSar­nieDermaier). 
nougein henri­JacqueS / Dupeyré romain, Règles et pratiques du droit 
français de l’arbitrage (Lextenso 2012). 
nyc Bar committee, 28 U.S. § 1782 as a Means of Obtaining Discovery in Aid 
of International Commercial Arbitration — Applicability and Best Prac­
tices (2010), (cited: nyc Bar committee report (2010)). 
o’caLLaghan kieron / finniS JeromS, Support and Supervision by the 
Courts, in: Arbitration in England with chapters on Scotland and Ireland, 
413, Julian D.M. Lew, Harris Bor, Gregore Fullelove & Joanne Greenaway 
eds. (Kluwer Law International 2013). 
o’maLLey nathan D. / eaton Luke n., U.S. Discovery in Aid of International 
Arbitration: Where Things Presently Stand, 31 J. Int’l Arb. 11 (2014). 
o’maLLey nathan D., Rules of Evidence in International Arbitration: An 
Annotated Guide (2nd ed., Routledge 2019).
oetiker chriStian
 — Art. 176, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 190, 192, in: Zürcher Kommentar 
zum IPRG, Band II, Art. 108a–200, Markus Müller­Chen & Corinne Widmer 
Lüchinger eds. (3rd ed., Schulthess 2018), (cited: ZK­oetiker). 
 — Article 26, in: Swiss Rules of International Arbitration: Commentary, 
Tobias Zuberbühler, Christoph Müller & Philipp Habegger eds. (2nd. ed., 
Schulthess 2013), (cited: ZuBerBühLer et al.­oetiker).
 — Sense and Nonsense of Written Witness Statements, in: New Develop­
ments in International Commercial Arbitration 2009, 29, Christoph Mül­
ler & Antonio Rigozzi eds. (Schulthess 2009), (cited: oetiker, Witness 
Statements). 
310 Bibliography
 — Witnesses before the International Arbitral Tribunal, 25 ASA Bull. 253 
(2007), (cited: oetiker, Witnesses).
oreLLi marieLLa, Chapter 2, Part II, Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, Ar­
ticle 176 [Field of application; seat of the arbitral tribunal], in: Arbitration 
in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Arroyo ed. (2nd ed., 
Kluwer Law International 2018), (cited: arroyo­oreLLi). 
orLowSki Victoria, FAA Section 10 Applications to Vacate an Award (Inclu­
ding “Manifest Disregard”), in: International Arbitration in the United 
States, 503, Laurence Shore et al. eds. (Kluwer Law International 2017). 
othenin­girarD Simon, Quelques observations sur le for de nécessité en 
droit international privé suisse (Art. 3 LDIP), 9 SZIER 251 (1999). 
paBSt Steffen, Haager Übereinkommen über die Bweisaufnahme im Aus­
land in Zivil­ oder Handelssachen, Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 1, Art. 1, 9, 
14, 23, in: Münchner Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung: mit Gerichts­
verfassungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Band 3, Thomas Rauscher & 
Wolfgang Krüger eds. (5th ed., C.H. Beck 2017), (cited: MüKo­paBSt). 
park wiLLiam w., A Fair Fight: Professional Guidelines in International Ar­
bitration, 30 Arb. Int. 409 (2014).
patocchi p. micheLe / Jermini ceSare, Art. 192, in: Basler Kommentar: In­
ternationales Privatrecht, Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Anton K. 
Schnyder, Stephen V. Berti eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013), 
(cited: BSK­patocchi/Jermini).
patocchi p. micheLe / nieDermaier tiLman, Chapter XV: UNCITRAL Arbit­
ration Rules — UNCITRAL Rules —, in: Institutional Arbitration: Article­ 
by­Article Commentary, Rolf A. Schütze ed. (C.H. Beck 2013), (cited: 
SchütZe­patocchi/nieDermaier).
pauLSSon Jan, Arbitration in Three Dimensions, LSE Law, Society and Eco­
nomy Working Papers 2 (2010). 
pauLSSon marike r. p., The 1958 New York Convention in Action (Kluwer 
Law International 2016), (cited: pauLSSon m.). 
peter woLfgang / Brunner chriStoph, Art. 180, in: Basler Kommentar: 
Internationales Privatrecht, Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Anton K. 
Schnyder, Stephen V. Berti eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013), 
(cited: BSK­peter/Brunner).
311 Bibliography
peter woLfgang, Witness ‘Conferencing’, 18 Arb. Int. 27 (2002). 
pfiffner DanieL c. / hochStraSSer DanieL, Art. 176, in: Basler Kommen­
tar: Internationales Privatrecht, Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Anton 
K. Schnyder, Stephen V. Berti eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013), 
(cited: BSK­pfiffner/hochStraSSer).
pfiSterer Stefanie
 — Art. 190, in: Basler Kommentar: Internationales Privatrecht, Heinrich 
Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Anton K. Schnyder, Stephen V. Berti eds. (3rd 
ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013), (cited: BSK­pfiSterer).
 — Art. 356, in: Berner Kommentar: Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, 
Band III: Art. 353–399 ZPO und Art. 407 ZPO, Heinz Hausheer & Hans P. 
Walther eds. (Stämpfli 2014), (cited: BK­pfiSterer). 
pitkowitZ nikoLauS, Chapter I: Issues Specific to Arbitration in Europe, Is 
There Still a Scope of Application of the European Convention on Inter­
national Commercial Arbitration?, in: Austrian Yearbook on Internatio­
nal Arbitration, Vol. 2013, 93, Christian Klausegger & Peter Klein et al. 
eds. (Manz’sche Verlags­ und Universitätsbuchhandlung 2013). 
pouDret Jean­françoiS / SéBaStien BeSSon, Comparative Law of Interna­
tional Arbitration (2nd ed., Sweet and Maxwell, Schulthess 2007). 
prütting hanS, § 1033, 1050, in: Zivilprozessordnung: Kommentar, Hans 
Prütting & Markus Gehrlein eds. (11th ed., Luchterhahn 2019), (cited: 
prütting/gehrLein­prütting). 
queen mary uniVerSity of LonDon
 — International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the 
Arbitral Process (2012), (cited: queen mary SurVey (2012)).
 — International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in In­
ternational Arbitration (2015), (cited: queen mary SurVey (2015)).
 — International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbit­
ration (2018), (cited: queen mary SurVey (2018)). 
racine Jean­BaptiSte, Droit de l’arbitrage (puf 2016).
raDicati Di BroZoLo Luca, International arbitration and domestic law, in: 
International Commercial Arbitration: Different Forms and their Featu­
res, 40, Giuditta Cordero­Moos ed. (Cambridge University Press 2013).
312 Bibliography
raeSchke­keSSLer hiLmar
 — Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration, in: The Taking of 
Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, 45, Karl­Heinz Böck­
stiegel, Klaus­Peter Berger & Jens Bredow eds., Schriftenreihe der Deut­
schen Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Band 26 (Carl Heymanns 
Verlag 2010), (cited: raeSchke­keSSLer, Discovery).
 — Witness Conferencing, in: The Leading Arbitrator’s Guide to Internatio­
nal Arbitration 415, Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds. (2nd 
ed., Juris 2008), (cited: raeSchke­keSSLer, Witness Conferencing). 
rainey BernaDette / wickS eLiZaBeth / oVey cLare, Jacobs, White, and 
Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights (7th ed., Oxford Uni­
versity Press 2017), (cited: rainey et al.). 
rauScher thomaS, Beweisaufnahme nach der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1206/2001, 
Art. 1 Anwendungsbereich, in: Münchner Kommentar zur Zivilprozess­
ordnung: mit Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Band 3, 
Thomas Rauscher & Wolfgang Krüger eds. (5th ed., C.H. Beck 2017), (cited: 
MüKo­rauScher). 
rawDing nigeL / fuLLeLoVe gregory / martin penny, International Arbi­
tration in England: A Procedural Overview, in: Arbitration in England 
with chapters on Scotland and Ireland, 398, Julian D.M. Lew, Harris Bor, 
Gregore Fullelove & Joanne Greenaway eds. (Kluwer Law International 
2013), (cited: rawDing et al.). 
reeD Lucy, Chapter 2, §1.04: Sanctions Available for Arbitrators to Curtail 
Guerrilla Tactics, in: Guerilla Tactics in International Arbitration, 93, 
Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds. (Kluwer Law International 
2013).
reiner anDreaS / aSchauer chriStian, Chapter II — ICC Rules —, in: Insti­
tutional Arbitration: Article­by­Article Commentary 25, Rolf A. Schütze 
ed. (C.H. Beck 2013), (cited: SchütZe­reiner/aSchauer).
reymonD cLauDe, Civil Law and Common Law Procedures: Which is the 
More Inquisitorial? A Civil Lawyer’s Response, 5 Arb. Int. 357 (1989). 
riSSe Jörg / haLLer heiko, Die “IBA-Regeln” zur Beweisaufnahme in der 
internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in: Beweis im Schiedsverfah­
ren, 115, Walter Eberl ed. (Nomos 2015). 
313 Bibliography
riSSe Jörg, Section 27 — Establishing the Facts, in: Arbitration in Germany: 
The Model Law in Practice, Karl­Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan M. Kröll & Pa­
tricia Nacimiento eds. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law International 2015), (cited: 
BöckStiegeL et al.­riSSe).
roBertSon ann r. / frieDman Scott L., Coming To America: The Use of 28 
U.S.C. § 1782, 25 J. Arb. Stud. 59 (2015). 
roDrigueZ roDrigo / VoLken pauL, Art. 11a, in: Zürcher Kommentar zum 
IPRG, Band I, Art. 1–108, Markus Müller­Chen & Corinne Widmer Lüchin­
ger eds. (3rd ed., Schulthess 2018), (cited: ZK­roDrigueZ/VoLken). 
rogerS catherine a., Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press 2014).
roSeLL JoSé, Arbitration Costs as Relief and/or Damages, 28 J. Int’l Arb. 115 
(2011).
rothStein DanieL J., A Proposal to Clarify U.S. Law on Judicial Assistance 
in Taking Evidence for International Arbitration, 19 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 
61 (2008). 
rüeDe thomaS / haDenfeLDt reimer, Schweizerisches Schiedsgerichts­
recht nach Konkordat und IPRG (2nd ed., Schulthess 1993). 
rüetSchi SVen, Art. 152, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, in: Berner Kommentar: Schwei­
zerische Zivilprozessordnung, Band II, Artikel 150–352 ZPO, Artikel 400–
406 ZPO, Heinz Hausheer & Hans P. Walther eds. (Stämpfli 2012), (cited: 
BK­rüetSchi). 
rütZeL Stefan / wegen gerharD / wiLSke Stephan, Commercial Dispute 
Resolution in Germany — Litigation Arbitration Mediation — (2nd ed., 
C.H. Beck 2016), (cited: rütZeL et al.). 
Saathoff arno, Möglichkeiten und Verfahren gerichtlicher Hilfe bei der 
Beweisaufnahme zugunsten fremdnationaler Handelsschiedsgerichts­
verfahren mit internationaler Beteiligung: Untersuchung im Recht der 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Universität Köln 1987). 
SachS kLauS / Lörcher torSten, § 1050 – Court Assistance in Taking Eviden­
ce and Other Judicial Acts, in: Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in 
Practice, Karl­Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan M. Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento 
eds. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law International 2015), (cited: BöckStiegeL et al.­
SachS/Lörcher).
314 Bibliography
SachS kLauS / nieDermaier tiLmann, Die Rechtsfigur der “adverse infe­
rence” in der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in: Beweis im 
Schiedsverfahren, 129, Walter Eberl ed. (Nomos 2015).
Saenger ingo, § 1050, in: Zivilprozessordnung: Familienverfahren, Gerichts­
verfassung, Europäisches Verfahrensrecht: Handkommentar, Ingo 
Saenger ed. (7th ed., Nomos 2019), (cited: HK­Saenger). 
SaLomon cLauDia t. / frieDrich SanDra, Obtaining and Submitting Evi­
dence in International Arbitration in the United States, 24 Am. Rev. Int’l 
Arb. 549 (2013), (cited: SaLomon/frieDrich, Obtaining Evidence).
SaLomon cLauDia t. / frieDrich SanDra, Witnesses, Subpoenas, Docu­
ments and the Relationship Between the FAA and State Law, in: Interna­
tional Arbitration in the United States, 317, Laurence Shore et al. eds. 
(Kluwer Law International 2017), (cited: SaLomon/frieDrich, FAA). 
Santacroce faBio g., The emergency arbitrator: a full­fledged arbitrator 
rendering an enforceable decision?, 31 Arb. Int. 283 (2015). 
Schaefer Jan k., Court Assistance in Arbitration – Some Observations on the 
Critical Stand­by Function of the Courts, 43 Pepp. L. Rev. 521 (2016). 
ScharDt ramona, Neue Regelungen der DIS-Schiedsgerichtsordnung zur 
Steigerung der Verfahrenseffizienz, 17 SchiedsVZ 28 (2019). 
ScheLhaaS harriet, Article 7.2.4, in: Commentary on the UNIDROIT Prin­
ciples of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), 909, Stefan Voge­
nauer ed. (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2015), (cited: Vogenauer­ 
ScheLhaaS).
Scherer matthiaS, SWITZERLAND, in: Arbitration Guide: IBA Arbitration 
Committee (2018). 
Scherer maxi / richman LiSa / gerBay rémy, Arbitrating under the 2014 
LCIA Rules: A User’s Guide (Kluwer Law International 2015), (cited: 
Scherer et al.). 
SchLoSSer peter
 — § 1033, 1042, 1050, in: Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung: ZPO, Band 
10: §§ 1025–1066, Reinhard Bork & Herbert Roth eds. (23 ed., Mohr Sie­
beck 2014), (cited: Stein/JonaS­SchLoSSer). 
 
315 Bibliography
 — Die lange Leine vom Gericht zum Schiedsgericht: Ein französisches 
Lehrstück für Deutschland, die Schweiz und manch’ andere, in: Fest­
schrift für Walther J. Habscheid zum 65. Geburtstag, 6. April 1989, 273, 
Walter F. Lindacher, Dieter Pfaff, Günther H. Roth, Peter Schlosser & 
Eberhard Wieser eds. (Gieseking 1989).
SchmiD ernSt f., Art. 162, 164, 166, in: Basler Kommentar: Schweizerische 
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), Karl Spühler, Luca Tenchio & Dominik In­
fanger eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2017), (cited: BSK­SchmiD). 
SchmiDt­ahrenDtS niLS / De Jong aron, The “Right” Place of Arbitration: 
How Germany Might Profit from Brexit, 16 SchiedsVZ 281 (2018). 
SchneiDer marceL, Funktionen des staatlichen Richters am Sitz des inter­
nationalen Schiedsgerichts gemäss 12. Kapitel des IPRG (DIKE 2009). 
SchneiDer michaeL e. / Scherer matthiaS, Art. 182, 184, in: Basler Kom­
mentar: Internationales Privatrecht, Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, 
Anton K. Schnyder, Stephen V. Berti eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 
2013), (cited: BSK­SchneiDer/Scherer). 
SchneiDer michaeL e., President’s Message: Yet another opportunity to 
waste time and money on procedural skirmishes: The IBA Guidelines on 
Party Representation, 31 ASA Bull. 497 (2013).
SchoiBL norBert a., Europäische Rechtshilfe bei der Beweisaufnahme in 
Zivil­ und Handelssachen durch ordentliche Gerichte für Schiedsge­
richte, in: Festschrift für Walter H. Rechberger zum 60. Geburtstag,  513, 
Ludwig Bittner, Thomas Klicka, Georg E. Kodek & Paul Oberhammer 
eds. (Springer 2005). 
Schott markuS / courVoiSier maurice, Art. 186, in: Basler Kommentar: 
Internationales Privatrecht, Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Anton K. 
Schnyder, Stephen V. Berti eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013), 
(cited: BSK­Schott/courVoiSier).
Schramm Dorothée / geiSinger eLLiott / pinSoLLe phiLippe, in Recog­
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commen­
tary on the New York Convention, Herbert Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, 
Dirk Otto & Nicola C. Port eds. (Kluwer Law International 2010), (cited: 
kronke et al.­Schramm et al.). 
316 Bibliography
Schumacher huBertuS, Grundsätze der Beweiserhebung im Schiedsver­
fahren, in: Beweiserhebung im Schiedsverfahren, 1, Hubertus Schuma­
cher ed. (Manz’sche Verlags­ und Universitätsbuchhandlung 2011). 
SchütZe roLf a.
 — § 1033, 1050, in: Zivilprozessordnung und Nebengesetze: Grosskommen­
tar, Elfter Band, §§916–1066, Bernhard Wieczorek & Rolf A. Schütze eds. 
(4th ed., De Gruyter 2018), (cited: wiecZorek/SchütZe­SchütZe). 
 — Die Ermessensgrenzen des Schiedsgerichts bei der Bestimmung derBe­
weisregeln, 4 SchiedsVZ 1 (2006), (cited: SchütZe, Ermessensgrenzen). 
 — Rechtsverfolgung im Ausland: Prozessführung vor ausländischen Ge­
richten und Schiedsgerichten (5th ed., De Gruyter 2016), (cited: SchütZe, 
Rechtsverfolgung). 
SchwaB karL h. / waLter gerharD, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit: Systemati­
scher Kommentar zu den Vorschriften der Zivilprozessordnung, des 
Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes, der Staatsverträge und der Kostengesetze über 
das privatrechtliche Schiedsgerichtsverfahren (7th ed., C.H. Beck 2005).
SchweiZer mark, Vorsorgliche Beweisabnahme nach schweizerischer Zivil­
prozessordnung und Patentgesetz, 21–22 ZZZ 3 (2010).
SeragLini chriStophe / ortScheiDt Jérôme, Droit de l’arbitrage interne 
et international (Lextenso 2013).
Sharpe Jeremy k., Drawing Adverse Inferences from the Non­production of 
Evidence, 22 Arb. Int. 549 (2006). 
ShepparD auDLey, Introduction, S. 2, 34, 41, 43, 44, 68, in: Concise Interna­
tional Arbitration, Loukas A. Mistelis ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law Interna­
tional 2015). 
Shore Laurence / cheng tai­heng / La chuiSa JeneLLe / Schaner  
Lawrence S. / Senn mara, Introduction, in: International Arbitration 
in the United States, 3, Laurence Shore et al. eds. (Kluwer Law Interna­
tional 2017), (cited: Shore et al.). 
SincLair anthony c., Differences in the Approach to Witness Evidence 
Between the Civil and Common Law Traditions, in: The Art of Advocacy 
in International Arbitration, 23, Doak Bishop & Edward G. Kehoe eds. 
(JurisNet 2010).




 — American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tri­
bunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 Syracuse J. Int’l 
L. & Com. 1 (1998), (cited: Smit, Section 1782 Revisited).
 — Assistance Rendered by the United States in Proceedings Before Inter­
national Tribunals, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1264 (1962), (cited: Smit, Interna­
tional Tribunals). 
 — International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1031 
(1961), (cited: Smit, International Aspects).
 — International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 
1015 (1965), (cited: Smit, International Litigation). 
SoLomon DenniS, International Commercial Arbitration: The New York Con­
vention, in: International Commercial Arbitration: International Conven­
tions, Country Reports and Comparative Analysis, 45, Stephan Balthasar 
ed. (C.H. Beck 2016), (cited: BaLthaSar­SoLomon). 
SourgenS fréDéric g. / DuggaL kaBir a.n. / LairD ian a., Evidence in Inter­
national Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2018), (cited: 
SourgenS et al.).
Stacher marco
 — Einführung in die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit der Schweiz, 
(DIKE 2015).
 — Art. 356, in: Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung ZPO: Kommentar, 
Alexander Brunner, Dominik Gasser & Ivo Schwander eds. (2nd ed., 
DIKE 2016), (cited: DIKE­Stacher). 
Staughton chriStopher, Civil Law and Common Law Procedures: Which 
is the More Inquisitorial? A Common Lawyer’s Response, 5 Arb. Int. 351 
(1989).
SteinBrück Ben
 — Die Unterstützung ausländischer Schiedsverfahren durch staatliche Ge­
richte: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung des deutschen, österrei­
chischen, englischen, schweizerischen, französischen und US­amerika­
nischen Schiedsrechts (Mohr Siebeck 2009).
 — Internationale Zuständigkeit deutscher Gerichte für selbständige Be­
weisverfahren in Schiedssachen (zu OLG Düsseldorf, 7.2.2008 — I­20 W 
152/07, unten, S. 442, Nr. 29), 8 IPrax 424 (2010), (cited: SteinBrück, Note 
on OLG Düsseldorf, 7 February 2008, I­20 W 152/07, in: 8 Iprax 424 (2010)). 
318 Bibliography
Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Distinguishing International Com­
mercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 Stan. J. 
Complex Litig. 295 (2013). 
SuSSman eDna, Ethics in International Arbitration: Soft Law Guidance for Ar­
bitrators and Party Representatives, in: Soft Law in International Arbitra­
tion, 239, Lawrence W. Newmann & Michael J. Radine eds. (JurisNet 2014). 
SutcLiffe Jonathan / wirth markuS, Witness Evidence: Written or Oral, 
Who asks the Questions, in: The Taking of Evidence in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 33, Karl­Heinz Böckstiegel, Klaus­Peter Berger 
& Jens Bredow eds., Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Institution für Schieds­
gerichtsbarkeit, Band 26 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2010).
Sutton DaViD St. J. / giLL JuDith / gearing matthew, Russell on Arbitra­
tion, (24th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2015), (cited: Sutton et al.).
SwiSS chamBerS’ arBitration inStitution, Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration 
Institution: Commented Statistics 2018, (cited: Scai StatiSticS (2018)). 
tercier pierre / BerSheDa tetiana, Document Production in Arbitration: 
A Civil Law Viewpoint, in: The Search for “Truth” in Arbitration, 77, 
Markus Wirth, Christina Rouvinez & Joachim Knoll eds., ASA Special 
Series No. 35 (Juris 2011). 
thorenS­aLaDJem Sophie, Le juge d’appui en matière d’arbitrage interne et 
international, 35 ASA Bull. 530 (2017).
timár kinga / kraayVanger Jan, U.S. Discovery in Aid of Foreign Arbitra­
tion — A Journey through the Jungle of U.S. Court Rulings — and a Guide, 
10 SchiedsVZ 66 (2012). 
tomS chriStian, National Report of United Kingdom, in Working Session 
“State Court Participation in Arbitration — Help or Hindrance?” (AIJA 
Annual Congress 2015).
trittmann roLf, Basics and Differences of the Continental and Common Law 
System and State Court Proceedings, in: The Taking of Evidence in Inter­
national Commercial Arbitration, 15, Karl­Heinz Böckstiegel, Klaus­Peter 
Berger & Jens Bredow eds., Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Institution für 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Band 26 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2010).
uhLmann feLix, Art. 90, in: Basler Kommentar: Bundesgerichtsgesetz, 
Marcel A. Niggli, Peter Uebersax, Hans Wiprächtiger & Lorenz Kneu­
bühler eds. (3rd. ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2018), (cited: BSK­uhLmann). 
319 Bibliography
uncitraL nyc guiDe, Online Guide on the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York), (cited: 
uncitraL nyc guiDe). 
uncitraL yB (1968–1970), UNCITRAL Yearbook, Volume I, 1968–1970 (cited: 
uncitraL yB (1968–1970).
uncitraL, Case Law (2012), 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on In­
ternational Commercial Arbitration (cited: uncitraL, Case Law (2012)). 
VaLentine Sarah, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: An Annotated Bibliography, 
7 N.Y.C. L. Rev. 391 (2004). 
Van houtte Vera, Chapter 5. Adverse Inferences in International Arbitra­
tion, in: Written Evidence and Discovery in International Arbitration: 
New Issues and Tendencies, 195, Teresa Giovannini & Alexis Mourre 
eds., ICC Dossiers Vol. 6 (Kluwer Law International 2009).
VáraDy tiBor / BarceLó John J. / kröLL Stefan / Von mehren arthur t., 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational Perspective (6th 
ed., West Academic Publishing 2015), (cited: VáraDy et al.).
Varga iStVán, Beweiserhebung in transatlantischen Schiedsverfahren: Eine 
Suche nach Kompromissen zwischen deutscher und US­amerikanischer 
Beweisrechtstradition (Nomos 2006).
Veit marc D., Chapter 2, Part II: Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, Article 184 
[Procedure: taking of evidence], in: Arbitration in Switzerland: The 
Practitioner’s Guide, Manuel Arroyo ed. (2nd ed., Kluwer Law Interna­
tional 2018), (cited: arroyo­Veit). 
VerBiSt herman / Schäfer erik / imhooS chriStophe, ICC Arbitration in 
Practice (2nd ed., Kluwer Law International 2015). 
VittoZ BorriS, Recalcitrant witnesses summoned by the State court at the 
seat of the arbitration to attend an arbitration hearing: Note on the Ordi­
nance of 9 February 2015 issued by the Tribunal de première instance in 
Geneva, 33 ASA Bull. 921 (2015). 
Voit woLfgang, § 1033, 1050, in: Zivilprozessordnung: mit Gerichtsverfas­
sungsgesetz: Kommentar, Hans­Joachim Musielak & Wolfgang Voit eds. 
(16th ed., Franz Vahlen 2019), (cited: muSieLak/Voit­Voit). 
320 Bibliography
Von enZBerg Donata / rohrSSen BeneDikt, National Report for Germany, 
in Working Session “State Court Participation in Arbitration — Help or 
Hindrance?” (AIJA Annual Congress 2015).
Von hein Jan, Art. 1 EG-BewVO, in: Europäisches Zivilprozess­ und Kollisi­
onsrecht: EUZPR/EuIPR: Kommentar: Band II, Thomas Rauscher ed. 
(4th ed., Dr. Otto Schmidt 2015), (cited: rauScher­Von hein). 
Von SegeSSer georg
 — Vorsorgliche Massnamen im Internationalen Schiedsprozess, 25 ASA 
Bull. 473 (2007), (cited: Von SegeSSer, Interim Measures). 
 — Witness Preparation in International Commercial Arbitration, 20 ASA 
Bull. 222 (2002), (cited: Von SegeSSer, Witness Preparation). 
Von SeLLe Dirk, § 142, in: BeckOK ZPO, Volkert Vorwerk & Christian Wolf 
eds. (32nd ed., C.H. Beck 2019), (cited: BeckOK­Von SeLLe).
wagner gerharD / BüLau maximiLian, Procedural Orders by Arbitral Tri­
bunals: In the Stays of Party Agreements?, 11 SchiedsVZ 6 (2013).
wagner gerharD, Europäisches Beweisrecht — Prozessrechtsharmonisie­
rung durch Schiedsgerichte, 9 ZeuP 441 (2001). 
waincymer Jeffrey
 — Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law Inter­
national 2012), (cited: waincymer, Evidence). 
 — Regulatory Developments in the Control of Counsel in International Ar­
bitration: The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International 
Arbitration and the New LCIA Rules and Annex, 30 Arb. Int. 513 (2014), 
(cited: waincymer, Regulatory Developments). 
waLDmann BernharD, Art. 29a, in: Basler Kommentar: Bundesverfassung, 
Bernhard Waldmann, Eva M. Belser & Astrid Epiney eds. (Helbing Lich­
tenhahn 2015), (cited: BSK­waLDmann). 
waLter gerharD / BoSch woLfgang / Jürgen Brönnimann, Internatio­
nale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz: Kommentar zu Kapitel 12 
des IPRG-Gesetzes (Stämpfli 1991), (cited: waLter et al.). 
waLZ cLauDia, Interim Measures: Seeking them before Arbitral Tribunals 
or Courts?, in: Selected Papers on International Arbitration, 143, Vol. 4 
(Stämpfli 2018).
321 Bibliography
weBer­Stecher urS, Art. 356, in: Basler Kommentar: Schweizerische Zivil­
prozessordnung (ZPO), Karl Spühler, Luca Tenchio & Dominik Infanger 
eds. (3rd ed., Helbing Lichtenhahn 2017), (cited: BSK­weBer­Stecher). 
wiLLiSegger DanieL, Grundstruktur des Zivilprozesses: Grundlagen, 
Grundelemente, Gerichtsverfahren (Schulthess 2012).
wiLSke Stephan / fox toDD J., F. Action Before State Courts (Article II (3)), 
in: New York Convention: Convention on the Recognition and Enforce­
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 June 1958: Commentary, Reinmar 
Wolff ed. (2nd ed., C.H. Beck 2018), (cited: woLff­wiLSke/fox). 
wiLSke Stephan / markert LarS, § 1050, 1065, in: BeckOK ZPO, Volkert Vor­
werk & Christian Wolf eds. (32nd ed., C.H. Beck 2019), (cited: BeckOK­ 
wiLSke/markert).
wirth markuS / hoffmann­nowotny urS, Rechtshilfe deutscher Gerichte 
zugunsten ausländischer Schiedsgerichte bei der Beweisaufnahme — 
ein Erfahrungsbericht, 3 SchiedsVZ 66 (2005). 
wirth markuS, Ihr Zeuge, Herr Rechtsanwalt! Weshalb Civil­Law­Schieds­
richter Common­Law­Verfahrensrecht anwenden, 1 SchiedsVZ 9 (2003).
woLff reinmar, Judicial Assistance by German Courts in Aid of Internatio­
nal Arbitration, in: International Arbitration and the Courts, 233, Devin 
Bray & Heather L. Bray eds. (JurisNet 2015).
wySS LukaS f., Vorsorgliche Massnahmen und Beweisaufnahme — die Rolle 
des Staatlichen Richters bei Internationalen Schiedsverfahren aus 
Schweizer Sicht, 9 SchiedsVZ 1964 (2011).
ZuBerBühLer toBiaS / hofmann Dieter / oetiker chriStian / rohner 
thomaS, IBA Rules of Evidence: Commentary on the IBA Rules on the 
Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (Schulthess 2012), (cited: 
ZuBerBühLer et al.). 
Zweigert konraD / kötZ hein, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf 
dem Gebiet des Privatrechts (3rd ed., J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1996). 
322 Bibliography
Table of Cases
The numbers in bold letters refer to the respective page number. 
I. Arbitral Tribunals
ICC  
ICC Case No. 13490, Procedural Order of July 2006,  
25 ICC Bulletin 8 (2014). 74
Manufacturer v. Buyer,  
ICC Case No. 8486 (1996), Y.B. Comm. Arb. 172 (1999). 68
Agent v. Principal and Managing director of principal,  
ICC Case No. 7453 (1994), Y.B. Comm. Arb. 107 (1997). 68
Buyer Y v. Seller A and others,  
ICC Case No. 7661 (1996), Y.B. Comm. Arb. 163 (1997). 68
ICSID 
Methanex Corporation v. Government of the United States of America,  
ICSID, 3 August 2005. 61
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States,  
ICSID, ARB (AF)/00/3, 30 April 2004. 97
Azinian et al. v. United Mexican States,  
ICSID, ARB (AF)/92/2), 1 November 1999. 43
IUSCT 
Frederica Lincoln Riahi v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
IUSCT, 27 February 2003, 600­485­1. 61
Houston Contracting Co. v. National Iranian Oil Co. IUSCT,  
22 July 1988, 378­173­3. 61 
II. European Court of Human Rights
Mutu et Pechstein v. Switzerland,  
ECtHR, no. 40575/10 and 67674/10, 2 October 2018. 112
Nourredine Tabbane v. Switzerland,  
ECtHR, no. 41069/12, 24 March 2016. 106, 112, 114, 238
Eiffage S.A. et autres v. Switzerland,  
ECtHR, no. 1742/05, 15 September 2009. 112
Tamminen v. Finnland,  
ECtHR, no. 40847/98, 15 June 2004. 111
323 Table of Cases
Transport Fluviais do Sado S.A. v. Portugal,  
ECtHR, no. 35943/02, 16 December 2003. 112
Roland Volkmer v. Germany,  
ECtHR, no. 39799/98, 22 November 2001. 111
Osmo Suovaniemi and others v. Finland,  
ECtHR, no. 31737/96, 23 February 1999. 112
Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands,  
ECtHR, App no 14448/88, 27 October 1993. 111
Ruiz­Mateos v. Spain,  
ECtHR, no. 12952/87, 23 June 1993. 111
Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria,  
ECtHR, no. 10802/84, 25 February 1992. 112
Schenk v. Switzerland,  
ECtHR, no. 10862/84, 12 July 1988. 111
R v. Switzerland,  
ECtHR, no. 10881/84, 4 March 1987. 114
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom,  
ECtHR, no. 9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81; 9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 
9405/81, 8 July 1986. 111
Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden,  
ECtHR, no. 8588/79 and 8589/79, 12 December 1983. 112
Deweer v. Belgium,  
ECtHR, no. 6903/75, 27 February 1980. 112
III. Countries
Canada
B.F. Jones Logistics Inc. et al. v. Rolko et al.,  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Canada, 24 August 2004,  
CanLII 21276. 94
Delphi Petroleum Inc. v. Derin Shipping and Training Ltd.,  
Federal Court of Canada, 3 December 1993,  
in: UNCITRAL; A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/4. 94
England and Wales 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
CGU International Insurance Plc & Ors v. AstraZeneca Insurance Co Ltd 
[2006] EWCA 1340 (Civ.). 180
Lord Borough of Southwark v. Kofi­Adu  
[2006] EWCA 28 (Civ.). 11
324 Table of Cases 
Tajik Aluminium Plant v. Hydro Aluminium AS & Ors  
[2005] EWCA 1218 (Civ.). 173
Cetelem SA v. Roust Holding Ltd  
[2005] EWCA 618 (Civ.). 174, 180
Davies v. Eli Lilly & Ors,  
[1987] EWCA 1 WLR 428. 13
High Court of Justice of England and Wales
DTEK Trading S.A. v. Morozov & Anor  
[2017] EWHC 94 (Comm.). 176
Gerald Metals SA v. Timis & Ors  
[2016] EWHC 2327. 179
AB v. CD  
[2014] EWHC 1 (QB). 174
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holding v. Unitech Ltd. & Ors  
[2014] EWHC 3704 (Comm.). 176
Euroil Ltd v. Cameroon Offshore Petroleum Sarl  
[2014] EWHC 12 (Comm.). 174
PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v. Sergey Maksimov & Ors  
[2013] EWHC 3203 (Comm.). 176
B v. S  
[2011] EWHC 691 (Comm.). 171
Schwebel v. Schwebel  
[2010] EWHC 3280 (TCC). 271
Travelers Insurance Co Ltd v. Countrywide Surveyors Ltd  
[2010] EWHC 2455 (TCC). 174
Stuart Peter and Anor v. Skylet Andrew  
[2009] EWHC 1511 (QB). 173
Pacific Maritime (Asia) Ltd. v. Holystone Overseas Ltd  
[2007] EWHC 2319 (Comm.). 178
Permasteelisa Japan KK v. Bouyguesstroi & Anor  
[2007] EWHC 3508 (TCC). 178
Starlight Shipping Co v. Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd.  
[2007] EWHC 1893 (Comm.). 174
Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v. Tank  
[2006] EWHC 1055 (Comm.). 170
Assimina Maritime Ltd. v. Pakistan Shipping Corporation & Anor  
[2004] EWHC 3005 (Comm.). 89, 173
NB Three Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd  
[2004] EWHC 2001 (Comm.). 179
325 Table of Cases
South Tyneside Borough Council v. Wickes Building Supplies  
[2004] EWHC 2428 (Comm.). 173
World Trade Corporation v. C. Czarnikow Sugar Ltd  
[2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm.). 271
BNP Paribas v. Deloitte & Touche LLP  
[2003] EWHC 2874 (Comm.). 173
Commerce and Industry Co, Canada v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyds  
of London  
[2002] EWHC 2 All ER. 175, 177, 178
France
Paris Court of Appeal
Société Dresser­Rand Group Inc. v. Société Diana Capital I F.C.R.,  
Paris Court of Appeal, 28 February 2017, First Civil Chamber, 15/06036. 
62
M. Ch. Di Sabatino et autre v. Société Animated Ventures et autres,  
Paris Court of Appeal, 7 October 2014, Rev. Arb. 531 (2015). 154
Société Filali Film Alimentaire S.A.R.L v. Société Bielloni Convertin Spa,  
Paris Court of Appeal, 4 November 2014, Rev. Arb. 1037 (2014). 164
Société Otor Participations et autres v. Carlyle Holdings 1 et autre,  
Paris Court of Appeal, 7 October 2004, Rev. Arb. 737 (2005). 74
Société d’étude et représentations navales et industrielles (SOERNI)  
et autres v. Société Aire sea broker limited (ASB),  
Paris Court of Appeal, 8 July 2009, 08­16­025. 25
Courts of Cassation
Paris Court of Cassation, 19 March 2015, 2nd Civil Chamber, 14­14389. 158
Paris Court of Cassation, 10 September 2014, 1st Civil Chamber, 13­22400. 15
Paris Court of Cassation, 27 February 2014, 2nd Civil Chamber, 13­10013. 157
Paris Court of Cassation, 10 January 2013, 2nd Civil Chamber, 12­12375. 161
Paris Court of Cassation, 26 May 2011, 2nd Civil Chamber, 10­20048. 158
Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale (INSERM)  
v. Fondation Letten F. Saugstad,  
Paris Court of Cassation, 26 January 2011, 1st Civil Chamber, 09­10198. 154
Paris Court of Cassation, 6 October 2010, 1st Civil Chamber, 08­20563. 163
Etat d’Israël v. Société NIOC,  
Paris Court of Cassation, 1 February 2005, 1st Civil Chamber,  
Rev. Arb. 693 (2005). 116
Paris Court of Cassation, 30 March 2004, 1st Civil Chamber, 02­12259.  
115, 154
326 Table of Cases 
Paris Court of Cassation, 13 June 2002, 2nd Civil Chamber, 00­20077. 153
Paris Court of Cassation, 11 October 1995, 2nd Civil Chamber, 92­20496. 158
Paris Court of Cassation, 11 April 1995, Comm. Chamber, 92­20985. 158
Paris Court of Cassation, 18 February 1986, 2nd Civil Chamber, 84­10620. 161
Court of First Instance
Société Pangee v. Société Fancefert,  
Paris High Court, 13 July 1999, Rev. Arb. 625 (1995). 154
Germany
OLG Köln, 6 July 2012, 19 Sch 8/11. 277
OLG Frankfurt am Main, 17 February 2011, 26 Sch 13/10  
(search for ‘26 Sch 13/10’). 147, 148
OLG Brandenburg, 16 February 2011, 13 U 11/10. 140
OLG Düsseldorf, 7 February 2008, I­20 W 152/07, 8 IPrax 424 (2010). 140
OLG Karlsruhe, 14 September 2007, 10 Sch 01/07. 270
OLG München, 15 March 2006, 34 Sch06/05. 277
Hong Kong
Vibroflotation A.G. v. Express Builders Co. Ltd., High Court of Hong Kong, 
15 August 1994, in: UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/5. 94
Singapore
Dongwoo Mann + Hummel Co. Ltd. v. Mann + Hummel GmbH  
[2008] 3 SLR 871, SGHC 67. 62
Switzerland
Swiss Federal Tribunal (published decisions)
DFT 144 III 120. 274
DFT 143 IV 380. 271
DFT 143 III 578. 266
DFT 143 III 297. 272
DFT 143 III 193. 105
DFT 142 III 521. 257, 267
DFT 142 III 360. 64, 106, 113, 267, 268, 271, 272, 273
DFT 142 II 324. 259
DFT 142 III 284. 271
DFT 142 III 230. 258, 264
DFT 141 III 444. 258, 261 
DFT 141 III 433. 240
327 Table of Cases
DFT 141 III 395. 260
DFT 141 III 229. 274, 275
DFT 141 I 172. 105
DFT 140 III 278. 275
DFT 140 III 264. 64, 248
DFT 138 III 322. 274
DFT 138 III 270. 258
DFT 138 III 76. 230
DFT 136 III 605. 266
DFT 136 III 345. 275
DFT 135 III 334. 266
DFT 134 III 186. 108
DFT 134 I 140. 234, 273
DFT 133 III 629. 260
DFT 133 III 295. 272
DFT 133 III 235. 107, 108, 236, 272
DFT 133 III 139. 107, 269
DFT 132 III 389. 274
DFT 132 III 291. 10, 11, 243, 244, 245
DFT 131 I 153. 234, 273
DFT 130 III 35. 107
DFT 130 III 235. 106
DFT 130 II 425. 273
DFT 129 III 445. 275
DFT 129 II 183. 261
DFT 128 III 330. 258
DFT 128 III 234. 106
DFT 128 III 191. 275
DFT 127 III 576. 106, 107, 273, 274
DFT 126 III 249. 275
DFT 124 I 241. 235
DFT 121 III 331. 107, 273, 274
DFT 121 I 81. 258
DFT 119 II 386. 106, 266, 273
DFT 118 Ia 20. 254, 258
DFT 117 II 346. 21, 32, 106, 239, 271
DFT 117 Ia 166. 113
DFT 116 II 639. 273
DFT 116 II 373. 108
DFT 115 II 294. 258
328 Table of Cases 
DFT 114 II 289. 272
DFT 112 Ia 166. 113
Swiss Federal Tribunal (unpublished decisions)
DFT 4A_424/2018 of 29 January 2019. 271
DFT 4A_438/2018 of 17 January 2019. 266, 275
DFT 4A_308/2018 of 23 November 2018. 275
DFT 4A_508/2017 of 29 January 2018. 274
DFT 4A_427/2017 of 22 January 2018. 64, 272, 273
DFT 4A_315/2017 of 17 January 2018. 10, 245
DFT 4A_450/2017 of 12 March 2018. 269
DFT 4A_592/2017 of 5 December 2017. 272
DFT 4A_312/2017 of 27 November 2017. 274
DFT 4A_236/2017 of 24 November 2017. 268, 269, 275
DFT 4A_277/2017 of 28 August 2017. 64, 273
DFT 4A_532/2016 of 30 May 2017. 271, 274
DFT 4A_405/2016 of 2 March 2017. 269
DFT 4A_32/2016 of 20 December 2016. 274
DFT 4A_342/2015 of 26 April 2016. 106, 107, 273
DFT 4A_520/2015 of 16 December 2015. 267
DFT 4A_392/2015 of 10 December 2015. 275
DFT 4A_172/2015 of 29 September 2015. 106
DFT 4A_246/2014 of 15 July 2015. 107, 113, 273
DFT 4A_544/2014 of 24 February 2015. 107, 273
DFT 4A_606/2013 of 2 September 2014. 107
DFT 4A_178/2014 of 11 June 2014. 267, 273
DFT 4A_304/2013 of 3 March 2014. 274
DFT 4A_256/2013 of 19 November 2013. 221
DFT 4A_214/2013 of 5 August 2013. 266
DFT 4A_672/2012 of 23 April 2013. 268, 269
DFT 4A_576/2012 of 28 February 2013. 257, 267
DFT 4A_407/2012 of 20 February 2013. 269
DFT 4A_335/2012 of 30 January 2013. 234
DFT 4A_538/2012 of 17 January 2013. 266
DFT 4A_214/2012 of 10 January 2013. 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263
DFT 4A_198/2012 of 14 December 2012. 113, 267
DFT 4A_110/2012 of 9 October 2012. 257, 267
DFT 4A_682/2011 of 31 May 2012. 274
DFT 4A_360/2011 of 31 January 2012. 107, 269
DFT 4A_528/2011 of 23 January 2012. 235
329 Table of Cases
DFT 4A_238/2011 of 4 January 2012. 113, 238
DFT 4A_424/2011 of 2 November 2011. 268
DFT 4A_64/2011 of 1 September 2011. 261
DFT 4A_46/2011 of 16 May 2011. 107
DFT 4A_404/2010 of 19 April 2011. 113
DFT 4A_402/2010 of 17 February 2011. 106
DFT 4A_386/2010 of 3 January 2011. 107, 273, 275
DFT 4A_279/2010 of 25 October 2010. 115
DFT 2C_8/2010 of 4 October 2010. 15, 43
DFT 4A_124/2010 of 4 October 2010. 277
DFT 4A_43/2010 of 29 July 2010. 113
DFT 4A_320/2009 of 2 June 2010. 113, 274
DFT 4A_612/2009 of 10 February 2010. 113
DFT 5A_171/2009 of 15 October 2009. 261
DFT 4A_215/2008 of 23 September 2008. 258
DFT 4A_539/2008 of 19 February 2008. 269
DFT 4A_450/2007 of 9 January. 2008. 63
DFT 4A_399/2007 of 4 December 2007. 245, 246
DFT 4C_379/2006 of 22 May 2007. 226
DFT 2A.599/2006 of 5 April 2007. 248
DFT 4A_2/2007 of 28 March 2007. 56, 63
DFT 4P.335/2006 of 27 February 2007. 265
DFT 4A_370/2007 of 21 February 2007. 113
DFT 4P.105/2006 of 4 August 2006. 113
DFT 5P.362/2005 of 19 May 2006. 258
DFT 4P.23/2006 of 27 March 2006. 239, 271, 273
DFT 4P.208/2004 of 14 December 2004. 268
DFT 4P.115/2003 of 16 October 2003. 222
DFT 4P.143/2001 of 18 September 2001. 275
DFT 4P.22/1996 of 25 July 1997. 63
DFT 5C.215/1994 of 21 March 1995. 115
DFT 4P.217/1992 of 15 March 1993, 11 ASA Bull. 408 (1993). 234, 256, 264, 272
Cantonal Supreme Courts 
Cantonal Supreme Court of Zurich,  
RU160027­O/U of 6 December 2016. 245
Cantonal Supreme Court of Zurich,  
LB120081 of 31 October 2012, 112 ZR 149 (2013). 232
Cantonal Supreme Court of Zurich,  
decree of 23 October 2001, 101 ZR 257 (2002). 245
330 Table of Cases 
Cantonal Commercial Court
Cantonal Commercial Court of Zurich,  
HE180200­O of 9 August 2018, 117 ZR 230 (2018). 232
District Court 
District Court of Zurich,  
FR160295­L/U of 27. May 2016, cited in BSK-Habegger,  
Art. 375 PILA CH n. 76a. 242, 243, 255, 262
USA
Supreme Court 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,  
556 U.S. 662 (2009). 10
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,  
550 U.S. 544 (2007). 10
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,  
542 U.S. 241 (2004). 186, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 202, 203, 
204, 205, 208, 210
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court,  
482 U.S. 522 (1987). 121, 208
Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler­Plymouth,  
473 U.S. 614 (1985). 194
Scherk v. Alberto­Culver Co.,  
417 U.S. 506 (1974). 194
Courts of Appeals (Cir. Courts)
Abdul Latif Jameel Trans. Co. v. Fede Corp.,  
No. 19­5315 (6th Cir. 2019). 201
Consorcio Ecuatoriano v. JAS Forwarding (USA),  
747 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). 198, 200
Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust,  
729 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2013). 213
Brandi­Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG,  
673 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012). 210
Consorcio Ecuatoriano v. JAS Forwarding (USA),  
685 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2012). 200
St. Hugh Williams v. NCL (Bahamas) LTD.,  
686 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2012). 115
Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica del Rio Lempa v. Nejapa Power  
Company LLC, 341 F. App’x 821 (3d Cir. 2009). 199
331 Table of Cases
El Paso Corp. v. La Comission Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica,  
341 F. App’x. 31 (5th Cir. 2009). 198
Bautisa v. Star Cruises,  
396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). 115
In re Edelmann,  
295 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2002). 209
Deiulemar Compagna v. M/V Allegra,  
198 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999). 185
National Broadcasting Company Inc NBC v. Bear Stearns Co Inc SBC TV,  
(2d Cir.1999), Y.B. Comm. Arb. 884 (1999); see also 165 F.3d 184.  
184, 187, 189, 193, 195, 214
Bayer,  
146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998). 208
Metallgesellschaft AG v. Hodapp,  
121 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1997). 210
Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc.,  
51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995). 210, 211
Malev Hungarian Airlines,  
964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992). 211, 252, 253
In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United 
Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 205
Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and  
Tobaga petition Jospeh Azar,  
848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988). 187
Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e  
Riassicurazioni v. Achille Lauro,  
712 F.3d 50 (3d Cir. 1983). 115
Burton v. Bush,  
614 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1980). 185
Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 
385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967). 188
District Courts 
In re Children’s Inv. Fund Found. (UK), Sir Christopher Hohn,  
& Axon Partners, LP,  
No. 18­MC­104 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 198
In re Servotronics, Inc.,  
No. 2:18­mc­00364­DCN (D.S.C. 2018). 201
Stati v. Republic of Kazakhstan,  
302 F. Supp. 3d 187 (D.C.C. 2018). 277
332 Table of Cases 
N.V. v. Benxi Iron & Steel Am., Ltd.,  
No. 17­cv­01287 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 198, 202
In re Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,  
Case 1:15­MC­00018 (D. n. Mar. I. 2016). 197, 201
Kleimar N.V.,  
220 F. Supp. 3d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 198, 200, 209
Qualcomm Inc.,  
162 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 209
TJAC Waterloo, LLC,  
No. 3:16­mc­9CAN (N.D. Ind. 2016). 202
Grupo Unidos Por El Canal S.A.,  
No. 14­mc­80277­JST (N.D. Cal. 2015). 201
Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A.,  
No. 14­mc­00226­MSK-KMT (D.C. Colo. 2015). 201, 211
In re Petition for Asia Mar. Pac. Ltd.,  
253 F. Supp. 3d 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 210
In re Owl Shipping, LLC,  
No. 14­5655 (D.N.J. 2014). 198, 200
In re Dubey,  
949 F.Supp. 2d 990 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 201
Finserve Group Ltd.,  
No. 4:11­mc­2044­RBH, 4 (D.S.C. 2011). 201
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.,  
297 F.R.D. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 210
Caratube Intl. Oil Company, Llp.,  
730 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.C.C. 2010). 196, 206
Chevron Corp. v. Jonathan S. Shefftz,  
754 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 2010). 197
In re Veiga,  
746 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2010). 210
Winning (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd.,  
No. 09­22659 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 198, 200
In re Arbitration between Norfolk Southern Corporation et al.,  
626 F. Supp. 2d 882 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 197, 201
Operadora DB Mexico, S.A. DE C.V.,  
Case No. 6:09­cv­Orl­22G JK., 23 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 199, 200
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co.,  
657 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.N.J. 2009). 208
Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp.,  
2009 WL 2877156 (D. Conn. 2009). 197
333 Table of Cases
Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica del Rio Lempa v. Nejapa Power  
Company, LLC,  
WL 4809035 (D. Del. 2008). 198, 199
In re Babcock Borsig AG,  
583 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Mass. 2008). 200, 204, 211
La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica v. El Paso,  
617 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 195, 198, 199
Hallmark Capital Corporation,  
534 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Minn. 2007). 194, 200, 204
In re Godfrey,  
526 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 209
Oxus Gold PLC,  
MISC 06­82 (D.N.J. 2007). 197
In re Order for Labor Court of Brazil,  
466 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 207
In re Roz Trading Ltd.,  
469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 199, 204, 211
In re Application of the Petition of Compania Chilena de Navegacion,  
2004 WL 1084243 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 185
In re Ishiara Chemical Co., Ltd.,  
121 F. Supp. 2d 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 207
In re Application of National Broadcasting Co.,  
1998 WL 1994 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 189
Application of Medway Power Ltd.,  
985 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 187, 188
In re Trygg­Hansa Ins. Co., Ltd.,  
896 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1995). 188
Application of Technostroyexport,  
853 F. Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 188, 189, 194, 204
In Re Deiulemar di Navigazione S.P.A.,  
153 F.R.D. 592 (E.D. La. 1994). 185
334 Table of Cases 
Table of Legislation 
I. Conventions
ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda­
mental Freedoms (1950), as amended in 2013.
ECICA European Convention on International Commercial Arbit­
ration (1961).
European Convention on Information on Foreign Law — European Conven­
tion on Information on Foreign Law (1968).
HEC Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Ab­
road in Civil or Commercial Matters (1970).
HCP Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil procedure (1954).
ICSID Convention — Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States (1966), 
as amended on 10 April 2006.
NYC United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce­
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). 
Panama Convention — Inter­American Convention on International commer­
cial arbitration (1975).
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between USA and Germany — 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between 
USA and Germany (1956).
II. European Law
EER Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on co­
operation between the courts of the Member States in the 
taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (2001).
Paris Agreement — Agreement relating to Application of the European Con­
vention on International Commercial Arbitration (1962). 
III. Countries
Austria 
CCP AU Code of Civil Procedure (1895), as amended in 2018. 
Belgium 
JC BE Belgian Judicial Code (2013), as amended in 2019.
335 Table of Legislation 
Colombia 
Const. CO Constitution of Colombia (1991), as amended in 2015.
Costa Rica 
Const. CR Constitution of Costa Rica (1949), as amended in 2015.
El Salvador 
Const. SV Constitution of El Salvador (1983), as amended in 2014.
England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
Civil Evidence Act 1995 — Civil Evidence Act (1995),  
as amended of 5 October 2015.
CPR 1998 The Civil Procedure Rules (1998),  
as amended in 2019.
CPR 1998 Practice Directions — Practice Direction to the Civil Procedure  
Rules (1998).
EAA 1996 English Arbitration Act (1996),  
as amended of 20 February 2020.
EAA 1950 English Arbitration Act (1950).
High Court and County Courts Order 1996 — The High Court and County 
Courts (Allocation of Arbitration Proceedings) Order (1996).
France 
CCP FR Code of Civil Procedure (1973),  
as amended on 1 January 2019.
Const. FR (1791) Constitution of France (1791).
Germany 
CCA DE Courts Constitutions Act Germany (1975),  
as amended on 12 December 2019.
CCP DE Code of Civil Procedure (1950),  
as amended on 12 December 219.
Netherlands 
CCP NL Code of Civil Procedure of the Netherlands (1986),  
as amended on 1 January 2019.
Panama 
Const. PA Constitution of Panama (1972), as amended in 2004.
Paraguay 
Const. PY  Constitution of Paraguay (1992), as amended in 2011.
336 Table of Legislation 
Peru 
Const. PE Constitution of Peru (1993), as amended in 2009.
Singapore 
IAA SG International Arbitration Act (1994),  
as amended on 21 November 2019.
Sweden 
SAA SE Swedish Arbitration Act (1999),  
as amended on 1 March 2019.
Switzerland 
CCP CH Swiss Civil Procedure Code (2008),  
as amended on 1 January 2020, SR 272.
Const. CH Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (1999),  
as amended on 1 January 2020, SR 101.
Federal Supreme Court Regulations — Federal Supreme Court Regulations 
(2006), SR. 173.110.131, as amended on 1 February 2018.
FSCA CH Federal Supreme Court Act (2005),  
as amended on 1 January 2019, SR 173.110.
Intercantonal Arbitration Convention CH Intercantonal Arbitration  
Convention (1969), SR 220.300.
PILA CH Federal Act on Private International Law (1987),  
as amended on 1 January 2020, SR 291.
SCC CH Swiss Criminal Code (1937),  
as amended on 3 March 2020, SR 311.0.
Cantonal Legislation  
Court and Authorities Organisation Act ZH — Court and Authorities Organi­
sation Act in Civil and Criminal Procedure of the Canton of 
Zurich (2010), as amended on 26 February 2019.
Court Organisation Act BS — Court Organisation Act of the Canton of Basle 
City (2015), as amended on 23 December 2019.
Introductory Act BE — Introductory Act to Civil Procedure Code, Swiss  
Criminal Procedure Code and Swiss Juvenile Criminal Pro­
cedure Law of the Canton of Berne (2009),  
as amended on 1 June 2013.
Judiciary Organisation Act GE — Judiciary Organisation Act of the Canton of 
Geneva (2011), as amended on 14 May 2019.
United States of America 
FAA USA Federal Arbitration Act (1925), Title 9 USC,  
as amended in 2018.
337 Table of Legislation 
FRAP USA Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (1967),  
as amended on 1 December 2019.
FRCP USA Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938),  
as amended on 1 December 2018.
USC The Code of Laws of the United States of America (1994),  
as amended in 2018.
Uruguay 
Const. UY Constitution of Uruguay (1985), as amended in 2004.
Venezuela 
Const. VE Const. of Venezuela (1999), as amended in 2009.
338 Table of Legislation 
Legislative Materials 
I. Bibliography of United Nations Documents
UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/669 (2009) 
UNCITRAL, General Assembly, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration 
and Conciliation) on the work of its fiftieth session, A/CN.9/669,  
9 March 2009.
UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108 (2000) 
UNCITRAL, General Assembly, 32nd session, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108, 14 January 2000.
UNCITRAL, A/40/17 (1985) 
UNCITRAL, General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Commis­
sion on International Trade Law on the work of its eighteenth session, 
3–21 June 1985, A/40/17.
UNCITRAL, Summary Records of the 325th meeting (1985) 
UNCITRAL, Summary Records of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law for meetings devoted for the preparation of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
309th Meeting, Article 25; Article 26, Article 27, 17 June 1985.
UNCITRAL, Summary Records of the 309th meeting (1985) 
UNCITRAL, Summary Records of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law for meetings devoted for the preparation of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
309th Meeting, Article 5; Article 6, 5 June 1985.
UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/264 (1985) 
UNCITRAL, 18th session, 25 March 1985, A/CN.9/264, Analytical Com­
mentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration.
UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/263 (1985) 
UNCITRAL, 18th session, Vienna, 19 March 1985, A/CN.9/263, Analytical 
compilation of comments by Governments and international organi­
zations on the draft text of a model law on international commercial 
arbitration: Report of the Secretary­General.
UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/246 (1984) 
UNCITRAL, General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on  
International Contract Practices on the Work of its seventh session,  
6 March 1984, A/CN.9/246.
339 Legislative Materials 
UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/245 (1983) 
UNCITRAL, General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on Inter­
national Contract Practices on the Work of its sixth session,  
22 September 1983, A/CN.9/245.
UNCITRAL, A./CN.9/WG.II/WP.44 (1983) 
UNCITRAL, Working Group, 6th session, 29 August–9 September 1983.
II. Bibliography of the Hague Convention on International  
Private Law
HEC Questionnaire (2014) 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Synopsis of Responses 
to the Questionnaire of November 2013 Relating the Hague Convention 
of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer­
cial Matters (Evidence Convention), Revised Version (2014).
HEC Questionnaire (2009) 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Synopsis of Responses 
to the Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating the Hague Convention of  
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters (Evidence Convention).
HEC Questionnaire (2004) 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Synopsis of the 
Replies to the Questionnaire Relating to the Hague Convention of  
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters (Prel. Doc. No 4).
HEC Recommendations (2003) 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and  
Recommendations Adopted by the Special Commission on the Practical 
Operation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence and Service Conventions 
(2003).
HEC Special Commission (1985) 
Hague Conference on Private International Law: Report of the Special 
Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention on the  
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (1985),  
24 Internatio nal Legal Materials 1668 (1985). 
340 Legislative Materials 
III. European Law
ECtHR Annual Report (2018) 
ECtHR Annual Report (2018).
EER Impact Assessment (2018) 
European Commission, Impact Assessment, Proposal for Regulation 
of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council  
Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between 
the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or 
commercial matters.
EU Study (2014)  
Legal Instruments and Practice of Arbitration in the EU, Directorate­ 
General for Internal Policies (2014).
EER Study (2007) 
European Commission, Study on the Application of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1206/2001, on Cooperation Between the Courts o the Member 
States in The Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matter (2007).
EER Report (2007) 
Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee on the application 
of the Council Regulation (EC) 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation 
between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in 
civil or commercial matters (2007). 
IV. Countries
England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
EAA Supplementary Report (1997) 
1997 Supplementary Report on the Arbitration Act 1996, Departemental 
Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, January 1997.
EAA Report (1996) 
1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, Departmental Advisory Committee 
on Arbitration Law, February 1996.
France 
Rapport to the Premier Minister (2011) 
Rapport au Premier Ministre relatif au décret 2011­48 du 13 Janvier 2011 
portant réforme de l’arbitrage, in: L’arbitrage: principes et pratiques 
32, Les cahiers du Conseil National des Barreaux (Conseil National des 
Barreaux 2011). 
341 Legislative Materials 
Germany 
Parliamentary Documentation 13/5274 (1996) 
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/5274 (1996).
Switzerland 
FCDisp PILA CH Revision (2018) 
Federal Council Dispatch About the Amendments of the PILA CH,  
12th ch.: International Arbitration,  
24 October 2018, Federal Law Gazette 2018, 7163 et seqq.
Rep. Consultation Procedure PILA CH (2018) 
Revision of the PILA CH (International Arbtiration), Report of the  
Result of the Consultation Procedure, 8 August 2018.
Int. Arbitration in CH Study (2017) Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in 
der Schweiz: Eine Markt­ und Regulierungskostenanalyse: Schluss­
bericht, School of Management and Law (2017).
Expl. Rep. Revision PILA CH (2017) 
Explanatory Report of the Revision of the PILA CH (International  
Arbitration), 11 January 2017.
Opinions Revision PILA CH (2017) Opinions of several Swiss organizations 
about the Revision of the PILA CH (2017).
Guideline Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters CH (2013) 
Federal Office of Justice, International Judicial Assistance in Civil  
Matters: Guidelines, 3rd ed., January 2013.
FCDisp CCP CH (2006) 
Federal Council Dispatch about the Federal Code of Civil Procedure,  
28 June 2006, Federal Law Gazette 2006, 7221 et seqq.
FCDisp HEC CH (1993) 
Federal Council Dispatch about the Approval of Four Conventions in 
the Field of International Judicial Assistance in Civil­ and Commercial 
Matters, 8 September 1993, Federal Law Gazette 1993 III, 1261 et seqq.
United States of America 
Advisory Committee FRCP USA (1970) 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1970 Amendment.
Sen. Rep. 1580, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1964) 
Senate Report No. 1580, 88th Congress, 2nd Session (1964).
H.R. Rep. 1052, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963) 
House of Representatives Report No. 1052, 88th Congress, 1st Session. 
(1963).
342 Legislative Materials 

About the author
Lorenz Raess studied at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and at the 
University of Bordeaux, France. After completing his internships at the re­
gional court of Bernese Jura­Seeland in Biel, Switzerland, a law firm in Berne 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers Ltd, he was admitted to the bar of the Canton 
of Berne in February 2017. He then worked at the chair for procedure (Civil 
Procedure Code/Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law) and international 
private law of Professor Ramon Mabillard, and at the chair for infrastructure 
law and new technologies of Professor Martin Beyeler, at the University of 
Fribourg.
In April 2020, the Faculty of Law of the University of Fribourg accepted 
his dissertation with the grade summa cum laude. Today, he works at Ever­
sheds Sutherland Ltd in Berne.
sui generis is an association dedicated to the promotion of free access to legal 
literature, court decisions, decisions of authorities and legislative materials. 
Since 2014, a legal open access journal has been published under the label sui 
generis. In 2019, the sui generis publishing house was founded.
sui generis book series
edited by Daniel Hürlimann and Marc Thommen
In this series, legal dissertations and postdoctoral theses, as well as text­
books and specialized publications, are made available to a wide audience. 
The books in this series are published in printed and online versions. The 
digital version is freely accessible worldwide (open access). The copyright 
remains with the authors; the works are published under a Creative Com­
mons licence.
Published so far in the sui generis series:
001 — Monika Simmler: Normstabilisierung und Schuldvorwurf
002 — Marc Thommen: Introduction to Swiss Law
003 — Silvio Hänsenberger: Die zivilrechtliche Haftung für autonome 
Drohnen unter Einbezug von Zulassungs- und Betriebsvorschriften
004 — Mais A.M. Qandeel:  
Enforcing Human Rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territory
005 — Moritz Oehen:  
Der Strafkläger im Strafbefehls- und im abgekürzten Verfahren
006 — Jens Lehne: Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appointments to 
the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified?
007 — Lorenz Garland: Waffengleichheit im Vorverfahren
008 — Christoph Urwyler:  
Die Praxis der bedingten Entlassung aus dem Strafvollzug
009 — Dominik Elser: Die privatisierte Erfüllung staatlicher Aufgaben
010 — David Henseler:  
Datenschutz bei drohnengestützter Datenbearbeitung durch Private
011— Lorenz Raess:  
Court Assistance in the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration
Published in the sui generis series,  
edited by Daniel Hürlimann and Marc Thommen.
1st edition, 30 September 2020
© 2020 Lorenz Raess
This work has been published under a Creative Commons license  
which requires only the attribution of the author when being reused  
(CC BY 4.0 — https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0).








COURT ASSISTANCE  
IN THE TAKING  




Although international arbitration is widely hailed as an efficient, confi-
dential and flexible way of settling commercial disputes, it has its limits. 
The arbitral tribunal’s lack of coercive power is thrown into particularly 
stark relief when it comes to the taking of evidence from third parties 
outside the arbitral proceedings. If they do not comply voluntarily with 
the request of the arbitral tribunal to testify as a witness or disclose docu-
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